draft-ietf-teep-protocol-07.txt   draft-ietf-teep-protocol-08.txt 
TEEP H. Tschofenig TEEP H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Arm Ltd. Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: 28 April 2022 Broadcom Expires: 8 September 2022 Broadcom
D. Wheeler D. Wheeler
Amazon Amazon
D. Thaler D. Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
A. Tsukamoto A. Tsukamoto
AIST AIST
25 October 2021 7 March 2022
Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
draft-ietf-teep-protocol-07 draft-ietf-teep-protocol-08
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
deletes Trusted Components in a device with a Trusted Execution deletes Trusted Components in a device with a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE). This specification defines an interoperable Environment (TEE). This specification defines an interoperable
protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Components. protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Components.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.1. Evidence and Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4.1. Example 1: Having one SUIT Manifest pointing to a URI
4.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 of a Trusted Component Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 18 4.4.2. Example 2: Having a SUIT Manifest include the Trusted
6. Behavior Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Component Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. TAM Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4.3. Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for the
6.2. TEEP Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Trusted Component Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.4.4. Example 4: Unlinking Trusted Component . . . . . . . 20
8. Freshness Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5. EAT Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 27
10.2. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7. Behavior Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.1. TAM Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.2. TEEP Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 8. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 9. Freshness Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 11.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation . . 34 11.2. Freshness Mechanism Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D.1. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D.1.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D.1.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.2. Entity Attestation Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
D.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation . . 43
D.3.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 D.1. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
D.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 D.1.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 D.1.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 D.2. Entity Attestation Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
D.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.3.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
D.6.2. CBOR binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
E. Examples of SUIT Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
E.1. Install a Trusted Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 D.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
E.2. Delete a Trusted Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D.6.2. CBOR binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
E. Examples of SUIT Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Example 1: SUIT Manifest pointing to URI of the Trusted Component
Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest . . . . . . . . . . 50
CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
CBOR Binary in Hex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Example 2: SUIT Manifest including the Trusted Component
Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest . . . . . . . . . . 53
CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
CBOR Binary in Hex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for Trusted Component
Binary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest . . . . . . . . . . 56
CBOR Binary Represenation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
CBOR Binary in Hex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
E.4. Example 4: Unlink a Trusted Component . . . . . . . . . . 60
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest . . . . . . . . . . 60
CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
CBOR Binary in Hex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F. Examples of SUIT Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F.1. Example 1: Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F.2. Example 2: Faiure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications. Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
In a TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating In a TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating
systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When Trusted systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When Trusted
Component Developers or Device Administrators use Trusted Application Component Developers or Device Administrators use Trusted Application
Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Applications Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Applications
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} }
4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages 4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages
4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message 4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message
To create a TEEP message, the following steps are performed. To create a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.
1. Create a TEEP message according to the description below and 1. Create a TEEP message according to the description below and
populate it with the respective content. TEEP messages sent by populate it with the respective content. TEEP messages sent by
TAMs (QueryRequest and Update) can include a "token". The first TAMs (QueryRequest and Update) can include a "token". The TAM
usage of a token generated by a TAM MUST be randomly created. can decide, in any implementation-specific way, whether to
Subsequent token values MUST be different for each subsequent include a token in a message. The first usage of a token
message created by a TAM. generated by a TAM MUST be randomly created. Subsequent token
values MUST be different for each subsequent message created by a
TAM.
2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header 2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header
Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152] Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152]
specification. specification.
3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the 3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the
COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating
a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed. a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed.
4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message
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Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1 Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1
payload is the content of the TEEP message. payload is the content of the TEEP message.
5. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the 5. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the
fields of the TEEP message according to this specification. fields of the TEEP message according to this specification.
4.2. QueryRequest Message 4.2. QueryRequest Message
A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from
the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent, the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent,
including ciphersuites, and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM including ciphersuites and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM
can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via the can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via the
request parameter. Currently, the following features are supported: request parameter. Currently, the following features are supported:
* Request for attestation information, * Request for attestation information,
* Listing supported extensions, * Listing supported extensions,
* Querying installed Trusted Components, and * Querying installed Trusted Components, and
* Listing supported SUIT commands. * Listing supported SUIT commands.
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trusted-components (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP trusted-components (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP
Agent for all installed Trusted Components. Agent for all installed Trusted Components.
extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for
supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to
discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation. discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.
Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration. Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.
supported-cipher-suites supported-cipher-suites
The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuites
supported by the TAM. If this parameter is not present, it is to supported by the TAM. If this parameter is not present, it is to
be treated the same as if it contained both ciphersuites defined be treated the same as if it contained all ciphersuites defined in
in this document. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be this document that are listed as "MUST". Details about the
found in Section 7. ciphersuite encoding can be found in Section 8.
supported-freshness-mechanisms supported-freshness-mechanisms
The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness
mechanism(s) supported by the TAM. Details about the encoding can mechanism(s) supported by the TAM. Details about the encoding can
be found in Section 8. If this parameter is absent, it means only be found in Section 9. If this parameter is absent, it means only
the nonce mechanism is supported. the nonce mechanism is supported.
challenge challenge
The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the
freshness of the attestation evidence returned with a freshness of the attestation evidence returned with a
QueryResponse message. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit QueryResponse message. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit
is clear (since the token is used instead in that case). When a is clear (since the token is used instead in that case). When a
challenge is provided in the QueryRequest and an EAT is returned challenge is provided in the QueryRequest and an EAT is returned
with a QueryResponse message then the challenge contained in this with a QueryResponse message then the challenge contained in this
request MUST be used to generate the EAT, such as by copying the request MUST be used to generate the EAT, such as by copying the
challengt into the nonce claim found in the EAT if using the Nonce challenge into the nonce claim found in the EAT if using the Nonce
freshness mechanism. For more details see Section 8. If any freshness mechanism. For more details see Section 9. If any
format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to define format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to define
the use of the challenge field. the use of the challenge field.
versions versions
The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s)
supported by the TAM. A value of 0 refers to the current version supported by the TAM. A value of 0 refers to the current version
of the TEEP protocol. If this field is not present, it is to be of the TEEP protocol. If this field is not present, it is to be
treated the same as if it contained only version 0. treated the same as if it contained only version 0.
4.3. QueryResponse Message 4.3. QueryResponse Message
The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP
Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message. Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message. As discussed in
Section 7.2, it can also be sent unsolicited if the contents of the
QueryRequest are already known and do not vary per message.
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and
the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
structure is shown in Appendix C. structure is shown in Appendix C.
query-response = [ query-response = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response, type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
options: { options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64), ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? selected-cipher-suite => suite, ? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
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token token
The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests. The value MUST correspond to the value received with requests. The value MUST correspond to the value received with
the QueryRequest message if one was present, and MUST be absent if the QueryRequest message if one was present, and MUST be absent if
no token was present in the QueryRequest. no token was present in the QueryRequest.
selected-cipher-suite selected-cipher-suite
The selected-cipher-suite parameter indicates the selected The selected-cipher-suite parameter indicates the selected
ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found
in Section 7. in Section 8.
selected-version selected-version
The selected-version parameter indicates the TEEP protocol version The selected-version parameter indicates the TEEP protocol version
selected by the TEEP Agent. The absense of this parameter selected by the TEEP Agent. The absense of this parameter
indicates the same as if it was present with a value of 0. indicates the same as if it was present with a value of 0.
evidence-format evidence-format
The evidence-format parameter indicates the IANA Media Type of the The evidence-format parameter indicates the IANA Media Type of the
attestation evidence contained in the evidence parameter. It MUST attestation evidence contained in the evidence parameter. It MUST
be present if the evidence parameter is present and the format is be present if the evidence parameter is present and the format is
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QueryRequest with the trusted-components bit set. QueryRequest with the trusted-components bit set.
