draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth-07.txt   draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth-08.txt 
Network Working Group M. Tuexen Network Working Group M. Tuexen
Internet-Draft Muenster Univ. of Applied Sciences Internet-Draft Muenster Univ. of Applied Sciences
Intended status: Standards Track R. Stewart Intended status: Standards Track R. Stewart
Expires: July 26, 2007 P. Lei Expires: August 30, 2007 P. Lei
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
E. Rescorla E. Rescorla
RTFM, Inc. RTFM, Inc.
January 22, 2007 February 26, 2007
Authenticated Chunks for Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Authenticated Chunks for Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth-07.txt draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth-08.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a new chunk type, several parameters and This document describes a new chunk type, several parameters and
procedures for SCTP. This new chunk type can be used to authenticate procedures for SCTP. This new chunk type can be used to authenticate
SCTP chunks by using shared keys between the sender and receiver. SCTP chunks by using shared keys between the sender and receiver.
The new parameters are used to establish the shared keys. The new parameters are used to establish the shared keys.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. New Parameter Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. New Parameter Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Random Parameter (RANDOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Random Parameter (RANDOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter (HMAC-ALGO) . . . . . . 5 3.3. Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter (HMAC-ALGO) . . . . . . 6
4. New Error Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. New Error Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Unsupported HMAC Identifier error cause . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Unsupported HMAC Identifier error cause . . . . . . . . . 7
5. New Chunk Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. New Chunk Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Authentication Chunk (AUTH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Authentication Chunk (AUTH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Establishment of an association shared key . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Establishment of an association shared key . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Sending authenticated chunks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.2. Sending authenticated chunks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Receiving authenticated chunks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.3. Receiving authenticated chunks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. A New Chunk Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.1. A New Chunk Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Three New Parameter Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.2. Three New Parameter Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.3. A New Error Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.3. A New Error Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.4. A New Table For HMAC Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.4. A New Table For HMAC Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 18 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
SCTP uses 32 bit verification tags to protect itself against blind SCTP uses 32 bit verification tags to protect itself against blind
attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an
SCTP association. SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions there is the need to have a method of Looking at new SCTP extensions there is the need to have a method of
proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer
that started the association and not by a malicious attacker. that started the association and not by a malicious attacker.
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Using TLS as defined in RFC3436 [6] does not help here because it Using TLS as defined in RFC3436 [6] does not help here because it
only secures SCTP user data. only secures SCTP user data.
Therefore an SCTP extension is presented which provides a mechanism Therefore an SCTP extension is presented which provides a mechanism
for deriving shared keys for each association. These association for deriving shared keys for each association. These association
shared keys are derived from endpoint pair shared keys, which are shared keys are derived from endpoint pair shared keys, which are
configured and might be empty, and data which is exchanged during the configured and might be empty, and data which is exchanged during the
SCTP association setup. SCTP association setup.
The extension presented in this document allows an SCTP sender to The extension presented in this document allows an SCTP sender to
sign chunks using shared keys between the sender and receiver. The authenticate chunks using shared keys between the sender and
receiver can then verify that the chunks are sent from the sender and receiver. The receiver can then verify that the chunks are sent from
not from a malicious attacker as long as the attacker does not know the sender and not from a malicious attacker as long as the attacker
an association shared key. does not know an association shared key.
The extension described in this document puts the result of an HMAC
computation before the data covered by that computation. Putting it
at the end of the packet would have required putting a control chunk
after DATA chunks in case of authenticating DATA chunks. This would
break the rule that control chunks occur before DATA chunks in SCTP
packets. It should also be noted that putting the result of the HMAC
computation after the data being covered would not allow sending the
packet during the computation of the HMAC because the result of the
HMAC computation is needed to compute the CRC32C checksum of the SCTP
packet which is placed in the common header of the SCTP packet.
The SCTP extension for Dynamic Address Reconfiguration (ADD-IP)
requires the usage of the extension described in this document. The
SCTP Partial Reliability Extension (PR-SCTP) can be used in
conjunction with the extension described in this document.
2. Conventions 2. Conventions
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL", when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted "OPTIONAL", when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted
as described in RFC2119 [3]. as described in RFC2119 [3].
