draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-00.txt   draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-01.txt 
TLS E. Rescorla, Ed. TLS E. Rescorla, Ed.
Internet-Draft RTFM, Inc. Internet-Draft RTFM, Inc.
Obsoletes: 6347 (if approved) H. Tschofenig, Ed. Updates: 6347 (if approved) H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track ARM Limited Intended status: Standards Track Arm Limited
Expires: June 30, 2018 T. Fossati Expires: January 3, 2019 T. Fossati
Nokia Nokia
T. Gondrom T. Gondrom
Huawei Huawei
December 27, 2017 July 02, 2018
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Connection Identifier The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Connection Identifier
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-00 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-01
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the "Connection ID" concept for the Datagram This document specifies the Connection ID construct for the Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, version 1.2 and version Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.
1.3.
A Connection ID is an identifier carried in the record layer header A Connection ID is an identifier carried in the record layer header
that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the
appropriate security association. In "classical" DTLS, selecting a appropriate security association. In "classical" DTLS, selecting a
security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with
the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port
changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the
receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context. receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 30, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
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skipping to change at page 2, line 37 skipping to change at page 2, line 37
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The "connection_id" Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. The "connection_id" Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Post-Handshake Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Record Layer Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Record Layer Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Record Payload Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Working Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix B. Working Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol was designed The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol was designed
for securing connection-less transports, like UDP. DTLS, like TLS, for securing connection-less transports, like UDP. DTLS, like TLS,
starts with a handshake, which can be computationally demanding starts with a handshake, which can be computationally demanding
(particularly when public key cryptography is used). After a (particularly when public key cryptography is used). After a
successful handshake, symmetric key cryptography is used to apply successful handshake, symmetric key cryptography is used to apply
data origin authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection. data origin authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection.
This two-step approach allows to amortize the cost of the initial This two-step approach allows endpoints to amortize the cost of the
handshake to subsequent application data protection. Ideally, the initial handshake across subsequent application data protection.
second phase where application data is protected lasts over a longer Ideally, the second phase where application data is protected lasts
period of time since the established keys will only need to be over a longer period of time since the established keys will only
updated once the key lifetime expires. need to be updated once the key lifetime expires.
In the current version of DTLS, the IP address and port of the peer In the current version of DTLS, the IP address and port of the peer
is used to identify the DTLS association. Unfortunately, in some are used to identify the DTLS association. Unfortunately, in some
cases, such as NAT rebinding, these values are insufficient. This is cases, such as NAT rebinding, these values are insufficient. This is
a particular issue in the Internet of Things when the device needs to a particular issue in the Internet of Things when devices enter
enter extended sleep periods to increase the battery lifetime and is extended sleep periods to increase their battery lifetime. The NAT
therefore subject to rebinding. This leads to connection failure, rebinding leads to connection failure, with the resulting cost of a
with the resulting cost of a new handshake. new handshake.
This document defines an extension to DTLS to add a connection ID to This document defines an extension to DTLS to add a connection ID to
each DTLS record. The presence of the connection ID is negotiated the DTLS record layer. The presence of the connection ID is
via a DTLS extension. It also defines a DTLS 1.3 post-handshake negotiated via a DTLS extension.
message to change connection ids.
2. Conventions and Terminology 2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119]. 2119 [RFC2119].
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the DTLS specifications The reader is assumed to be familiar with DTLS [RFC6347].
since this document defines an extension to DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3.
3. The "connection_id" Extension 3. The "connection_id" Extension
This document defines a new extension type (connection_id(TBD)), This document defines a new extension type (connection_id(TBD)),
which is used in ClientHello and ServerHello messages. which is used in ClientHello and ServerHello messages.
