draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01.txt   draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02.txt 
TEEP H. Tschofenig TEEP H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Arm Ltd. Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: September 10, 2020 Broadcom Expires: October 16, 2020 Broadcom
D. Wheeler D. Wheeler
Intel Intel
D. Thaler D. Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
March 9, 2020 A. Tsukamoto
AIST
April 14, 2020
Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01 draft-ietf-teep-protocol-02
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted
Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an
interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs. interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.
The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a
wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.5. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.6. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.5. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.6. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.7. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels . . . . . . 15
7.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.4. CBOR Tag Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C. Complete CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications. Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
In an TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating In an TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating
systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When
application providers or device administrators use Trusted application providers or device administrators use Trusted
Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted
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The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture
document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design
guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the
necessary terminology. Note that the term Trusted Application may necessary terminology. Note that the term Trusted Application may
include more than code; it may also include configuration data and include more than code; it may also include configuration data and
keys needed by the TA to operate correctly. keys needed by the TA to operate correctly.
2. Requirements Language 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification re-uses the terminology defined in This specification re-uses the terminology defined in
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]. [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
3. Message Overview 3. Message Overview
The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between
a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded
in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol
messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP
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TrustedAppDelete ----> TrustedAppDelete ---->
Success Success
<---- or <---- or
Error Error
4. Detailed Messages Specification 4. Detailed Messages Specification
The CBOR-encoded messages are protected by COSE, as described in CDDL TEEP messages are protected by the COSE_Sign1 structure. The TEEP
format [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] below. protocol messages are described in CDDL format [RFC8610] below.
Outer_Wrapper = {
msg-authenc-wrapper => bstr .cbor
Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper / nil,
teep-message => (QueryRequest / teep-message => (QueryRequest /
QueryResponse / QueryResponse /
TrustedAppInstall / TrustedAppInstall /
TrustedAppDelete / TrustedAppDelete /
Error / Error /
Success ), Success ),
} }
msg-authenc-wrapper = 1 4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages
teep-message = 2
Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper = [ * (COSE_Mac_Tagged / 4.1.1. Creating a TEEP message
COSE_Sign_Tagged /
COSE_Mac0_Tagged /
COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]
4.1. QueryRequest To create a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.
suite = int 1. Create a TEEP message according to the description below and
populate it with the respective content.
version = int 2. Create a COSE Header containing the desired set of Header
Parameters. The COSE Header MUST be valid per the [RFC8152]
specification.
data_item = int 3. Create a COSE_Sign1 object using the TEEP message as the
COSE_Sign1 Payload; all steps specified in [RFC8152] for creating
a COSE_Sign1 object MUST be followed.
QueryRequest = { 4. Prepend the COSE object with the TEEP CBOR tag to indicate that
TYPE : int, the CBOR-encoded message is indeed a TEEP message.
TOKEN : bstr,
REQUEST : [+data_item],
? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
? NONCE : bstr,
? VERSION : [+version],
? OCSP_DATA : bstr,
* $$extensions
}
A QueryRequest message is signed by the TAM and has the following 4.1.2. Validating a TEEP Message
fields:
TYPE TYPE = 1 corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the When validating a TEEP message, the following steps are performed.
TAM to the TEEP Agent. If any of the listed steps fail, then the TEEP message MUST be
rejected.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to 1. Verify that the received message is a valid CBOR object.
responses.
REQUEST The REQUEST field indicates what information the TAM 2. Remove the TEEP message CBOR tag and verify that one of the COSE
requests from the TEEP Agent in form of a list of integer values. CBOR tags follows it.
Each integer value corresponds to an IANA registered information
element. This specification defines the initial set of 3. Verify that the message contains a COSE_Sign1 structure.
information elements:
4. Verify that the resulting COSE Header includes only parameters
and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and
supported or that are specified as being ignored when not
understood.
5. Follow the steps specified in Section 4 of [RFC8152] ("Signing
Objects") for validating a COSE_Sign1 object. The COSE_Sign1
payload is the content of the TEEP message.
