draft-ietf-teep-protocol-00.txt		draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01.txt
	TEEP H. Tschofenig		TEEP H. Tschofenig
	Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.		Internet-Draft Arm Ltd.
	Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei		Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
	Expires: June 9, 2020 Broadcom		Expires: September 10, 2020 Broadcom
	D. Wheeler		D. Wheeler
	Intel		Intel
	D. Thaler		D. Thaler
	Microsoft		Microsoft
	December 7, 2019		March 9, 2020
	Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol		Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol
	draft-ietf-teep-protocol-00		draft-ietf-teep-protocol-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and		This document specifies a protocol that installs, updates, and
	deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted		deletes Trusted Applications (TAs) in a device with a Trusted
	Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an		Execution Environment (TEE). This specification defines an
	interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.		interoperable protocol for managing the lifecycle of TAs.
	The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a		The protocol name is pronounced teepee. This conjures an image of a
	wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of		wedge-shaped protective covering for one's belongings, which sort of
	skipping to change at page 1, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 42 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 9, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. QueryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2. QueryResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.3. TrustedAppInstall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.4. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		4.4. TrustedAppDelete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.5. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.5. Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	4.6. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.6. Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		5. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		6. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		7.2. Error Code Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		7.3. Ciphersuite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to		The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
	separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich		separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
	Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.		Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
	In an TEE ecosystem, different device vendors may use different		In an TEE ecosystem, device vendors may use different operating
	operating systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs.		systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs. When
	When application providers or device administrators use Trusted		application providers or device administrators use Trusted
	Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted		Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted
	Applications (TAs) on a wide range of devices with potentially		Applications (TAs) on a wide range of devices with potentially
	different TEEs then an interoperability need arises.		different TEEs then an interoperability need arises.
	This document specifies the protocol for communicating between a TAM		This document specifies the protocol for communicating between a TAM
	and a TEEP Agent, involving a TEEP Broker.		and a TEEP Agent, involving a TEEP Broker.
	The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture		The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture
	document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design		document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design
	guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the		guidance for such an interoperable protocol and introduces the
	skipping to change at page 3, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 28 ¶
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	This specification re-uses the terminology defined in		This specification re-uses the terminology defined in
	[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].		[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
	3. Message Overview		3. Message Overview
	The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between		The TEEP protocol consists of a couple of messages exchanged between
	a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded		a TAM and a TEEP Agent via a TEEP Broker. The messages are encoded
	either in JSON or CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security.		in CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. TEEP protocol
	TEEP protocol messages are signed and/or encrypted by the endpoints,		messages are signed by the endpoints, i.e., the TAM and the TEEP
	i.e., the TAM and the TEEP Agent, but trusted applications may as		Agent, but trusted applications may as well be encrypted and signed
	well be encrypted and signed by the service provider. The TEEP		by the service provider. The TEEP protocol not only re-use CBOR but
	protocol not only re-use JSON and CBOR but also the respective		also the respective security wrapper, namely COSE [RFC8152].
	security wrappers, namely JOSE (JWS [RFC7515] and JWE [RFC7516], to		Furthermore, for attestation the Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
	be more specific) and COSE [RFC8152]. Furthermore, for attestation		[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] and for software updates the SUIT manifest format
	the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] and for		[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest] are re-used.
	software updates the SUIT manifest format [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
	are re-used.
	This specification defines six messages.		This specification defines six messages.
	A TAM queries a device's current state with a QueryRequest message.		A TAM queries a device's current state with a QueryRequest message.
	A TEEP Agent will, after authenticating and authorizing the request,		A TEEP Agent will, after authenticating and authorizing the request,
	report attestation information, list all TAs, and provide information		report attestation information, list all TAs, and provide information
	about supported algorithms and extensions in a QueryResponse message.		about supported algorithms and extensions in a QueryResponse message.
	An error message is returned if the request could not be processed.		An error message is returned if the request could not be processed.