3. New Parameter Types 3. New Parameter Types
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This parameter is used to carry an arbitrary length random number. This parameter is used to carry an arbitrary length random number.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Parameter Type = 0x8002 | Parameter Length | | Parameter Type = 0x8002 | Parameter Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
\ Random Number / \ Random Number /
/ \ / +-------------------------------\
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1 Figure 1
Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x8002. This value MUST be set to 0x8002.
Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value is the length of the Random Number in bytes plus 4. This value is the length of the Random Number in bytes plus 4.
Random Number: n bytes (unsigned integer) Random Number: n bytes (unsigned integer)
This value represents an arbitrary Random Number in network byte This value represents an arbitrary Random Number in network byte
order. order.
Padding: 0, 1, 2, or 3 bytes (unsigned integer)
If the length of the random number is not a multiple of 4 bytes,
the sender MUST pad the parameter with all zero bytes to make the
parameter 32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3
bytes and it MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The RANDOM parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK The RANDOM parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK
chunk if the sender wants to send or receive authenticated chunks. chunk if the sender wants to send or receive authenticated chunks to
provide a 32 byte Random Number. For 32 byte Random Numbers the
Padding is empty.
3.2. Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS) 3.2. Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS)
This parameter is used to specify which chunk types are required to This parameter is used to specify which chunk types are required to
be sent authenticated by the peer. be sent authenticated by the peer.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Parameter Type = 0x8003 | Parameter Length | | Parameter Type = 0x8003 | Parameter Length |
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Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x8003. This value MUST be set to 0x8003.
Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value is the number of listed Chunk Types plus 4. This value is the number of listed Chunk Types plus 4.
Chunk Type n: 1 byte (unsigned integer) Chunk Type n: 1 byte (unsigned integer)
Each Chunk Type listed is required to be authenticated when sent Each Chunk Type listed is required to be authenticated when sent
by the peer. by the peer.
Padding: 0, 1, 2, or 3 bytes (unsigned integer)
If the number of Chunk Types is not a multiple of 4, the sender
MUST pad the parameter with all zero bytes to make the parameter
32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3 bytes and
it MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK
chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated chunks. Its chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated chunks. Its
maximum length is 260 bytes. maximum length is 260 bytes.
The chunk types for INIT, INIT-ACK, SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE and AUTH chunks The chunk types for INIT, INIT-ACK, SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE and AUTH chunks
MUST NOT be listed in the CHUNKS parameter. However, if a CHUNKS MUST NOT be listed in the CHUNKS parameter. However, if a CHUNKS
parameter is received then the types for INIT, INIT-ACK, SHUTDOWN- parameter is received then the types for INIT, INIT-ACK, SHUTDOWN-
COMPLETE and AUTH chunks MUST be ignored. COMPLETE and AUTH chunks MUST be ignored.
3.3. Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter (HMAC-ALGO) 3.3. Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter (HMAC-ALGO)
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Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value is the number of HMAC identifiers multiplied by 2 plus This value is the number of HMAC identifiers multiplied by 2 plus
4. 4.
HMAC Identifier n: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) HMAC Identifier n: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
The values expressed are a list of HMAC identifiers that may be The values expressed are a list of HMAC identifiers that may be
used by the peer. The values are listed by preference, with used by the peer. The values are listed by preference, with
respect to the sender, where the first HMAC identifier listed is respect to the sender, where the first HMAC identifier listed is
the one most preferable to the sender. the one most preferable to the sender.
Padding: 0 or 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
If the number of HMAC Identifiers is not even, the sender MUST pad
the parameter with all zero bytes to make the parameter 32-bit
aligned. The Padding MUST be 0 or 2 bytes long and it MUST be
ignored by the receiver.
The HMAC-ALGO parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK The HMAC-ALGO parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK
chunk if the sender wants to send or receive authenticated chunks. chunk if the sender wants to send or receive authenticated chunks.
The following Table 2 shows the currently defined values for HMAC The following Table 2 shows the currently defined values for HMAC
identifiers. identifiers.
