--- 1/draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-11.txt 2017-12-04 06:13:13.545103610 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-12.txt 2017-12-04 06:13:13.597104840 -0800 @@ -1,103 +1,103 @@ Using TLS in Applications D. Margolis Internet-Draft M. Risher Intended status: Standards Track Google, Inc -Expires: May 12, 2018 B. Ramakrishnan +Expires: June 7, 2018 B. Ramakrishnan Yahoo!, Inc A. Brotman Comcast, Inc J. Jones Microsoft, Inc - November 8, 2017 + December 4, 2017 SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) - draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-11 + draft-ietf-uta-mta-sts-12 Abstract SMTP Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security (MTA-STS) is a mechanism enabling mail service providers to declare their ability to receive Transport Layer Security (TLS) secure SMTP connections, and to specify whether sending SMTP servers should refuse to deliver to MX hosts that do not offer TLS with a trusted server certificate. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- - Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. + Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2018. + This Internet-Draft will expire on June 7, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents - (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Related Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. MTA-STS TXT Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. MTA-STS Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. HTTPS Policy Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4. Policy Selection for Smart Hosts and Subdomains . . . . . 9 - 3.5. MX Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 4. Policy Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 4.1. Policy Application Control Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 5. Reporting Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 6. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 6.1. SNI Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 6.2. Minimum TLS Version Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 7. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 7.1. Policy Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 7.2. Policy Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 7.3. Removing MTA-STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8.1. Well-Known URIs Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8.2. MTA-STS TXT Record Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 8.3. MTA-STS Policy Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 9.1. Obtaining a Signed Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 9.2. Preventing Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 9.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 9.4. Weak Policy Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 9.5. Compromise of the Web PKI System . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 11. Appendix 1: MTA-STS example record & policy . . . . . . . . . 19 - 12. Appendix 2: Message delivery pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 13.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 4. Policy Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4.1. MX Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5. Policy Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.1. Policy Application Control Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 6. Reporting Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 7. Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 7.1. SNI Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 7.2. Minimum TLS Version Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 8.1. Policy Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 8.2. Policy Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 8.3. Removing MTA-STS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 9.1. Well-Known URIs Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 9.2. MTA-STS TXT Record Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 9.3. MTA-STS Policy Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 10.1. Obtaining a Signed Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 10.2. Preventing Policy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 10.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 10.4. Weak Policy Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 10.5. Compromise of the Web PKI System . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + Appendix A. MTA-STS example record & policy . . . . . . . . . . 21 + Appendix B. Message delivery pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 1. Introduction The STARTTLS extension to SMTP [RFC3207] allows SMTP clients and hosts to negotiate the use of a TLS channel for encrypted mail transmission. While this opportunistic encryption protocol by itself provides a high barrier against passive man-in-the-middle traffic interception, @@ -134,35 +134,35 @@ 2. Related Technologies The DANE TLSA record [RFC7672] is similar, in that DANE is also designed to upgrade unauthenticated encryption or plaintext transmission into authenticated, downgrade-resistant encrypted transmission. DANE requires DNSSEC [RFC4033] for authentication; the mechanism described here instead relies on certificate authorities (CAs) and does not require DNSSEC, at a cost of risking malicious downgrades. For a thorough discussion of this trade-off, see - Section 9, "Security Considerations". + Section 10, "Security Considerations". In addition, MTA-STS provides an optional report-only mode, enabling soft deployments to detect policy failures; partial deployments can be achieved in DANE by