draft-ietf-teep-protocol-06.txt   draft-ietf-teep-protocol-07.txt 
TEEP H. Tschofenig TEEP H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Arm Ltd. Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: January 13, 2022 Broadcom Expires: 28 April 2022 Broadcom
D. Wheeler D. Wheeler
Amazon Amazon
D. Thaler D. Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
A. Tsukamoto A. Tsukamoto
AIST AIST
July 12, 2021 25 October 2021
Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
draft-ietf-teep-protocol-06 draft-ietf-teep-protocol-07
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
deletes Trusted Components in a device with a Trusted Execution deletes Trusted Components in a device with a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE). This specification defines an interoperable Environment (TEE). This specification defines an interoperable
protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Components. protocol for managing the lifecycle of Trusted Components.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.1. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 17 5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 18
6. Behavior Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. Behavior Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1. TAM Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.1. TAM Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2. TEEP Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.2. TEEP Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Freshness Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Freshness Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.2. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.2. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.4. CBOR Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation . . 34
D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation . . 31 D.1. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D.1. Some assumptions in examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 D.1.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D.2. QueryRequest Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 D.1.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 D.2. Entity Attestation Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D.2.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D.3. Entity Attestation Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 D.3. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D.4. QueryResponse Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 D.3.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 D.4. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
D.5. Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 D.5. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.6. Success Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 D.6. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.6.2. CBOR Binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.7. Error Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 D.6.2. CBOR binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
D.7.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 E. Examples of SUIT Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
D.7.2. CBOR binary Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 E.1. Install a Trusted Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 E.2. Delete a Trusted Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications. Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
In a TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating In a TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating
systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When Trusted systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When Trusted
Component Developers or Device Administrators use Trusted Application Component Developers or Device Administrators use Trusted Application
Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Applications Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Applications
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message created by a TAM. message created by a TAM.
2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header 2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header
Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152] Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152]
specification. specification.
3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the 3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the
COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating
a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed. a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed.
4. Prepend the COSE object with the TEEP CBOR tag to indicate that
the CBOR-encoded message is indeed a TEEP message.
4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message
When TEEP message is received (see the ProcessTeepMessage conceptual When TEEP message is received (see the ProcessTeepMessage conceptual
API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] section 6.2.1), the API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] section 6.2.1), the
following validation steps are performed. If any of the listed steps following validation steps are performed. If any of the listed steps
fail, then the TEEP message MUST be rejected. fail, then the TEEP message MUST be rejected.
1. Verify that the received message is a valid CBOR object. 1. Verify that the received message is a valid CBOR object.
2. Remove the TEEP message CBOR tag and verify that one of the COSE 2. Verify that the message contains a COSE_Sign1 structure.
CBOR tags follows it.
3. Verify that the message contains a COSE_Sign1 structure.
4. Verify that the resulting COSE Header includes only parameters 3. Verify that the resulting COSE Header includes only parameters
and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and
supported or that are specified as being ignored when not supported or that are specified as being ignored when not
understood. understood.
5. Follow the steps specified in Section 4 of [RFC8152] ("Signing 4. Follow the steps specified in Section 4 of [RFC8152] ("Signing
Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1 Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1
payload is the content of the TEEP message. payload is the content of the TEEP message.
6. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the 5. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the
fields of the TEEP message according to this specification. fields of the TEEP message according to this specification.
4.2. QueryRequest Message 4.2. QueryRequest Message
A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from
the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent, the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent,
including ciphersuites, and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM including ciphersuites, and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM
can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via the can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via the
request parameter. Currently, the following features are supported: request parameter. Currently, the following features are supported:
o Request for attestation information, * Request for attestation information,
o Listing supported extensions, * Listing supported extensions,
o Querying installed Trusted Components, and * Querying installed Trusted Components, and
o Listing supported SUIT commands. * Listing supported SUIT commands.
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in Appendix C. shown in Appendix C.
query-request = [ query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request, type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
options: { options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64), ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ], ? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ], ? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? challenge => bstr .size (8..512), ? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
? versions => [ + version ], ? versions => [ + version ],
? ocsp-data => bstr,
* $$query-request-extensions * $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
}, },
data-item-requested: data-item-requested data-item-requested: data-item-requested
] ]
The message has the following fields: The message has the following fields:
type type
The value of (1) corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from The value of (1) corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from
the TAM to the TEEP Agent. the TAM to the TEEP Agent.
token token
The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests. This is particularly useful when a TAM issues multiple requests. This is particularly useful when a TAM issues multiple
concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent. The token MUST be present if concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent. The token MUST be present if
and only if the attestation bit is clear in the data-item- and only if the attestation bit is clear in the data-item-
requested value. The size of the token is at least 8 bytes (64 requested value. The size of the token is at least 8 bytes (64
bits) and maximum of 64 bytes, which is the same as in an EAT bits) and maximum of 64 bytes, which is the same as in an EAT
Nonce Claim (see [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] Section 3.3). Nonce Claim (see [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] Section 3.3). The first
usage of a token generated by a TAM MUST be randomly created.
