draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02.txt   draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03.txt 
uta Y. Sheffer uta Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Porticor Internet-Draft Porticor
Intended status: Informational R. Holz Intended status: Informational R. Holz
Expires: February 13, 2015 TUM Expires: March 13, 2015 TUM
P. Saint-Andre P. Saint-Andre
&yet &yet
August 12, 2014 September 9, 2014
Summarizing Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS Summarizing Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS
draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02 draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03
Abstract Abstract
Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on
TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of
operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of
motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage
of TLS and DTLS. of TLS and DTLS.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Attacks on TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Attacks on TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. SSL Stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. SSL Stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. BEAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. STARTTLS Command Injection Attack (CVE-2011-0411) . . . . . 3
2.3. Lucky Thirteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.3. BEAST (CVE-2011-3389) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.4. Attacks on RC4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.4. Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Compression Attacks: CRIME and BREACH . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.5. Attacks on RC4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.6. Certificate Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.6. Compression Attacks: CRIME, TIME and BREACH . . . . . . . . 4
2.7. Diffie-Hellman Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.7. Certificate Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.8. Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.8. Diffie-Hellman Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.9. Triple Hanshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.9. Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.10. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.10. Triple Handshake (CVE-2014-1295) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.11. Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.11. Virtual Host Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.12. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.13. Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Applicability to DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Applicability to DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Appendix: Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Appendix: Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.2. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.3. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.3. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.4. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Over the last few years there have been several major attacks on TLS Over the last few years there have been several major attacks on TLS
[RFC5246], including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and [RFC5246], including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and
modes of operation. Details are given in Section 2, but suffice it modes of operation. Details are given in Section 2, but suffice it
to say that both AES-CBC and RC4, which together make up for most to say that both AES-CBC and RC4, which together make up for most
current usage, have been seriously attacked in the context of TLS. current usage, have been seriously attacked in the context of TLS.
This situation motivated the creation of the UTA working group, which This situation motivated the creation of the UTA working group, which
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While there are widely deployed mitigations for some of the attacks While there are widely deployed mitigations for some of the attacks
listed below, we believe that their root causes necessitate a more listed below, we believe that their root causes necessitate a more
systemic solution. systemic solution.
2.1. SSL Stripping 2.1. SSL Stripping
Various attacks attempt to remove the use of SSL/TLS altogether, by Various attacks attempt to remove the use of SSL/TLS altogether, by
modifying unencrypted protocols that request the use of TLS, modifying unencrypted protocols that request the use of TLS,
specifically modifying HTTP traffic and HTML pages as they pass on specifically modifying HTTP traffic and HTML pages as they pass on
the wire. These attacks are known collectively as SSL Stripping, and the wire. These attacks are known collectively as SSL Stripping and
were first introduced by Moxie Marlinspike [SSL-Stripping]. In the were first introduced by Moxie Marlinspike [SSL-Stripping]. In the
context of Web traffic, these attacks are only effective if the context of Web traffic, these attacks are only effective if the
client accesses a Web server using a mixture of HTTP and HTTPS. client initially accesses a Web server using HTTP. A commonly used
mitigation is HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797].
2.2. BEAST 2.2. STARTTLS Command Injection Attack (CVE-2011-0411)
Similarly, there are attacks on the transition between unprotected
and TLS-protected traffic. A number of IETF application protocols
have used an application-level command, usually STARTTLS, to upgrade
a clear-text connection to use TLS. Multiple implementations of
STARTTLS had a flaw where an application-layer input buffer retained
commands that were pipelined with the STARTTLS command, such that
commands received prior to TLS negotiation are executed after TLS
negotiation. This problem is resolved by requiring the application-
level command input buffer to be empty before negotiating TLS. Note
that this flaw lives in the application layer code and does not
impact the TLS protocol directly.
2.3. BEAST (CVE-2011-3389)
The BEAST attack [BEAST] uses issues with the TLS 1.0 implementation The BEAST attack [BEAST] uses issues with the TLS 1.0 implementation
of CBC (that is, the predictable initialization vector) to decrypt of CBC (that is, the predictable initialization vector) to decrypt
parts of a packet, and specifically to decrypt HTTP cookies when HTTP parts of a packet, and specifically to decrypt HTTP cookies when HTTP
is run over TLS. is run over TLS.