	A TAM will process the QueryResponse message and determine whether		A TAM will process the QueryResponse message and determine whether
	subsequent message exchanges to install, update, or delete trusted		subsequent message exchanges to install, update, or delete trusted
	skipping to change at page 5, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 7 ¶
	TrustedAppDelete ---->		TrustedAppDelete ---->
	Success		Success
	<---- or		<---- or
	Error		Error
	4. Detailed Messages Specification		4. Detailed Messages Specification
	For a CBOR-based encoding the following security wrapper is used		The CBOR-encoded messages are protected by COSE, as described in CDDL
	(described in CDDL format [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]).		format [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] below.
	Outer_Wrapper = {		Outer_Wrapper = {
	msg-authenc-wrapper => bstr .cbor		msg-authenc-wrapper => bstr .cbor
	Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper / nil,		Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper / nil,
	teep-message => (QueryRequest /		teep-message => (QueryRequest /
	QueryResponse /		QueryResponse /
	TrustedAppInstall /		TrustedAppInstall /
	TrustedAppDelete /		TrustedAppDelete /
	Error /		Error /
	Success ),		Success ),
	}		}
	msg-authenc-wrapper = 1		msg-authenc-wrapper = 1
	teep-message = 2		teep-message = 2
	Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper = [ * (COSE_Mac_Tagged /		Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper = [ * (COSE_Mac_Tagged /
	COSE_Sign_Tagged /		COSE_Sign_Tagged /
	COSE_Mac0_Tagged /		COSE_Mac0_Tagged /
	COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]		COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]
	A future version of this specification will also describe the
	security wrapper for JSON (in CDDL format).
	4.1. QueryRequest		4.1. QueryRequest
	suite = int		suite = int
	version = int		version = int
	data_items = (		data_item = int
	attestation: 1,
	trusted_apps: 2,
	extensions: 3,
	suit_commands: 4
	)
	QueryRequest = (		QueryRequest = {
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	REQUEST : [+data_items],		REQUEST : [+data_item],
	? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],		? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
	? NONCE : bstr,		? NONCE : bstr,
	? VERSION : [+version],		? VERSION : [+version],
	? OCSP_DATA : bstr,		? OCSP_DATA : bstr,
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	A QueryRequest message is signed by the TAM and has the following		A QueryRequest message is signed by the TAM and has the following
	fields:		fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 1 corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the		TYPE TYPE = 1 corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the
	TAM to the TEEP Agent.		TAM to the TEEP Agent.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
	responses.		responses.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 47 ¶
	VERSION The VERSION field lists the version(s) supported by the TAM.		VERSION The VERSION field lists the version(s) supported by the TAM.
	For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.		For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.
	OCSP_DATA The OCSP_DATA field contains a list of OCSP stapling data		OCSP_DATA The OCSP_DATA field contains a list of OCSP stapling data
	respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA		respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA
	certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP		certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP
	data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM		data so that the TEEP Agent can validate the status of the TAM
	certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service		certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service
	call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response		call. OCSP data MUST be conveyed as a DER-encoded OCSP response
	(using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use		(using the ASN.1 type OCSPResponse defined in [RFC2560]). The use
	of OCSP is optional to implement for both the TAM and the TEEP		of OCSP is optional to implement for bo th the TAM and the TEEP
	Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this		Agent. A TAM can query the TEEP Agent for the support of this
	functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described		functionality via the capability discovery exchange, as described
	above.		above.
