draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02.txt   draft-ietf-teep-protocol-03.txt 
TEEP H. Tschofenig TEEP H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Arm Ltd. Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: October 16, 2020 Broadcom Expires: January 14, 2021 Broadcom
D. Wheeler D. Wheeler
Intel Intel
D. Thaler D. Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
A. Tsukamoto A. Tsukamoto
AIST AIST
April 14, 2020 July 13, 2020
Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02 draft-ietf-teep-protocol-03
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an
interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs. interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.
The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a
wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of
matches the intent of this protocol. matches the intent of this protocol.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.5. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.6. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.7. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 15 5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 15
6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.4. CBOR Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.4. CBOR Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
skipping to change at page 10, line 18 skipping to change at page 10, line 18
(trusted apps) via the TEEP Agent. (trusted apps) via the TEEP Agent.
Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppInstall message is signed, Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppInstall message is signed,
and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
structure is shown in [CDDL]. structure is shown in [CDDL].
trusted-app-install = [ trusted-app-install = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install, type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
token: uint, token: uint,
option: { option: {
? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ], ? manifest-list => [ + SUIT_Envelope ],
* $$trusted-app-install-extensions, * $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
} }
] ]
The TrustedAppInstall message has the following fields: The TrustedAppInstall message has the following fields:
type type
The value of (3) corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent The value of (3) corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent
from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing,
skipping to change at page 16, line 35 skipping to change at page 16, line 35
A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided by the TEEP A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided by the TEEP
Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to convey this Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to convey this
information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it is necessary information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it is necessary
for the device to possess a public key (usually in the form of a for the device to possess a public key (usually in the form of a
certificate) along with the corresponding private key. Depending certificate) along with the corresponding private key. Depending
on the properties of the attestation mechanism it is possible to on the properties of the attestation mechanism it is possible to
uniquely identify a device based on information in the attestation uniquely identify a device based on information in the attestation
information or in the certificate used to sign the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the attestation
token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns. To lower the token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns. To lower the
privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its attestation privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its attestation
information only to an authenticated and authorized TAM. information only to an authenticated and authorized TAM and SHOULD
use encryption in EATs as discussed in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] since
confidentiality is not provided by the TEEP protocol itself, and
the transport protocol under the TEEP protocol might be
implemented outside of any TEE.
TA Binaries TA Binaries
TA binaries are provided by the SP. It is the responsibility of TA binaries are provided by the SP. It is the responsibility of
the TAM to relay only verified TAs from authorized SPs. Delivery the TAM to relay only verified TAs from authorized SPs. Delivery
of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the responsibility of the TAM of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the responsibility of the TAM
and the TEEP Broker, using the security mechanisms provided by the and the TEEP Broker, using the security mechanisms provided by the
TEEP protocol. To protect the TA binary the SUIT manifest is re- TEEP protocol. To protect the TA binary the SUIT manifest is re-
used and it offers a varity of security features, including used and it offers a varity of security features, including
digitial signatures and symmetric encryption. digitial signatures and symmetric encryption.
skipping to change at page 20, line 15 skipping to change at page 20, line 19
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J. Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft- O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020. ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg, Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
"A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based "A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-04 of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-08
(work in progress), March 2020. (work in progress), July 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999, DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999, <https://www.rfc-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>. editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
skipping to change at page 21, line 10 skipping to change at page 21, line 10
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-08 (work in Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-11 (work in
progress), April 2020. progress), July 2020.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
skipping to change at page 21, line 45 skipping to change at page 21, line 45
We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Kuniyasu Suzaki We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Kuniyasu Suzaki
(TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for (TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for
their valuable implementation feedback. their valuable implementation feedback.
We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for
their help with the CDDL. their help with the CDDL.
C. Complete CDDL C. Complete CDDL
teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework Valid TEEP messages MUST adhere to the following CDDL data
definitions, except that "SUIT_Envelope" is specified in
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].
SUIT-envelope = bstr ; placeholder teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework
SUIT_Envelope = any
teep-message-framework = [ teep-message-framework = [
type: 0..23 / $teep-type-extension, type: 0..23 / $teep-type-extension,
token: uint, token: uint,
options: { * teep-option }, options: { * teep-option },
* int; further integers, e.g. for data-item-requested * int; further integers, e.g. for data-item-requested
] ]
teep-option = (uint => any) teep-option = (uint => any)
; messages defined below: ; messages defined below:
skipping to change at page 22, line 22 skipping to change at page 22, line 26
$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-install $teep-message-type /= trusted-app-install
$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-delete $teep-message-type /= trusted-app-delete
$teep-message-type /= teep-error $teep-message-type /= teep-error
$teep-message-type /= teep-success $teep-message-type /= teep-success
; message type numbers ; message type numbers
TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1 TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1
TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2 TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2
TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install = 3 TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install = 3
TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete = 4 TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete = 4
TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 5 TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 5
TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 6 TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 6
version = uint .size 4 version = uint .size 4
ext-info = uint ext-info = uint
; data items as bitmaps ; data items as bitmaps
data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8 data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8
attestation = 1 attestation = 1
$data-item-requested /= attestation $data-item-requested /= attestation
trusted-apps = 2 trusted-apps = 2
$data-item-requested /= trusted-apps $data-item-requested /= trusted-apps
skipping to change at page 23, line 31 skipping to change at page 23, line 36
? ext-list => [ + ext-info ], ? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
* $$query-response-extensions, * $$query-response-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
} }
] ]
trusted-app-install = [ trusted-app-install = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install, type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
token: uint, token: uint,
option: { option: {
? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ], ? manifest-list => [ + SUIT_Envelope ],
* $$trusted-app-install-extensions, * $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions * $$teep-option-extensions
} }
] ]
trusted-app-delete = [ trusted-app-delete = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete, type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete,
token: uint, token: uint,
option: { option: {
? ta-list => [ + bstr ], ? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
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