The extension type is specified as follows. The extension type is specified as follows.
enum { enum {
connection_id(TBD), (65535) connection_id(TBD), (65535)
} ExtensionType; } ExtensionType;
The extension_data field of this extension, when included in the The extension_data field of this extension, when included in the
ClientHello, MUST contain the CID structure, which contains the CID ClientHello, MUST contain the CID structure, which carries the CID
which the client wishes the server to use when sending messages which the client wishes the server to use when sending messages
towards it. A zero-length value indicates that the client is towards it. A zero-length value indicates that the client is
prepared to send with a connection ID but does not wish the server to prepared to send with a connection ID but does not wish the server to
use one when sending (alternately, this can be interpreted as the use one when sending (alternately, this can be interpreted as the
client wishes the server to use a zero-length CID; the result is the client wishes the server to use a zero-length CID; the result is the
same). same).
struct { struct {
opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
} ConnectionId; } ConnectionId;
A server which is willing to use CIDs will respond with its own A server which is willing to use CIDs will respond with its own
"connection_id" extension, containing the CID which it wishes the "connection_id" extension, containing the CID it wishes the client to
client to use when sending messages towards it. A zero-length value use when sending messages towards it. A zero-length value indicates
indicates that the server will send with the client's CID but does that the server will send with the client's CID but does not wish the
not wish the client to use a CID (or again, alternately, to use a client to use a CID (or again, alternately, to use a zero-length
zero-length CID). CID).
When a session is resumed, the "connection_id" extension is When a session is resumed, the "connection_id" extension is
negotiated afresh, not retained from previous connections in the negotiated afresh, not retained from previous connections in the
session. session.
This is effectively the simplest possible design that will work. This is effectively the simplest possible design that will work.
Previous design ideas for using cryptographically generated session Previous design ideas for using cryptographically generated session
ids, either using hash chains or public key encryption, were ids, either using hash chains or public key encryption, were
dismissed due to their inefficient designs. Note that a client dismissed due to their inefficient designs. Note that a client
always has the chance to fall-back to a full handshake or more always has the chance to fall back to a full handshake or more
precisely to a handshake that uses session resumption (DTLS 1.2 precisely to a handshake that uses session resumption.
language) or to a PSK-based handshake using the ticket-based
approach.
Because each party sends in the extension_data the value that it will Because each party sends in the extension_data the value that it will
receive as a connection identifier in encrypted records, it is receive as a connection identifier in encrypted records, it is
possible for an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such possible for an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such
connection identifiers. This can in turn ease parsing and connection connection identifiers. This can in turn ease parsing and connection
lookup, for example by having the length in question be a compile- lookup, for example by having the length in question be a compile-
time constant. Note that such implementations must still be able to time constant. Implementations which want to use variable-length
send other length connection identifiers to other parties. CIDs are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its
length can be determined on reception. Note that such
In DTLS 1.2, connection ids are exchanged at the beginning of the implementations must still be able to send other length connection
DTLS session only. There is no dedicated "connection id update" identifiers to other parties.
message that allows new connection ids to be established mid-session,
because DTLS 1.2 in general does not allow post-handshake messages
that do not themselves begin other handshakes. In DTLS 1.3, which
does allow such messages, we use post-handshake message to update the
connection ID Section 4 and to request new IDs.
DTLS 1.2 peers switch to the new record layer format when encryption
is enabled. The same is true for DTLS 1.3 but since the DTLS 1.3
enables encryption early in the handshake phase the connection ID
will be enabled earlier. For this reason, the connection ID needs to
go in the DTLS 1.3 ServerHello.
4. Post-Handshake Messages
In DTLS 1.3, if the client and server have negotiated the
"connection_id" extension, either side can send a new connection ID
which it wishes the other side to use in a NewConnectionId message:
enum {
cid_immediate(0), cid_spare(1), (255)
} ConnectionIdUsage;
struct {
opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
ConnectionIdUsage usage;
} NewConnectionId;
cid Indicates the CID which the sender wishes the peer to use. In DTLS, connection ids are exchanged at the beginning of the DTLS
session only. There is no dedicated "connection id update" message
that allows new connection ids to be established mid-session, because
DTLS in general does not allow TLS 1.3-style post-handshake messages
that do not themselves begin other handshakes. DTLS peers switch to
the new record layer format when encryption is enabled.
usage Indicates whether the new CID should be used immediately or is 4. Record Layer Extensions
a spare. If usage is set to "cid_immediate", then the new CID
MUST be used immediately for all future records. If it is set to
"cid_spare", then either CID MAY be used, as described in
Section 7.