requested-tc-list requested-tc-list
The requested-tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components The requested-tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components
that are not currently installed in the TEE, but which are that are not currently installed in the TEE, but which are
requested to be installed, for example by an installer of an requested to be installed, for example by an installer of an
Untrusted Application that has a TA as a dependency, or by a Untrusted Application that has a TA as a dependency, or by a
Trusted Application that has another Trusted Component as a Trusted Application that has another Trusted Component as a
dependency. Requested Trusted Components are expressed in the dependency. Requested Trusted Components are expressed in the
form of requested-tc-info objects. A TEEP Agent can get this form of requested-tc-info objects. A TEEP Agent can get this
information from the UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in information from the RequestTA conceptual API defined in
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] section 6.2.1. [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] section 6.2.1.
unneeded-tc-list unneeded-tc-list
The unneeded-tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components The unneeded-tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components
that are currently installed in the TEE, but which are no longer that are currently installed in the TEE, but which are no longer
needed by any other application. The TAM can use this information needed by any other application. The TAM can use this information
in determining whether a Trusted Component can be deleted. Each in determining whether a Trusted Component can be deleted. Each
unneeded Trusted Component is identified by its SUIT Component unneeded Trusted Component is identified by its SUIT Component
Identifier. A TEEP Agent can get this information from the Identifier. A TEEP Agent can get this information from the
UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
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manifest for the Trusted Component. If not present, indicates manifest for the Trusted Component. If not present, indicates
that any sequence number will do. that any sequence number will do.
have-binary have-binary
If present with a value of true, indicates that the TEEP agent If present with a value of true, indicates that the TEEP agent
already has the Trusted Component binary and only needs an Update already has the Trusted Component binary and only needs an Update
message with a SUIT manifest that authorizes installing it. If message with a SUIT manifest that authorizes installing it. If
have-binary is true, the tc-manifest-sequence-number field MUST be have-binary is true, the tc-manifest-sequence-number field MUST be
present. present.
4.3.1. Evidence 4.3.1. Evidence and Attestation Results
Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] lists information that Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] lists information that may
may be required in the evidence depend on the circumstance. When an appear in evidence depending on the circumstance. However, the
Entity Attestation Token is used, the following claims can be used to evidence is opaque to the TEEP protocol and there are no formal
meet those requirements: requirements on the contents of evidence.
+===========+=====================+=================================+ TAMs however consume Attestation Results and do need enough
|Requirement|Claim | Reference | information therein to make decisions on how to remediate a TEE that
+===========+=====================+=================================+ is out of compliance, or update a TEE that is requesting an
|Device |device-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] | authorized change. To do so, the information in Section 7 of
|unique | | section 3.1.3 | [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] is often required depending on the
|identifier | | | policy. When an Entity Attestation Token is used, the following
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+ claims can be used to meet those requirements:
|Vendor of |vendor-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
|the device | | section 3.1.1 |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|Class of |class-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
|the device | | section 3.1.2 |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|TEE |chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
|hardware | | |
|type | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|TEE |chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
|hardware | | |
|version | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|TEE |component-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
|firmware | | section 3.1.4 |
|type | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|TEE |version | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
|firmware | | section 3.1.8 |
|version | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|Freshness |nonce | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.3 |
|proof | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1 +=============+==================+=================================+
| Requirement | Claim | Reference |
+=============+==================+=================================+
| Device | ueid | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.4 |
| unique | | |
| identifier | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| Vendor of | oemid | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.6 |
| the device | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| Class of | class-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
| the device | | section 3.1.2 |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| TEE | chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| hardware | | |
| type | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| TEE | chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| hardware | | |
| version | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| TEE | sw-name | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.9 |
| firmware | | |
| type | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| TEE | sw-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section |
| firmware | | 3.10 |
| version | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
| Freshness | nonce | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.3 |
| proof | | |
+-------------+------------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1
4.4. Update Message 4.4. Update Message
The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or
more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent. more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent.
Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in Appendix C. shown in Appendix C.
skipping to change at page 13, line 44 skipping to change at page 14, line 44
manifest. The manifest may also convey personalization data. manifest. The manifest may also convey personalization data.
Trusted Component binaries and personalization data can be signed Trusted Component binaries and personalization data can be signed
and encrypted by the same Trusted Component Signer. Other and encrypted by the same Trusted Component Signer. Other
combinations are, however, possible as well. For example, it is combinations are, however, possible as well. For example, it is
also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the personalization also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the personalization
data and to let the Trusted Component Developer sign and/or data and to let the Trusted Component Developer sign and/or
encrypt the Trusted Component binary. encrypt the Trusted Component binary.
Note that an Update message carrying one or more SUIT manifests will Note that an Update message carrying one or more SUIT manifests will
inherently involve multiple signatures, one by the TAM in the TEEP inherently involve multiple signatures, one by the TAM in the TEEP
message and one from a Trusted Component signer inside each manifest. message and one from a Trusted Component Signer inside each manifest.
This is intentional as they are for different purposes. This is intentional as they are for different purposes.
The TAM is what authorizes apps to be installed, updated, and deleted The TAM is what authorizes apps to be installed, updated, and deleted
on a given TEE and so the TEEP signature is checked by the TEEP Agent on a given TEE and so the TEEP signature is checked by the TEEP Agent
at protocol message processing time. (This same TEEP security at protocol message processing time. (This same TEEP security
wrapper is also used on messages like QueryRequest so that Agents wrapper is also used on messages like QueryRequest so that Agents
only send potentially sensitive data such as evidence to trusted only send potentially sensitive data such as evidence to trusted
TAMs.) TAMs.)
The Trusted Component signer on the other hand is what authorizes the The Trusted Component signer on the other hand is what authorizes the
Trusted Component to actually run, so the manifest signature could be Trusted Component to actually run, so the manifest signature could be
checked at install time or load (or run) time or both, and this checked at install time or load (or run) time or both, and this
checking is done by the TEE independent of whether TEEP is used or checking is done by the TEE independent of whether TEEP is used or
some other update mechanism. See section 5 of some other update mechanism. See section 5 of
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] for further discussion. [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] for further discussion.
The Update Message has a SUIT_Envelope containing SUIT manifests.
Following are some examples of using SUIT manifests in the Update
Message.
4.4.1. Example 1: Having one SUIT Manifest pointing to a URI of a
Trusted Component Binary
In this example, a SUIT Manifest has a URI pointing to a Trusted
Component Binary.
A Trusted Component Developer creates a new Trusted Component Binary
and hosts it at a Trusted Component Developer's URI. Then the
Trusted Component Developer generates an associated SUIT manifest
with the filename "tc-uuid.suit" that contains the URI. The filename
"tc-uuid.suit" is used in Example 3 later.
The TAM receives the latest SUIT manifest from the Trusted Component
Developer, and the URI it contains will not be changeable by the TAM
since the SUIT manifest is signed by the Trusted Component Developer.
Pros:
* The Trusted Component Developer can ensure that the intact Trusted
Component Binary is downloaded by devices
* The TAM does not have to send large Update messages containing the
Trusted Component Binary
Cons:
* The Trusted Component Developer must host the Trusted Component
Binary server
* The device must fetch the Trusted Component Binary in another
connection after receiving an Update message
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=================== teep-protocol(TAM) ==================+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| += suit-manifest "tc-uuid.suit" (TC Developer) =+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +===============================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+=========================================================+
and then,
+-------------+ +--------------+
| TEEP Agent | | TC Developer |
+-------------+ +--------------+
<----
fetch "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta"
+======= tc-uuid.ta =======+
| 48 65 6C 6C 6F 2C 20 ... |
+==========================+
Figure 1: URI of the Trusted Component Binary
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 1:
SUIT Manifest pointing to URI of the Trusted Component Binary".
4.4.2. Example 2: Having a SUIT Manifest include the Trusted Component
Binary
In this example, the SUIT manifest contains the entire Trusted
Component Binary using the integrated-payload (see
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] Section 7.6).
A Trusted Component Developer delegates to the TAM the task of
delivering the Trusted Component Binary in the SUIT manifest. The
Trusted Component Developer creates a SUIT manifest and embeds the
Trusted Component Binary, which is referenced in the URI parameter
with identifier "#tc". The Trusted Component Developer provides the
SUIT manifest to the TAM.