+-----------------+--------------------------+ +-----------------+--------------------------+
| HMAC Identifier | Message Digest Algorithm | | HMAC Identifier | Message Digest Algorithm |
+-----------------+--------------------------+ +-----------------+--------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | | 0 | Reserved |
| 1 | SHA-1 defined in [6] | | 1 | SHA-1 defined in [8] |
| 3 | SHA-256 defined in [6] | | 2 | Reserved |
| 3 | SHA-256 defined in [8] |
+-----------------+--------------------------+ +-----------------+--------------------------+
Table 2 Table 2
Every endpoint supporting SCTP chunk authentication MUST support the Every endpoint supporting SCTP chunk authentication MUST support the
HMAC based on the SHA-1 algorithm. HMAC based on the SHA-1 algorithm.
4. New Error Cause 4. New Error Cause
This section defines a new error cause that will be sent if an AUTH This section defines a new error cause that will be sent if an AUTH
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Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Cause Code: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x0105. This value MUST be set to 0x0105.
Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Cause Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 6. This value MUST be set to 6.
HMAC Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) HMAC Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value is the HMAC Identifier which is not supported. This value is the HMAC Identifier which is not supported.
Padding: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
The sender MUST pad the error cause with all zero bytes to make
the cause 32-bit aligned. The Padding MUST be 2 bytes long and it
MUST be ignored by the receiver.
5. New Chunk Type 5. New Chunk Type
This section defines the new chunk type that will be used to This section defines the new chunk type that will be used to
authenticate chunks. Table 4 illustrates the new chunk type. authenticate chunks. Table 4 illustrates the new chunk type.
+------------+-----------------------------+ +------------+-----------------------------+
| Chunk Type | Chunk Name | | Chunk Type | Chunk Name |
+------------+-----------------------------+ +------------+-----------------------------+
| 0x0F | Authentication Chunk (AUTH) | | 0x0F | Authentication Chunk (AUTH) |
+------------+-----------------------------+ +------------+-----------------------------+
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0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 0x0F | Flags=0 | Length | | Type = 0x0F | Flags=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Shared Key Identifier | HMAC Identifier | | Shared Key Identifier | HMAC Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
\ HMAC / \ HMAC /
/ \ / \
/ +-------------------------------\
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5 Figure 5
Type: 1 byte (unsigned integer) Type: 1 byte (unsigned integer)
This value MUST be set to 0x0F for all AUTH-chunks. This value MUST be set to 0x0F for all AUTH-chunks.
Flags: 1 byte (unsigned integer) Flags: 1 byte (unsigned integer)
SHOULD be set to zero on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt. SHOULD be set to zero on transmit and MUST be ignored on receipt.
skipping to change at page 9, line 8 skipping to change at page 9, line 40
Shared Key Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) Shared Key Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value describes which endpoint pair shared key is used. This value describes which endpoint pair shared key is used.
HMAC Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) HMAC Identifier: 2 bytes (unsigned integer)
This value describes which message digest is being used. Table 2 This value describes which message digest is being used. Table 2
shows the currently defined values. shows the currently defined values.
HMAC: n bytes (unsigned integer) HMAC: n bytes (unsigned integer)
This hold the result of the HMAC calculation. This hold the result of the HMAC calculation.
Padding: 0, 1, 2, or 3 bytes (unsigned integer)
If the length of the HMAC is not a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender
MUST pad the chunk with all zero bytes to make the chunk 32-bit
aligned. The Padding MUST NOT be longer than 3 bytes and it MUST
be ignored by the receiver.
The control chunk AUTH MUST NOT appear more than once in an SCTP The control chunk AUTH MUST NOT appear more than once in an SCTP
packet. All control and data chunks which are placed after the AUTH packet. All control and data chunks which are placed after the AUTH
chunk in the packet are sent in an authenticated way. Those chunks chunk in the packet are sent in an authenticated way. Those chunks
placed in a packet before the AUTH chunk are not authenticated. placed in a packet before the AUTH chunk are not authenticated.
Please note that DATA chunks can not appear before control chunks in Please note that DATA chunks can not appear before control chunks in
an SCTP packet. an SCTP packet.