	4.2. QueryResponse		4.2. QueryResponse
	ta_id = (
	Vendor_ID = bstr,
	Class_ID = bstr,
	Device_ID = bstr,
	* $$extensions
	)
	ext_info = int		ext_info = int
	QueryResponse = (		QueryResponse = {
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	? SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE : suite,		? SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE : suite,
	? SELECTED_VERSION : version,		? SELECTED_VERSION : version,
	? EAT : bstr,		? EAT : bstr,
	? TA_LIST : [+ta_id],		? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
	? EXT_LIST : [+ext_info],		? EXT_LIST : [+ext_info],
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	The QueryResponse message is signed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent		The QueryResponse message is signed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent
	and returned to the TAM. It has the following fields:		and returned to the TAM. It has the following fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 2 corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the		TYPE TYPE = 2 corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the
	TEEP Agent to the TAM.		TEEP Agent to the TAM.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
	responses. The value MUST correspond to the value received with		responses. The value MUST correspond to the value received with
	the QueryRequest.		the QueryRequest.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 41 ¶
	selected ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can		selected ciphersuite. Details about the ciphersuite encoding can
	be found in Section 5.		be found in Section 5.
	SELECTED_VERSION The SELECTED_VERSION field indicates the protocol		SELECTED_VERSION The SELECTED_VERSION field indicates the protocol
	version selected by the TEEP Agent.		version selected by the TEEP Agent.
	EAT The EAT field contains an Entity Attestation Token following the		EAT The EAT field contains an Entity Attestation Token following the
	encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].		encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].
	TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the trusted applications		TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the trusted applications
	installed on the device in form of ta_ids, i.e., a vendor id/class		installed on the device in form of TA ID strings.
	id/device id triple.
	EXT_LIST The EXT_LIST field lists the supported extensions. This		EXT_LIST The EXT_LIST field lists the supported extensions. This
	document does not define any extensions.		document does not define any extensions.
	4.3. TrustedAppInstall		4.3. TrustedAppInstall
			TrustedAppInstall = {
	TrustedAppInstall = (
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	? MANIFEST_LIST : [+ SUIT_Outer_Wrapper],		? MANIFEST_LIST : [+ SUIT_Outer_Wrapper],
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	The TrustedAppInstall message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and		The TrustedAppInstall message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and
	has the following fields:		has the following fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 3 corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent from		TYPE TYPE = 3 corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent from
	the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an		the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an
	Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an		Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
	error, an Error message is returned. Note that the		error, an Error message is returned. Note that the
	TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but		TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but
	also for TA updates.		also for TA updates.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶
	cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest		cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest
	may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and		may also convey personalization data. TA binaries and
	personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP.		personalization data is typically signed and encrypted by the SP.
	Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example,		Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example,
	it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the		it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the
	personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA		personalization data and to let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA
	binary.		binary.
	4.4. TrustedAppDelete		4.4. TrustedAppDelete
	TrustedAppDelete = (		TrustedAppDelete = {
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	? TA_LIST : [+ta_id],		? TA_LIST : [+bstr],
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	The TrustedAppDelete message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and		The TrustedAppDelete message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and
	has the following fields:		has the following fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 4 corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent from		TYPE TYPE = 4 corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent from
	the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an		the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, an
	Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an		Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an
	error, an Error message is returned.		error, an Error message is returned.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
	responses.		responses.
	TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the TAs to be deleted.		TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the TAs to be deleted.
	4.5. Success		4.5. Success
	Success = (		Success = {
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	? MSG : tstr,		? MSG : tstr,
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	The Success message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent and has		The Success message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP Agent and has
	the following fields:		the following fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 5 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP		TYPE TYPE = 5 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP
	Agent to the TAM.		Agent to the TAM.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
	responses.		responses.
	MSG The MSG field contains optional diagnostics information encoded		MSG The MSG field contains optional diagnostics information encoded
	in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent.		in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the TEEP Agent.
	4.6. Error		4.6. Error
	Error = (		Error = {
	TYPE : int,		TYPE : int,
	TOKEN : bstr,		TOKEN : bstr,
	ERR_CODE : int,		ERR_CODE : int,
	? ERR_MSG : tstr,		? ERR_MSG : tstr,
	? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],		? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
	? VERSION : [+version],		? VERSION : [+version],
	* $$extensions		* $$extensions
	)		}
	If possible, the Error message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP		If possible, the Error message is MACed and encrypted by the TEEP
	Agent. Unprotected Error messages MUST be handled with care by the		Agent. Unprotected Error messages MUST be handled with care by the
	TAM due to possible downgrading attacks. It has the following		TAM due to possible downgrading attacks. It has the following
	fields:		fields:
	TYPE TYPE = 6 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP		TYPE TYPE = 6 corresponds to a Error message sent from the TEEP
	Agent to the TAM.		Agent to the TAM.
	TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to		TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
	skipping to change at page 11, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 24 ¶
	supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be		supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
	returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.		returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.
	CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)		CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)
	supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be		supported by the TEEP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
	returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.		returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
	This specification defines the following initial error messages.		This specification defines the following initial error messages.
	Additional error code can be registered with IANA.		Additional error code can be registered with IANA.
	ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER The TEEP Agent sends this error message when a		ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER (1) The TEEP Agent sends this error message
	request contains incorrect fields or fields that are inconsistent		when a request contains incorrect fields or fields that are
	with other fields.		inconsistent with other fields.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION The TEEP Agent sends this error message		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2) The TEEP Agent sends this error
	when it recognizes an unsupported extension or unsupported		message when it recognizes an unsupported extension or unsupported
	message.		message.
	ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED The TEEP Agent sends this error message		ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED (3) The TEEP Agent sends this error
	when it fails to verify the signature of the message.		message when it fails to verify the signature of the message.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION The TEEP Agent receives a message but		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4) The TEEP Agent receives a message
	does not support the indicated version.		but does not support the indicated version.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG The TEEP Agent receives a request message		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG (5) The TEEP Agent receives a request
	encoded with an unsupported cryptographic algorithm.		message encoded with an unsupported cryptographic algorithm.
	ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE The TEEP Agent returns this error when		ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6) The TEEP Agent returns this error when
	processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is		processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is
	RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate		RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate
	in the error message.		in the error message.
	ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE (7) The TEEP Agent returns this error
	certificate was of an unsupported type.		when a certificate was of an unsupported type.
	ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED (8) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a
	certificate was revoked by its signer.		certificate was revoked by its signer.
	ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a
	certificate has expired or is not currently valid.		certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
	ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR The TEEP Agent returns this error when a		ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR (10) The TEEP Agent returns this error when a
	miscellaneous internal error occurred while processing the		miscellaneous internal error occurred while processing the
	request.		request.
	ERR_RESOURCE_FULL This error is reported when a device resource		ERR_RESOURCE_FULL (11) This error is reported when a device resource
	isn't available anymore, such as storage space is full.		isn't available anymore, such as storage space is full.
	ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND This error will occur when the target TA does not		ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND (12) This error will occur when the target TA does
	exist. This error may happen when the TAM has stale information		not exist. This error may happen when the TAM has stale
	and tries to delete a TA that has already been deleted.		information and tries to delete a TA that has already been
			deleted.
	ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED While installing a TA, a TEE will return		ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED (13) While installing a TA, a TEE will
	this error if the TA has already been installed.		return this error if the TA has already been installed.
	ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT The TEEP Agent returns this error when it does		ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT (14) The TEEP Agent returns this error when it
	not recognize the format of the TA binary.		does not recognize the format of the TA binary.
	ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED The TEEP Agent returns this error when it		ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED (15) The TEEP Agent returns this error when
	fails to decrypt the TA binary.		it fails to decrypt the TA binary.
	ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED The TEEP Agent returns this error when		ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED (16) The TEEP Agent returns this error
	it fails to decompress the TA binary.		when it fails to decompress the TA binary.
	ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED The TEEP Agent returns this error		ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17) The TEEP Agent returns this
	when manifest processing failures occur that are less specific		error when manifest processing failures occur that are less
	than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and		specific than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and
	ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.		ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
	ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED The TEEP Agent returns this error when it		ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED (18) The TEEP Agent returns this error when
	fails to process the provided personalization data.		it fails to process the provided personalization data.