deploying TLSA records only for some of a domain's MXs, but such a mechanism is not possible for the per-domain policies used by MTA-STS. The primary motivation of MTA-STS is to provide a mechanism for - domains to upgrade their transport security even when deploying - DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical. However, MTA-STS is designed - not to interfere with DANE deployments when the two overlap; in - particular, senders who implement MTA-STS validation MUST NOT allow a - "valid" or "report-only" MTA-STS validation to override a failing - DANE validation. + domains to ensure transport security even when deploying DNSSEC is + undesirable or impractical. However, MTA-STS is designed not to + interfere with DANE deployments when the two overlap; in particular, + senders who implement MTA-STS validation MUST NOT allow a "valid" or + "report-only" MTA-STS validation to override a failing DANE + validation. 3. Policy Discovery MTA-STS policies are distributed via HTTPS from a "well-known" [RFC5785] path served within the Policy Domain, and their presence and current version are indicated by a TXT record at the Policy Domain. These TXT records additionally contain a policy "id" field, allowing sending MTAs to check the currency of a cached policy without performing an HTTPS request. @@ -200,25 +200,25 @@ sts-extension ; is required. field-delim = *WSP ";" *WSP sts-version = %s"v=STSv1" sts-id = %s"id=" 1*32(ALPHA / DIGIT) ; id=... sts-extension = sts-ext-name "=" sts-ext-value ; name=value -sts-ext-name = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *31(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-" / ".") + sts-ext-name = (ALPHA / DIGIT) + *31(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-" / ".") -sts-ext-value = 1*(%x21-3A / %x3C / %x3E-7E) ; chars excluding "=", - ; ";", SP, and control - ; chars + sts-ext-value = 1*(%x21-3A / %x3C / %x3E-7E) + ; chars excluding "=", ";", SP, and control chars If multiple TXT records for "_mta-sts" are returned by the resolver, records which do not begin with "v=STSv1;" are discarded. If the number of resulting records is not one, senders MUST assume the recipient domain does not implement MTA-STS and skip the remaining steps of policy discovery. If the resulting TXT record contains multiple strings, then the record MUST be treated as if those strings are concatenated together without adding spaces. 3.2. MTA-STS Policies @@ -229,25 +229,26 @@ the "mta-sts" host at the Policy Domain. Thus for "example.com" the path is "https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt". The [RFC7231] "Content-Type" media type for this resource MUST be "text/plain". When fetching a policy, senders SHOULD validate that the media type is "text/plain" to guard against cases where webservers allow untrusted users to host non-text content (typically, HTML or images) at a user-defined path. Additional "Content-Type" parameters are ignored. - This resource contains the following line-separated key/value pairs: + This resource contains the following newline-separated key/value + pairs: o "version": (plain-text). Currently only "STSv1" is supported. - o "mode": (plain-text). One of "enforce", "report", or "none", + o "mode": (plain-text). One of "enforce", "testing", or "none", indicating the expected behavior of a sending MTA in the case of a policy validation failure. o "max_age": Max lifetime of the policy (plain-text non-negative integer seconds, maximum value of 31557600). Well-behaved clients SHOULD cache a policy for up to this value from last policy fetch time. To mitigate the risks of attacks at policy refresh time, it is expected that this value typically be in the range of weeks or greater. @@ -259,21 +260,21 @@ that mail for this domain might be handled by any MX with a certificate valid for a host at "mail.example.com" or "example.net". Valid patterns can be either fully specified names ("example.com") or suffixes (".example.net") matching the right- hand parts of a server's identity; the latter case are distinguished by a leading period. If there are more than one MX specified by the policy, they MUST be on separate lines within the policy file. In the case of Internationalized Domain Names ([RFC5891]), the MX MUST specify the Punycode-encoded A-label [RFC3492] and not the Unicode-encoded U-label. The full semantics - of certificate validation are described in Section 3.5, "MX + of certificate validation are described in Section 4.1, "MX Certificate Validation." An example policy is as below: version: STSv1 mode: enforce mx: mail.example.com mx: .example.net mx: backupmx.example.com max_age: 123456 @@ -276,72 +277,73 @@ mx: mail.example.com mx: .example.net mx: backupmx.example.com max_age: 123456 The formal definition of the policy resource, defined using [RFC7405], is as follows: sts-policy-record = *WSP sts-policy-field *WSP *(CRLF *WSP sts-policy-field *WSP) + [CRLF] sts-policy-field = sts-policy-version / ; required once sts-policy-mode / ; required once sts-policy-max-age / ; required once - 0*(sts-policy-mx *WSP CRLF) / ; required at - ; least once - ; except when mode - ; is "none" + + 0*(sts-policy-mx *WSP CRLF) / + ; required at least once, except when + ; mode is "none" + sts-policy-extension ; other fields field-delim = ":" *WSP sts-policy-version = sts-policy-version-field field-delim sts-policy-version-value sts-policy-version-field = %s"version" sts-policy-version-value = %s"STSv1" sts-policy-mode = sts-policy-mode-field field-delim sts-policy-mode-value sts-policy-mode-field = %s"mode" -sts-policy-model-value = %s"report" / %s"enforce" / %s"none" + sts-policy-model-value = %s"testing" / %s"enforce" / %s"none" sts-policy-mx = sts-policy-mx-field field-delim sts-policy-mx-value sts-policy-mx-field = %s"mx" sts-policy-mx-value = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-" / ".") sts-policy-max-age = sts-policy-max-age-field field-delim sts-policy-max-age-value sts-policy-max-age-field = %s"max_age" sts-policy-max-age-value = 1*10(DIGIT) -sts-policy-extension = sts-policy-ext-name field-delim ; additional - sts-policy-ext-value ; extension - ; fields + sts-policy-extension = sts-policy-ext-name ; additional + field-delim ; extension + sts-policy-ext-value ; fields sts-policy-ext-name = (ALPHA / DIGIT) *31(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-" / ".") -sts-policy-ext-value = 1*(%x21-3A / %x3C / %x3E-7E) ; chars excluding - ; "=", ";", SP, - ; and control - ; chars + sts-policy-ext-value = 1*(%x21-3A / %x3C / %x3E-7E) + ; chars, excluding "=", ";", SP, and + ; control chars Parsers MUST accept TXT records and policy files which are syntactically valid (i.e. valid key/value pairs separated by semi- colons for TXT records) and but containing additional key/value pairs not specified in this document, in which case unknown fields SHALL be ignored. If any non-repeated field--i.e. all fields excepting "mx"-- is duplicated, all entries except for the first SHALL be ignored. If any field is not specified, the policy SHALL be treated as invalid. 3.3. HTTPS Policy Fetching @@ -388,156 +390,163 @@ If a valid TXT record is found but no policy can be fetched via HTTPS (for any reason), and there is no valid (non-expired) previously- cached policy, senders MUST continue with delivery as though the domain has not implemented MTA-STS. Conversely, if no "live" policy can be discovered via DNS or fetched via HTTPS, but a valid (non-expired) policy exists in the sender's cache, the sender MUST apply that cached policy. + Finally, to mitigate the risk of persistent interference with policy + refresh, as discussed in-depth in Section 10, MTAs SHOULD + proactivecly refresh cached policies before they expire; a suggested + refresh frequency is once per day. To enable administrators to + discover problems with policy refresh, MTAs SHOULD alert + administrators (through the use of logs or similar) when such + attempts fail, unless the cached policy mode is "none". + 3.4. Policy Selection for Smart Hosts and Subdomains When sending mail via a "smart host"--an intermediate SMTP relay rather than the message recipient's server--compliant senders MUST treat the smart host domain as the policy domain for the purposes of policy discovery and application. When sending mail to a mailbox at a subdomain, compliant senders MUST NOT attempt to fetch a policy from the parent zone. Thus for mail sent to "user@mail.example.com", the policy can be fetched only from "mail.example.com", not "example.com". - #Policy Validation +4. Policy Validation When sending to an MX at a domain for which the sender has a valid and non-expired MTA-STS policy, a sending MTA honoring MTA-STS MUST validate: 1. That the recipient MX supports STARTTLS and offers a valid PKIX- based TLS certificate. 2. That at least one of the policy's "mx" patterns matches at least one of the identities presented in the MX's X.509 certificate, as described in "MX Certificate Validation". This section does not dictate the behavior of sending MTAs when - policies fail to validate; in particular, validation failures of - policies which specify mode values of "report" or "none" MUST NOT be - interpreted as delivery failures, as described in Section 4, "Policy - Application". + policies fail to validate; see Section 5, "Policy Application" for a + description of sending MTA behavior when policy validation fails. -3.5. MX Certificate Validation +4.1. MX Certificate Validation The certificate presented by the receiving MX MUST chain to a root CA that is trusted by the sending MTA and be non-expired. The certificate MUST have a CN-ID ([RFC6125]) or subject alternative name (SAN, [RFC5280]) with a DNS-ID matching the "mx" pattern. The MX's certificate MAY also be checked for revocation via OCSP [RFC6960], CRLs [RFC6818], or some other mechanism. Because the "mx" patterns are not hostnames, however, matching is not identical to other common cases of X.509 certificate authentication (as described, for example, in [RFC6125]). Consider the example policy given above, with an "mx" pattern containing ".example.com". In this case, if the MX server's X.509 certificate contains a SAN matching "*.example.com", we are required to implement "wildcard-to- wildcard" matching. To simplify this case, we impose the following constraints on wildcard certificates, identical to those in [RFC7672] section 3.2.3 - and [@?RFC6125 section 6.4.3: wildcards are valid in DNS-IDs or CN- + and [RFC6125] section 6.4.3: wildcards are valid in DNS-IDs or CN- IDs, but must be the entire first label of the identifier (that is, "*.example.com", not "mail*.example.com"). Senders who are comparing a "suffix" MX pattern with a wildcard identifier should thus strip the wildcard and ensure that the two sides match label-by-label, until all labels of the shorter side (if unequal length) are consumed. - Note that a wildcard _must_ match a label; an "mx" pattern of + Note that a wildcard must match a label; an "mx" pattern of ".example.com" thus does not match a SAN of "example.com", nor does a SAN of "*.example.com" match an "mx" of "example.com". A simple pseudocode implementation of this algorithm is presented in - the Appendix. + Appendix B. -4. Policy Application +5. Policy Application When sending to an MX at a domain for which the sender has a valid, non-expired MTA-STS policy, a sending MTA honoring MTA-STS applies the result of a policy validation failure one of two ways, depending on the value of the policy "mode" field: 1. "enforce": In this mode, sending MTAs MUST NOT deliver the message to hosts which fail MX matching or certificate validation. 