The TAM serves the SUIT manifest containing the Trusted Component
Binary to the device in an Update message.
Pros:
* The device can obtain the Trusted Component Binary and its SUIT
manifest together in one Update message
* The Trusted Component Developer does not have to host a server to
deliver the Trusted Component Binary directly to devices
Cons:
* The TAM must host the Trusted Component Binary itself, rather than
delegating such storage to the Trusted Component Developer
* The TAM must deliver Trusted Component Binaries in Update
messages, which result in increased Update message size
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=========== teep-protocol(TAM) ============+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ==+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | "#tc": h'48 65 6C 6C ...', | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "#tc" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================+
Figure 2: Integrated Payload with Trusted Component Binary
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 2:
SUIT Manifest including the Trusted Component Binary".
4.4.3. Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for the Trusted
Component Binary
In this example, Personalization Data is associated with the Trusted
Component Binary "tc-uuid.suit" from Example 1.
The Trusted Component Developer places Personalization Data in a file
named "config.json" and hosts it on an HTTPS server. The Trusted
Component Developer then creates a SUIT manifest with the URI,
specifying which Trusted Component Binary it correlates to in the
parameter 'dependency-resolution', and signs the SUIT manifest.
The TAM delivers the SUIT manifest of the Personalization Data which
depends on the Trusted Component Binary from Example 1.
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+================= teep-protocol(TAM) ======================+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +======== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ============+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | common: { | |
| | dependencies: [ | |
| | {{digest-of-tc.suit}} | |
| | ] | |
| | } | |
| | dependency-resolution: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid.suit" | |
| | } | |
| | fetch | |
| | } | |
| | install: { | |
| | set-parameter: { | |
| | uri: "https://example.org/config.json" | |
| | }, | |
| | fetch | |
| | set-dependency-index | |
| | process-dependency | |
| | } | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================================+
and then,
+-------------+ +--------------+
| TEEP Agent | | TC Developer |
+-------------+ +--------------+
<----
fetch "https://example.org/config.json"
+=======config.json========+
| 7B 22 75 73 65 72 22 ... |
+==========================+
Figure 3: Personalization Data
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix "Example 3:
Supplying Personalization Data for Trusted Component Binary".
4.4.4. Example 4: Unlinking Trusted Component
This subsection shows an example deleting the Trusted Component
Binary in the TEEP Device.
A Trusted Component Developer can also generate SUIT Manifest which
unlinks the installed Trusted Component. The TAM deliver it when the
TAM want to uninstall the component.
The directive-unlink (see [I-D.moran-suit-trust-domains] Section-
6.5.4) is located in the manifest to delete the Trusted Component.
Note that in case other Trusted Components depend on it, i.e. the
reference count is not zero, the TEEP Device SHOULD NOT delete it
immediately.
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | | TEEP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
Update ---->
+=========== teep-protocol(TAM) ============+
| TEEP_Message([ |
| TEEP-TYPE-update, |
| options: { |
| manifest-list: [ |
| +== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ==+ |
| | SUIT_Envelope({ | |
| | manifest: { | |
| | install: [ | |
| | unlink | |
| | ] | |
| | } | |
| | }) | |
| +=================================+ |
| ] |
| } |
| ]) |
+===========================================+
Figure 4: Unlink Trusted Component example (summary)
For the full SUIT Manifest example binary, see Appendix E. SUIT
Example 4 (Appendix "E.4. Example 4: Unlink a Trusted Component")
4.5. Success Message 4.5. Success Message
The Success message is used by the TEEP Agent to return a success in The Success message is used by the TEEP Agent to return a success in
response to an Update message. response to an Update message.
Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in Appendix C. shown in Appendix C.
teep-success = [ teep-success = [
skipping to change at page 14, line 51 skipping to change at page 22, line 36
If none was present, the token MUST be absent in the Success If none was present, the token MUST be absent in the Success
message. message.
msg msg
The msg parameter contains optional diagnostics information The msg parameter contains optional diagnostics information
encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] with encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] with
max 128 bytes returned by the TEEP Agent. max 128 bytes returned by the TEEP Agent.
suit-reports suit-reports
If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT
Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If a
the suit-report-nonce field is present in the SUIT Report, is token parameter was present in the Update message the Success
value MUST match the value of the token parameter in the Update message is in response to, the suit-report-nonce field MUST be
message the Success message is in response to. present in the SUIT Report with a value matching the token
parameter in the Update message.
4.6. Error Message 4.6. Error Message
The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error in The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error in
response to an Update message. response to an Update message.
Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in Appendix C. shown in Appendix C.
skipping to change at page 16, line 8 skipping to change at page 23, line 41
message. message.
err-msg err-msg
The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST
be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198]
with max 128 bytes. with max 128 bytes.
supported-cipher-suites supported-cipher-suites
The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s)
supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the ciphersuite supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the ciphersuite
encoding can be found in Section 7. This otherwise optional encoding can be found in Section 8. This otherwise optional
parameter MUST be returned if err-code is parameter MUST be returned if err-code is
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES. ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES.
supported-freshness-mechanisms supported-freshness-mechanisms
The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness
mechanism(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the mechanism(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the
encoding can be found in Section 8. This otherwise optional encoding can be found in Section 9. This otherwise optional
parameter MUST be returned if err-code is parameter MUST be returned if err-code is
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS. ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS.
versions versions
The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s)
supported by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter supported by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter
MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION. MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION.
suit-reports suit-reports
If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT
Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If a
the suit-report-nonce field is present in the SUIT Report, is token parameter was present in the Update message the Error
value MUST match the value of the token parameter in the Update message is in response to, the suit-report-nonce field MUST be
message the Error message is in response to. present in the SUIT Report with a value matching the token
parameter in the Update message.
err-code err-code
The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed
below). Only selected values are applicable to each message. below). Only selected values are applicable to each message.
This specification defines the following initial error messages: This specification defines the following initial error messages:
ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR (1) ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR (1)
The TEEP request contained incorrect fields or fields that are The TEEP request contained incorrect fields or fields that are
inconsistent with other fields. For diagnosis purposes it is inconsistent with other fields. For diagnosis purposes it is
skipping to change at page 18, line 20 skipping to change at page 25, line 45
on the failed manifest. on the failed manifest.
New error codes should be added sparingly, not for every New error codes should be added sparingly, not for every
implementation error. That is the intent of the err-msg field, which implementation error. That is the intent of the err-msg field, which
can be used to provide details meaningful to humans. New error codes can be used to provide details meaningful to humans. New error codes
should only be added if the TAM is expected to do something should only be added if the TAM is expected to do something
behaviorally different upon receipt of the error message, rather than behaviorally different upon receipt of the error message, rather than
just logging the event. Hence, each error code is responsible for just logging the event. Hence, each error code is responsible for
saying what the behavioral difference is expected to be. saying what the behavioral difference is expected to be.
5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels 5. EAT Profile
The TEEP protocol operates between a TEEP Agent and a TAM. While the
TEEP protocol does not require use of EAT, use of EAT is encouraged
and Section 4.3 explicitly defines a way to carry an Entity
Attestation Token evidence in a QueryResponse.
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the content of attestation evidence is
opaque to the TEEP architecture, but the content of Attestation
Results is not, where Attestation Results flow between a Verifier and
a TAM (as the Relying Party). Although Attestation Results required
by a TAM are separable from the TEEP protocol per se, this section is
included as part of the requirements for building a compliant TAM
that uses EATs for Attestation Results.
Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] defines the requirement for Entity
Attestation Token profiles. This section defines an EAT profile for
use with TEEP.
* profile-label: The profile-label for this specification is the URI
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-protocol-08
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-protocol-08).
(RFC-editor: upon RFC publication, replace string with
"https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX" where XXXX is the RFC
number of this document.)
* Use of JSON, CBOR, or both: CBOR only.
* CBOR Map and Array Encoding: Only definite length arrays and maps.
* CBOR String Encoding: Only definite-length strings are allowed.