2.3. Lucky Thirteen 2.4. Lucky Thirteen (CVE-2013-0169)
A consequence of the MAC-then-encrypt design in all current versions A consequence of the MAC-then-encrypt design in all current versions
of TLS is the existence of padding oracle attacks [Padding-Oracle]. of TLS is the existence of padding oracle attacks [Padding-Oracle].
A recent incarnation of these attacks is the Lucky Thirteen attack A recent incarnation of these attacks is the Lucky Thirteen attack
[CBC-Attack], a timing side-channel attack that allows the attacker [CBC-Attack], a timing side-channel attack that allows the attacker
to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext. to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext.
The Lucky Thirteen attack can be mitigated by using authenticated The Lucky Thirteen attack can be mitigated by using authenticated
encryption like AES-GCM [RFC5288] and encrypt-then-mac encryption like AES-GCM [RFC5288] or encrypt-then-mac
[I-D.ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac] instead of the TLS default of MAC- [I-D.ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac] instead of the TLS default of MAC-
then-encrypt. then-encrypt.
2.4. Attacks on RC4 2.5. Attacks on RC4
The RC4 algorithm [RC4] has been used with TLS (and previously, SSL) The RC4 algorithm [RC4] has been used with TLS (and previously, SSL)
for many years. RC4 has long been known to have a variety of for many years. RC4 has long been known to have a variety of
cryptographic weaknesses, e.g. [RC4-Attack-Pau], [RC4-Attack-Man], cryptographic weaknesses, e.g. [RC4-Attack-Pau], [RC4-Attack-Man],
[RC4-Attack-FMS]. Recent cryptanalysis results [RC4-Attack-AlF] [RC4-Attack-FMS]. Recent cryptanalysis results [RC4-Attack-AlF]
exploit biases in the RC4 keystream to recover repeatedly encrypted exploit biases in the RC4 keystream to recover repeatedly encrypted
plaintexts. plaintexts.
These recent results are on the verge of becoming practically These recent results are on the verge of becoming practically
exploitable; currently they require 2^26 sessions or 13x2^30 exploitable; currently they require 2^26 sessions or 13x2^30
encryptions. As a result, RC4 can no longer be seen as providing a encryptions. As a result, RC4 can no longer be seen as providing a
sufficient level of security for TLS sessions. For further details, sufficient level of security for TLS sessions. For further details,
the reader is refered to [I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4]. the reader is referred to [I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4].
2.5. Compression Attacks: CRIME and BREACH 2.6. Compression Attacks: CRIME, TIME and BREACH
The CRIME attack [CRIME] allows an active attacker to decrypt The CRIME attack [CRIME] (CVE-2012-4929) allows an active attacker to
ciphertext (specifically, cookies) when TLS is used with TLS level decrypt ciphertext (specifically, cookies) when TLS is used with TLS
compression. level compression.
The TIME attack [TIME] and the later BREACH attack [BREACH] both make The TIME attack [TIME] and the later BREACH attack [BREACH]
similar use of HTTP-level compression to decrypt secret data passed (CVE-2013-3587, though the number has not been officially allocated)
in the HTTP response. We note that compression of the HTTP message both make similar use of HTTP-level compression to decrypt secret
body is much more prevalent than compression at the TLS level. data passed in the HTTP response. We note that compression of the
HTTP message body is much more prevalent than compression at the TLS
level.
The former attack can be mitigated by disabling TLS compression. We The former attack can be mitigated by disabling TLS compression. We
are not aware of mitigations at the TLS protocol level to the latter are not aware of mitigations at the TLS protocol level to the latter
attack, and so application-level mitigations are needed (see attack, and so application-level mitigations are needed (see
[BREACH]). For example, implementations of HTTP that use CSRF tokens [BREACH]). For example, implementations of HTTP that use CSRF tokens
will need to randomize them even when the recommendations of will need to randomize them even when the recommendations of
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are adopted. [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are adopted.
2.6. Certificate Attacks 2.7. Certificate Attacks
There have been several practical attacks on TLS when used with RSA There have been several practical attacks on TLS when used with RSA
certificates (the most common use case). These include certificates (the most common use case). These include
[Bleichenbacher98] and [Klima03]. While the Bleichenbacher attack [Bleichenbacher98] and [Klima03]. While the Bleichenbacher attack
has been mitigated in TLS 1.0, the Klima attack that relies on a has been mitigated in TLS 1.0, the Klima attack that relies on a
version-check oracle is only mitigated by TLS 1.1. version-check oracle is only mitigated by TLS 1.1.