2. "report": In this mode, sending MTAs which also implement the - TLSRPT specification (TODO: add ref) merely send a report - indicating policy application failures (so long as TLSRPT is also - implemented by the recipient domain). + TLSRPT specification [I-D.ietf-uta-smtp-tlsrpt] merely send a + report indicating policy application failures (so long as TLSRPT + is also implemented by the recipient domain). 3. "none": In this mode, sending MTAs should treat the policy domain - as though it does not have any active policy; see Section 7.3, + as though it does not have any active policy; see Section 8.3, "Removing MTA-STS", for use of this mode value. When a message fails to deliver due to an "enforce" policy, a compliant MTA MUST NOT permanently fail to deliver messages before checking for the presence of an updated policy at the Policy Domain. (In all cases, MTAs SHOULD treat such failures as transient errors and retry delivery later.) This allows implementing domains to update long-lived policies on the fly. -4.1. Policy Application Control Flow +5.1. Policy Application Control Flow An example control flow for a compliant sender consists of the following steps: 1. Check for a cached policy whose time-since-fetch has not exceeded its "max_age". If none exists, attempt to fetch a new policy (perhaps asynchronously, so as not to block message delivery). Optionally, sending MTAs may unconditionally check for a new policy at this step. 2. For each candidate MX, in order of MX priority, attempt to deliver the message, enforcing STARTTLS and, assuming a policy is - present, PKIX certificate validation as described in Section 3.5, + present, PKIX certificate validation as described in Section 4.1, "MX Certificate Validation." 3. A message delivery MUST NOT be permanently failed until the sender has first checked for the presence of a new policy (as indicated by the "id" field in the "_mta-sts" TXT record). If a new policy is not found, existing rules for the case of temporary message delivery failures apply (as discussed in [RFC5321] section 4.5.4.1). -5. Reporting Failures +6. Reporting Failures - MTA-STS is intended to be used along with TLSRPT (TODO: add ref) in - order to ensure implementing domains can detect cases of both benign - and malicious failures, and to ensure that failures that indicate an - active attack are discoverable. As such, senders who also implement - TLSRPT SHOULD treat the following events as reportable failures: + MTA-STS is intended to be used along with TLSRPT + [I-D.ietf-uta-smtp-tlsrpt] in order to ensure implementing domains + can detect cases of both benign and malicious failures, and to ensure + that failures that indicate an active attack are discoverable. As + such, senders who also implement TLSRPT SHOULD treat the following + events as reportable failures: o HTTPS policy fetch failures when a valid TXT record is present. o Policy fetch failures of any kind when a valid policy exists in the policy cache, except if that policy's mode is "none". o Delivery attempts in which a contacted MX does not support STARTTLS or does not present a certificate which validates according to the applied policy, except if that policy's mode is "none". -6. Interoperability Considerations +7. Interoperability Considerations -6.1. SNI Support +7.1. SNI Support To ensure that the server sends the right certificate chain, the SMTP client MUST have support for the TLS SNI extension [RFC6066]. When connecting to a HTTP server to retrieve the MTA-STS policy, the SNI extension MUST contain the name of the policy host (e.g. "mta- sts.example.com"). When connecting to an SMTP server, the SNI extension MUST contain the MX hostname. HTTP servers used to deliver MTA-STS policies MUST have support for the TLS SNI extension and MAY rely on SNI to determine which @@ -549,91 +558,93 @@ on SNI to determine which certificate chain to present to the client. If the client sends no SNI extension or sends an SNI extension for an unsupported server name, the server MUST simply send a fallback certificate chain of its choice. The reason for not enforcing strict matching of the requested SNI hostname is that MTA-STS TLS clients may be typically willing to accept multiple server names but can only send one name in the SNI extension. The server's fallback certificate may match a different name that is acceptable to the client, e.g., the original next-hop domain. -6.2. Minimum TLS Version Support +7.2. Minimum TLS Version Support MTAs supporting MTA-STS MUST have support for TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] or higher. The general TLS usage guidance in [RFC7525] SHOULD be followed. -7. Operational Considerations -7.1. Policy Updates +8. Operational Considerations + +8.1. Policy Updates Updating the policy requires that the owner make changes in two places: the "_mta-sts" TXT record in the Policy Domain's DNS zone and at the corresponding HTTPS endpoint. As a result, recipients should expect a policy will continue to be used by senders until both the HTTPS and TXT endpoints are updated and the TXT record's TTL has passed. In other words, a sender who is unable to successfully deliver a message while applying a cache of the recipient's now-outdated policy may be unable to discover that a new policy exists until the DNS TTL has passed. Recipients should therefore ensure that old policies continue to work for message delivery during this period of time, or risk message