6. Verify that the TEEP message is a valid CBOR map and verify the
fields of the TEEP message according to this specification.
4.2. QueryRequest
A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from
the TEEP Agent. The TAM can learn the features supported by the TEEP
Agent, including ciphersuites, and protocol versions. Additionally,
the TAM can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent via
the request parameter. Currently, the following features are
supported:
o Request for attestation information,
o Listing supported extensions,
o Querying installed software (trusted apps), and
o Listing supporting SUIT commands.
Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the
relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in [CDDL].
query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
token: uint,
options: {
? supported-cipher-suites => suite,
? nonce => bstr .size (8..64),
? version => [ + version ],
? oscp-data => bstr,
* $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
data-item-requested
]
The message has the following fields:
type
The value of (1) corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from
the TAM to the TEEP Agent.
token
The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests. This is particualrly useful when a TAM issues multiple
concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent.
request
The request parameter indicates what information the TAM requests
from the TEEP Agent in form of a bitmap. Each value in the bitmap
corresponds to an IANA registered information element. This
specification defines the following initial set of information
elements:
attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent attestation (1) With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent
to return an entity attestation token (EAT) in the response. to return an entity attestation token (EAT) in the response.
If the TAM requests an attestation token to be returned by the
TEEP Agent then it MUST also include the nonce in the message.
The nonce is subsequently placed into the EAT token for replay
protection.
trusted_apps (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent trusted_apps (2) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent
for all installed TAs. for all installed TAs.
extensions (3) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for extensions (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for
supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to
discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation. discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.
suit_commands (4) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent suit_commands (8) With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent
for supported commands offered by the SUIT manifest for supported commands offered by the SUIT manifest
implementation. implementation.
Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration. Further values may be added in the future via IANA registration.
CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s) cipher-suites
supported by the TAM. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can The cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) supported by
be found in Section 5. the TAM. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found in
Section 6.
NONCE NONCE is an optional field used for ensuring the refreshness nonce
of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) contained in the response. The none field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the
refreshness of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) returned with a
QueryResponse message. When a nonce is provided in the
QueryRequest and an EAT is returned with the QueryResponse message
then the nonce contained in this request MUST be copied into the
nonce claim found in the EAT token.
VERSION The VERSION field lists the version(s) supported by the TAM. version
The version field parameter the version(s) supported by the TAM.
For this version of the specification this field can be omitted. For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.
OCSP_DATA The OCSP_DATA field contains a list of OCSP stapling data ocsp_data
The ocsp_data parameter contains a list of OCSP stapling data
respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA
certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP
data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM
certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service
call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response
(using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use (using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use
of OCSP is optional to implement for bo th the TAM and the TEEP of OCSP is optional to implement for both the TAM and the TEEP
Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this
functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described
above. above.
4.2. QueryResponse 4.3. QueryResponse
ext_info = int The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP
Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message.
QueryResponse = { Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and
TYPE : int, the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
TOKEN : bstr, structure is shown in [CDDL].
? SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE : suite,
? SELECTED_VERSION : version,
? EAT : bstr,
? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
? EXT_LIST : [+ext_info],
* $$extensions
}
The QueryResponse message is signed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent query-response = [
and returned to the TAM. It has the following fields: type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
token: uint,
options: {
? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
? selected-version => version,
? eat => bstr,
? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
* $$query-response-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
TYPE TYPE = 2 corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the The message has the following fields:
TEEP Agent to the TAM.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to type
responses. The value MUST correspond to the value received with The value of (2) corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from
the QueryRequest. the TEEP Agent to the TAM.
SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE The SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE field indicates the token
selected ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
be found in Section 5. requests. The value MUST correspond to the value received with
the QueryRequest message.
SELECTED_VERSION The SELECTED_VERSION field indicates the protocol selected-cipher-suite
version selected by the TEEP Agent. The selected-cipher-suite parameter indicates the selected
ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can be found
in Section 6.