6. Procedures 6. Procedures
6.1. Establishment of an association shared key 6.1. Establishment of an association shared key
An SCTP endpoint willing to receive or send authenticated chunks MUST An SCTP endpoint willing to receive or send authenticated chunks MUST
send one RANDOM parameter in its INIT or INIT-ACK chunk. The RANDOM send one RANDOM parameter in its INIT or INIT-ACK chunk. The RANDOM
parameter MUST contain a 32 byte random number. If the random number parameter MUST contain a 32 byte random number. The random number
is not 32 byte long the association MUST be aborted. The ABORT chunk should be generated in accordance with RFC4086 [7]. If the random
SHOULD contain the error cause 'Protocol Violation'. In case of INIT number is not 32 byte long the association MUST be aborted. The
collision, the rules governing the handling of this random number ABORT chunk SHOULD contain the error cause 'Protocol Violation'. In
follow the same pattern as those for the Verification Tag, as case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling of this
explained in section 5.2.4 of RFC2960 [5]. Therefore each endpoint random number follow the same pattern as those for the Verification
knows its own random number and the peer's random number after the Tag, as explained in section 5.2.4 of RFC2960 [5]. Therefore each
association has been established. endpoint knows its own random number and the peer's random number
after the association has been established.
An SCTP endpoint has a list of chunks it only accepts if they are An SCTP endpoint has a list of chunks it only accepts if they are
received in an authenticated way. This list is included in the INIT received in an authenticated way. This list is included in the INIT
and INIT-ACK and MAY be omitted if it is empty. Since this list does and INIT-ACK and MAY be omitted if it is empty. Since this list does
not change during the lifetime of there is no problem in case of INIT not change during the lifetime of there is no problem in case of INIT
collision. collision.
Each SCTP endpoint MUST include in the INIT and INIT-ACK a HMAC-ALGO Each SCTP endpoint MUST include in the INIT and INIT-ACK a HMAC-ALGO
parameter containing a list of HMAC Identifiers it requests the peer parameter containing a list of HMAC Identifiers it requests the peer
to use. The receiver of a HMAC-ALGO parameter SHOULD use the first to use. The receiver of a HMAC-ALGO parameter SHOULD use the first
listed algorithm it supports. The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST listed algorithm it supports. The HMAC algorithm based on SHA-1 MUST
be supported and included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter. An SCTP be supported and included in the HMAC-ALGO parameter. An SCTP
endpoint MUST NOT change the parameters listed in the HMAC-ALGO endpoint MUST NOT change the parameters listed in the HMAC-ALGO
parameter during the lifetime of the endpoint. parameter during the lifetime of the endpoint.
Both endpoints of an association MAY have endpoint pair shared keys Both endpoints of an association MAY have endpoint pair shared keys
which are byte vectors and pre-configured or established by another which are byte vectors and pre-configured or established by another
mechanism. They are identified by the shared key identifier. If no mechanism. They are identified by the shared key identifier. For
endpoint pair shared keys are preconfigured or established by another each endpoint pair shared key an association shared key is computed.
mechanism an empty byte vector is used. If there is no endpoint pair shared key only one association shared
key is computed by using an empty byte vector as the endpoint pair
shared key.
The RANDOM parameter, the CHUNKS parameter and the HMAC-ALGO The RANDOM parameter, the CHUNKS parameter and the HMAC-ALGO
parameter sent by each endpoint are concatenated as byte vectors. parameter sent by each endpoint are concatenated as byte vectors.
These parameters include the parameter type, parameter length, and
the parameter value, but padding is omitted; all padding MUST be
removed from this concatenation before proceeding with further
computation of keys. Parameters which were not sent are simply
omitted from the concatenation process. The resulting two vectors
are called the two key vectors.
Parameters which were not sent are simply omitted from the From the endpoint pair shared keys and the key vectors the
concatenation process. The resulting two vectors are called the two
key numbers.
From the endpoint pair shared keys and the key numbers the
association shared keys are computed. This is performed by selecting association shared keys are computed. This is performed by selecting
the smaller key number and concatenating it to the endpoint pair the numerically smaller key vector and concatenating it to the
shared key, and then concatenating the larger of the key numbers to endpoint pair shared key, and then concatenating the numerically
that. If both key numbers are equal, then the concatenation order is larger key vector to that. If the key vectors are equal as numbers
the endpoint shared key, followed by the key number with the shorter but differ in length, then the concatenation order is the endpoint
length, followed by the key number with the longer length. If the shared key, followed by the shorter key vector, followed by the
key number lengths are the same, then they may be concatenated to the longer key vector. Otherwise, the key vectors are identical, and may
endpoint pair key in any order. The concatenation is performed on be concatenated to the endpoint pair key in any order. The
byte vectors representing all numbers in network byte order. The concatenation is performed on byte vectors, and all numerical
result is the association shared key. comparisons use network byte order to convert the key vectors to a
number. The result of the concatenation is the association shared
key.