Subsequent token values MUST be different for each request message
to distinguish the correct response from multiple requests. The
token value MUST NOT be used for other purposes, such as a TAM to
identify the devices and/or a device to identify TAMs or Trusted
Components. The TAM SHOULD set an expiration time for each token
and MUST ignore any messages with expired tokens. The TAM MUST
expire the token value after receiving the first response
containing the token value and ignore any subsequent messages that
have the same token value.
data-item-requested data-item-requested
The data-item-requested parameter indicates what information the The data-item-requested parameter indicates what information the
TAM requests from the TEEP Agent in the form of a bitmap. Each TAM requests from the TEEP Agent in the form of a bitmap. Each
value in the bitmap corresponds to an IANA registered information value in the bitmap corresponds to an IANA registered information
element. This specification defines the following initial set of element. This specification defines the following initial set of
information elements: information elements:
attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent
to return attestation evidence (e.g., an EAT) in the response. to return attestation evidence (e.g., an EAT) in the response.
trusted-components (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP trusted-components (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP
Agent for all installed Trusted Components. Agent for all installed Trusted Components.
extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for
supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to
discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation. discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.
suit-commands (8) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent
for supported commands offered by the SUIT manifest
implementation.
Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration. Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.
supported-cipher-suites supported-cipher-suites
The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s)
supported by the TAM. If this parameter is not present, it is to supported by the TAM. If this parameter is not present, it is to
be treated the same as if it contained both ciphersuites defined be treated the same as if it contained both ciphersuites defined
in this document. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be in this document. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be
found in Section 7. found in Section 7.
supported-freshness-mechanisms supported-freshness-mechanisms
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mechanism(s) supported by the TAM. Details about the encoding can mechanism(s) supported by the TAM. Details about the encoding can
be found in Section 8. If this parameter is absent, it means only be found in Section 8. If this parameter is absent, it means only
the nonce mechanism is supported. the nonce mechanism is supported.
challenge challenge
The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the
freshness of the attestation evidence returned with a freshness of the attestation evidence returned with a
QueryResponse message. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit QueryResponse message. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit
is clear (since the token is used instead in that case). When a is clear (since the token is used instead in that case). When a
challenge is provided in the QueryRequest and an EAT is returned challenge is provided in the QueryRequest and an EAT is returned
with the QueryResponse message then the challenge contained in with a QueryResponse message then the challenge contained in this
this request MUST be copied into the nonce claim found in the EAT. request MUST be used to generate the EAT, such as by copying the
If any format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to challengt into the nonce claim found in the EAT if using the Nonce
define the use of the challenge field. freshness mechanism. For more details see Section 8. If any
format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to define
the use of the challenge field.
versions versions
The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s)
supported by the TAM. A value of 0 refers to the current version supported by the TAM. A value of 0 refers to the current version
of the TEEP protocol. If this field is not present, it is to be of the TEEP protocol. If this field is not present, it is to be
treated the same as if it contained only version 0. treated the same as if it contained only version 0.
ocsp-data
The ocsp-data parameter contains a list of OCSP stapling data
respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA
certificates up to, but not including, the trust anchor. The TAM
provides OCSP data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status
of the TAM certificate chain without making its own external OCSP
service call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP
response (using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC6960]).
The use of OCSP is OPTIONAL to implement for both the TAM and the
TEEP Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of
this functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as
described above.
4.3. QueryResponse Message 4.3. QueryResponse Message
The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP
Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message. Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message.
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and
the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
structure is shown in Appendix C. structure is shown in Appendix C.
query-response = [ query-response = [
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that are currently installed in the TEE, but which are no longer that are currently installed in the TEE, but which are no longer
needed by any other application. The TAM can use this information needed by any other application. The TAM can use this information
in determining whether a Trusted Component can be deleted. Each in determining whether a Trusted Component can be deleted. Each
unneeded Trusted Component is identified by its SUIT Component unneeded Trusted Component is identified by its SUIT Component
Identifier. A TEEP Agent can get this information from the Identifier. A TEEP Agent can get this information from the
UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
section 6.2.1. section 6.2.1.
ext-list ext-list
The ext-list parameter lists the supported extensions. This The ext-list parameter lists the supported extensions. This
document does not define any extensions. document does not define any extensions. This parameter MUST be
present if the QueryResponse is sent in response to a QueryRequest
with the extensions bit set.
The tc-info object has the following fields: The tc-info object has the following fields:
component-id component-id
A SUIT Component Identifier. A SUIT Component Identifier.
tc-manifest-sequence-number tc-manifest-sequence-number
The suit-manifest-sequence-number value from the SUIT manifest for The suit-manifest-sequence-number value from the SUIT manifest for
the Trusted Component, if a SUIT manifest was used. the Trusted Component, if a SUIT manifest was used.
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have-binary is true, the tc-manifest-sequence-number field MUST be have-binary is true, the tc-manifest-sequence-number field MUST be
present. present.
4.3.1. Evidence 4.3.1. Evidence
Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] lists information that Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] lists information that
may be required in the evidence depend on the circumstance. When an may be required in the evidence depend on the circumstance. When an
Entity Attestation Token is used, the following claims can be used to Entity Attestation Token is used, the following claims can be used to
meet those requirements: meet those requirements:
+------------+---------------------+--------------------------------+ +===========+=====================+=================================+
| Requiremen | Claim | Reference | |Requirement|Claim | Reference |
| t | | | +===========+=====================+=================================+
+------------+---------------------+--------------------------------+ |Device |device-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
| Device | device-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims | |unique | | section 3.1.3 |
| unique | | ] section 3.1.3 | |identifier | | |
| identifier | | | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
| Vendor of | vendor-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims | |Vendor of |vendor-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
| the device | | ] section 3.1.1 | |the device | | section 3.1.1 |
| Class of | class-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
| the device | | ] section 3.1.2 | |Class of |class-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
| TEE | chip-version-scheme | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section | |the device | | section 3.1.2 |
| hardware | | 3.7 | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
| type | | | |TEE |chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| TEE | chip-version-scheme | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section | |hardware | | |
| hardware | | 3.7 | |type | | |
| version | | | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
| TEE | component- | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims | |TEE |chip-version | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.7 |
| firmware | identifier | ] section 3.1.4 | |hardware | | |
| type | | | |version | | |
| TEE | version | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
| firmware | | ] section 3.1.8 | |TEE |component-identifier | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
| version | | | |firmware | | section 3.1.4 |
| Freshness | nonce | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section | |type | | |
| proof | | 3.3 | +-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
+------------+---------------------+--------------------------------+ |TEE |version | [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] |
|firmware | | section 3.1.8 |
|version | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
|Freshness |nonce | [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] section 3.3 |
|proof | | |
+-----------+---------------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1
4.4. Update Message 4.4. Update Message
The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or
more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent. more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent.
Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in Appendix C. shown in Appendix C.
skipping to change at page 15, line 50 skipping to change at page 16, line 8
message. message.
err-msg err-msg
The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST
be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198]
with max 128 bytes. with max 128 bytes.
supported-cipher-suites supported-cipher-suites
The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) The supported-cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s)
supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the ciphersuite supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the ciphersuite
encoding can be found in Section 7. This field is optional but encoding can be found in Section 7. This otherwise optional
MUST be returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error parameter MUST be returned if err-code is
message. ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES.
supported-freshness-mechanisms supported-freshness-mechanisms
The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness
mechanism(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the mechanism(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the
encoding can be found in Section 8. If this parameter is absent, encoding can be found in Section 8. This otherwise optional
it means only the nonce mechanism is supported. parameter MUST be returned if err-code is
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS.
versions versions
The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s)
supported by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter supported by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter
MUST be returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION.
message.
suit-reports suit-reports
If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT
Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.moran-suit-report]. If
the suit-report-nonce field is present in the SUIT Report, is the suit-report-nonce field is present in the SUIT Report, is
value MUST match the value of the token parameter in the Update value MUST match the value of the token parameter in the Update
message the Error message is in response to. message the Error message is in response to.
err-code err-code
The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed
skipping to change at page 16, line 49 skipping to change at page 17, line 12
ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR is an indication that a more agressive retry ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR is an indication that a more agressive retry
is warranted. is warranted.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2) ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2)
The TEEP Agent does not support an extension included in the The TEEP Agent does not support an extension included in the
request message. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMMENDED to request message. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMMENDED to
identify the unsupported extension in the error message. A TAM identify the unsupported extension in the error message. A TAM
receiving this error might retry the request without using receiving this error might retry the request without using
extensions. extensions.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS (3)
The TEEP Agent does not support any freshness algorithm mechanisms
in the request message. A TAM receiving this error might retry
the request using a different set of supported freshness
mechanisms in the request message.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4) ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4)
The TEEP Agent does not support the TEEP protocol version The TEEP Agent does not support the TEEP protocol version
indicated in the request message. A TAM receiving this error indicated in the request message. A TAM receiving this error
might retry the request using a different TEEP protocol version. might retry the request using a different TEEP protocol version.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5) ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES (5)
The TEEP Agent does not support the cryptographic algorithm The TEEP Agent does not support any ciphersuites indicated in the
indicated in the request message. A TAM receiving this error request message. A TAM receiving this error might retry the
might retry the request using a different cryptographic algorithm. request using a different set of supported ciphersuites in the
request message.
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6) ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6)
Processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is Processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is
RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate
in the error message. For example, the certificate was of an in the error message. For example, the certificate was of an
unsupported type, or the certificate was revoked by its signer. A unsupported type, or the certificate was revoked by its signer. A
TAM receiving this error might attempt to use an alternate TAM receiving this error might attempt to use an alternate
certificate. certificate.
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9) ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9)
skipping to change at page 18, line 5 skipping to change at page 19, line 5
5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels 5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels
In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned
integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of
encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning,
as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for
this usage as a map key. this usage as a map key.
This specification uses the following mapping: This specification uses the following mapping:
+--------------------------------+-------+ +================================+=======+
| Name | Label | | Name | Label |
+--------------------------------+-------+ +================================+=======+
| supported-cipher-suites | 1 | | supported-cipher-suites | 1 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| challenge | 2 | | challenge | 2 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| version | 3 | | version | 3 |
| ocsp-data | 4 | +--------------------------------+-------+
| selected-cipher-suite | 5 | | selected-cipher-suite | 5 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| selected-version | 6 | | selected-version | 6 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| evidence | 7 | | evidence | 7 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| tc-list | 8 | | tc-list | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| ext-list | 9 | | ext-list | 9 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| manifest-list | 10 | | manifest-list | 10 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| msg | 11 | | msg | 11 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| err-msg | 12 | | err-msg | 12 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| evidence-format | 13 | | evidence-format | 13 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| requested-tc-list | 14 | | requested-tc-list | 14 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| unneeded-tc-list | 15 | | unneeded-tc-list | 15 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| component-id | 16 | | component-id | 16 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| tc-manifest-sequence-number | 17 | | tc-manifest-sequence-number | 17 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| have-binary | 18 | | have-binary | 18 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| suit-reports | 19 | | suit-reports | 19 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| token | 20 | | token | 20 |
+--------------------------------+-------+
| supported-freshness-mechanisms | 21 | | supported-freshness-mechanisms | 21 |
+--------------------------------+-------+ +--------------------------------+-------+
Table 2
6. Behavior Specification 6. Behavior Specification
Behavior is specified in terms of the conceptual APIs defined in Behavior is specified in terms of the conceptual APIs defined in
section 6.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. section 6.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
6.1. TAM Behavior 6.1. TAM Behavior
When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest
message. message.
skipping to change at page 20, line 38 skipping to change at page 22, line 12
some time, and the Success or Error message is generated only after some time, and the Success or Error message is generated only after
completing the Update Procedure. completing the Update Procedure.