* CBOR Preferred Serialization: Encoders must use preferred
serialization, and decoders need not accept non-preferred
serialization.
* COSE/JOSE Protection: See Section 8.
* Detached EAT Bundle Support: DEB use is permitted.
* Verification Key Identification: COSE Key ID (kid) is used, where
the key ID is the hash of a public key (where the public key may
be used as a raw public key, or in a certificate).
* Endorsement Identification: Optional, but semantics are the same
as in Verification Key Identification.
* Freshness: See Section 9.
* Required Claims: None.
* Prohibited Claims: None.
* Additional Claims: Optional claims are those listed in
Section 4.3.1.
* Refined Claim Definition: None.
* CBOR Tags: CBOT Tags are not used.
* Manifests and Software Evidence Claims: The sw-name claim for a
Trusted Component holds the URI of the SUIT manifest for that
component.
6. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels
In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned
integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of
encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning,
as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for
this usage as a map key. this usage as a map key.
This specification uses the following mapping: This specification uses the following mapping:
+================================+=======+ +================================+=======+
skipping to change at page 20, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 5
+--------------------------------+-------+ +--------------------------------+-------+
| suit-reports | 19 | | suit-reports | 19 |
+--------------------------------+-------+ +--------------------------------+-------+
| token | 20 | | token | 20 |
+--------------------------------+-------+ +--------------------------------+-------+
| supported-freshness-mechanisms | 21 | | supported-freshness-mechanisms | 21 |
+--------------------------------+-------+ +--------------------------------+-------+
Table 2 Table 2
6. Behavior Specification 7. Behavior Specification
Behavior is specified in terms of the conceptual APIs defined in Behavior is specified in terms of the conceptual APIs defined in
section 6.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. section 6.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
6.1. TAM Behavior 7.1. TAM Behavior
When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest
message. message.
When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the TAM first does When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the TAM first does
validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and drops the message if it validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and drops the message if it
is not valid. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows. is not valid. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.
If the message includes a token, it can be used to match the response If the message includes a token, it can be used to match the response
to a request previously sent by the TAM. The TAM MUST expire the to a request previously sent by the TAM. The TAM MUST expire the
skipping to change at page 21, line 9 skipping to change at page 30, line 9
matches the token sent in the Update message, and drops the message matches the token sent in the Update message, and drops the message
if it does not match. Otherwise, the TAM handles the update in any if it does not match. Otherwise, the TAM handles the update in any
implementation specific way, such as updating any locally cached implementation specific way, such as updating any locally cached
information about the state of the TEEP Agent, or logging the information about the state of the TEEP Agent, or logging the
results. results.
If any other Error message is received, the TAM can handle it in any If any other Error message is received, the TAM can handle it in any
implementation specific way, but Section 4.6 provides recommendations implementation specific way, but Section 4.6 provides recommendations
for such handling. for such handling.
6.2. TEEP Agent Behavior 7.2. TEEP Agent Behavior
When the RequestTA API is invoked, the TEEP Agent first checks When the RequestTA API is invoked, the TEEP Agent first checks
whether the requested TA is already installed. If it is already whether the requested TA is already installed. If it is already
installed, the TEEP Agent passes no data back to the caller. installed, the TEEP Agent passes no data back to the caller.
Otherwise, if the TEEP Agent chooses to initiate the process of Otherwise, if the TEEP Agent chooses to initiate the process of
requesting the indicated TA, it determines (in any implementation requesting the indicated TA, it determines (in any implementation
specific way) the TAM URI based on any TAM URI provided by the specific way) the TAM URI based on any TAM URI provided by the
RequestTA caller and any local configuration, and passes back the TAM RequestTA caller and any local configuration, and passes back the TAM
URI to connect to. URI to connect to. It MAY also pass back a QueryResponse message if
all of the following conditions are true:
* The last QueryRequest message received from that TAM contained no
token or challenge,
* The ProcessError API was not invoked for that TAM since the last
QueryResponse message was received from it, and
* The public key or certificate of the TAM is cached and not
expired.
When the RequestPolicyCheck API is invoked, the TEEP Agent decides When the RequestPolicyCheck API is invoked, the TEEP Agent decides
whether to initiate communication with any trusted TAMs (e.g., it whether to initiate communication with any trusted TAMs (e.g., it
might choose to do so for a given TAM unless it detects that it has might choose to do so for a given TAM unless it detects that it has
already communicated with that TAM recently). If so, it passes back already communicated with that TAM recently). If so, it passes back
a TAM URI to connect to. If the TEEP Agent has multiple TAMs it a TAM URI to connect to. If the TEEP Agent has multiple TAMs it
needs to connect with, it just passes back one, with the expectation needs to connect with, it just passes back one, with the expectation
that RequestPolicyCheck API will be invoked to retrieve each one that RequestPolicyCheck API will be invoked to retrieve each one
successively until there are no more and it can pass back no data at successively until there are no more and it can pass back no data at
that time. Thus, once a TAM URI is returned, the TEEP Agent can that time. Thus, once a TAM URI is returned, the TEEP Agent can
skipping to change at page 22, line 5 skipping to change at page 31, line 15
When an Update message is received, the Agent attempts to update the When an Update message is received, the Agent attempts to update the
Trusted Components specified in the SUIT manifests by following the Trusted Components specified in the SUIT manifests by following the
Update Procedure specified in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest], and responds Update Procedure specified in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest], and responds
with a Success message if all SUIT manifests were successfully with a Success message if all SUIT manifests were successfully
installed, or an Error message if any error was encountered. It is installed, or an Error message if any error was encountered. It is
important to note that the Update Procedure requires resolving and important to note that the Update Procedure requires resolving and
installing any dependencies indicated in the manifest, which may take installing any dependencies indicated in the manifest, which may take
some time, and the Success or Error message is generated only after some time, and the Success or Error message is generated only after
completing the Update Procedure. completing the Update Procedure.
7. Ciphersuites 8. Ciphersuites
A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a MAC algorithm, and a The TEEP protocol uses COSE for protection of TEEP messages. After a
signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer QueryResponse is received, the selected cryptographic algorithm is
value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite (see used in subsequent TEEP messages (Install, Success, and Error). To
Section 10.2. This document specifies two ciphersuites. negotiate cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms, the TEEP protocol
defines the following ciphersuite structure.
+=======+================================================+ ciphersuite = [
| Value | Ciphersuite | teep-cose-sign-algs / nil,
+=======+================================================+ teep-cose-encrypt-algs / nil ,
| 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA | teep-cose-mac-algs / nil
+-------+------------------------------------------------+ ]
| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 3 The ciphersuite structure is used to present the combination of
mechanisms and cryptographic algorithms. Each suite value
corresponds with a COSE-type defined in Section 2 of [RFC8152].
A TAM MUST support both ciphersuites. A TEEP Agent MUST support at supported-cipher-suites = [ + suite ]
least one of the two but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP
Agent might choose ciphersuite 2 if it has hardware support for it. Cryptographic algorithm values are defined in the COSE Algorithms
registry [COSE.Algorithm]. A TAM MUST support both of the following
ciphersuites. A TEEP Agent MUST support at least one of the two but
can choose which one. For example, a TEEP Agent might choose a given
ciphersuite if it has hardware support for it.
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-es256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-eddsa
A TAM or TEEP Agent MUST also support the following algorithms:
teep-cose-encrypt-algs /= cose-alg-accm-16-64-128
teep-cose-mac-algs /= cose-alg-hmac-256
A TAM or TEEP Agent MAY also support one or more of the following
algorithms:
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps384,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps512,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512
Any ciphersuites without confidentiality protection can only be added Any ciphersuites without confidentiality protection can only be added
if the associated specification includes a discussion of security if the associated specification includes a discussion of security
considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive
information. For example, Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] information. For example, Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the
TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then
additional encryption might not be needed in the manifest for some additional encryption might not be needed in the manifest for some
use cases. For most use cases, however, manifest confidentiality use cases. For most use cases, however, manifest confidentiality
will be needed to protect sensitive fields from the TAM as discussed will be needed to protect sensitive fields from the TAM as discussed
in Section 9.8 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. in Section 9.8 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
8. Freshness Mechanisms 9. Freshness Mechanisms
A freshness mechanism determines how a TAM can tell whether evidence A freshness mechanism determines how a TAM can tell whether evidence
provided in a Query Response is fresh. There are multiple ways this provided in a Query Response is fresh. There are multiple ways this
can be done as discussed in Section 10 of can be done as discussed in Section 10 of
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].