6.2. Sending authenticated chunks 6.2. Sending authenticated chunks
Endpoints MUST send all requested chunks authenticated where this has Endpoints MUST send all requested chunks authenticated where this has
been requested by the peer. The other chunks MAY be sent been requested by the peer. The other chunks MAY be sent
authenticated or not. If endpoint pair shared keys are used, one of authenticated or not. If endpoint pair shared keys are used, one of
them MUST be selected for authentication. them MUST be selected for authentication.
To send chunks in an authenticated way, the sender MUST include these To send chunks in an authenticated way, the sender MUST include these
chunks after an AUTH chunk. This means that a sender MUST bundle chunks after an AUTH chunk. This means that a sender MUST bundle
chunks in order to authenticate them. chunks in order to authenticate them.
If the endpoint has no endpoint shared key for the peer, it MUST use If the endpoint has no endpoint pair shared key for the peer, it MUST
Shared Key Identifier 0 with an empty endpoint pair shared key. use Shared Key Identifier 0 with an empty endpoint pair shared key.
If there are multiple endpoint shared keys the sender selects one and
uses the corresponding Shared Key Identifier.
The sender MUST calculate the MAC as described in RFC2104 [2] using The sender MUST calculate the MAC as described in RFC2104 [2] using
the hash function H as described by the MAC Identifier and the shared the hash function H as described by the MAC Identifier and the shared
association key K based on the endpoint pair shared key described by association key K based on the endpoint pair shared key described by
the shared key identifier. The 'data' used for the computation of the shared key identifier. The 'data' used for the computation of
the AUTH-chunk is given by Figure 6 and all chunks that are placed the AUTH-chunk is given by the AUTH chunk with its HMAC field set to
zero (as shown in Figure 6) followed by all chunks that are placed
after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet. after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 0x0F | Flags=0 | Chunk Length | | Type = 0x0F | Flags=0 | Chunk Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Shared Key Identifier | HMAC Identifier | | Shared Key Identifier | HMAC Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
\ 0 / \ 0 /
/ \ / +-------------------------------\
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6 Figure 6
Please note that all fields are in network byte order and that the Please note that all fields are in network byte order and that the
field which will contain the complete HMAC is filled with zeroes. field which will contain the complete HMAC is filled with zeroes.
The length of the field shown as 0 is the length of the HMAC The length of the field shown as 0 is the length of the HMAC
described by the HMAC Identifier. The padding of all chunks being described by the HMAC Identifier. The padding of all chunks being
authenticated MUST be included in the HMAC computation. authenticated MUST be included in the HMAC computation.
The sender fills the HMAC into the HMAC field and sends the packet. The sender fills the HMAC into the HMAC field and sends the packet.
6.3. Receiving authenticated chunks 6.3. Receiving authenticated chunks
skipping to change at page 11, line 43 skipping to change at page 12, line 45
The receiver now performs the same calculation as described for the The receiver now performs the same calculation as described for the
sender based on Figure 6. If the result of the calculation is the sender based on Figure 6. If the result of the calculation is the
same as given in the HMAC field, all chunks following the AUTH chunk same as given in the HMAC field, all chunks following the AUTH chunk
are processed. If the field does not match the result of the are processed. If the field does not match the result of the
calculation, all the chunks following the AUTH chunk MUST be silently calculation, all the chunks following the AUTH chunk MUST be silently
discarded. discarded.
It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear down an It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear down an
association in an authenticated way only, the handling of malformed association in an authenticated way only, the handling of malformed
packets should be in tune with this. packets should not result in tearing down the association.
An SCTP implementation has to maintain state for each SCTP An SCTP implementation has to maintain state for each SCTP
association. In the following we call this data structure the SCTP association. In the following we call this data structure the SCTP
transmission control block (STCB). transmission control block (STCB).