delays. Recipients should also prefer to update the HTTPS policy body before updating the TXT record; this ordering avoids the risk that senders, seeing a new TXT record, mistakenly cache the old policy from HTTPS. -7.2. Policy Delegation +8.2. Policy Delegation Domain owners commonly delegate SMTP hosting to a different organization, such as an ISP or a Web host. In such a case, they may wish to also delegate the MTA-STS policy to the same organization which can be accomplished with two changes. First, the Policy Domain must point the "_mta-sts" record, via CNAME, to the "_mta-sts" record maintained by the hosting organization. This allows the hosting organization to control update signaling. Second, the Policy Domain must point the "well-known" policy location to the hosting organization. This can be done either by setting the - "mta-sts" record to a host or CNAME specified by the hosting + "mta-sts" record to an IP address or CNAME specified by the hosting organization and by giving the hosting organization a TLS certificate which is valid for that host, or by setting up a "reverse proxy" (also known as a "gateway") server that serves as the Policy Domain's policy the policy currently served by the hosting organization. - For example, given a user domain "user.com" hosted by a mail provider - "provider.com", the following configuration would allow policy - delegation: + For example, given a user domain "user.example" hosted by a mail + provider "provider.example", the following configuration would allow + policy delegation: DNS: - _mta-sts.user.com. IN CNAME _mta-sts.provider.com. + _mta-sts.user.example. IN CNAME _mta-sts.provider.example. Policy: > GET /.well-known/mta-sts.txt -> Host: mta-sts.user.com -< HTTP/1.1 200 OK # Response proxies content from https://mta-sts.provider.com + > Host: mta-sts.user.example + < HTTP/1.1 200 OK # Response proxies content from + # https://mta-sts.provider.example Note that while sending MTAs MUST NOT use HTTP caching when fetching policies via HTTPS, such caching may nonetheless be useful to a reverse proxy configured as described in this section. An HTTPS policy endpoint expecting to be proxied for multiple hosted domains-- as with a large mail hosting provider or similar--may wish to indicate an HTTP Cache-Control "max-age" response directive (as specified in [RFC7234]) of 60 seconds as a reasonable value to save reverse proxies an unnecessarily high-rate of proxied policy fetching. -7.3. Removing MTA-STS +8.3. Removing MTA-STS In order to facilitate clean opt-out of MTA-STS by implementing policy domains, and to distinguish clearly between failures which indicate attacks and those which indicate such opt-outs, MTA-STS implements the "none" mode, which allows validated policies to indicate authoritatively that the policy domain wishes to no longer implement MTA-STS and may, in the future, remove the MTA-STS TXT and policy endpoints entirely. A suggested workflow to implement such an opt out is as follows: @@ -642,62 +653,62 @@ "max_age" (e.g. one day). 2. Publish a new TXT record to trigger fetching of the new policy. 3. When all previously served policies have expired--normally this is the time the previously published policy was last served plus that policy's "max_age", but note that older policies may have been served with a greater "max_age", allowing overlapping policy caches--safely remove the TXT record and HTTPS endpoint. -8. IANA Considerations +9. IANA Considerations -8.1. Well-Known URIs Registry +9.1. Well-Known URIs Registry - A new .well-known URI will be registered in the Well-Known URIs - registry as described below: + A new "well-known" URI as described in Section 3 will be registered + in the Well-Known URIs registry as described below: URI Suffix: mta-sts.txt Change Controller: IETF -8.2. MTA-STS TXT Record Fields +9.2. MTA-STS TXT Record Fields IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "MTA-STS TXT Record Fields". The initial entries in the registry are: +------------+--------------------+------------------------+ | Field Name | Description | Reference | +------------+--------------------+------------------------+ | v | Record version | Section 3.1 of RFC XXX | | id | Policy instance ID | Section 3.1 of RFC XXX | +------------+--------------------+------------------------+ New fields are added to this registry using IANA's "Expert Review" policy. -8.3. MTA-STS Policy Fields +9.3. MTA-STS Policy Fields IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "MTA-STS Policy Fields". The initial entries in the registry are: +------------+----------------------+------------------------+ | Field Name | Description | Reference | +------------+----------------------+------------------------+ | version | Policy version | Section 3.2 of RFC XXX | | mode | Enforcement behavior | Section 3.2 of RFC XXX | | max_age | Policy lifetime | Section 3.2 of RFC XXX | | mx | MX identities | Section 3.2 of RFC XXX | +------------+----------------------+------------------------+ New fields are added to this registry using IANA's "Expert Review" policy. -9. Security Considerations +10. Security Considerations SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security attempts to protect against an active attacker who wishes to intercept or tamper with mail between hosts who support STARTTLS. There are two classes of attacks considered: o Foiling TLS negotiation, for example by deleting the "250 STARTTLS" response from a server or altering TLS session negotiation. This would result in the SMTP session occurring over plaintext, despite both parties supporting TLS. @@ -709,78 +720,78 @@ for the recipient domain, or by redirecting client connections intended for