draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05.txt   rfc5487.txt 
TLS Working Group Mohamad Badra
Internet Draft LIMOS Laboratory
Intended status: Standards Track October 31, 2008
Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode
draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05.txt
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Drafts. SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode
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Abstract Abstract
RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 describe pre-shared key cipher suites for RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 describe pre-shared key cipher suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, all those cipher suites Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, all those cipher suites use
use SHA-1 as their MAC algorithm. This document describes a set of SHA-1 in their Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm. This
pre-shared key cipher suites for TLS which uses stronger digest document describes a set of pre-shared key cipher suites for TLS that
algorithms (i.e., SHA-256 or SHA-384) and another set which uses the uses stronger digest algorithms (i.e., SHA-256 or SHA-384) and
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois Counter Mode (GCM). another set that uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in
Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Applicability Statement...................................3 1.1. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Conventions used in this document.........................4 1.2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM..4 2. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with
3. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384.........4 AES-GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...............5 3. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384 . . . . 4
3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...........5 3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384...........5 3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations........................................6 3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations............................................6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgments................................................7 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References.....................................................7 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Normative References......................................7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Informative References....................................8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Addresses................................................8 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Property Statement...................................8
Disclaimer of Validity............................................9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The benefits of pre-shared symmetric-key vs. public-/private-key The benefits of pre-shared symmetric-key vs. public-/private-key pair
pair based authentication for the key exchange in TLS have been based authentication for the key exchange in TLS have been explained
explained in the Introduction of [RFC4279]. This document leverages in the Introduction of [RFC4279]. This document leverages the
the already defined algorithms for the application of newer, already defined algorithms for the application of newer, generally
generally regarded stronger, cryptographic primitives and building regarded stronger, cryptographic primitives and building blocks.
blocks.
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] adds support for authenticated encryption with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] adds support for authenticated encryption with
additional data (AEAD) cipher modes [RFC5116]. This document additional data (AEAD) cipher modes [RFC5116]. This document
describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] in describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard [AES] in Galois
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various pre-shared Counter Mode [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various pre-shared key (PSK)
key (PSK) authenticated key exchange mechanisms ([RFC4279] and authenticated key exchange mechanisms ([RFC4279] and [RFC4785]) in
[RFC4785]) in cipher suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS). cipher suites for TLS.
This document also specifies PSK cipher suites for TLS which replace This document also specifies PSK cipher suites for TLS that replace
SHA-1 by SHA-256 or SHA-384 [SHS]. RFC 4279 [RFC4279] and RFC 4785 SHA-1 by SHA-256 or SHA-384 [SHS]. RFC 4279 [RFC4279] and RFC 4785
[RFC4785] describe PSK cipher suites for TLS. However, all of the [RFC4785] describe PSK cipher suites for TLS. However, all of the
RFC 4279 and the RFC 4785 cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC RFC 4279 and the RFC 4785 cipher suites use HMAC-SHA1 as their MAC
algorithm. Due to recent analytic work on SHA-1 [Wang05], the IETF algorithm. Due to recent analytic work on SHA-1 [Wang05], the IETF
is gradually moving away from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash is gradually moving away from SHA-1 and towards stronger hash
algorithms. algorithms.
Related TLS cipher suites with key exchange algorithms that are Related TLS cipher suites with key exchange algorithms that are
authenticated using public/private key pairs have recently been authenticated using public/private key pairs have recently been
specified: specified:
- RSA, DSS, and Diffie-Hellman based cipher suites in [RFC5288], o RSA-, DSS-, and Diffie-Hellman-based cipher suites in [RFC5288],
and and
o ECC-based cipher suites with SHA-256/384 and AES-GCM in [RFC5289].
- ECC based cipher suites with SHA-256/384 and AES-GCM in
[RFC5289].
The reader is expected to become familiar with these two memos prior The reader is expected to become familiar with these two memos prior
to studying this document. to studying this document.
1.1. Applicability Statement 1.1. Applicability Statement
The cipher suites defined in Section 3 can be negotiated, whatever The cipher suites defined in Section 3 can be negotiated, whatever
the negotiated TLS version is. the negotiated TLS version is.
The cipher suites defined in Section 2 can be negotiated in TLS The cipher suites defined in Section 2 can be negotiated in TLS
version 1.2 or higher. version 1.2 or higher.
1.2. Conventions used in this document The applicability statement in [RFC4279] applies to this document as
well.
1.2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM 2. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithms with AES-GCM
The following six cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption The following six cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption
modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode [GCM]. The
[GCM]. The cipher suites with DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm cipher suites with the DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm
(TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and (TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA348) provide Perfect Forward Secrecy TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA348) provide Perfect Forward Secrecy
(PFS). (PFS).
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA9};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAA};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAB};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAC};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAD};
These cipher suites use authenticated encryption with additional These cipher suites use authenticated encryption with additional data
data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM as (AEAD) algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, as
described in RFC 5116. GCM is used as described in [RFC5288]. described in RFC 5116. GCM is used as described in [RFC5288].
The PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK key exchanges are performed as defined The PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK key exchanges are performed as defined
in [RFC4279]. in [RFC4279].