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated some When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated some
special procedures have to be followed because the reception of an special procedures have to be followed because the reception of an
COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result in the creation of an SCTP COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result in the creation of an SCTP
association. If the receiver does not find a STCB for a packet association. If a packet arrives containing an AUTH chunk as a first
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk and a COOKIE-ECHO chunk as chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO chunk as the second chunk and possibly more
the second chunk and possibly more chunks after them, the receiver chunks after them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
MUST authenticate the chunks by using the random numbers included in packet, then authentication is based on the contents of the COOKIE-
the COOKIE-ECHO, and possibly the local shared secret. If ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST authenticate the
authentication fails then the packet is discarded. If the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM parameters, CHUNKS
authentication is successful the COOKIE-ECHO and all chunks after the parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO
COOKIE-ECHO MUST be processed. If the receiver has a STCB, it MUST chunk, and possibly a local shared secret as inputs to the
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB from the authentication procedure specified in Section 6.3. If authentication
existing association to authenticate the COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all fails then the packet is discarded. If the authentication is
chunks after it. successful the COOKIE-ECHO and all chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO MUST
be processed. If the receiver has a STCB, it MUST process the AUTH
chunk as described above using the STCB from the existing association
to authenticate the COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all chunks after it.
If the receiver does not find a STCB for a packet containing an AUTH If the receiver does not find a STCB for a packet containing an AUTH
chunk as the first chunk and not a COOKIE-ECHO chunk as the second chunk as the first chunk and not a COOKIE-ECHO chunk as the second
chunk, it MUST use the chunks after the AUTH chunk to look up an chunk, it MUST use the chunks after the AUTH chunk to look up an
existing association. If no association is found, the packet MUST be existing association. If no association is found, the packet MUST be
considered as out of the blue. The out of the blue handling MUST be considered as out of the blue. The out of the blue handling MUST be
based on the packet without taking the AUTH chunk into account. If based on the packet without taking the AUTH chunk into account. If
an association is found, it MUST process the AUTH chunk using the an association is found, it MUST process the AUTH chunk using the
STCB from the existing association as described earlier. STCB from the existing association as described earlier.
If the receiver of the packet does not have a STCB when it needs to
process the AUTH chunk, it MUST ignore the AUTH chunk. This applies
to a packet containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk and an COOKIE-
ECHO chunk as the second chunk received in the CLOSED state. If the
receiver has a STCB, it MUST process the AUTH chunk as described
above.
Requiring ABORT chunks and COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated Requiring ABORT chunks and COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated
makes it impossible for an attacker to bring down or restart an makes it impossible for an attacker to bring down or restart an
association as long as the attacker does not know the association association as long as the attacker does not know the association
shared key. But it should also be noted that if an endpoint accepts shared key. But it should also be noted that if an endpoint accepts
ABORT chunks only in an authenticated way, it may take longer to ABORT chunks only in an authenticated way, it may take longer to
detect that the peer is no longer available. If an endpoint accepts detect that the peer is no longer available. If an endpoint accepts
COOKIE-ECHO chunks only in an authenticated way, the restart COOKIE-ECHO chunks only in an authenticated way, the restart
procedure does not work, because the restarting end-point most likely procedure does not work, because the restarting end-point most likely
does not know the association shared key of the old association to be does not know the association shared key of the old association to be
restarted. However, if the restarting end-point does know the old restarted. However, if the restarting end-point does know the old
skipping to change at page 13, line 6 skipping to change at page 14, line 4
association shared key for the packet containing the AUTH chunk. association shared key for the packet containing the AUTH chunk.
After this operation both end-points have to use the new association After this operation both end-points have to use the new association
shared key. shared key.
If a server has an endpoint pair shared key with some clients it can If a server has an endpoint pair shared key with some clients it can
request the COOKIE_ECHO chunk to be authenticated and can ensure that request the COOKIE_ECHO chunk to be authenticated and can ensure that
only associations from client with a correct endpoint pair shared key only associations from client with a correct endpoint pair shared key
are accepted. are accepted.
Furthermore it is important that the cookie contained in an INIT-ACK Furthermore it is important that the cookie contained in an INIT-ACK
chunk and in a COOKIE-ECHO chunk MUST NOT contain the end-point pair chunk and in a COOKIE-ECHO chunk MUST NOT contain any end-point pair
shared key. shared keys.