the legitimate recipient server (for example, by altering BGP routing tables). MTA-STS can thwart such attacks only if the sender is able to previously obtain and cache a policy for the recipient domain, and only if the attacker is unable to obtain a valid certificate that complies with that policy. Below, we consider specific attacks on this model. -9.1. Obtaining a Signed Certificate +10.1. Obtaining a Signed Certificate SMTP MTA-STS relies on certificate validation via PKIX based TLS identity checking [RFC6125]. Attackers who are able to obtain a valid certificate for the targeted recipient mail service (e.g. by compromising a certificate authority) are thus able to circumvent STS authentication. -9.2. Preventing Policy Discovery +10.2. Preventing Policy Discovery Since MTA-STS uses DNS TXT records for policy discovery, an attacker who is able to block DNS responses can suppress the discovery of an MTA-STS Policy, making the Policy Domain appear not to have an MTA- STS Policy. The sender policy cache is designed to resist this attack by decreasing the frequency of policy discovery and thus reducing the window of vulnerability; it is nonetheless a risk that attackers who can predict or induce policy discovery--for example, by - inducing a victim sending domain to send mail to a never-before- - contacted recipient while carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack-- - may be able to foil policy discovery and effectively downgrade the - security of the message delivery. + inducing a sending domain to send mail to a never-before-contacted + recipient while carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack--may be able + to foil policy discovery and effectively downgrade the security of + the message delivery. Since this attack depends upon intercepting initial policy discovery, we strongly recommend implementers to prefer policy "max_age" values to be as long as is practical. Because this attack is also possible upon refresh of a cached policy, we suggest implementers do not wait until a cached policy has expired before checking for an update; if senders attempt to refresh the cache regularly (for instance, by checking their cached version string against the TXT record on each successful send, or in a background task that runs daily or weekly), an attacker would have to foil policy discovery consistently over the lifetime of a cached policy to prevent a successful refresh. Additionally, MTAs should alert administrators to repeated policy refresh failures long before cached policies expire (through warning logs or similar applicable mechanisms), allowing administrators to detect such a persistent attack on policy refresh. (However, they should not implement such alerts if the cached policy has a "none" - mode, to allow clean MTA-STS removal, as described in Section 7.3.) + mode, to allow clean MTA-STS removal, as described in Section 8.3.) Resistance to downgrade attacks of this nature--due to the ability to authoritatively determine "lack of a record" even for non- participating recipients--is a feature of DANE, due to its use of DNSSEC for policy discovery. -9.3. Denial of Service +10.3. Denial of Service We additionally consider the Denial of Service risk posed by an - attacker who can modify the DNS records for a victim domain. Absent - MTA-STS, such an attacker can cause a sending MTA to cache invalid MX - records, but only for however long the sending resolver caches those - records. With MTA-STS, the attacker can additionally advertise a - new, long-"max_age" MTA-STS policy with "mx" constraints that - validate the malicious MX record, causing senders to cache the policy - and refuse to deliver messages once the victim has resecured the MX - records. + attacker who can modify the DNS records for a recipient domain. + Absent MTA-STS, such an attacker can cause a sending MTA to cache + invalid MX records, but only for however long the sending resolver + caches those records. With MTA-STS, the attacker can additionally + advertise a new, long-"max_age" MTA-STS policy with "mx" constraints + that validate the malicious MX record, causing senders to cache the + policy and refuse to deliver messages once the victim has resecured + the MX records. This attack is mitigated in part by the ability of a victim domain to (at any time) publish a new policy updating the cached, malicious policy, though this does require the victim domain to both obtain a valid CA-signed certificate and to understand and properly configure MTA-STS. Similarly, we consider the possibility of domains that deliberately allow untrusted users to serve untrusted content on user-specified subdomains. In some cases (e.g. the service Tumblr.com) this takes @@ -791,33 +802,33 @@ In these cases, there is a risk that untrusted users would be able to serve custom content at the "mta-sts" host, including serving an illegitimate MTA-STS policy. We believe this attack is rendered more difficult by the need for the attacker to also serve the "_mta-sts" TXT record on the same domain--something not, to our knowledge, widely provided to untrusted users. This attack is additionally mitigated by the aforementioned ability for a victim domain to update an invalid policy at any future date. -9.4. Weak Policy Constraints +10.4. Weak Policy Constraints Even if an attacker cannot modify a served policy, the potential exists for configurations that allow attackers on the same domain to receive mail for that domain. For example, an easy configuration option when authoring an MTA-STS Policy for "example.com" is to set the "mx" equal to ".example.com"; recipient domains must consider in this case the risk that any user possessing a valid