Each freshness mechanism is identified with an integer value, which Each freshness mechanism is identified with an integer value, which
corresponds to an IANA registered freshness mechanism (see corresponds to an IANA registered freshness mechanism (see
Section 10.3. This document defines the following freshness Section 11.2. This document defines the following freshness
mechanisms: mechanisms:
+=======+=====================+ +=======+=====================+
| Value | Freshness mechanism | | Value | Freshness mechanism |
+=======+=====================+ +=======+=====================+
| 1 | Nonce | | 1 | Nonce |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| 2 | Timestamp | | 2 | Timestamp |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| 3 | Epoch ID | | 3 | Epoch ID |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
Table 4 Table 3
In the Nonce mechanism, the evidence MUST include a nonce provided in In the Nonce mechanism, the evidence MUST include a nonce provided in
the QueryRequest challenge. In other mechanisms, a timestamp or the QueryRequest challenge. In other mechanisms, a timestamp or
epoch ID determined via mechanisms outside the TEEP protocol is used, epoch ID determined via mechanisms outside the TEEP protocol is used,
and the challenge is only needed in the QueryRequest message if a and the challenge is only needed in the QueryRequest message if a
challenge is needed in generating evidence for reasons other than challenge is needed in generating evidence for reasons other than
freshness. freshness.
If a TAM supports multiple freshness mechanisms that require If a TAM supports multiple freshness mechanisms that require
different challenge formats, the QueryRequest message can currently different challenge formats, the QueryRequest message can currently
only send one such challenge. This situation is expected to be rare, only send one such challenge. This situation is expected to be rare,
but should it occur, the TAM can choose to prioritize one of them and but should it occur, the TAM can choose to prioritize one of them and
exclude the other from the supported-freshness-mechanisms in the exclude the other from the supported-freshness-mechanisms in the
QueryRequest, and resend the QueryRequest with the other mechanism if QueryRequest, and resend the QueryRequest with the other mechanism if
an ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS Error is received that an ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS Error is received that
indicates the TEEP Agent supports the other mechanism. indicates the TEEP Agent supports the other mechanism.
9. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
specification: specification:
Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic Algorithms
TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP
Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the
cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based
authentication is used by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the TAM authentication is used by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the TAM
and vice versa. and vice versa.
skipping to change at page 25, line 30 skipping to change at page 35, line 16
The integrity and the accuracy of the clock within the TEE The integrity and the accuracy of the clock within the TEE
determines the ability to determine an expired TAM certificate, if determines the ability to determine an expired TAM certificate, if
certificates are used. certificates are used.
Compromised Time Source Compromised Time Source
As discussed above, certificate validity checks rely on comparing As discussed above, certificate validity checks rely on comparing
validity dates to the current time, which relies on having a validity dates to the current time, which relies on having a
trusted source of time, such as [RFC8915]. A compromised time trusted source of time, such as [RFC8915]. A compromised time
source could thus be used to subvert such validity checks. source could thus be used to subvert such validity checks.
10. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
10.1. Media Type Registration 11.1. Media Type Registration
IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor. IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.
Type name: application Type name: application
Subtype name: teep+cbor Subtype name: teep+cbor
Required parameters: none Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none Optional parameters: none
skipping to change at page 26, line 29 skipping to change at page 36, line 15
Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none Restrictions on usage: none
Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
Change controller: IETF Change controller: IETF
10.2. Ciphersuite Registry 11.2. Freshness Mechanism Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites.
Name of registry: TEEP Ciphersuites
Policy: Specification Required
Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant
security considerations.
Initial values:
+=======+=========================+===============+
| Value | Ciphersuite | Specification |
+=======+=========================+===============+
| 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC | RFC TBD |
| | 256/256, X25519, EdDSA | Section 7 |
+-------+-------------------------+---------------+
| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC | RFC TBD |
| | 256/256, P-256, ES256 | Section 7 |
+-------+-------------------------+---------------+
Table 5
[RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to
this document]
10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for freshness IANA is also requested to create a new registry for freshness
mechanisms. mechanisms.
Name of registry: TEEP Freshness Mechanisms Name of registry: TEEP Freshness Mechanisms
Policy: Specification Required Policy: Specification Required [RFC8126]
Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant
security considerations. security considerations.
Initial values: Initial values:
+=======+=====================+===================+ +=======+=====================+===================+
| Value | Freshness mechanism | Specification | | Value | Freshness mechanism | Specification |
+=======+=====================+===================+ +=======+=====================+===================+
| 1 | Nonce | RFC TBD Section 8 | | 1 | Nonce | RFC TBD Section 9 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+ +-------+---------------------+-------------------+
| 2 | Timestamp | RFC TBD Section 8 | | 2 | Timestamp | RFC TBD Section 9 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+ +-------+---------------------+-------------------+
| 3 | Epoch ID | RFC TBD Section 8 | | 3 | Epoch ID | RFC TBD Section 9 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+ +-------+---------------------+-------------------+
Table 6 Table 4
[RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to (RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to
this document] this document.)
11. References 12. References
11.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[COSE.Algorithm]
IANA, "COSE Algorithms", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/
cose.xhtml#algorithms>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
12, 23 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- 15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
ietf-rats-architecture-12.txt>. draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., and J. O'Donoghue, "The Entity Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., and J. O'Donoghue, "The Entity
Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet- Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-11, 24 October 2021, Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-12, 24 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-eat- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-eat-
11.txt>. 12.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg, Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
"A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based "A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet- of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-14, 12 July 2021, Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-16, 25 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-suit-manifest- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-suit-manifest-
14.txt>. 16.txt>.
[I-D.moran-suit-report] [I-D.moran-suit-report]
Moran, B., "Secure Reporting of Update Status", Work in Moran, B., "Secure Reporting of Update Status", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moran-suit-report-01, 22 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moran-suit-report-01, 22
February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
moran-suit-report-01.txt>. moran-suit-report-01.txt>.
[I-D.moran-suit-trust-domains]
Moran, B., "SUIT Manifest Extensions for Multiple Trust
Domains", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moran-
suit-trust-domains-00, 25 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moran-suit-trust-
domains-00.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
skipping to change at page 29, line 9 skipping to change at page 38, line 23
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims]
Birkholz, H. and B. Moran, "Trustworthiness Vectors for Birkholz, H. and B. Moran, "Trustworthiness Vectors for
the Software Updates of Internet of Things (SUIT) Workflow the Software Updates of Internet of Things (SUIT) Workflow
Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz- Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-
rats-suit-claims-02, 12 July 2021, rats-suit-claims-03, 12 January 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-rats-suit- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-rats-suit-
claims-02.txt>. claims-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-15, 12 July 2021, ietf-teep-architecture-16, 28 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-teep- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-teep-
architecture-15.txt>. architecture-16.txt>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
skipping to change at page 30, line 10 skipping to change at page 39, line 22
We would like to thank Brian Witten (Symantec), Tyler Kim (Solacia), We would like to thank Brian Witten (Symantec), Tyler Kim (Solacia),
Nick Cook (Arm), and Minho Yoo (IoTrust) for their contributions to Nick Cook (Arm), and Minho Yoo (IoTrust) for their contributions to
the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), which influenced the design of this the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), which influenced the design of this
specification. specification.
B. Acknowledgements B. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the
protocol name. protocol name.
We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Kuniyasu Suzaki We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Ken Takayama
(TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for (SECOM) Kuniyasu Suzaki (TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and
their valuable implementation feedback. Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for their valuable implementation feedback.