If the client and server have negotiated the "connection_id" This extension is applicable for use with DTLS 1.2 and below.
extension, either side can request a new CID using the Figure 1 illustrates the record format. [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
RequestConnectionId message. specifies how to carry the CID in a DTLS 1.3 record.
struct { struct {
} RequestConnectionId; ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
Endpoints SHOULD respond to RequestConnectionId by sending a uint16 epoch;
NewConnectionId with usage "cid_spare" as soon as possible. Note uint48 sequence_number;
that an endpoint MAY ignore requests which it considers excessive opaque cid[cid_length]; // New field
(though they MUST be ACKed as usual). uint16 length;
select (CipherSpec.cipher_type) {
5. Record Layer Extensions case block: GenericBlockCipher;
case aead: GenericAEADCipher;
This extension is applicable for use with DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3. } fragment;
This extension can be used with the optimized DTLS 1.3 record layer } DTLSCiphertext;
format.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the record formats of DTLS 1.2 and
DTLS 1.3, respectively.
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 epoch;
uint48 sequence_number;
opaque cid[cid_length]; // New field
uint16 length;
select (CipherSpec.cipher_type) {
case block: GenericBlockCipher;
case aead: GenericAEADCipher;
} fragment;
} DTLSCiphertext;
Figure 1: DTLS 1.2 Record Format with Connection ID Figure 1: DTLS 1.2 Record Format with Connection ID
struct {
opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length];
ContentType type;
uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
} DTLSInnerPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType opaque_type = 23; /* application_data */
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = {254,253); // DTLSv1.2
uint16 epoch; // DTLS-related field
uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS-related field
opaque cid[cid_length]; // New field
uint16 length;
opaque encrypted_record[length];
} DTLSCiphertext;
Figure 2: DTLS 1.3 Record Format with Connection ID
Besides the "cid" field, all other fields are defined in the DTLS 1.2
and DTLS 1.3 specifications.
Note that for both record formats, it is not possible to parse the Note that for both record formats, it is not possible to parse the
records without knowing if the connection ID is in use and how long records without knowing how long the Connection ID is.
it is.
6. Examples
Below is an example exchange for DTLS 1.3 using a single connection
id in each direction.
Client Server
------ ------
ClientHello In order to allow a receiver to determine whether a record has CID or
(connection_id=5) not, connections which have negotiated this extension use new record
--------> types for all protected records. Table 1 shows the record types to
use:
<-------- HelloRetryRequest +---------------------------+-------+
(cookie) | New ContentType | Value |
+---------------------------+-------+
| alert_with_cid | 25 |
| | |
| handshake_with_cid | 26 |
| | |
| application_data_with_cid | 27 |
| | |
| heartbeat_with_cid | 28 |
+---------------------------+-------+
ClientHello --------> Table 1
(connection_id=5)
+cookie
<-------- ServerHello 5. Record Payload Protection
(connection_id=100)
EncryptedExtensions
(cid=5)
Certificate
(cid=5)
CertificateVerify
(cid=5)
Finished
(cid=5)
Certificate --------> The CID value, when present, is included in the MAC calculation for
(cid=100) the DTLS record. The MAC algorithm described in Section 4.1.2.1 of
CertificateVerify [RFC6347] and Section 6.2.3.1 of [RFC5246] is extended as follows:
(cid=100)
Finished
(cid=100)
<-------- Ack
(cid=5)
Application Data ========> MAC(MAC_write_key, DTLSCompressed.epoch +
(cid=100) DTLSCompressed.sequence_number +
<======== Application Data DTLSCompressed.type +
(cid=5) DTLSCompressed.version +
connection_id + // New field
cid_length + // New input
cid + // New input
DTLSCompressed.length +
DTLSCompressed.fragment);
where "+" denotes concatenation.