EAT The EAT field contains an Entity Attestation Token following the selected-version
encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. The selected-version parameter indicates the protocol version
selected by the TEEP Agent.
TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the trusted applications eat
installed on the device in form of TA ID strings. The eat parameter contains an Entity Attestation Token following
the encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].
EXT_LIST The EXT_LIST field lists the supported extensions. This ta-list
The ta-list parameter enumerates the trusted applications
installed on the device in form of TA_ID byte strings.
ext-list
The ext-list parameter lists the supported extensions. This
document does not define any extensions. document does not define any extensions.
4.3. TrustedAppInstall 4.4. TrustedAppInstall
TrustedAppInstall = {
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
? MANIFEST_LIST : [+ SUIT_Outer_Wrapper],
* $$extensions
}
The TrustedAppInstall message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and The TrustedAppInstall message is used by the TAM to install software
has the following fields: (trusted apps) via the TEEP Agent.
TYPE TYPE = 3 corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent from Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppInstall message is signed,
the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an structure is shown in [CDDL].
trusted-app-install = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
token: uint,
option: {
? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ],
* $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
The TrustedAppInstall message has the following fields:
type
The value of (3) corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent
from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing,
an Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
error, an Error message is returned. Note that the error, an Error message is returned. Note that the
TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but
also for TA updates. also for TA updates.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to token
responses. The value in the token field is used to match responses to
requests.
TA The MANIFEST_LIST field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT manifest-list
The manifest-list field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT
manifests. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the trusted manifests. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about the trusted
app, where to find the code, the devices to which it applies, and app, where to find the code, the devices to which it applies, and
cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest
may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and
personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP. personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP.
Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example, Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example,
it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the
personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA
binary. binary.
4.4. TrustedAppDelete 4.5. TrustedAppDelete
TrustedAppDelete = { The TrustedAppDelete message is used by the TAM to remove software
TYPE : int, (trust apps) from the device.
TOKEN : bstr,
? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
* $$extensions
}
The TrustedAppDelete message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and Like other TEEP messages, the TrustedAppDelete message is signed, and
has the following fields: the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL
structure is shown in [CDDL].
TYPE TYPE = 4 corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent from trusted-app-delete = [
the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete,
Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an token: uint,
option: {
? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
* $$trusted-app-delete-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
The TrustedAppDelete message has the following fields:
type
The value of (4) corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent
from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing,
an Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
error, an Error message is returned. error, an Error message is returned.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to token
responses. The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests.
TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the TAs to be deleted. ta-list
The ta-list parameter enumerates the TAs to be deleted.
4.5. Success 4.6. Success
Success = { The TEEP protocol defines two implicit success messages and this
TYPE : int, explicit Success message for the cases where the TEEP Agent cannot
TOKEN : bstr, return another reply, such as for the TrustedAppInstall and the
? MSG : tstr, TrustedAppDelete messages.
* $$extensions
}
The Success message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent and has Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the
the following fields: relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in [CDDL].
TYPE TYPE = 5 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP teep-success = [
Agent to the TAM. type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
token: uint,
option: {
? msg => text,
* $$teep-success-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to The Success message has the following fields:
responses.
MSG The MSG field contains optional diagnostics information encoded type
in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent. The value of (5) corresponds to corresponds to a Success message
sent from the TEEP Agent to the TAM.
4.6. Error token
The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests.
Error = { msg
TYPE : int, The msg parameter contains optional diagnostics information
TOKEN : bstr, encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent.
ERR_CODE : int,
? ERR_MSG : tstr,
? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
? VERSION : [+version],
* $$extensions
}
If possible, the Error message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP 4.7. Error
Agent. Unprotected Error messages MUST be handled with care by the
TAM due to possible downgrading attacks. It has the following
fields:
TYPE TYPE = 6 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error.
Agent to the TAM.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the
responses. relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is
shown in [CDDL].