7. Examples 7. Examples
This section gives examples of message exchanges for association This section gives examples of message exchanges for association
setup. setup.
The simplest way of using the extension described in this document is The simplest way of using the extension described in this document is
given by the following message exchange. given by the following message exchange.
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
skipping to change at page 13, line 36 skipping to change at page 14, line 34
the following message exchange is possible: the following message exchange is possible:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
--------------- COOKIE-ECHO; AUTH; DATA -------------> --------------- COOKIE-ECHO; AUTH; DATA ------------->
<----------------- COOKIE-ACK; SACK ------------------ <----------------- COOKIE-ACK; SACK ------------------
Please note that if the endpoint pair shared key depends on the Please note that if the endpoint pair shared key depends on the
client and the server and that it is only known by the upper layer client and the server and that it is only known by the upper layer
this message exchange requires an upper layer intervention between this message exchange requires an upper layer intervention between
the processing of the COOKIE-ECHO chunk (COMMUNICATION-UP the processing of the COOKIE-ECHO chunk and the processing of the
notification followed by the presentation of the endpoint pair shared AUTH and DATA chunk at the server side. This intervention may be
key by the upper layer to the SCTP stack) and the processing of the realized by a COMMUNICATION-UP notification followed by the
AUTH and DATA chunk at the server side. If this intervention is not presentation of the endpoint pair shared key by the upper layer to
possible due to limitations of the API (for example the socket API) the SCTP stack, see for example section 10 of RFC2960 [5]. If this
the server might discard the AUTH and DATA chunk making a intervention is not possible due to limitations of the API (for
retransmission of the DATA chunk necessary. If the same endpoint example the socket API) the server might discard the AUTH and DATA
pair shared key is used for multiple endpoints and does not depend on chunk making a retransmission of the DATA chunk necessary. If the
the client this intervention might not be necessary. same endpoint pair shared key is used for multiple endpoints and does
not depend on the client this intervention might not be necessary.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
[NOTE to RFC-Editor: [NOTE to RFC-Editor:
"RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this "RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number you assign this
document. document.
] ]
This document (RFCXXX) is the reference for all registrations This document (RFCXXX) is the reference for all registrations
described in this section. All registrations need to be listed in described in this section. All registrations need to be listed in
the document available at sctp-parameters [8]. The suggested changes the document available at sctp-parameters [9]. The suggested changes
are described below. are described below.
8.1. A New Chunk Type 8.1. A New Chunk Type
A chunk type for the AUTH chunk has to be assigned by IANA. It is A chunk type for the AUTH chunk has to be assigned by IANA. It is
suggested to use the value given in Table 4. This requires an suggested to use the value given in Table 4. This requires an
additional line in the "CHUNK TYPES" table of sctp-parameters [8]: additional line in the "CHUNK TYPES" table of sctp-parameters [9]:
CHUNK TYPES CHUNK TYPES
ID Value Chunk Type Reference ID Value Chunk Type Reference
----- ---------- --------- ----- ---------- ---------
15 Authentication Chunk (AUTH) [RFCXXXX] 15 Authentication Chunk (AUTH) [RFCXXXX]
8.2. Three New Parameter Types 8.2. Three New Parameter Types
Parameter types have to be assigned for the RANDOM, CHUNKS, and HMAC- Parameter types have to be assigned for the RANDOM, CHUNKS, and HMAC-
ALGO parameter by IANA. It is suggested to use the values given in ALGO parameter by IANA. It is suggested to use the values given in
Table 1. This requires two modifications of the "CHUNK PARAMETER Table 1. This requires two modifications of the "CHUNK PARAMETER
TPYES" tables in sctp-parameters [8]: The first change is the TPYES" tables in sctp-parameters [9]: The first change is the
addition of three new lines to the "INIT Chunk Parameter Types" addition of three new lines to the "INIT Chunk Parameter Types"
table: table:
Chunk Parameter Type Value Chunk Parameter Type Value
-------------------- ----- -------------------- -----
Random 32770 (0x8002) Random 32770 (0x8002)
Chunk List 32771 (0x8003) Chunk List 32771 (0x8003)
Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter 32772 (0x8004) Requested HMAC Algorithm Parameter 32772 (0x8004)
The second required change is the addition of the same three lines to The second required change is the addition of the same three lines to
the to the "INIT ACK Chunk Parameter Types" table. the to the "INIT ACK Chunk Parameter Types" table.