Figure 3: Example DTLS 1.3 Exchange with Connection IDs 6. Examples
Below is an example exchange for DTLS 1.2 using a connection id used Figure 2 shows an example exchange where a connection id is used uni-
uni-directionally from the client to the server. directionally from the client to the server.
Client Server Client Server
------ ------ ------ ------
ClientHello ClientHello
(connection_id=empty) (connection_id=empty)
--------> -------->
<-------- HelloVerifyRequest <-------- HelloVerifyRequest
(cookie) (cookie)
skipping to change at page 8, line 39 skipping to change at page 7, line 39
[ChangeCipherSpec] [ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished Finished
(cid=100) (cid=100)
<-------- [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- [ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished Finished
Application Data ========> Application Data ========>
(cid=100) (cid=100)
<======== Application Data <======== Application Data
Figure 4: Example DTLS 1.2 Exchange with Connection IDs Figure 2: Example DTLS 1.2 Exchange with Connection IDs
7. Security and Privacy Considerations 7. Security and Privacy Considerations
The connection id replaces the previously used 5-tuple and, as such, The connection id replaces the previously used 5-tuple and, as such,
introduces an identifier that remains persistent during the lifetime introduces an identifier that remains persistent during the lifetime
of a DTLS connection. Every identifier introduces the risk of of a DTLS connection. Every identifier introduces the risk of
linkability, as explained in [RFC6973]. linkability, as explained in [RFC6973].
In addition, endpoints can use the connection ID to attach arbitrary In addition, endpoints can use the connection ID to attach arbitrary
metadata to each record they receive. This may be used as a metadata to each record they receive. This may be used as a
mechanism to communicate per-connection to on-path observers. There mechanism to communicate per-connection to on-path observers. There
is no straightforward way to address this with connection IDs that is no straightforward way to address this with connection IDs that
contain arbitrary values; implementations concerned about this SHOULD contain arbitrary values; implementations concerned about this SHOULD
refuse to use connection ids. refuse to use connection ids.
An on-path adversary, who is able to observe the DTLS 1.2 protocol An on-path adversary, who is able to observe the DTLS protocol
exchanges between the DTLS client and the DTLS server, is able to exchanges between the DTLS client and the DTLS server, is able to
link the observed payloads to all subsequent payloads carrying the link the observed payloads to all subsequent payloads carrying the
same connection id pair (for bi-directional communication). In DTLS same connection id pair (for bi-directional communication). Without
1.3, it is possible to provide new encrypted connection IDs, though multi-homing or mobility, the use of the connection id is not
of course those IDs are immediately used on the wire. Without multi- different to the use of the 5-tuple.
homing and mobility the use of the connection id is not different to
the use of the 5-tuple.
With multi-homing, an adversary is able to correlate the With multi-homing, an adversary is able to correlate the
communication interaction over the two paths, which adds further communication interaction over the two paths, which adds further
privacy concerns. In order to prevent this, implementations SHOULD privacy concerns. In order to prevent this, implementations SHOULD
attempt to use fresh connection IDs whenever they change local attempt to use fresh connection IDs whenever they change local
addresses or ports (though this is not always possible to detect). addresses or ports (though this is not always possible to detect).
In DTLS 1.3, The RequestConnectionId message can be used to ask for
new IDs in order to ensure that you have a pool of suitable IDs.
This document does not change the security properties of DTLS 1.2 Importantly, the sequence number makes it possible for a passive
[RFC6347] and DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. It merely provides a attacker to correlate packets across CID changes. Thus, even if a
more robust mechanism for associating an incoming packet with a client/server pair do a rehandshake to change CID, that does not
stored security context. provide much privacy benefit.