hostname and CA- signed certificate (for example, "dhcp-123.example.com") will, from the perspective of MTA-STS Policy validation, be a valid MX host for that domain. -9.5. Compromise of the Web PKI System +10.5. Compromise of the Web PKI System A host of risks apply to the PKI system used for certificate authentication, both of the "mta-sts" HTTPS host's certificate and the SMTP servers' certificates. These risks are broadly applicable within the Web PKI ecosystem and are not specific to MTA-STS; nonetheless, they deserve some consideration in this context. Broadly speaking, attackers may compromise the system by obtaining certificates under fraudulent circumstances (i.e. by impersonating the legitimate owner of the victim domain), by compromising a @@ -826,58 +837,167 @@ similar. One approach commonly employed by Web browsers to help mitigate against some of these attacks is to allow for revocation of compromised or fraudulent certificates via OCSP [RFC6960] or CRLs [RFC6818]. Such mechanisms themselves represent tradeoffs and are not universally implemented; we nonetheless recommend implementors of MTA-STS to implement revocation mechanisms which are most applicable to their implementations. -10. Contributors +11. Contributors Nicolas Lidzborski Google, Inc nlidz (at) google (dot com) Wei Chuang Google, Inc weihaw (at) google (dot com) Brandon Long Google, Inc blong (at) google (dot com) Franck Martin LinkedIn, Inc fmartin (at) linkedin (dot com) Klaus Umbach 1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH klaus.umbach (at) 1und1 (dot de) Markus Laber 1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH markus.laber (at) 1und1 (dot de) -11. Appendix 1: MTA-STS example record & policy +12. References + +12.1. Normative References + + [I-D.ietf-uta-smtp-tlsrpt] + Margolis, D., Brotman, A., Ramakrishnan, B., Jones, J., + and M. Risher, "SMTP TLS Reporting", draft-ietf-uta-smtp- + tlsrpt-11 (work in progress), November 2017. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + . + + [RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode + for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications + (IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003, + . + + [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security + (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, + . + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, + . + + [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, + . + + [RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known + Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010, + . + + [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, + DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, + . + + [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and + Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity + within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 + (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer + Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March + 2011, . + + [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer + Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, + . + + [RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF", + RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014, + . + + [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, + "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer + Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security + (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May + 2015, . + +12.2. Informative References + + [RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over + Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207, + February 2002, . + + [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", + RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, + . + + [RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008, + . + + [RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in + Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, + DOI 10.17487/RFC5891, August 2010, + . + + [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, DOI 10.17487/RFC6818, January + 2013, . + + [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., + Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key + Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", + RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, + . + + [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, + Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", + RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, + . + + [RFC7672] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via + Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities + (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015, + . + +Appendix A. MTA-STS example record & policy The owner of "example.com" wishes to begin using MTA-STS with a policy that will solicit reports from senders without affecting how the messages are processed, in order to verify the identity of MXs that handle mail for "example.com", confirm that TLS is correctly used, and ensure that certificates presented by the recipient MX validate. MTA-STS policy indicator TXT RR: _mta-sts.example.com. IN TXT "v=STSv1; id=20160831085700Z;" - MTA-STS Policy file served as the response body at [1] + MTA-STS Policy file served as the response body at "https://mta- + sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt": version: STSv1 mode: report mx: mx1.example.com mx: mx2.example.com mx: mx.backup-example.com max_age: 12345678 -12. Appendix 2: Message delivery pseudocode +Appendix B. Message delivery pseudocode Below is pseudocode demonstrating the logic of a compliant sending MTA. While