ERR_CODE The ERR_CODE field is populated with values listed in a teep-error = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
token: uint,
err-code: uint,
options: {
? err-msg => text,
? cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? versions => [ + version ],
* $$teep-error--extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
The Error message has the following fields:
type
The value of (6) corresponds to an Error message sent from the
TEEP Agent to the TAM.
token
The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to
requests.
err-code
The err-code parameter is populated with values listed in a
registry (with the initial set of error codes listed below). Only registry (with the initial set of error codes listed below). Only
selected messages are applicable to each message. selected messages are applicable to each message.
ERR_MSG The ERR_MSG message is a human-readable diagnostic message err-msg
that MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form The err-msg parameter is a human-readable diagnostic text that
MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form
[RFC5198]. [RFC5198].
VERSION The VERSION field enumerates the protocol version(s) cipher-suites
supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be The cipher-suites parameter lists the ciphersuite(s) supported by
the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be returned with
the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
versions
The version parameter enumerates the protocol version(s) supported
by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be
returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message. returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.
CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s) This specification defines the following initial error messages:
supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
This specification defines the following initial error messages. ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (1)
Additional error code can be registered with IANA. The TEEP Agent sends this error message when a request contains
incorrect fields or fields that are inconsistent with other
fields.
ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (1) The TEEP Agent sends this error message ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2)
when a request contains incorrect fields or fields that are The TEEP Agent sends this error message when it recognizes an
inconsistent with other fields. unsupported extension or unsupported message.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2) The TEEP Agent sends this error ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED (3)
message when it recognizes an unsupported extension or unsupported The TEEP Agent sends this error message when it fails to verify
message. the signature of the message.
ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED (3) The TEEP Agent sends this error ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4)
message when it fails to verify the signature of the message. The TEEP Agent receives a message but does not support the
indicated version.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4) The TEEP Agent receives a message ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5)
but does not support the indicated version. The TEEP Agent receives a request message encoded with an
unsupported cryptographic algorithm.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5) The TEEP Agent receives a request ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6)
message encoded with an unsupported cryptographic algorithm. The TEEP Agent returns this error when processing of a certificate
failed. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMMENDED to include
information about the failing certificate in the error message.
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6) The TEEP Agent returns this error when ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (7)
processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate was of an
RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate unsupported type.
in the error message.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (7) The TEEP Agent returns this error ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (8)
when a certificate was of an unsupported type. The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate was revoked
by its signer.
ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (8) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9)
certificate was revoked by its signer. The TEEP Agent returns this error when a certificate has expired
or is not currently valid.
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR (10)
certificate has expired or is not currently valid. The TEEP Agent returns this error when a miscellaneous internal
error occurred while processing the request.
ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR (10) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a ERR_RESOURCE_FULL (11)
miscellaneous internal error occurred while processing the This error is reported when a device resource isn't available
request. anymore, such as storage space is full.
ERR_RESOURCE_FULL (11) This error is reported when a device resource ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND (12)
isn't available anymore, such as storage space is full. This error will occur when the target TA does not exist. This
error may happen when the TAM has stale information and tries to
delete a TA that has already been deleted.
ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND (12) This error will occur when the target TA does ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED (13)
not exist. This error may happen when the TAM has stale While installing a TA, a TEE will return this error if the TA has
information and tries to delete a TA that has already been already been installed.
deleted.
ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED (13) While installing a TA, a TEE will ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT (14)
return this error if the TA has already been installed. The TEEP Agent returns this error when it does not recognize the
format of the TA binary.
ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT (14) The TEEP Agent returns this error when it ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED (15)
does not recognize the format of the TA binary. The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to decrypt the TA
binary.
ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED (15) The TEEP Agent returns this error when ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED (16)
it fails to decrypt the TA binary. The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to decompress the
TA binary.
ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED (16) The TEEP Agent returns this error ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17)
when it fails to decompress the TA binary. The TEEP Agent returns this error when manifest processing
failures occur that are less specific than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT,
ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17) The TEEP Agent returns this ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED (18)
error when manifest processing failures occur that are less The TEEP Agent returns this error when it fails to process the
specific than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and provided personalization data.
ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED (18) The TEEP Agent returns this error when Additional error code can be registered with IANA.
it fails to process the provided personalization data.
5. Ciphersuites 5. Mapping of TEEP Message Parameters to CBOR Labels
In COSE, arrays and maps use strings, negative integers, and unsigned
integers as their keys. Integers are used for compactness of
encoding. Since the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning,
as a cryptographic key, this specification uses the term "label" for
this usage as a map key.
This specification uses the following mapping:
+-----------------------+-------+
| Name | Label |
+-----------------------+-------+
| cipher-suites | 1 |
| nonce | 2 |
| version | 3 |
| ocsp-data | 4 |
| selected-cipher-suite | 5 |
| selected-version | 6 |
| eat | 7 |
| ta-list | 8 |
| ext-list | 9 |
| manifest-list | 10 |
| msg | 11 |
| err-msg | 12 |
+-----------------------+-------+
6. Ciphersuites
A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a
signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer
value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This
document specifies two ciphersuites. document specifies two ciphersuites.
Value | Ciphersuite +-------+------------------------------------------------+
------+------------------------------------------------ | Value | Ciphersuite |
0 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA +-------+------------------------------------------------+
1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 | 1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA |
| 2 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256 |
+-------+------------------------------------------------+
6. Security Consideration 7. Security Considerations
This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
specification: specification:
Cryptographic Algorithms TEEP protocol messages exchanged between Cryptographic Algorithms
the TAM and the TEEP Agent are protected using COSE. This TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM and the TEEP
specification relies on the cryptographic algorithms provided by Agent are protected using COSE. This specification relies on the
COSE. Public key based authentication is used to by the TEEP cryptographic algorithms provided by COSE. Public key based
Agent to authenticate the TAM and vice versa. authentication is used to by the TEEP Agent to authenticate the
TAM and vice versa.
Attestation A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided Attestation
by the TEEP Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided by the TEEP
convey this information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to convey this
is necessary for the device to possess a public key (usually in information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it is necessary
the form of a certificate) along with the corresponding private for the device to possess a public key (usually in the form of a
key. Depending on the properties of the attestation mechanism it certificate) along with the corresponding private key. Depending
is possible to uniquely identify a device based on information in on the properties of the attestation mechanism it is possible to
the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the uniquely identify a device based on information in the attestation
attestation token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns. information or in the certificate used to sign the attestation
To lower the privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns. To lower the
attestation information only to an authenticated and authorized privacy implications the TEEP Agent MUST present its attestation
TAM. information only to an authenticated and authorized TAM.
TA Binaries TA binaries are provided by the SP.It is the TA Binaries
responsibility of the TAM to relay only verified TAs from TA binaries are provided by the SP. It is the responsibility of
authorized SPs. Delivery of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the the TAM to relay only verified TAs from authorized SPs. Delivery
responsibility of the TAM and the TEEP Broker, using the security of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the responsibility of the TAM
mechanisms provided by the TEEP protocol. To protect the TA and the TEEP Broker, using the security mechanisms provided by the
binary the SUIT manifest is re-used and it offers a varity of TEEP protocol. To protect the TA binary the SUIT manifest is re-
security features, including digitial signatures and symmetric used and it offers a varity of security features, including
encryption. digitial signatures and symmetric encryption.
Personalization Data An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data Personalization Data
along with a TA. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest. An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data along with a TA.
The personalization data may be opaque to the TAM. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest. The
personalization data may be opaque to the TAM.
TEEP Broker The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay TEEP Broker
messages between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay messages
is compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker is
messages, and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages. compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of messages,
(A replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages. (A
replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A
compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to
install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest
ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such
downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest
itself. itself.
