draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-02.txt		draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-03.txt
	Network Working Group L. Velvindron		Network Working Group L. Velvindron
	Internet-Draft cyberstorm.mu		Internet-Draft cyberstorm.mu
	Updates: 8314 (if approved) S. Farrell		Updates: 8314 (if approved) S. Farrell
	Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin		Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin
	Expires: March 14, 2020 September 11, 2019		Expires: April 24, 2020 October 22, 2019
	Use of TLS for Email Submission and Access		Use of TLS for Email Submission and Access
	draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-02		draft-ietf-uta-tls-for-email-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification updates current recommendation for the use of		This specification updates current recommendation for the use of
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide confidentiality of		Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide confidentiality of
	email between a Mail User Agent (MUA) and a Mail Submission Server or		email between a Mail User Agent (MUA) and a Mail Submission Server or
	Mail Access Server. This document updates RFC8314.		Mail Access Server. This document updates RFC8314.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 34 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 14, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 4, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 11 ¶
	" MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later e.g TLS 1.3		" MUAs MUST implement TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or later e.g TLS 1.3
	[RFC8446]. Earlier TLS and SSL versions MAY also be supported, so		[RFC8446]. Earlier TLS and SSL versions MAY also be supported, so
	long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] when accessing		long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] when accessing
	accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality		accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality
	requirements. "		requirements. "
	OLD:		OLD:
	" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new		" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new
	accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's		accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's
	certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or		certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.1 or
	greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these		greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these
	requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly		requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly
	discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. "		discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms. "
	NEW:		NEW:
	" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new		" The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new
	accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's		accounts MUST require successful validation of the server's
	certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or		certificate and SHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or
	greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these		greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these
	skipping to change at page 4, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 37 ¶
	None of the proposed measures have an impact on IANA.		None of the proposed measures have an impact on IANA.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	The purpose of this document is to document updated recommendations		The purpose of this document is to document updated recommendations
	for using TLS with Email services. Those recommendations are based		for using TLS with Email services. Those recommendations are based
	on [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate].		on [I-D.ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate].
	6. Acknowledgement		6. Acknowledgement
	The authors would like to thank Vittorio Bertola for his feedback.		The authors would like to thank Vittorio Bertola and Viktor Dukhovni
			for their feedback.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Informative References		7.1. Informative References
	[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
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