	5. Ciphersuites		5. Ciphersuites
	A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a		A ciphersuite consists of an AEAD algorithm, a HMAC algorithm, and a
	signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer		signature algorithm. Each ciphersuite is identified with an integer
	value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This		value, which corresponds to an IANA registered ciphersuite. This
	document specifies two ciphersuites.		document specifies two ciphersuites.
	Value | Ciphersuite		Value | Ciphersuite
	------+------------------------------------------------		------+------------------------------------------------
	0 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA		0 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, X25519, EdDSA
	1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256		1 | AES-CCM-16-64-128, HMAC 256/256, P-256, ES256
	6. Security Consideration		6. Security Consideration
	This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this		This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
	specification:		specification:
	Cryptographic Algorithms This specification relies on the		Cryptographic Algorithms TEEP protocol messages exchanged between
	cryptographic algorithms provided by the security wrappers JOSE		the TAM and the TEEP Agent are protected using COSE. This
	and COSE, respectively. A companion document makes algorithm		specification relies on the cryptographic algorithms provided by
	recommendations but this document is written in an algorithm-		COSE. Public key based authentication is used to by the TEEP
	agnostic way. TEEP protocol messages exchanged between the TAM		Agent to authenticate the TAM and vice versa.
	and the TEEP Agent are protected using JWS and JWE (for JSON-
	encoded messages) and COSE (for CBOR-encoded messages). Public
	key based authentication is used to by the TEEP Agent to
	authenticate the TAM and vice versa.
	Attestation A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided		Attestation A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided
	by the TEEP Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to		by the TEEP Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to
	convey this information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it		convey this information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it
	is necessary for the device to possess a public key (usually in		is necessary for the device to possess a public key (usually in
	the form of a certificate) along with the corresponding private		the form of a certificate) along with the corresponding private
	key. Depending on the properties of the attestation mechanism it		key. Depending on the properties of the attestation mechanism it
	is possible to uniquely identify a device based on information in		is possible to uniquely identify a device based on information in
	the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the		the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the
	attestation token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns.		attestation token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns.
	skipping to change at page 13, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 40 ¶
	responsibility of the TAM to relay only verified TAs from		responsibility of the TAM to relay only verified TAs from
	authorized SPs. Delivery of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the		authorized SPs. Delivery of that TA to the TEEP Agent is then the
	responsibility of the TAM and the TEEP Broker, using the security		responsibility of the TAM and the TEEP Broker, using the security
	mechanisms provided by the TEEP protocol. To protect the TA		mechanisms provided by the TEEP protocol. To protect the TA
	binary the SUIT manifest is re-used and it offers a varity of		binary the SUIT manifest is re-used and it offers a varity of
	security features, including digitial signatures and symmetric		security features, including digitial signatures and symmetric
	encryption.		encryption.
	Personalization Data An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data		Personalization Data An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data
	along with a TA. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest.		along with a TA. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest.
	The personalization data may be itself is (or can be) opaque to		The personalization data may be opaque to the TAM.
	the TAM.
	TEEP Broker The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay		TEEP Broker The TEEP protocol relies on the TEEP Broker to relay
	messages between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker		messages between the TAM and the TEEP Agent. When the TEEP Broker
	is compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of		is compromised it can drop messages, delay the delivery of
	messages, and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages.		messages, and replay messages but it cannot modify those messages.
	(A replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A		(A replay would be, however, detected by the TEEP Agent.) A
	compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to		compromised TEEP Broker could reorder messages in an attempt to
	install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest		install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest
	ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such		ensures that the TEEP Agents are protected against such
	downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest		downgrading attacks based on features offered by the manifest
	skipping to change at page 14, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 39 ¶
	validity of intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the		validity of intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the
	accuracy of the clock within the TEE determines the ability to		accuracy of the clock within the TEE determines the ability to
	determine an expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling		determine an expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling
	includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are		includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are
	compared to the current time.		compared to the current time.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	7.1. Media Type Registration		7.1. Media Type Registration
	IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+json.