CA Compromise The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the TEEP Agent CA Compromise
may include OCSP stapling data for the TAM's signer certificate The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the TEEP Agent may include
and for intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so OCSP stapling data for the TAM's signer certificate and for
that the TEEP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so that
status. the TEEP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation status. A
certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate is
A certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate OPTIONAL by a TEEP Agent. A TAM is responsible for vetting a TA
is OPTIONAL by a TEEP Agent. A TAM is responsible for vetting a and before distributing them to TEEP Agents. TEEP Agents will
TA and before distributing them to TEEP Agents. TEEP Agents will
trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a TAM. trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a TAM.
CA Compromise The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or an SP may get CA Compromise
compromised. A compromised intermediate CA certificates can be The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or an SP may get compromised.
detected by a TEEP Agent by using OCSP information, assuming the A compromised intermediate CA certificates can be detected by a
revocation information is available. Additionally, it is TEEP Agent by using OCSP information, assuming the revocation
RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor store used information is available. Additionally, it is RECOMMENDED to
by the device, for example using a firmware update mechanism. provide a way to update the trust anchor store used by the device,
for example using a firmware update mechanism. If the CA issuing
If the CA issuing certificates to devices gets compromised then certificates to devices gets compromised then these devices might
these devices might be rejected by a TAM, if revocation is be rejected by a TAM, if revocation is available to the TAM.
available to the TAM.
Compromised TAM The TEEP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify Compromised TAM
the validity of the TAM-provided certificate (as well as the The TEEP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify the validity
validity of intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the of the TAM-provided certificate (as well as the validity of
accuracy of the clock within the TEE determines the ability to intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the accuracy of
determine an expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling the clock within the TEE determines the ability to determine an
includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling includes
compared to the current time. signature generation time, certificate validity dates are compared
to the current time.
7. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
7.1. Media Type Registration 8.1. Media Type Registration
IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor. IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.
Type name: application Type name: application
Subtype name: teep+cbor Subtype name: teep+cbor
Required parameters: none Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
application/cbor application/cbor
Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this
document. document.
Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049] considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049]
Published specification: This document. Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information: Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none Restrictions on usage: none
Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
Change controller: IETF Change controller: IETF
7.2. Error Code Registry 8.2. Error Code Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for the error codes IANA is also requested to create a new registry for the error codes
defined in Section 4. defined in Section 4.
Registration requests are evaluated after a three-week review period Registration requests are evaluated after a three-week review period
on the teep-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or on the teep-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or
more Designated Experts [RFC8126]. However, to allow for the more Designated Experts [RFC8126]. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may
approve registration once they are satisfied that such a approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published. specification will be published.
skipping to change at page 15, line 17 skipping to change at page 19, line 25
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
whether it is useful only for a single extension, and whether the whether it is useful only for a single extension, and whether the
registration description is clear. registration description is clear.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
7.3. Ciphersuite Registry 8.3. Ciphersuite Registry
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as
defined in Section 5. defined in Section 6.
8. References 8.4. CBOR Tag Registry
8.1. Normative References IANA is requested to register a CBOR tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry
for use with TEEP messages.
The registry contents is:
o CBOR Tag: TBD1
o Data Item: TEEP Message
o Semantics: TEEP Message, as defined in [[TBD: This RFC]]
o Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]
o Point of Contact: TEEP working group (teep@ietf.org)
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J. Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft- O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020. ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Concise Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., and K. Zandberg,
Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization "A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based
Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet
(SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-03 (work in of Things (SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-04
progress), February 2020. (work in progress), March 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999, DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>. 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
8.2. Informative References [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] 9.2. Informative References
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-07 (work in Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-08 (work in
progress), March 2020. progress), April 2020.
[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]
Pei, M., Atyeo, A., Cook, N., Yoo, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)", draft-ietf-teep-
opentrustprotocol-03 (work in progress), May 2019.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements [RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
This work is based on the initial version of OTrP A. Contributors
[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol] and hence credits go to those who
have contributed to it. We would like to thank Brian Witten (Symantec), Tyler Kim (Solacia),
Nick Cook (Arm), and Minho Yoo (IoTrust) for their contributions to
the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP), which influenced the design of this
specification.
B. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the
protocol name. protocol name.