We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for
their help with the CDDL. their help with the CDDL.
C. Complete CDDL C. Complete CDDL
Valid TEEP messages MUST adhere to the following CDDL data Valid TEEP messages MUST adhere to the following CDDL data
definitions, except that "SUIT_Envelope" and definitions, except that SUIT_Envelope and SUIT_Component_Identifier
"SUIT_Component_Identifier" are specified in are specified in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].
teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework
SUIT_Envelope = any SUIT_Envelope = any
teep-message-framework = [ teep-message-framework = [
type: uint (0..23) / $teep-type-extension, type: uint (0..23) / $teep-type-extension,
options: { * teep-option }, options: { * teep-option },
* uint; further integers, e.g., for data-item-requested * uint; further integers, e.g., for data-item-requested
] ]
skipping to change at page 31, line 28 skipping to change at page 40, line 38
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ], ? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? challenge => bstr .size (8..512), ? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
? versions => [ + version ], ? versions => [ + version ],
* $$query-request-extensions * $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
}, },
data-item-requested: data-item-requested data-item-requested: data-item-requested
] ]
; ciphersuites ; ciphersuites
suite = $TEEP-suite .within uint .size 4 suite = [
teep-cose-sign-algs / nil,
teep-cose-encrypt-algs / nil,
teep-cose-mac-algs / nil
]
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = 1 teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-es256,
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256 = 2 teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-eddsa
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps384,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-ps512,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256,
teep-cose-sign-algs /= cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512
teep-cose-encrypt-algs /= cose-alg-accm-16-64-128
$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA teep-cose-mac-algs /= cose-alg-hmac-256
$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256
; algorithm identifiers defined in the IANA COSE Algorithms Registry
cose-alg-es256 = -7
cose-alg-eddsa = -8
cose-alg-ps256 = -37
cose-alg-ps384 = -38
cose-alg-ps512 = -39
cose-alg-rsa-oaep-256 = -41
cose-alg-rsa-oaep-512 = -42
cose-alg-accm-16-64-128 = 10
cose-alg-hmac-256 = 5
; freshness-mechanisms ; freshness-mechanisms
freshness-mechanism = $TEEP-freshness-mechanism .within uint .size 4 freshness-mechanism = $TEEP-freshness-mechanism .within uint .size 4
FRESHNESS_NONCE = 0 FRESHNESS_NONCE = 0
FRESHNESS_TIMESTAMP = 1 FRESHNESS_TIMESTAMP = 1
FRESHNESS_EPOCH_ID = 2 FRESHNESS_EPOCH_ID = 2
$TEEP-freshness-mechanism /= FRESHNESS_NONCE $TEEP-freshness-mechanism /= FRESHNESS_NONCE
skipping to change at page 34, line 9 skipping to change at page 43, line 35
tc-manifest-sequence-number = 17 tc-manifest-sequence-number = 17
have-binary = 18 have-binary = 18
suit-reports = 19 suit-reports = 19
token = 20 token = 20
supported-freshness-mechanisms = 21 supported-freshness-mechanisms = 21
D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation
This section includes some examples with the following assumptions: This section includes some examples with the following assumptions:
* TEEP Device will have two TCs with the following SUIT Component * The device will have two TCs with the following SUIT Component
Identifiers: Identifiers:
- [ 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] - [ 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ]
- [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] - [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ]
* SUIT manifest-list is set empty only for example purposes (see * SUIT manifest-list is set empty only for example purposes (see
Appendix E for actual manifest examples) Appendix E for actual manifest examples)
D.1. QueryRequest Message D.1. QueryRequest Message
skipping to change at page 39, line 34 skipping to change at page 49, line 34
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
0C # unsigned(12) uint (0..23) 0C # unsigned(12) uint (0..23)
69 # text(9) (1..128) 69 # text(9) (1..128)
6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full" 6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full"
11 # unsigned(17) uint (0..23) 11 # unsigned(17) uint (0..23)
E. Examples of SUIT Manifests E. Examples of SUIT Manifests
This section shows some examples of SUIT manifests for a case where This section shows some examples of SUIT manifests described in
the TEE will use a Trusted Application (TA) for OP-TEE on Arm Section 4.4.
TrustZone, storing the TA in Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB)
secure storage in a file named "edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-
b3ad5a2d5b8a.ta".
The TA developer places personalization data for the device on an The examples are signed using the following ECDSA secp256r1 key with
HTTPS server and puts the URI in the TA manifest. The SHA256 as the digest function.
personalization data will also be stored in RPMB secure storage in a
file named "config.json".
E.1. Install a Trusted Component COSE_Sign1 Cryptographic Key:
This sample manifest installs a Trusted Component that depends on -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
personalization data resolved separately. MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgApZYjZCUGLM50VBC
CjYStX+09jGmnyJPrpDLTz/hiXOhRANCAASEloEarguqq9JhVxie7NomvqqL8Rtv
P+bitWWchdvArTsfKktsCYExwKNtrNHXi9OB3N+wnAUtszmR23M4tKiW
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
TA Manifest: The corresponding public key can be used to verify these examples:
107({ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:<<[ MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEhJaBGq4LqqvSYVcYnuzaJr6qi/Eb
digest: <<[ bz/m4rVlnIXbwK07HypLbAmBMcCjbazR14vTgdzfsJwFLbM5kdtzOLSolg==
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
/ digest-bytes / h'd6c1fc7200483092e2db59d4907f9b15'
h'05cb3af2795cf78f7ae3d88166fdf743'
]>>,
signature: <<18([
/ protected / <<{
/ alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
}>>,
/ unprotected / {},
/ payload / F6 / nil /,
/ signature / h'd11a2dd9610fb62a707335f584079225'
h'709f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ec'
h'fba1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca'
h'3215e1193be201467d052b42db6b7287'
])>>
]>>,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
/ common / 3:<<{
/ components / 2:[
["OP-TEE","RPMB","edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216- b3ad5a2d5b8a","ta"]
],
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id / 1:h'c0ddd5f15243566087db4f5b0aa26c2f',
/ class-id / 2:h'db42f7093d8c55baa8c5265fc5820f4e',
/ image-digest / 3:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
]>>,
/ image-size / 14:76778,
},
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15
]>>,
}>>,
/ install / 9:<<[
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:
'https://teep.example/edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.ta',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>, Example 1: SUIT Manifest pointing to URI of the Trusted Component Binary
/ validate / 10:<<[
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ run / 12:<<[
/ directive-run / 23,2
]>>,
/ text / 13:<<{
[
h'4f502d544545',
h'44f301',
h'edd94cd89d9c4cc89216b3ad5a2d5b8a',
h'7461'
]:{
/ model-name / 2: 'OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'teep.example'
}
}>>
}>>
})
Personalization Data Manifest: CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest
107({ / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
2:<<[ / suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
digest: <<[ << [
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, / suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c' / suit-digest-bytes: / h'DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD'
h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609' ] >>,
]>> << / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
]>>, / protected: / << {
/ manifest / 3:<<{ / algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
/ manifest-version / 1:1, } >>,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3, / unprotected: / {},
/ dependencies / 1:[ / payload: / null,
{ / signature: / h'5B2D535A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579A4'
/ dependency-digest / 1:[ ] ) >>
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, ] >>,
/ digest-bytes / h'd6c1fc7200483092e2db59d4907f9b15' / suit-manifest / 3: << {
h'05cb3af2795cf78f7ae3d88166fdf743' / suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
] / suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
} / suit-common / 3: << {
], / suit-components / 2: [
/ components / 2:[ [
["OP-TEE","RPMB","config.json"] h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
], h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[ h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0, h'7461' / "ta" /
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{ ]
/ vendor-id / 1:h'ec41787224345ae580003de697ff8d43' ],
/ ec417872-2434-5ae5-8000-3de697ff8d43 /, / suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ class-id / 2:h'eb1701b48be85709aca0adf89f056a64' / suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ eb1701b4-8be8-5709-aca0-adf89f056a64 /, / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ image-digest / 3:<<[ / suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, / suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ digest-bytes / h'aaabcccdeeef00012223444566678889' / suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
h'abbbcdddefff01112333455567778999' / suit-digest-bytes: / h'8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
]>> ] >>,
}, / suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 20
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15, },
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15 / suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
]>>, / suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
/ dependency-resolution / 7:<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'tam.teep.example/'
'edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-'
'9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.suit',
},
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ install / 9:<<[