7. Ciphersuites 7. Ciphersuites
A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a MAC algorithm, and a A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a MAC algorithm, and a
signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer
value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite (see value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite (see
Section 10.2. This document specifies two ciphersuites. Section 10.2. This document specifies two ciphersuites.
+-------+------------------------------------------------+ +=======+================================================+
| Value | Ciphersuite | | Value | Ciphersuite |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+ +=======+================================================+
| 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA | | 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 | | 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+ +-------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 3
A TAM MUST support both ciphersuites. A TEEP Agent MUST support at A TAM MUST support both ciphersuites. A TEEP Agent MUST support at
least one of the two but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP least one of the two but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP
Agent might choose ciphersuite 2 if it has hardware support for it. Agent might choose ciphersuite 2 if it has hardware support for it.
Any ciphersuites without confidentiality protection can only be added Any ciphersuites without confidentiality protection can only be added
if the associated specification includes a discussion of security if the associated specification includes a discussion of security
considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive
information. For example, Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] information. For example, Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the
TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then
skipping to change at page 21, line 24 skipping to change at page 23, line 5
A freshness mechanism determines how a TAM can tell whether evidence A freshness mechanism determines how a TAM can tell whether evidence
provided in a Query Response is fresh. There are multiple ways this provided in a Query Response is fresh. There are multiple ways this
can be done as discussed in Section 10 of can be done as discussed in Section 10 of
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture].
Each freshness mechanism is identified with an integer value, which Each freshness mechanism is identified with an integer value, which
corresponds to an IANA registered freshness mechanism (see corresponds to an IANA registered freshness mechanism (see
Section 10.3. This document defines the following freshness Section 10.3. This document defines the following freshness
mechanisms: mechanisms:
+-------+---------------------+ +=======+=====================+
| Value | Freshness mechanism | | Value | Freshness mechanism |
+-------+---------------------+ +=======+=====================+
| 1 | Nonce | | 1 | Nonce |
+-------+---------------------+
| 2 | Timestamp | | 2 | Timestamp |
+-------+---------------------+
| 3 | Epoch ID | | 3 | Epoch ID |
+-------+---------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
Table 4
In the Nonce mechanism, the evidence MUST include a nonce provided in In the Nonce mechanism, the evidence MUST include a nonce provided in
the QueryRequest challenge. In other mechanisms, a timestamp or the QueryRequest challenge. In other mechanisms, a timestamp or
epoch ID determined via mechanisms outside the TEEP protocol is used, epoch ID determined via mechanisms outside the TEEP protocol is used,
and the challenge is only needed in the QueryRequest message if a and the challenge is only needed in the QueryRequest message if a
challenge is needed in generating evidence for reasons other than challenge is needed in generating evidence for reasons other than
freshness. freshness.
If a TAM supports multiple freshness mechanisms that require
different challenge formats, the QueryRequest message can currently
only send one such challenge. This situation is expected to be rare,
but should it occur, the TAM can choose to prioritize one of them and
exclude the other from the supported-freshness-mechanisms in the
QueryRequest, and resend the QueryRequest with the other mechanism if
an ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS Error is received that
indicates the TEEP Agent supports the other mechanism.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
specification: specification:
Cryptographic Algorithms Cryptographic Algorithms
TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP
Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the
cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based
authentication is used by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the TAM authentication is used by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the TAM
skipping to change at page 23, line 4 skipping to change at page 24, line 45
compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of messages, compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of messages,
and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages. (A and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages. (A
replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A
compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to
install an old version of a Trusted Component. Information in the install an old version of a Trusted Component. Information in the
manifest ensures that TEEP Agents are protected against such manifest ensures that TEEP Agents are protected against such
downgrade attacks based on features offered by the manifest downgrade attacks based on features offered by the manifest
itself. itself.
Trusted Component Signer Compromise Trusted Component Signer Compromise
The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the TEEP Agent can include A TAM is responsible for vetting a Trusted Component and before
OCSP stapling data for the TAM's certificate and for intermediate distributing them to TEEP Agents.
CA certificates up to, but not including, the trust anchor so that
the TEEP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation status. A
certificate revocation status check on a Trusted Component Signer
certificate is OPTIONAL by a TEEP Agent. A TAM is responsible for
vetting a Trusted Component and before distributing them to TEEP
Agents, so TEEP Agents can instead simply trust that a Trusted
Component Signer certificate's status was done by the TAM.
CA Compromise It is RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor
The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or a Trusted Component Signer
might get compromised. A compromised intermediate CA certificate
can be detected by a TEEP Agent by using OCSP information,
assuming the revocation information is available. Additionally,
it is RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor
store used by the TEE, for example using a firmware update store used by the TEE, for example using a firmware update
mechanism. If the CA issuing certificates to devices gets mechanism. Thus, if a Trusted Component Signer is later
compromised then these devices might be rejected by a TAM, if compromised, the TAM can update the trust anchor store used by the
revocation is available to the TAM. TEE, for example using a firmware update mechanism.
Compromised TAM CA Compromise
The TEEP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify the validity The CA issuing certificates to a TEE or a Trusted Component Signer
of the TAM's certificate (as well as the validity of intermediate might get compromised. It is RECOMMENDED to provide a way to
CA certificates). The integrity and the accuracy of the clock update the trust anchor store used by the TEE, for example using a
within the TEE determines the ability to determine an expired or firmware update mechanism. If the CA issuing certificates to
revoked certificate. OCSP stapling data includes signature devices gets compromised then these devices might be rejected by a
generation time, allowing certificate validity dates to be TAM, if revocation is available to the TAM.
compared to the current time.