this pseudocode implementation suggests synchronous policy retrieval in the delivery path, in a working implementation that may be undesirable, and we expect some implementers to instead prefer a background fetch that does not block delivery if no cached policy is present. @@ -905,22 +1026,22 @@ return true } } return false } func certMatches(connection, policy) { // Assume a handy function to return CN and DNS-ID SANs. for san in getDnsIdSansAndCnFromCert(connection) { for mx in policy.mx { - // Return if the server certificate from "connection" matches the "mx" - // host. + // Return if the server certificate from "connection" matches the + // "mx" host. if san[0] == '*' { // Invalid wildcard! if san[1] != '.' continue san = san[1:] } if isWildcardMatch(san, mx) || isWildcardMatch(mx, san) { return true } } } @@ -943,21 +1065,22 @@ // Return a cached policy for "domain". } func reportError(error) { // Report an error via TLSRPT. } func tryMxAccordingTo(message, mx, policy) { connection := connect(mx) if !connection { - return false // Can't connect to the MX so it's not an MTA-STS error. + return false // Can't connect to the MX so it's not an MTA-STS + // error. } secure := true if !tryStartTls(connection) { secure = false reportError(E_NO_VALID_TLS) } else if !certMatches(connection, policy) { secure = false reportError(E_CERT_MISMATCH) } if secure || !isEnforce(policy) { @@ -983,142 +1106,35 @@ cachePolicy(domain, policy) } else { policy = tryGetCachedPolicy(domain) } if policy { return tryWithPolicy(message, domain, policy) } // Try to deliver the message normally (i.e. without MTA-STS). } -13. References - -13.1. Normative References - - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ - RFC2119, March 1997, - . - - [RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode - for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications - (IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003, - . - - [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security - (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/ - RFC5246, August 2008, . - - [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., - Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key - Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List - (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, - . - - [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, - DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, - . - - [RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known - Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, DOI 10 - .17487/RFC5785, April 2010, - . - - [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) - Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, DOI 10 - .17487/RFC6066, January 2011, . - - [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and - Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity - within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 - (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer - Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March - 2011, . - - [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer - Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI - 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, . - - [RFC7405] Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF", RFC - 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014, - . - - [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, - "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer - Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security - (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May - 2015, . - -13.2. Informative References - - [RFC3207] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over - Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, DOI 10.17487/RFC3207, - February 2002, . - - [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. - Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC - 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, - . - - [RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, DOI - 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008, - . - - [RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in - Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, DOI 10.17487/ - RFC5891, August 2010, - . - - [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key - Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List - (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, DOI 10.17487/RFC6818, January - 2013, . - - [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., - Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key - Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", - RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, . - - [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, - Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", - RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, . - - [RFC7672] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via - Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities - (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672, DOI 10 - .17487/RFC7672, October 2015, - . - -13.3. URIs - - [1] https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt: - Authors' Addresses Daniel Margolis Google, Inc - Email: dmargolis (at) google.com + Email: dmargolis (at) google (dot com) Mark Risher Google, Inc Email: risher (at) google (dot com) Binu Ramakrishnan Yahoo!, Inc Email: rbinu (at) yahoo-inc (dot com) Alexander Brotman Comcast, Inc - Email: alex_brotman (at) comcast.com + Email: alex_brotman (at) comcast (dot com) Janet Jones Microsoft, Inc Email: janet.jones (at) microsoft (dot com)