--- 1/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-04.txt 2009-03-08 00:12:13.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-tls-extractor-05.txt 2009-03-08 00:12:13.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group E. Rescorla Internet-Draft RTFM, Inc. -Intended status: Standards Track February 28, 2009 -Expires: September 1, 2009 +Intended status: Standards Track March 07, 2009 +Expires: September 8, 2009 Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS) - draft-ietf-tls-extractor-04.txt + draft-ietf-tls-extractor-05.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from @@ -31,21 +31,21 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2009. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2009. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights @@ -58,26 +58,26 @@ for their own purposes. This document describes a general mechanism for allowing that. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Binding to Application Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Exporter Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 8.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 8.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. Introduction Note: The mechanism described in this document was previously known as "TLS Extractors" but was changed to avoid a name conflict with the use of the term "Extractor" in the cryptographic community. A number of protocols wish to leverage Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] or Datagram TLS (DTLS) [RFC4347] to perform key establishment but then use some of the keying material for their own @@ -94,36 +94,36 @@ o Both client and server need to be able to export the same EKM value. o EKM values should be indistinguishable from random by attackers who don't know the master_secret. o It should be possible to export multiple EKM values from the same TLS/DTLS association. o Knowing one EKM value should not reveal any information about the master_secret or about other EKM values. - The mechanism described in this document is intended to fill these + The mechanism described in this document is intended to fulfill these requirements. 2. Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 3. Binding to Application Contexts In addition to exporting keying material, an application using the - keying material has to securely establish the upper-layer layer - context where the keying material will be used. The details of this - context depend on the application, but it could include things such - as algorithms and parameters that will be used with the keys, + keying material has to securely establish the upper-layer context + where the keying material will be used. The details of this context + depend on the application, but it could include things such as + algorithms and parameters that will be used with the keys, identifier(s) for the endpoint(s) who will use the keys, identifier(s) for the session(s) where the keys will be used, and the lifetime(s) for the context and/or keys. At minimum, there should be some mechanism for signalling that an exporter will be used. This specification does not mandate a single mechanism for agreeing on such context; instead, there are several possibilities that can be used (and can complement each other). For example: o One important part of the context -- which application will use @@ -131,126 +131,160 @@ (see Section 4). o Information about the upper-layer context can be included in the optional data after the exporter label (see Section 4). o Information about the upper-layer context can be exchanged in TLS extensions included in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages. This approach is used in [DTLS-SRTP]. The handshake messages are protected by the Finished messages, so once the handshake completes, the peers will have the same view of the information. Extensions also allow a limited form of negotiation: for example, the TLS client could propose several alternatives for some context - parameters, and TLS server could select one of them. + parameters, and the TLS server could select one of them. o The upper-layer protocol can include its own handshake which can be protected using the keys exported from TLS. It is important to note that just embedding TLS messages in the upper-layer protocol may not automatically secure all the important context information, since the upper-layer messages are not covered by TLS Finished messages. 4. Exporter Definition - An exporter takes as input three values: + The output of the exporter is intended to be used in a single scope, + which is associated with the TLS session, the label, and the context + value. o A disambiguating label string - o A per-association context value provided by the exporter using - application + o A per-association context value provided by the application using + the exporter o A length value It then computes: - PRF(master_secret, label, + PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, label, SecurityParameters.client_random + SecurityParameters.server_random + context_value_length + context_value )[length] - The output is a pseudorandom bit string of length bytes generated - from the master_secret. - Label values beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" MAY be used for private - use without registration. All other label values MUST be registered - via Specification Required as described by RFC 2434 [RFC2434]. Note - that exporter labels have the potential to collide with existing PRF - labels. In order to prevent this, labels SHOULD begin with - "EXPORTER". This is not a MUST because there are existing uses which - have labels which do not begin with this prefix. + Where PRF is the TLS PRF in use for the session. The output is a + pseudorandom bit string of length bytes generated from the + master_secret. + + Labels here have the same definition as in TLS, i.e., an ASCII string + with no terminating NULL. Label values beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" + MAY be used for private use without registration. All other label + values MUST be registered via Specification Required as described by + RFC 5226 [RFC5226]. Note that exporter labels have the potential to + collide with existing PRF labels. In order to prevent this, labels + SHOULD begin with "EXPORTER". This is not a MUST because there are + existing uses which have labels which do not begin with this prefix. + + opaque context<0..2^16-1>; The context value allows the application using the exporter to mix - its own data with the TLS PRF for the exporter output. The context - value length is encoded as an unsigned 16-bit quantity (uint16) - representing the length of the context value. + its own data with the TLS PRF for the exporter output. One example + of where this might be useful is an authentication setting where the + client credentials are valid for more than one identity; the context + value could then be used to mix the expected identity into the keying + material, thus preventing substitution attacks. The context value + length is encoded as an unsigned 16-bit quantity (uint16) + representing the length of the context value. The context MAY be + zero length. 5. Security Considerations + The prime security requirement for exporter outputs is that they be + independent. More formally, after a particular TLS session, if an + adversary is allowed to choose multiple (label, context value) pairs + and is given the output of the PRF for those values, the attacker is + still unable to distinguish between the output of the PRF for a + (label, context value) pair (different from the ones that it + submitted) and a random value of the same length. In particular, + there may be settings, such as the one described in Section 4, where + the attacker can control the context value; such an attacker MUST not + be able to predict the output of the exporter. Similarly, an + attacker who does not know the master secret should not be able to + distinguish valid exporter outputs from random values. The current + set of TLS PRFs is believed to meet this objective, provided the + master secret is randomly generated. + Because an exporter produces the same value if applied twice with the same label to the same master_secret, it is critical that two EKM - values generated with the same label be used for two different + values generated with the same label not be used for two different purposes--hence the requirement for IANA registration. However, because exporters depend on the TLS PRF, it is not a threat to the use of an EKM value generated from one label to reveal an EKM value generated from another label. 6. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to create (has created) a TLS Exporter Label registry for this purpose. The initial contents of the registry are given below: Value Reference ----- ------------ client finished [RFC5246] server finished [RFC5246] master secret [RFC5246] key expansion [RFC5246] client EAP encryption [RFC2716] - ttls keying material [draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01] + ttls keying material [RFC5281] + ttls challenge [RFC5281] - Future values are allocated via RFC2434 Specification Required + Future values are allocated via RFC5226 Specification Required policy. The label is a string consisting of printable ASCII characters. IANA MUST also verify that one label is not a prefix of any other label. For example, labels "key" or "master secretary" are forbidden. 7. Acknowledgments Thanks to Pasi Eronen for valuable comments and the contents of the - IANA section and Section 3. + IANA section and Section 3. Thanks to David McGrew for helpful + discussion of the security considerations and Alfred Hoenes for + editorial comments. 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an - IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, - October 1998. + [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, + May 2008. [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. -8.2. Informational References + [RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication + Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated + Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281, August 2008. - [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer - Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. +8.2. Informational References [RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 3711, March 2004. + [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer + Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. + [I-D.ietf-avt-dtls-srtp] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", - draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-06 (work in progress), - October 2008. + draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-07 (work in progress), + February 2009. Author's Address Eric Rescorla RTFM, Inc. 2064 Edgewood Drive Palo Alto, CA 94303 USA Email: ekr@rtfm.com