TAM Certificate Expiry
The integrity and the accuracy of the clock within the TEE
determines the ability to determine an expired TAM certificate, if
certificates are used.
Compromised Time Source Compromised Time Source
As discussed above, certificate validity checks rely on comparing As discussed above, certificate validity checks rely on comparing
validity dates to the current time, which relies on having a validity dates to the current time, which relies on having a
trusted source of time, such as [RFC8915]. A compromised time trusted source of time, such as [RFC8915]. A compromised time
source could thus be used to subvert such validity checks. source could thus be used to subvert such validity checks.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. Media Type Registration 10.1. Media Type Registration
skipping to change at page 24, line 21 skipping to change at page 26, line 11
Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049]. considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049].
Published specification: This document. Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information: Additional information: Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none Restrictions on usage: none
Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
Change controller: IETF Change controller: IETF
10.2. Ciphersuite Registry 10.2. Ciphersuite Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites.
defined in Section 7.
Name of registry: TEEP Ciphersuites
Policy: Specification Required
Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant
security considerations.
Initial values:
+=======+=========================+===============+
| Value | Ciphersuite | Specification |
+=======+=========================+===============+
| 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC | RFC TBD |
| | 256/256, X25519, EdDSA | Section 7 |
+-------+-------------------------+---------------+
| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC | RFC TBD |
| | 256/256, P-256, ES256 | Section 7 |
+-------+-------------------------+---------------+
Table 5
[RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to
this document]
10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry 10.3. Freshness Mechanism Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for freshness IANA is also requested to create a new registry for freshness
mechanisms, as defined in Section 8. mechanisms.
10.4. CBOR Tag Registry
IANA is requested to register a CBOR tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry Name of registry: TEEP Freshness Mechanisms
for use with TEEP messages.
The registry contents is: Policy: Specification Required
o CBOR Tag: TBD1 Additional requirements: The specification must document relevant
security considerations.
o Data Item: TEEP Message Initial values:
o Semantics: TEEP Message, as defined in draft-ietf-teep-protocol +=======+=====================+===================+
(TODO: replace with RFC once published) | Value | Freshness mechanism | Specification |
+=======+=====================+===================+
| 1 | Nonce | RFC TBD Section 8 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+
| 2 | Timestamp | RFC TBD Section 8 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+
| 3 | Epoch ID | RFC TBD Section 8 |
+-------+---------------------+-------------------+
o Reference: draft-ietf-teep-protocol (TODO: replace with RFC once Table 6
published)
o Point of Contact: TEEP working group (teep@ietf.org) [RFC Editor: please replace TBD above with the number assigned to
this document]
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-12 (work in progress), April in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
2021. 12, 23 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-rats-architecture-12.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J. Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., and J. O'Donoghue, "The Entity
O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft- Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-
ietf-rats-eat-10 (work in progress), June 2021. Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-11, 24 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-eat-
11.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg, Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
"A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based "A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-14 of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-
(work in progress), July 2021. Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-14, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-suit-manifest-
14.txt>.
[I-D.moran-suit-report] [I-D.moran-suit-report]
Moran, B., "Secure Reporting of Update Status", draft- Moran, B., "Secure Reporting of Update Status", Work in
moran-suit-report-01 (work in progress), February 2021. Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moran-suit-report-01, 22
February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
moran-suit-report-01.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims] [I-D.birkholz-rats-suit-claims]
Birkholz, H. and B. Moran, "Trustworthiness Vectors for Birkholz, H. and B. Moran, "Trustworthiness Vectors for
the Software Updates of Internet of Things (SUIT) Workflow the Software Updates of Internet of Things (SUIT) Workflow
Model", draft-birkholz-rats-suit-claims-02 (work in Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-
progress), July 2021. rats-suit-claims-02, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-rats-suit-
claims-02.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-15 (work in Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
progress), July 2021. ietf-teep-architecture-15, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-teep-
architecture-15.txt>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
skipping to change at page 28, line 33 skipping to change at page 31, line 4
; message type numbers, uint (0..23) ; message type numbers, uint (0..23)
TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1 TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1
TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2 TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2
TEEP-TYPE-update = 3 TEEP-TYPE-update = 3
TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5 TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5
TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6 TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6
version = .within uint .size 4 version = .within uint .size 4
ext-info = .within uint .size 4 ext-info = .within uint .size 4
; data items as bitmaps ; data items as bitmaps
data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8 data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8
attestation = 1 attestation = 1