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:
'http://tam.teep.example/config.json',
},
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0,
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ validate / 10:<<[
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15,
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0
]>>,
/ run / 12:<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0
]>>,
/ text / 13:<<{
[h'4f502d544545', h'44f301',
h'636f6e6669672e6a736f6e']:{
/ model-name / 2: 'Personalised OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'tam.teep.example',
},
[
h'4f502d544545',
h'44f301',
h'edd94cd89d9c4cc89216b3ad5a2d5b8a',
h'7461'
]:{
/ model-name / 2:'OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'teep.example'
}
}>>
}>>
})
E.2. Delete a Trusted Component ] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 15,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
This sample manifest removes a Trusted Component and its dependency. CBOR Binary Representation
107({ D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:<<[ A2 # map(2)
digest: <<[ 02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, 58 73 # bytes(115)
/ digest-bytes / 82 # array(2)
h'a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b305516d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a' 58 24 # bytes(36)
]>>, 82 # array(2)
signature: <<18([ 2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
/ protected / <<{ 58 20 # bytes(32)
/ alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /, DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD
}>>, 58 4A # bytes(74)
/ unprotected / { D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
}, 84 # array(4)
/ payload / F6 / nil /, 43 # bytes(3)
/ signature / h'd11a2dd9610fb62a707335f58407922570 A1 # map(1)
9f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ecfba1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca3215e119 01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
3be201467d052b42db6b7287' 26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
])>> A0 # map(0)
] F6 # primitive(22) / null /
]>>, 58 40 # bytes(64)
/ manifest / 3:<<{ 5B2D535A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579A4
/ manifest-version / 1:1, 03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:0, 58 D4 # bytes(212)
/ common / 3:<<{ A4 # map(4)
/ components / 2:[ 01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
[h'00'] 01 # unsigned(1)
], 02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[ 03 # unsigned(3)
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{ 03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
/ vendor-id / 58 84 # bytes(132)
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf- A2 # map(2)
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /, 02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
/ class-id / 81 # array(1)
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' / 84 # array(4)
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /, 4B # bytes(11)
/ image-digest / 3:<<[ 544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /, 48 # bytes(8)
/ digest-bytes / 5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210' 50 # bytes(16)
]>>, 8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
/ image-size / 14:34768, 42 # bytes(2)
} , 7461 # "ta"
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 , 04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15 58 54 # bytes(84)
]>>, 86 # array(6)
}>>, 14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
/ validate / 10:<<[ A4 # map(4)
/ condition-image-match / 3,15 01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
]>>, 50 # bytes(16)
/ run / 12:<<[ C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
/ directive-run / 23,2 02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
]>>, 50 # bytes(16)
}>>, DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
}) 03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
14 # unsigned(20)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
58 45 # bytes(69)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 3B # text(59)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E7461 # "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
0F # unsigned(15)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 161 CBOR Binary in Hex
D86BA2025873825824822F5820DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE495
32435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD584AD28443A10126A0F658405B2D53
5A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817
AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579
A40358D4A401010203035884A20281844B544545502D4465766963654853
65637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74427461045854
8614A40150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F0250DB42F7093D8C55
BAA8C5265FC5820F4E035824822F58208CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411
A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE80E14010F020F0958458614A1
15783B68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733
612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E
7461150F030F
Envelope: Example 2: SUIT Manifest including the Trusted Component Binary
d86ba2025827815824822f5820a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b3055 CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest
16d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a035871a50101020003585fa2028181
41000458568614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492
af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122334455667788
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f02
0f0a4382030f0c43821702
Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 237 / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'14A98BE957DE38FAE37376EA491FD6CAD9BFBD3C90051C8F5B017D7A496C3B05'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected: / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'4093B323953785981EB607C8BA61B21E5C4F85726A2AF48C1CB05BD4401B1B1565070728FDA38E6496D631E1D23F966CFF7805EDE721D48507D9192993DA8722'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-integrated-payload / "#tc": h'48656C6C6F2C2053656375726520576F726C6421', / "Hello, Secure World!" /
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
h'7461' / "ta" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
] >>,
/ suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 20
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "#tc"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 15,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
Envelope with COSE authentication object: CBOR Binary Representation
d86ba2025873825824822f5820a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b3055 D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
16d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a584ad28443a10126a0f65840d11a2d A3 # map(3)
d9610fb62a707335f584079225709f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ecfb 02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
a1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca3215e1193be201467d052b42db6b72 58 73 # bytes(115)
87035871a50101020003585fa202818141000458568614a40150fa6b4a53 82 # array(2)
d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45 58 24 # bytes(36)
035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcd 82 # array(2)
effedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f0a4382030f0c43821702 2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
14A98BE957DE38FAE37376EA491FD6CAD9BFBD3C90051C8F5B017D7A496C3B05
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
4093B323953785981EB607C8BA61B21E5C4F85726A2AF48C1CB05BD4401B1B1565070728FDA38E6496D631E1D23F966CFF7805EDE721D48507D9192993DA8722
63 # text(3) / suit-integrated-payload /
237463 # "#tc"
54 # bytes(20)
48656C6C6F2C2053656375726520576F726C6421 # "Hello, Secure World!"
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
58 9A # bytes(154)
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
03 # unsigned(3)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 84 # bytes(132)
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
84 # array(4)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
50 # bytes(16)
8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
42 # bytes(2)
7461 # "ta"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 54 # bytes(84)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
14 # unsigned(20)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
4C # bytes(12)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
63 # text(3)
237463 # "#tc"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
0F # unsigned(15)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
CBOR Binary in Hex
D86BA3025873825824822F582014A98BE957DE38FAE37376EA491FD6CAD9
BFBD3C90051C8F5B017D7A496C3B05584AD28443A10126A0F658404093B3
23953785981EB607C8BA61B21E5C4F85726A2AF48C1CB05BD4401B1B1565
070728FDA38E6496D631E1D23F966CFF7805EDE721D48507D9192993DA87
22632374635448656C6C6F2C2053656375726520576F726C642103589AA4
01010203035884A20281844B544545502D44657669636548536563757265
4653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F744274610458548614A40150
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F0250DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265F
C5820F4E035824822F58208CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9
B77A30D046397481469468ECE80E14010F020F094C8614A1156323746315
0F030F
Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for Trusted Component Binary
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'CE596D785169B72712560B3A246AA98F814498EA3625EEBB72CED9AF273E7FFD'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected: / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'E9083AA71D2BFCE48253037B9C3116A5EDF23BE0F4B4357A8A835F724660DA7482C64345B4C73DE95F05513BD09FC2E58BD2CC865CC851AD797513A9A951A3CA'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-dependencies / 1: [
{
/ suit-dependency-digest / 1: [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'F8690E5A86D010BF2B5348ABB99F2254DB7B608D0D626B98DB51AB3ECFC51907'
]
}
],
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'636F6E6669672E6A736F6E' / "config.json" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
/ suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'AAABCCCDEEEF00012223444566678889ABBBCDDDEFFF01112333455567778999'
] >>,
/ suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 64
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-idnetifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-dependency-resolution / 7: << [