The use of RSA certificates often involves exploitable timing issues The use of RSA certificates often involves exploitable timing issues
[Brumley03], unless the implementation takes care to explicitly [Brumley03] (CVE-2003-0147), unless the implementation takes care to
eliminate them. explicitly eliminate them.
2.7. Diffie-Hellman Parameters A recent certificate fuzzing tool [Brubaker2014using] uncovered
numerous vulnerabilities in different TLS libraries, related to
certificate validation.
2.8. Diffie-Hellman Parameters
TLS allows to define ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve TLS allows to define ephemeral Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman parameters in its respective key exchange modes. This Diffie-Hellman parameters in its respective key exchange modes. This
results in an outstanding attack, detailed in [Cross-Protocol]. In results in an attack detailed in [Cross-Protocol]. In addition,
addition, clients that do not properly verify the received parameters clients that do not properly verify the received parameters are
are exposed to man in the middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately the exposed to man in the middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately the TLS
TLS protocol does not require this verification, see [RFC6989] for protocol does not require this verification, see [RFC6989] for the
the IPsec analogy. IPsec analogy.
2.8. Renegotiation 2.9. Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555)
A major attack on the TLS renegotiation mechanism applies to all A major attack on the TLS renegotiation mechanism applies to all
current versions of the protocol. The attack and the TLS extension current versions of the protocol. The attack and the TLS extension
that resolves it are described in [RFC5746]. that resolves it are described in [RFC5746].
2.9. Triple Hanshake 2.10. Triple Handshake (CVE-2014-1295)
The triple handshake attack [[TRIPLE-HS, add the reference when The triple handshake attack [[TRIPLE-HS, add the reference when
published]] enables the attacker to cause two TLS connections to published]] enables the attacker to cause two TLS connections to
share keying material. This leads to a multitude of attacks, e.g. share keying material. This leads to a multitude of attacks, e.g.
Man-in-the-Middle, breaking safe renegotiation and breaking channel Man-in-the-Middle, breaking safe renegotiation and breaking channel
binding via TLS Exporter [RFC5705] or "tls-unique" [RFC5929]. binding via TLS Exporter [RFC5705] or "tls-unique" [RFC5929].
2.10. Denial of Service 2.11. Virtual Host Confusion
A recent article [Delignat14] describes a security issue whereby
SSLv3 fallback and improper handling of session caches on the server
side can be abused by an attacker to establish a malicious connection
to a virtual host other than originally intended and approved by the
server. This attack is especially serious in performance critical
environments where sharing of SSLv3 session caches is very common.
2.12. Denial of Service
Server CPU power has progressed over the years so that TLS can now be Server CPU power has progressed over the years so that TLS can now be
turned on by default. However the risk of malicious clients and turned on by default. However the risk of malicious clients and
coordinated groups of clients ("botnets") mounting denial of service coordinated groups of clients ("botnets") mounting denial of service
attacks is still very real. TLS adds another vector for attacks is still very real. TLS adds another vector for
computational attacks, since a client can easily (with little computational attacks, since a client can easily (with little
computational effort) force the server to expend relatively large computational effort) force the server to expend relatively large
computational work. It is known that such attacks have in fact been computational work. It is known that such attacks have in fact been
mounted. mounted.
2.11. Implementation Issues 2.13. Implementation Issues
Even when the protocol is fully specified, the are very common issues Even when the protocol is fully specified, the are very common issues
that often plague implementations. In particular, the integration of that often plague implementations. In particular, the integration of
higher-level protocols, TLS and its PKI-based authentication is the higher-level protocols, TLS and its PKI-based authentication is the
source of misunderstandings and implementation "shortcuts". An source of misunderstandings and implementation "shortcuts". An
extensive survey of these issues can be found in [Georgiev2012]. extensive survey of these issues can be found in [Georgiev2012].
o Implementations may omit validation of the server certificate o Implementations may omit validation of the server certificate
altogether. For example, this is true of the default altogether. For example, this is true of the default
implementation of HTTP client libraries in Python 2. implementation of HTTP client libraries in Python 2 (see e.g.
CVE-2013-2191).
o Implementations may not validate the server identity. This o Implementations may not validate the server identity. This
validation typically amounts to matching the protocol-level server validation typically amounts to matching the protocol-level server
name with the certificate's Subject Alternative Name field. name with the certificate's Subject Alternative Name field. Note:
historically, although incorrect, this information is also often
found in the Common Name part of the Distinguished Name instead.
o Implementations may be validating the certificate chain o Implementations may be validating the certificate chain
incorrectly or not at all, or using an incorrect or outdated trust incorrectly or not at all, or using an incorrect or outdated trust
anchor list. anchor list.