$data-item-requested /= attestation $data-item-requested /= attestation
trusted-components = 2 trusted-components = 2
$data-item-requested /= trusted-components $data-item-requested /= trusted-components
extensions = 4 extensions = 4
$data-item-requested /= extensions $data-item-requested /= extensions
suit-commands = 8
$data-item-requested /= suit-commands
query-request = [ query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request, type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
options: { options: {
? token => bstr .size (8..64), ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ], ? supported-cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ], ? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + freshness-mechanism ],
? challenge => bstr .size (8..512), ? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
? versions => [ + version ], ? versions => [ + version ],
? ocsp-data => bstr,
* $$query-request-extensions * $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
}, },
data-item-requested: data-item-requested data-item-requested: data-item-requested
] ]
; ciphersuites ; ciphersuites
suite = $TEEP-suite .within uint .size 4 suite = $TEEP-suite .within uint .size 4
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = 1 TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = 1
skipping to change at page 30, line 52 skipping to change at page 33, line 19
? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ], ? suit-reports => [ + suit-report ],
* $$teep-error-extensions, * $$teep-error-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
}, },
err-code: uint (0..23) err-code: uint (0..23)
] ]
; The err-code parameter, uint (0..23) ; The err-code parameter, uint (0..23)
ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR = 1 ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR = 1
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION = 2 ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION = 2
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS = 3
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION = 4 ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION = 4
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG = 5 ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES = 5
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE = 6 ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE = 6
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 9 ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 9
ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR = 10 ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR = 10
ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17 ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17
; labels of mapkey for teep message parameters, uint (0..23) ; labels of mapkey for teep message parameters, uint (0..23)
supported-cipher-suites = 1 supported-cipher-suites = 1
challenge = 2 challenge = 2
versions = 3 versions = 3
ocsp-data = 4
selected-cipher-suite = 5 selected-cipher-suite = 5
selected-version = 6 selected-version = 6
evidence = 7 evidence = 7
tc-list = 8 tc-list = 8
ext-list = 9 ext-list = 9
manifest-list = 10 manifest-list = 10
msg = 11 msg = 11
err-msg = 12 err-msg = 12
evidence-format = 13 evidence-format = 13
requested-tc-list = 14 requested-tc-list = 14
unneeded-tc-list = 15 unneeded-tc-list = 15
component-id = 16 component-id = 16
tc-manifest-sequence-number = 17 tc-manifest-sequence-number = 17
have-binary = 18 have-binary = 18
suit-reports = 19 suit-reports = 19
token = 20 token = 20
supported-freshness-mechanisms = 21
D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation D. Examples of Diagnostic Notation and Binary Representation
D.1. Some assumptions in examples This section includes some examples with the following assumptions:
o OCSP stapling data = h'010203'
o TEEP Device will have two TCs with the following SUIT Component * TEEP Device will have two TCs with the following SUIT Component
Identifiers: Identifiers:
* [ 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] - [ 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ]
* [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] - [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ]
o SUIT manifest-list is set empty only for example purposes * SUIT manifest-list is set empty only for example purposes (see
Appendix E for actual manifest examples)
D.2. QueryRequest Message D.1. QueryRequest Message
D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
D.1.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ query-request = / / query-request = /
[ [
1, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1 (uint (0..23)) / 1, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : / / options : /
{ {
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf, 20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) : / token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)), h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
generated by TAM / generated by TAM /
1 : [ 1 ], / supported-cipher-suites = 1 (mapkey) : 1 : [ 1 ], / supported-cipher-suites = 1 (mapkey) :
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA =
[ 1 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) / [ 1 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) /
3 : [ 0 ], / version = 3 (mapkey) : 3 : [ 0 ] / version = 3 (mapkey) :
[ 0 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) / [ 0 ] (array of .within uint .size 4) /
4 : h'010203' / ocsp-data = 4 (mapkey) : 0x010203 (bstr) /
}, },
3 / data-item-requested : 3 / data-item-requested :
attestation | trusted-components = 3 (.within uint .size 8) / attestation | trusted-components = 3 (.within uint .size 8) /
] ]
D.2.2. CBOR Binary Representation D.1.2. CBOR Binary Representation
83 # array(3) 83 # array(3)
01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23) 01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23)
A4 # map(4) A4 # map(4)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23) 01 # unsigned(1) uint (0..23)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
01 # unsigned(1) within uint .size 4 01 # unsigned(1) within uint .size 4
03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23) 03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
00 # unsigned(0) within uint .size 4 00 # unsigned(0) within uint .size 4
04 # unsigned(4) uint (0..23) 04 # unsigned(4) uint (0..23)
43 # bytes(3) 43 # bytes(3)
010203 # "\x01\x02\x03" 010203 # "\x01\x02\x03"
03 # unsigned(3) .within uint .size 8 03 # unsigned(3) .within uint .size 8
D.3. Entity Attestation Token D.2. Entity Attestation Token
This is shown below in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed This is shown below in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed
by COSE is shown. by COSE is shown.