The Pseudo Random Function (PRF) algorithms SHALL be as follows: The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) algorithms SHALL be as follows:
For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF o For cipher suites ending with _SHA256, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function. [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF o For cipher suites ending with _SHA384, the PRF is the TLS PRF
[RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function. [RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
Implementations MUST send a TLS Alert 'bad_record_mac' for all types Implementations MUST send a TLS Alert 'bad_record_mac' for all types
of failures encountered in processing the AES-GCM algorithm. of failures encountered in processing the AES-GCM algorithm.
3. PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384 3. PSK, DHE_PSK, and RSA_PSK Key Exchange with SHA-256/384
The first two cipher suites described in each of the following three The first two cipher suites described in each of the following three
sections use AES [AES] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [CBC] for sections use AES [AES] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [MODES]
data confidentiality, whereas the other two cipher suites do not for data confidentiality, whereas the other two cipher suites do not
provide data confidentiality; all cipher suites provide integrity provide data confidentiality; all cipher suites provide integrity
protection and authentication using HMAC-based MACs. protection and authentication using HMAC-based MACs.
3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 3.1. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAE};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAF};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB0};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB1};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
cipher suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
in place of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
algorithms: as explained below.
o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA256": o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA256":
- The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-256 as the hash * The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
function.
- When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF * When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
from that version is used; otherwise the PRF is the TLS that version is used; otherwise, the PRF is the TLS PRF
PRF [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function. [RFC5246] with SHA-256 as the hash function.
o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA384": o For cipher suites with names ending in "_SHA384":
- The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-384 as the hash * The MAC is HMAC [RFC2104] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
function.
- When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF * When negotiated in a version of TLS prior to 1.2, the PRF from
from that version is used; otherwise the PRF is the TLS that version is used; otherwise, the PRF is the TLS PRF
PRF [RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function. [RFC5246] with SHA-384 as the hash function.
3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 3.2. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB2};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB3};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB4};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB5};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
cipher suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
in place of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
algorithms, as explained in Section 3.1. as explained in Section 3.1.
3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384 3.3. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm with SHA-256/384
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB6};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB7};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB8};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9};
The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding The above four cipher suites are the same as the corresponding cipher
cipher suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" suites in RFC 4279 and RFC 4785 (with names ending in "_SHA" in place
in place of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF of "_SHA256" or "_SHA384"), except for the hash and PRF algorithms,
algorithms, as explained in Section 3.1. as explained in Section 3.1.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [RFC4279], [RFC4785] and [RFC5288] The security considerations in [RFC4279], [RFC4785], and [RFC5288]
apply to this document as well. In particular, as authentication- apply to this document as well. In particular, as authentication-
only cipher suites (with no encryption) defined here do not support only cipher suites (with no encryption) defined here do not support
confidentiality, care should be taken not to send sensitive confidentiality, care should be taken not to send sensitive
information (such as passwords) over connections protected with one information (such as passwords) over connections protected with one
of the cipher suites with NULL encryption defined in this document. of the cipher suites with NULL encryption defined in this document.
As described in [RFC5288], the cipher suites defined in the Section
2 of this document may only be used with TLS 1.2 or greater. The
cipher suites defined in the Section 3 may be used, whatever the
negotiated TLS version is.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following values for the cipher suites defined IANA has assigned the following values for the cipher suites defined
in this document: in this document:
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xA8};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xA9};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAA};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAB};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAC};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAD};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xAE};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xAF};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB0};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB1};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB2};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB3};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB4};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB5};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB6};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB7};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 = {0x00,0xB8};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0xXX,0xXX}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 = {0x00,0xB9};
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
This draft borrows heavily from [RFC5289] and [RFC5288]. This document borrows from [RFC5289]. The author appreciates Alfred
Hoenes for his detailed review and effort on resolving issues in
The author appreciates Alfred Hoenes for his detailed review and discussion. The author would like also to acknowledge Ibrahim
effort on issues resolving discussion. The author would like also Hajjeh, Simon Josefsson, Hassnaa Moustafa, Joseph Salowey, and Pascal
to acknowledge Ibrahim Hajjeh, Simon Josefsson, Hassnaa Moustafa, Urien for their reviews of the content of the document.
Joseph Salowey and Pascal Urien for their reviews of the content of
the document.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001. (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[CBC] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation -
Methods and Techniques", SP 800-38A, December 2001.
[GCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [GCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", SP 800-38D, November 2007. Authentication", SP 800-38D, November 2007.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [MODES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002. "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation -
Methods and Techniques", SP 800-38A, December 2001.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
2005. December 2005.
[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U., Goel, P., "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) [RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007. Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008. Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., A. Choudhury, and C. McGrew, "RSA based AES- [RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
GCM Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008. Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- [RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5289, August 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
2008. August 2008.
[Wang05] Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the [Wang05] Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005. Full SHA-1", CRYPTO 2005, August 2005.
Author's Addresses Author's Address
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
LIMOS Laboratory - UMR6158, CNRS CNRS/LIMOS Laboratory
Campus de cezeaux, Bat. ISIMA
Aubiere 63170
France France
Email: badra@isima.fr EMail: badra@isima.fr
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