draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10.txt   draft-ietf-tokbind-https-11.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov
Internet-Draft M. Nystroem Internet-Draft M. Nystroem
Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp. Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.
Expires: January 22, 2018 D. Balfanz, Ed. Expires: May 19, 2018 D. Balfanz, Ed.
A. Langley A. Langley
N. Harper N. Harper
Google Inc. Google Inc.
J. Hodges J. Hodges
PayPal PayPal
July 21, 2017 November 15, 2017
Token Binding over HTTP Token Binding over HTTP
draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10 draft-ietf-tokbind-https-11
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies
and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections. and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.
We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first- We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first-
party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the
security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client
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Protocol. Protocol.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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5.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.5. Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS 7.2. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS
Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . 14 7.3. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . 14
7.4. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.4. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.3. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.3. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Token Binding Protocol [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] defines a The Token Binding Protocol [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] defines a
Token Binding ID for a TLS connection between a client and a server. Token Binding ID for a TLS connection between a client and a server.
The Token Binding ID of a TLS connection is constructed using the The Token Binding ID of a TLS connection is constructed using the
public key of a private-public key pair. The client proves public key of a private-public key pair. The client proves
possession of the corresponding private key. This Token Binding key possession of the corresponding private key. This Token Binding key
pair is long-lived. I.e., subsequent TLS connections between the pair is long-lived. I.e., subsequent TLS connections between the
same client and server have the same Token Binding ID, unless same client and server have the same Token Binding ID, unless
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referred Token Binding ID in an application-level message as part of referred Token Binding ID in an application-level message as part of
the redirect URL) is one way to assure that the man-in-the-middle the redirect URL) is one way to assure that the man-in-the-middle
between client and Token Consumer cannot affect the communication of between client and Token Consumer cannot affect the communication of
the referred Token Binding ID to the Token Provider. the referred Token Binding ID to the Token Provider.
Therefore, the Sec-Token-Binding header field in the federated sign- Therefore, the Sec-Token-Binding header field in the federated sign-
on use case contains both: a proof of possession of the provided on use case contains both: a proof of possession of the provided
Token Binding key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred Token Binding key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred
Token Binding key. Token Binding key.
Note that the presence of Token Binding does not relieve the Token
Provider and Token Consumer from performing various checks to ensure
the security of clients during federated sign-on protocols. These
include the following:
o The Token Provider should not issue tokens to Token Consumers that
have been shown to act maliciously. To aid in this, the
federation protocol should identify the Token Consumer to the
Token Provider (e.g., through OAuth client IDs or similar
mechanisms), and the Token Provider should ensure that tokens are
indeed issued to the Token Consumer identified in the token
request (e.g., by verifying that the redirect URI is associated
with the OAuth client ID.)
o The Token Consumer should verify that the tokens were issued for
it, and not some other token consumer. To aid in this, the
federation protocol should include an audience parameter in the
token response, or apply equivalent mechanisms (the implicit OAuth
flow requires Token Consumers to identify themselves when they
exchange OAuth authorization codes for OAuth refresh tokens,
leaving it up to the Token Provider to verify that the OAuth
authorization was delivered to the correct Token Consumer).
8. Privacy Considerations 8. Privacy Considerations
8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs 8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs
Clients use different Token Binding key pairs for different servers, Clients use different Token Binding key pairs for different servers,
so as to not allow Token Binding to become a tracking tool across so as to not allow Token Binding to become a tracking tool across
different servers. However, the scoping of the Token Binding key different servers. However, the scoping of the Token Binding key
pairs to servers varies according to the scoping rules of the pairs to servers varies according to the scoping rules of the
application protocol (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]). application protocol (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]).
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11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[fetch-spec] [fetch-spec]
WhatWG, "Fetch", Living Standard , WhatWG, "Fetch", Living Standard ,
<https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>. <https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.
[I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]
Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley, Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token
Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind- Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind-
negotiation-09 (work in progress), July 2017. negotiation-10 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]
Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J. Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.
Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft- Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-
ietf-tokbind-protocol-15 (work in progress), July 2017. ietf-tokbind-protocol-16 (work in progress), October 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration [RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864, Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>. March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265, [RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for [RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015, HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", August 2015, C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", August 2015,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov, [RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010, Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., [RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015, RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[TRIPLE-HS] [TRIPLE-HS]
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014. Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Andrei Popov Andrei Popov
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