D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation D.2.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ eat-claim-set = / / eat-claim-set = /
{ {
/ issuer / 1: "joe", / issuer / 1: "joe",
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894) / timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894)
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ secure-boot / 15: true, / secure-boot / 15: true,
/ debug-status / 16: 3, / disabled-permanently / / debug-status / 16: 3, / disabled-permanently /
/ security-level / <TBD>: 3, / secure-restricted / / security-level / 14: 3, / secure-restricted /
/ device-identifier / <TBD>: h'e99600dd921649798b013e9752dcf0c5', / device-identifier / <TBD>: h'e99600dd921649798b013e9752dcf0c5',
/ vendor-identifier / <TBD>: h'2b03879b33434a7ca682b8af84c19fd4', / vendor-identifier / <TBD>: h'2b03879b33434a7ca682b8af84c19fd4',
/ class-identifier / <TBD>: h'9714a5796bd245a3a4ab4f977cb8487f', / class-identifier / <TBD>: h'9714a5796bd245a3a4ab4f977cb8487f',
/ chip-version-scheme / <TBD>: "MyTEE v1.0", / chip-version / 26: [ "MyTEE", 1 ],
/ component-identifier / <TBD>: h'60822887d35e43d5b603d18bcaa3f08d', / component-identifier / <TBD>: h'60822887d35e43d5b603d18bcaa3f08d',
/ version / <TBD>: "v0.1" / version / <TBD>: "v0.1"
} }
D.4. QueryResponse Message D.3. QueryResponse Message
D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation D.3.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ query-response = / / query-response = /
[ [
2, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2 (uint (0..23)) / 2, / type : TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : / / options : /
{ {
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf, 20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) : / token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)), h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's QueryRequest message / given from TAM's QueryRequest message /
5 : 1, / selected-cipher-suite = 5 (mapkey) : 5 : 1, / selected-cipher-suite = 5 (mapkey) :
skipping to change at page 34, line 35 skipping to change at page 36, line 35
}, },
{ {
16 : [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] / component-id = 16 : [ 0x100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f ] / component-id =
16 (mapkey) : [ h'100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f' ] 16 (mapkey) : [ h'100102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f' ]
(SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]) / (SUIT_Component_Identifier = [* bstr]) /
} }
] ]
} }
] ]
D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation D.3.2. CBOR Binary Representation
82 # array(2) 82 # array(2)
02 # unsigned(2) uint (0..23) 02 # unsigned(2) uint (0..23)
A5 # map(5) A5 # map(5)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23) 05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23)
01 # unsigned(1) .within uint .size 4 01 # unsigned(1) .within uint .size 4
06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23) 06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23)
00 # unsigned(0) .within uint .size 4 00 # unsigned(0) .within uint .size 4
skipping to change at page 35, line 25 skipping to change at page 37, line 25
... # Entity Attestation Token ... # Entity Attestation Token
08 # unsigned(8) uint (0..23) 08 # unsigned(8) uint (0..23)
82 # array(2) 82 # array(2)
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
4F # bytes(16) 4F # bytes(16)
000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
81 # array(1) 81 # array(1)
4F # bytes(16) 4F # bytes(16)
100102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F 100102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
D.5. Update Message D.4. Update Message
D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation D.4.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ update = / / update = /
[ [
3, / type : TEEP-TYPE-update = 3 (uint (0..23)) / 3, / type : TEEP-TYPE-update = 3 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : / / options : /
{ {
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf, 20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) : / token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)), h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
generated by TAM / generated by TAM /
10 : [ ] / manifest-list = 10 (mapkey) : 10 : [ ] / manifest-list = 10 (mapkey) :
[ ] (array of bstr wrapped SUIT_Envelope(any)) / [ ] (array of bstr wrapped SUIT_Envelope(any)) /
/ empty, example purpose only / / empty, example purpose only /
} }
] ]
D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation D.4.2. CBOR Binary Representation
82 # array(2) 82 # array(2)
03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23) 03 # unsigned(3) uint (0..23)
A3 # map(3) A3 # map(3)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
0A # unsigned(10) uint (0..23) 0A # unsigned(10) uint (0..23)
80 # array(0) 80 # array(0)
D.6. Success Message D.5. Success Message
D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation D.5.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ teep-success = / / teep-success = /
[ [
5, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5 (uint (0..23)) / 5, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : / / options : /
{ {
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf, 20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) : / token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)), h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's Update message / given from TAM's Update message /
} }
] ]
D.6.2. CBOR Binary Representation D.5.2. CBOR Binary Representation
82 # array(2) 82 # array(2)
05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23) 05 # unsigned(5) uint (0..23)
A1 # map(1) A1 # map(1)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
D.7. Error Message D.6. Error Message
D.7.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation D.6.1. CBOR Diagnostic Notation
/ teep-error = / / teep-error = /
[ [
6, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6 (uint (0..23)) / 6, / type : TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6 (uint (0..23)) /
/ options : / / options : /
{ {
20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf, 20 : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf,
/ token = 20 (mapkey) : / token = 20 (mapkey) :
h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)), h'a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf' (bstr .size (8..64)),
given from TAM's Update message / given from TAM's Update message /
12 : "disk-full" / err-msg = 12 (mapkey) : 12 : "disk-full" / err-msg = 12 (mapkey) :
"disk-full" (text .size (1..128)) / "disk-full" (text .size (1..128)) /
}, },
17, / err-code : ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17 (uint (0..23)) / 17, / err-code : ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17 (uint (0..23)) /
] ]
D.7.2. CBOR binary Representation D.6.2. CBOR binary Representation
83 # array(3) 83 # array(3)
06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23) 06 # unsigned(6) uint (0..23)
A2 # map(2) A2 # map(2)
14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23) 14 # unsigned(20) uint (0..23)
4F # bytes(16) (8..64) 4F # bytes(16) (8..64)
A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
0C # unsigned(12) uint (0..23) 0C # unsigned(12) uint (0..23)
69 # text(9) (1..128) 69 # text(9) (1..128)
6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full" 6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full"
11 # unsigned(17) uint (0..23) 11 # unsigned(17) uint (0..23)
E. Examples of SUIT Manifests
This section shows some examples of SUIT manifests for a case where
the TEE will use a Trusted Application (TA) for OP-TEE on Arm
TrustZone, storing the TA in Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB)
secure storage in a file named "edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-
b3ad5a2d5b8a.ta".
The TA developer places personalization data for the device on an
HTTPS server and puts the URI in the TA manifest. The
personalization data will also be stored in RPMB secure storage in a
file named "config.json".
E.1. Install a Trusted Component
This sample manifest installs a Trusted Component that depends on
personalization data resolved separately.