[[OPEN ISSUE: Sequence numbers leak connection IDs. We need to This document does not change the security properties of DTLS
update the document to address this. One possibility would be the [RFC6347]. It merely provides a more robust mechanism for
technique documented in https://quicwg.github.io/base-drafts/draft- associating an incoming packet with a stored security context.
ietf-quic-transport.html#packet-number-gap.]]
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the existing TLS IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the existing TLS
"ExtensionType Values" registry, defined in [RFC5246], for "ExtensionType Values" registry, defined in [RFC5246], for
connection_id(TBD) defined in this document. connection_id(TBD) defined in this document.
IANA is requested to allocate two values in the "TLS Handshake Type" IANA is requested to allocate the following new values in the "TLS
registry, defined in [RFC5246], for request_connection_id (TBD), and ContentType Registry":
new_connection_id (TBD), as defined in this document.
9. References - alert_with_cid(25)
9.1. Normative References - handshake_with_cid(26)
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] - application_data_with_cid(27)
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version - heartbeat_with_cid(28)
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-22 (work in progress),
November 2017. 9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-26 (work in progress), March
2018.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
editor.org/info/rfc6973>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
9.3. URIs 9.3. URIs
[1] mailto:tls@ietf.org [1] mailto:tls@ietf.org
[2] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/index.html
Appendix A. History Appendix A. History
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE THIS SECTION RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE THIS SECTION
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-01
- Remove 1.3 based on the WG consensus at IETF 101
draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-00
- Initial working group version (containing a solution for DTLS 1.2
and 1.3)
draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id-00 draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id-00
- Initial version - Initial version
Appendix B. Working Group Information Appendix B. Working Group Information
The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the
e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and e-mail address tls@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and
information on how to subscribe to the list is at information on how to subscribe to the list is at
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls [2]
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail- Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/tls/current/index.html archive/web/tls/current/index.html [3]
Appendix C. Contributors Appendix C. Contributors
Many people have contributed to this specification since the Many people have contributed to this specification since the
functionality has been highly desired by the IoT community. We would functionality has been highly desired by the IoT community. We would
like to thank the following individuals for their contributions in like to thank the following individuals for their contributions in
earlier specifications: earlier specifications:
* Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos * Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
RedHat RedHat
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Additionally, we would like to thank Yin Xinxing (Huawei), Tobias Additionally, we would like to thank Yin Xinxing (Huawei), Tobias
Gondrom (Huawei), and the Connection ID task force team members: Gondrom (Huawei), and the Connection ID task force team members:
- Martin Thomson (Mozilla) - Martin Thomson (Mozilla)
- Christian Huitema (Private Octopus Inc.) - Christian Huitema (Private Octopus Inc.)
- Jana Iyengar (Google) - Jana Iyengar (Google)
- Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU) - Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU)
- Patrick McManus (Mozilla)
- Patrick McManus (Sole Proprietor)
- Ian Swett (Google) - Ian Swett (Google)
- Mark Nottingham (Fastly) - Mark Nottingham (Fastly)
Finally, we want to thank the IETF TLS working group chairs, Joseph Finally, we want to thank the IETF TLS working group chairs, Joseph
Salowey and Sean Turner, for their patience, support and feedback. Salowey and Sean Turner, for their patience, support and feedback.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Eric Rescorla (editor) Eric Rescorla (editor)
RTFM, Inc. RTFM, Inc.
EMail: ekr@rtfm.com EMail: ekr@rtfm.com
Hannes Tschofenig (editor) Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
ARM Limited Arm Limited
EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
Thomas Fossati Thomas Fossati
Nokia Nokia
EMail: thomas.fossati@nokia.com EMail: thomas.fossati@nokia.com
Tobias Gondrom Tobias Gondrom
Huawei Huawei
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