	Type name: application
	Subtype name: teep+json
	Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none
	Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
	application/json as specified in Section 11 of [RFC7159]
	Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this
	document.
	Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
	considerations of application/json as specified in [RFC7159]
	Published specification: This document.
	Applications that use this media type: TEEP protocol implementations
	Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
	Additional information:
	Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
	Magic number(s): N/A
	File extension(s): N/A
	Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
	Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
	Intended usage: COMMON
	Restrictions on usage: none
	Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
	Change controller: IETF
	IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.		IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.
	Type name: application		Type name: application
	Subtype name: teep+cbor		Subtype name: teep+cbor
	Required parameters: none		Required parameters: none
	Optional parameters: none		Optional parameters: none
	skipping to change at page 17, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 29 ¶
	IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as		IANA is also requested to create a new registry for ciphersuites, as
	defined in Section 5.		defined in Section 5.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]		[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
	Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.		Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
	O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-		O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
	ietf-rats-eat-01 (work in progress), July 2019.		ietf-rats-eat-03 (work in progress), February 2020.
	[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]		[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
	Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Concise		Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Concise
	Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization		Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization
	Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things		Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things
	(SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-02 (work in		(SUIT) Manifest", draft-ietf-suit-manifest-03 (work in
	progress), November 2019.		progress), February 2020.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.		[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
	Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online		Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
	Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,		Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
	skipping to change at page 18, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 17 ¶
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
	[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network		[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
	Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,		Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
	Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
	2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
	[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
	Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
	2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
	[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
	RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
	[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
	[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]		[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
	Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data		Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
	definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to		definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
	express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-		express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
	cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.		cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.
	[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
	Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Wheeler, D., Atyeo, A., and D.		Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
	Liu, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)		"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
	Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-04 (work in		Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-07 (work in
	progress), December 2019.		progress), March 2020.
	[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]		[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]
	Pei, M., Atyeo, A., Cook, N., Yoo, M., and H. Tschofenig,		Pei, M., Atyeo, A., Cook, N., Yoo, M., and H. Tschofenig,
	"The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)", draft-ietf-teep-		"The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)", draft-ietf-teep-
	opentrustprotocol-03 (work in progress), May 2019.		opentrustprotocol-03 (work in progress), May 2019.
	[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for		[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
	Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,		Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
	RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,		RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		Appendix A. Acknowledgements
	This work is based on the initial version of OTrP		This work is based on the initial version of OTrP
	[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol] and hence credits go to those who		[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol] and hence credits go to those who
	have contributed to it.		have contributed to it.
	We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the		We would like to thank Eve Schooler for the suggestion of the
	protocol name.		protocol name.
			We would like to thank Akira Tsukamoto, Isobe Kohei, Kohei Isobe,
			Tsukasa Ooi, and Yuichi Takita for their valuable implementation
			feedback.
	Appendix B. Contributors		Appendix B. Contributors
	We would like to thank the following individuals for their		We would like to thank the following individuals for their
	contributions to an earlier version of this specification.		contributions to an initial version of this specification.
	- Brian Witten		- Brian Witten
	Symantec		Symantec
	brian_witten@symantec.com		brian_witten@symantec.com
	- Tyler Kim		- Tyler Kim
	Solacia		Solacia
	tylerkim@iotrust.kr		tylerkim@iotrust.kr
	- Nick Cook		- Nick Cook
	skipping to change at page 20, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 34 ¶
	nicholas.cook@arm.com		nicholas.cook@arm.com
	- Minho Yoo		- Minho Yoo
	IoTrust		IoTrust
	minho.yoo@iotrust.kr		minho.yoo@iotrust.kr
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	Arm Ltd.		Arm Ltd.
	110 Fulbourn Rd		Absam, Tirol 6067
	Cambridge, CB1 9NJ		Austria
	Great Britain
	Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com		Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
	Mingliang Pei		Mingliang Pei
	Broadcom		Broadcom
	350 Ellis St		350 Ellis St
	Mountain View, CA 94043		Mountain View, CA 94043
	USA		USA
	Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com		Email: mingliang.pei@broadcom.com
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