TA Manifest:
107({
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:<<[
digest: <<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'd6c1fc7200483092e2db59d4907f9b15'
h'05cb3af2795cf78f7ae3d88166fdf743'
]>>,
signature: <<18([
/ protected / <<{
/ alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
}>>,
/ unprotected / {},
/ payload / F6 / nil /,
/ signature / h'd11a2dd9610fb62a707335f584079225'
h'709f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ec'
h'fba1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca'
h'3215e1193be201467d052b42db6b7287'
])>>
]>>,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
/ common / 3:<<{
/ components / 2:[
["OP-TEE","RPMB","edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216- b3ad5a2d5b8a","ta"]
],
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id / 1:h'c0ddd5f15243566087db4f5b0aa26c2f',
/ class-id / 2:h'db42f7093d8c55baa8c5265fc5820f4e',
/ image-digest / 3:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
]>>,
/ image-size / 14:76778,
},
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15
]>>,
}>>,
/ install / 9:<<[
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:
'https://teep.example/edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.ta',
} ,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ validate / 10:<<[
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ run / 12:<<[
/ directive-run / 23,2
]>>,
/ text / 13:<<{
[
h'4f502d544545',
h'44f301',
h'edd94cd89d9c4cc89216b3ad5a2d5b8a',
h'7461'
]:{
/ model-name / 2: 'OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'teep.example'
}
}>>
}>>
})
Personalization Data Manifest:
107({
2:<<[
digest: <<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c'
h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
]>>
]>>,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
/ dependencies / 1:[
{
/ dependency-digest / 1:[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'd6c1fc7200483092e2db59d4907f9b15'
h'05cb3af2795cf78f7ae3d88166fdf743'
]
}
],
/ components / 2:[
["OP-TEE","RPMB","config.json"]
],
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id / 1:h'ec41787224345ae580003de697ff8d43'
/ ec417872-2434-5ae5-8000-3de697ff8d43 /,
/ class-id / 2:h'eb1701b48be85709aca0adf89f056a64'
/ eb1701b4-8be8-5709-aca0-adf89f056a64 /,
/ image-digest / 3:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes / h'aaabcccdeeef00012223444566678889'
h'abbbcdddefff01112333455567778999'
]>>
},
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15
]>>,
/ dependency-resolution / 7:<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:'tam.teep.example/'
'edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-'
'9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a.suit',
},
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ install / 9:<<[
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ directive-set-parameters / 19,{
/ uri / 21:
'http://tam.teep.example/config.json',
},
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0,
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ directive-fetch / 21,2,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ validate / 10:<<[
/ directive-set-component-index / 12,0,
/ condition-image-match / 3,15,
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0
]>>,
/ run / 12:<<[
/ directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
/ directive-process-dependency / 18,0
]>>,
/ text / 13:<<{
[h'4f502d544545', h'44f301',
h'636f6e6669672e6a736f6e']:{
/ model-name / 2: 'Personalised OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'tam.teep.example',
},
[
h'4f502d544545',
h'44f301',
h'edd94cd89d9c4cc89216b3ad5a2d5b8a',
h'7461'
]:{
/ model-name / 2:'OP-TEE on TF-A on TrustZone',
/ vendor-domain / 3:'teep.example'
}
}>>
}>>
})
E.2. Delete a Trusted Component
This sample manifest removes a Trusted Component and its dependency.
107({
/ authentication-wrapper / 2:<<[
digest: <<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b305516d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a'
]>>,
signature: <<18([
/ protected / <<{
/ alg / 1:-7 / "ES256" /,
}>>,
/ unprotected / {
},
/ payload / F6 / nil /,
/ signature / h'd11a2dd9610fb62a707335f58407922570
9f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ecfba1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca3215e119
3be201467d052b42db6b7287'
])>>
]
]>>,
/ manifest / 3:<<{
/ manifest-version / 1:1,
/ manifest-sequence-number / 2:0,
/ common / 3:<<{
/ components / 2:[
[h'00']
],
/ common-sequence / 4:<<[
/ directive-override-parameters / 20,{
/ vendor-id /
1:h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe' / fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-
be9d-e663e4d41ffe /,
/ class-id /
2:h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45' /
1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45 /,
/ image-digest / 3:<<[
/ algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
/ digest-bytes /
h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
]>>,
/ image-size / 14:34768,
} ,
/ condition-vendor-identifier / 1,15 ,
/ condition-class-identifier / 2,15
]>>,
}>>,
/ validate / 10:<<[
/ condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,
/ run / 12:<<[
/ directive-run / 23,2
]>>,
}>>,
})
Total size of Envelope without COSE authentication object: 161
Envelope:
d86ba2025827815824822f5820a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b3055
16d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a035871a50101020003585fa2028181
41000458568614a40150fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492
af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45035824822f5820001122334455667788
99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100e1987d0010f02
0f0a4382030f0c43821702
Total size of Envelope with COSE authentication object: 237
Envelope with COSE authentication object:
d86ba2025873825824822f5820a6c4590ac53043a98e8c4106e1e31b3055
16d7cf0a655eddfac6d45c810e036a584ad28443a10126a0f65840d11a2d
d9610fb62a707335f584079225709f96e8117e7eeed98a2f207d05c8ecfb
a1755208f6abea977b8a6efe3bc2ca3215e1193be201467d052b42db6b72
87035871a50101020003585fa202818141000458568614a40150fa6b4a53
d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe02501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45
035824822f582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcd
effedcba98765432100e1987d0010f020f0a4382030f0c43821702
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd. Arm Ltd.
Absam, Tirol 6067 6067 Absam
Austria Austria
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
Mingliang Pei Mingliang Pei
Broadcom Broadcom
350 Ellis St 350 Ellis St
Mountain View, CA 94043 Mountain View, CA 94043
USA United States of America
Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com
David Wheeler David Wheeler
Amazon Amazon
US United States of America
Email: davewhee@amazon.com Email: davewhee@amazon.com
Dave Thaler Dave Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
US United States of America
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
Akira Tsukamoto Akira Tsukamoto
AIST AIST
JP Japan
Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp
 End of changes. 122 change blocks. 
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