8.3. A New Error Cause 8.3. A New Error Cause
An error cause for the Unsupported HMAC Identifier error cause has to An error cause for the Unsupported HMAC Identifier error cause has to
be assigned. It is suggested to use the value given in Table 3. be assigned. It is suggested to use the value given in Table 3.
This requires an additional line of the "CAUSE CODES" table in sctp- This requires an additional line of the "CAUSE CODES" table in sctp-
parameters [8]: parameters [9]:
VALUE CAUSE CODE REFERENCE VALUE CAUSE CODE REFERENCE
----- ---------------- --------- ----- ---------------- ---------
261 (0x0105) Unsupported HMAC Identifier RFCXXXX 261 (0x0105) Unsupported HMAC Identifier RFCXXXX
8.4. A New Table For HMAC Identifiers 8.4. A New Table For HMAC Identifiers
HMAC Identifiers have to be maintained by IANA. Three initial values HMAC Identifiers have to be maintained by IANA. Four initial values
should be assigned by IANA as described in Table 2. This requires a should be assigned by IANA as described in Table 2. This requires a
new table "HMAC IDENTIFIERS" in sctp-parameters [8]: new table "HMAC IDENTIFIERS" in sctp-parameters [9]:
HMAC Identifier Message Digest Algorithm REFERENCE HMAC Identifier Message Digest Algorithm REFERENCE
--------------- ------------------------ --------- --------------- ------------------------ ---------
0 Reserved RFCXXXX 0 Reserved RFCXXXX
1 SHA-1 RFCXXXX 1 SHA-1 RFCXXXX
2 Reserved RFCXXXX
3 SHA-256 RFCXXXX 3 SHA-256 RFCXXXX
For registering at IANA a new HMAC Identifier in this table a request For registering at IANA a new HMAC Identifier in this table a request
has to be made to assign such a number. This number must be unique has to be made to assign such a number. This number must be unique
and a message digest algorithm usable with the HMAC defined in and a message digest algorithm usable with the HMAC defined in
RFC2104 [2] MUST be specified. The "Specification Required" policy RFC2104 [2] MUST be specified. The "Specification Required" policy
of RFC2434 [4] MUST be applied. of RFC2434 [4] MUST be applied.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
skipping to change at page 16, line 21 skipping to change at page 17, line 22
ALGO parameter must be prepared that the peer uses the weakest ALGO parameter must be prepared that the peer uses the weakest
algorithm listed. algorithm listed.
When an endpoint pair uses non-NULL endpoint pair shared keys and one When an endpoint pair uses non-NULL endpoint pair shared keys and one
of the endpoints still accepts a NULL key an attacker who captured of the endpoints still accepts a NULL key an attacker who captured
the initial handshake can still inject or modify authenticated chunks the initial handshake can still inject or modify authenticated chunks
by using the NULL key. by using the NULL key.
10. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Sascha Grau, Ivan Arias Rodriguez, Irene The authors wish to thank David Black, Sascha Grau, Russ Housley,
Ruengeler, and Magnus Westerlund for their invaluable comments. Ivan Arias Rodriguez, Irene Ruengeler, and Magnus Westerlund for
their invaluable comments.
11. Normative References 11. Normative References
[1] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, [1] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992. April 1992.
[2] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing [2] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997. for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
skipping to change at page 16, line 46 skipping to change at page 17, line 48
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[5] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer, [5] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer,
H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L., and V. Paxson, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L., and V. Paxson,
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000. "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.
[6] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport Layer [6] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport Layer
Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 3436, Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 3436,
December 2002. December 2002.
[7] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash [7] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[8] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002, Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/ <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/
fips180-2.pdf>. fips180-2.pdf>.
[8] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters> [9] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/sctp-parameters>
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Michael Tuexen Michael Tuexen
Muenster Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster Univ. of Applied Sciences
Stegerwaldstr. 39 Stegerwaldstr. 39
48565 Steinfurt 48565 Steinfurt
Germany Germany
Email: tuexen@fh-muenster.de Email: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
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