/ suit-directive-set-dependency-index / 13, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.suit"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 2,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-set-dependency-index / 13, 0,
/ suit-directive-process-dependency / 18, 0,
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/config.json"
},
/ suit-directive-fetch / 21, 2,
/ suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
] >>,
/ suit-validate / 10: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
/ suit-condition-image-match/ 3, 15
] >>
} >>
} )
CBOR Binary Represenation
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper: /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
CE596D785169B72712560B3A246AA98F814498EA3625EEBB72CED9AF273E7FFD
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
E9083AA71D2BFCE48253037B9C3116A5EDF23BE0F4B4357A8A835F724660DA7482C64345B4C73DE95F05513BD09FC2E58BD2CC865CC851AD797513A9A951A3CA
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
59 0134 # bytes(308)
A6 # map(6)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
03 # unsigned(3)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 A7 # bytes(167)
A3 # map(3)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-dependencies: /
81 # array(1)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) suit-dependency-digest: /
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
F8690E5A86D010BF2B5348ABB99F2254DB7B608D0D626B98DB51AB3ECFC51907
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
83 # array(3)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
4B # bytes(11)
636F6E6669672E6A736F6E # "config.json"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 57 # bytes(87)
88 # array(8)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
AAABCCCDEEEF00012223444566678889ABBBCDDDEFFF01112333455567778999
0E # unsigned(14) / suit-parameter-image-size: /
18 40 # unsigned(64)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
07 # unsigned(7) / suit-dependency-resolution: /
58 49 # bytes(73)
88 # array(8)
0D # unsigned(13) / suit-directive-set-dependency-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 3D # text(61)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E73756974 # "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.suit"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
02 # unsigned(2)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
58 2F # bytes(47)
8C # array(12)
0D # unsigned(13) / suit-directive-set-dependency-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
12 # unsigned(18) / suit-directive-process-dependency: /
00 # unsigned(0)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A1 # map(1)
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-parameter-uri: /
78 1F # text(31)
68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F636F6E6669672E6A736F6E # "https://example.org/config.json"
15 # unsigned(21) / suit-directive-fetch: /
02 # unsigned(2)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
0A # unsigned(10) / suit-validate: /
45 # bytes(5)
84 # array(4)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-condition-image-match: /
0F # unsigned(15)
CBOR Binary in Hex
D86BA2025873825824822F5820CE596D785169B72712560B3A246AA98F81
4498EA3625EEBB72CED9AF273E7FFD584AD28443A10126A0F65840E9083A
A71D2BFCE48253037B9C3116A5EDF23BE0F4B4357A8A835F724660DA7482
C64345B4C73DE95F05513BD09FC2E58BD2CC865CC851AD797513A9A951A3
CA03590134A6010102030358A7A30181A101822F5820DB601ADE73092B58
532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD0281834B5445
45502D4465766963654853656375726546534B636F6E6669672E6A736F6E
045857880C0014A40150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F0250DB42
F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E035824822F5820AAABCCCDEEEF000122
23444566678889ABBBCDDDEFFF011123334555677789990E1840010F020F
075849880D0014A115783D68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F7267
2F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332
393939376637342E737569741502030F09582F8C0D0012000C0014A11578
1F68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F636F6E6669672E6A73
6F6E1502030F0A45840C00030F
E.4. Example 4: Unlink a Trusted Component
CBOR Diagnostic Notation of SUIT Manifest
/ SUIT_Envelope_Tagged / 107( {
/ suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
<< [
/ suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-sha256 /,
/ suit-digest-bytes: / h'632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42'
] >>,
<< / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
/ protected / << {
/ algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
} >>,
/ unprotected: / {},
/ payload: / null,
/ signature: / h'A32CDB7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BBBF'
] ) >>
] >>,
/ suit-manifest / 3: << {
/ suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
/ suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 18446744073709551615 / UINT64_MAX /,
/ suit-common / 3: << {
/ suit-components / 2: [
[
h'544545502D446576696365', / "TEEP-Device" /
h'5365637572654653', / "SecureFS" /
h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
h'7461' / "ta" /
]
],
/ suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
/ suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
/ suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
/ suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E'
},
/ suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
/ suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
] >>
} >>,
/ suit-install / 9: << [
/ suit-directive-set-component-index: / 12, 0,
/ suit-directive-unlink: / 33, 0
] >>
} >>
} )
CBOR Binary Representation
D8 6B # tag(107) / SUIT_Envelope_Tagged /
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-authentication-wrapper /
58 73 # bytes(115)
82 # array(2)
58 24 # bytes(36)
82 # array(2)
2F # negative(15) / -16 = suit-cose-alg-sha256 /
58 20 # bytes(32)
632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42
58 4A # bytes(74)
D2 # tag(18) / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
84 # array(4)
43 # bytes(3)
A1 # map(1)
01 # unsigned(1) / algorithm-id /
26 # negative(6) / -7 = ES256 /
A0 # map(0)
F6 # primitive(22) / null /
58 40 # bytes(64)
A32CDB7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BBBF
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-manifest: /
58 73 # bytes(115)
A4 # map(4)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-manifest-version: /
01 # unsigned(1)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-manifest-sequence-number: /
1B FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF # unsigned(18446744073709551615)
03 # unsigned(3) / suit-common: /
58 5B # bytes(91)
A2 # map(2)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-components: /
81 # array(1)
84 # array(4)
4B # bytes(11)
544545502D446576696365 # "TEEP-Device"
48 # bytes(8)
5365637572654653 # "SecureFS"
50 # bytes(16)
8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74 # tc-uuid
42 # bytes(2)
7461 # "ta"
04 # unsigned(4) / suit-common-sequence: /
58 2B # bytes(84)
86 # array(6)
14 # unsigned(20) / suit-directive-override-parameters: /
A2 # map(2)
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-parameter-class-identifier: /
50 # bytes(16)
DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E
01 # unsigned(1) / suit-condition-vendor-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
02 # unsigned(2) / suit-condition-class-identifier: /
0F # unsigned(15)
09 # unsigned(9) / suit-install: /
46 # bytes(6)
84 # array(4)
0C # unsigned(12) / suit-directive-set-component-index: /
00 # unsigned(0)
18 21 # unsigned(33) / suit-directive-unlink: /
00 # unsigned(0)
CBOR Binary in Hex
D86BA2025873825824822F5820632454F19A9440A5B83493628A7EF8704C
8A0205A62C34E425BAA34C71341F42584AD28443A10126A0F65840A32CDB
7C1D089C27408CED3C79087220EB0D77F105BB5330912875F4D94AD108D7
658C650463AEB7E1CCA5084F22B2F3993176E8B3529A3202ED735E4D39BB
BF035873A40101021BFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF03585BA20281844B544545502D
446576696365485365637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC2999
7F7442746104582B8614A20150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F02
50DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E010F020F0946840C00182100
F. Examples of SUIT Reports
This section shows some examples of SUIT reports.
F.1. Example 1: Success
SUIT Reports have no records if no conditions have failed. The URI
in this example is the reference URI provided in the SUIT manifest.
{
/ suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c'
h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
]>>,
/ suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation.suit",
/ suit-report-records / 4: []
}
F.2. Example 2: Faiure
{
/ suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
]>>,
/ suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation.suit",
/ suit-report-records / 4: [
{
/ suit-record-manifest-id / 1:[],
/ suit-record-manifest-section / 2: 7 / dependency-resolution /,
/ suit-record-section-offset / 3: 66,
/ suit-record-dependency-index / 5: 0,
/ suit-record-failure-reason / 6: 404
}
]
}
where the dependency-resolution refers to:
107({
authentication-wrapper,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
common,
dependency-resolution,
install,
validate,
run,
text
}>>,
})
and the suit-record-section-offset refers to:
<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0 ,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'tam.teep.example/'
'edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.suit',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2 ,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd. Arm Ltd.
6067 Absam 6067 Absam
Austria Austria
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
Mingliang Pei Mingliang Pei
Broadcom Broadcom
350 Ellis St 350 Ellis St
Mountain View, CA 94043 Mountain View, CA 94043
United States of America United States of America
Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com
David Wheeler David Wheeler
Amazon Amazon
United States of America United States of America
Email: davewhee@amazon.com Email: davewhee@amazon.com
Dave Thaler Dave Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
United States of America United States of America
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
Akira Tsukamoto Akira Tsukamoto
AIST AIST
Japan Japan
Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp
 End of changes. 94 change blocks. 
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