draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-04.txt | draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-05.txt | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Network Working Group L. Velvindron | Network Working Group L. Velvindron | |||
Internet-Draft cyberstorm.mu | Internet-Draft cyberstorm.mu | |||
Updates: 8314 (if approved) S. Farrell | Updates: 8314 (if approved) S. Farrell | |||
Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin | Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin | |||
Expires: July 26, 2020 January 23, 2020 | Expires: September 25, 2020 March 24, 2020 | |||
Deprecation of use of TLS 1.1 for Email Submission and Access | Deprecation of use of TLS 1.1 for Email Submission and Access | |||
draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-04 | draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-05 | |||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
This specification updates current recommendation for the use of | This specification updates current recommendation for the use of | |||
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide confidentiality of | Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide confidentiality of | |||
email between a Mail User Agent (MUA) and a Mail Submission Server or | email between a Mail User Agent (MUA) and a Mail Submission Server or | |||
Mail Access Server. This document updates RFC8314. | Mail Access Server. This document updates RFC8314. | |||
Status of This Memo | Status of This Memo | |||
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶ | |||
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2020. | This Internet-Draft will expire on September 25, 2020. | |||
Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
skipping to change at page 2, line 13 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 13 ¶ | |||
described in the Simplified BSD License. | described in the Simplified BSD License. | |||
Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |||
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
3. Updates to RFC8314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | 3. Updates to RFC8314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 | |||
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | |||
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
7.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 | 7.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
7.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | 7.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 | |||
1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
[RFC8314] defines the minimum recommended version for TLS as version | [RFC8314] defines the minimum recommended version for TLS as version | |||
1.1. Due to the deprecation of TLS 1.1 in | 1.1. Due to the deprecation of TLS 1.1 in | |||
[I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate], this recommendation is no | [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate], this recommendation is no | |||
longer valid. Therefore this document updates [RFC8314] so that the | longer valid. Therefore this document updates [RFC8314] so that the | |||
minimum version for TLS is TLS 1.2. | minimum version for TLS is TLS 1.2. | |||
skipping to change at page 2, line 46 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 46 ¶ | |||
OLD: | OLD: | |||
"4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less | "4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less | |||
Than 1.1" | Than 1.1" | |||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
"4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less | "4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less | |||
Than 1.2" | Than 1.2" | |||
OLD | OLD: | |||
"As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | "As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | |||
Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their users to | Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their users to | |||
TLS 1.1 or later and discontinue support for those earlier versions | TLS 1.1 or later and discontinue support for those earlier versions | |||
of SSL and TLS." | of SSL and TLS." | |||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
"As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | "As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | |||
Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 SHOULD transition their | Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 SHOULD transition their | |||
users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those earlier | users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those earlier | |||
versions of SSL and TLS." | versions of SSL and TLS." | |||
In Section 4.1, the text should be revised from: | ||||
OLD: | OLD: | |||
In Section 4.1, the text should be revised from: "It is RECOMMENDED | One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any | |||
that new users be required to use TLS version 1.1 or greater from the | client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any | |||
start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to make exceptions to | version of SSL or TLS 1.0. | |||
accommodate some legacy systems that support only earlier versions of | ||||
TLS or only cleartext." | NEW: | |||
One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any | ||||
client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any | ||||
version of SSL or TLS earlier than TLS1.2. | ||||
OLD: | ||||
"It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.1 | ||||
or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to | ||||
make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems that support only | ||||
earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext." | ||||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
"It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.2 | "It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.2 | |||
or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to | or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to | |||
make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems that support only | make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems that support only | |||
earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext." | earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext." | |||
OLD: | OLD: | |||
" If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOT | " If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOT | |||
indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least | indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least | |||
use TLS 1.1 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum | use TLS 1.1 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum | |||
confidentiality requirements associated with that account. " | confidentiality requirements associated with that account. " | |||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
" If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOT | " If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOT | |||
indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least | indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least | |||
use TLS 1.2 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum | use TLS 1.2 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum | |||
confidentiality requirements associated with that account. " | confidentiality requirements associated with that account. " | |||
OLD | OLD | |||
" MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later. Earlier TLS and | " MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later. Earlier TLS and | |||
SSL versions MAY also be supported, so long as the MUA requires at | SSL versions MAY also be supported, so long as the MUA requires at | |||
least TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] when accessing accounts that are configured | least TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] when accessing accounts that are configured | |||
to impose minimum confidentiality requirements. " | to impose minimum confidentiality requirements. " | |||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
" MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later e.g TLS 1.3 | " MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later e.g TLS 1.3 | |||
[RFC8446]. Earlier TLS and SSL versions MAY also be supported, so | [RFC8446]. Earlier TLS and SSL versions MAY also be supported, so | |||
long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] when accessing | long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] when accessing | |||
accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality | accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality | |||
requirements. " | requirements. " | |||
OLD: | OLD: | |||
" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new | " The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new | |||
accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's | accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's | |||
certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.1 or | certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.1 or | |||
greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these | greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these | |||
requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly | requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly | |||
discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. " | discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. " | |||
NEW: | NEW: | |||
" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new | " The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new | |||
accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's | accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's | |||
certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or | certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or | |||
greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these | greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these | |||
requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly | requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly | |||
discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. " | discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. " | |||
4. IANA Considerations | 4. IANA Considerations | |||
None of the proposed measures have an impact on IANA. | None of the proposed measures have an impact on IANA. | |||
5. Security Considerations | 5. Security Considerations | |||
The purpose of this document is to document updated recommendations | The purpose of this document is to document updated recommendations | |||
for using TLS with Email services. Those recommendations are based | for using TLS with Email services. Those recommendations are based | |||
on [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate]. | on [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate]. | |||
End of changes. 13 change blocks. | ||||
18 lines changed or deleted | 30 lines changed or added | |||
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