3. Applicability to DTLS 3. Applicability to DTLS
DTLS [RFC4347] [RFC6347] is an adaptation of TLS for UDP datagrams. DTLS [RFC4347] [RFC6347] is an adaptation of TLS for UDP datagrams.
With respect to the attacks described in the current document, DTLS With respect to the attacks described in the current document, DTLS
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This document requires no IANA actions. [Note to RFC Editor: please This document requires no IANA actions. [Note to RFC Editor: please
remove this whole section before publication.] remove this whole section before publication.]
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Simon Josefsson, John We would like to thank Stephen Farrell, Simon Josefsson, John
Mattsson, Yoav Nir, Kenny Paterson, Patrick Pelletier, Tom Ritter and Mattsson, Yoav Nir, Kenny Paterson, Patrick Pelletier, Tom Ritter and
Rich Salz for their review of this document. We thank Andrei Popov Rich Salz for their review of this document. We thank Andrei Popov
for contributing text on RC4, Kohei Kasamatsu for text on Lucky13, for contributing text on RC4, Kohei Kasamatsu for text on Lucky13,
Ilari Liusvaara for text on attacks and on DTLS. Ilari Liusvaara for text on attacks and on DTLS, Aaron Zauner for
text on virtual host confusion, Chris Newman for text on STARTTLS
command injection.
The document was prepared using the lyx2rfc tool, created by Nico The document was prepared using the lyx2rfc tool, created by Nico
Williams. Williams.
7. Informative References 7. Informative References
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
skipping to change at page 7, line 11 skipping to change at page 7, line 48
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov, [RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010. Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings [RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010. for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012. Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797, November 2012.
[RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman [RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 6989, July 2013. (IKEv2)", RFC 6989, July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft- "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-01 (work in progress), June 2014. ietf-uta-tls-bcp-01 (work in progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4] [I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4]
skipping to change at page 9, line 17 skipping to change at page 10, line 12
protocols based on the RSA encryption standard pkcs1", protocols based on the RSA encryption standard pkcs1",
1998. 1998.
[Klima03] Klima, V., Pokorny, O., and T. Rosa, "Attacking RSA-based [Klima03] Klima, V., Pokorny, O., and T. Rosa, "Attacking RSA-based
sessions in SSL/TLS", 2003. sessions in SSL/TLS", 2003.
[Brumley03] [Brumley03]
Brumley, D. and D. Boneh, "Remote timing attacks are Brumley, D. and D. Boneh, "Remote timing attacks are
practical", 2003. practical", 2003.
[Brubaker2014using]
Brubaker, C., Jana, S., Ray, B., Khurshid, S., and V.
Shmatikov, "Using frankencerts for automated adversarial
testing of certificate validation in SSL/TLS
implementations", 2014.
[Delignat14]
Delignat-Lavaud, A. and K. Bhargavan, "Virtual Host
Confusion: Weaknesses and Exploits", Black Hat 2014, 2014.
Appendix A. Appendix: Change Log Appendix A. Appendix: Change Log
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication. Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.
A.1. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02 A.1. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-03
o Implemented WG Last Call comments.
o Virtual host confusion.
o STARTTLS command injection.
o Added CVE numbers.
A.2. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-02
o Added implementation issues ("most dangerous code"), o Added implementation issues ("most dangerous code"),
renegotiation, triple handshake. renegotiation, triple handshake.
o Added text re: mitigation of Lucky13. o Added text re: mitigation of Lucky13.
o Added applicability to DTLS. o Added applicability to DTLS.
A.2. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01 A.3. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-01
o Added SSL Stripping, attacks related to certificates, Diffie o Added SSL Stripping, attacks related to certificates, Diffie
Hellman parameters and denial of service. Hellman parameters and denial of service.
o Expanded on RC4 attacks, thanks to Andrei Popov. o Expanded on RC4 attacks, thanks to Andrei Popov.
A.3. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00 A.4. draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-00
o Initial version, extracted from draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01. o Initial version, extracted from draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Porticor Porticor
29 HaHarash St. 29 HaHarash St.
Hod HaSharon 4501303 Hod HaSharon 4501303
Israel Israel
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