We would like to thank Akira Tsukamoto, Isobe Kohei, Kohei Isobe, We would like to thank Kohei Isobe (TRASIO/SECOM), Kuniyasu Suzaki
Tsukasa Ooi, and Yuichi Takita for their valuable implementation (TRASIO/AIST), Tsukasa Oi (TRASIO), and Yuichi Takita (SECOM) for
feedback. their valuable implementation feedback.
Appendix B. Contributors We would also like to thank Carsten Bormann and Henk Birkholz for
their help with the CDDL.
We would like to thank the following individuals for their C. Complete CDDL
contributions to an initial version of this specification.
- Brian Witten teep-message = $teep-message-type .within teep-message-framework
Symantec
brian_witten@symantec.com
- Tyler Kim SUIT-envelope = bstr ; placeholder
Solacia
tylerkim@iotrust.kr
- Nick Cook teep-message-framework = [
Arm Ltd. type: 0..23 / $teep-type-extension,
nicholas.cook@arm.com token: uint,
options: { * teep-option },
* int; further integers, e.g. for data-item-requested
]
- Minho Yoo teep-option = (uint => any)
IoTrust
minho.yoo@iotrust.kr ; messages defined below:
$teep-message-type /= query-request
$teep-message-type /= query-response
$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-install
$teep-message-type /= trusted-app-delete
$teep-message-type /= teep-error
$teep-message-type /= teep-success
; message type numbers
TEEP-TYPE-query-request = 1
TEEP-TYPE-query-response = 2
TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install = 3
TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete = 4
TEEP-TYPE-teep-error = 5
TEEP-TYPE-teep-success = 6
version = uint .size 4
ext-info = uint
; data items as bitmaps
data-item-requested = $data-item-requested .within uint .size 8
attestation = 1
$data-item-requested /= attestation
trusted-apps = 2
$data-item-requested /= trusted-apps
extensions = 4
$data-item-requested /= extensions
suit-commands = 8
$data-item-requested /= suit-commands
query-request = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
token: uint,
options: {
? supported-cipher-suites => suite,
? nonce => bstr .size (8..64),
? version => [ + version ],
? oscp-data => bstr,
* $$query-request-extensions
* $$teep-option-extensions
},
data-item-requested
]
; ciphersuites as bitmaps
suite = $TEEP-suite .within uint .size 8
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA = 1
TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256 = 2
$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-X25519-EdDSA
$TEEP-suite /= TEEP-AES-CCM-16-64-128-HMAC256--256-P-256-ES256
query-response = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
token: uint,
options: {
? selected-cipher-suite => suite,
? selected-version => version,
? eat => bstr,
? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
* $$query-response-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
trusted-app-install = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-install,
token: uint,
option: {
? manifest-list => [ + SUIT-envelope ],
* $$trusted-app-install-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
trusted-app-delete = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-trusted-app-delete,
token: uint,
option: {
? ta-list => [ + bstr ],
* $$trusted-app-delete-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
teep-success = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
token: uint,
option: {
? msg => text,
* $$teep-success-extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
]
teep-error = [
type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
token: uint,
options: {
? err-msg => text,
? cipher-suites => [ + suite ],
? versions => [ + version ],
* $$teep-error--extensions,
* $$teep-option-extensions
}
err-code: uint,
]
cipher-suites = 1
nonce = 2
versions = 3
oscp-data = 4
selected-cipher-suite = 5
selected-version = 6
eat = 7
ta-list = 8
ext-list = 9
manifest-list = 10
msg = 11
err-msg = 12
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd. Arm Ltd.
Absam, Tirol 6067 Absam, Tirol 6067
Austria Austria
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
skipping to change at line 808 skipping to change at page 25, line 15
Intel Intel
US US
Email: david.m.wheeler@intel.com Email: david.m.wheeler@intel.com
Dave Thaler Dave Thaler
Microsoft Microsoft
US US
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
Akira Tsukamoto
AIST
JP
Email: akira.tsukamoto@aist.go.jp
 End of changes. 125 change blocks. 
342 lines changed or deleted 659 lines changed or added

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