SUIT                                                            B. Moran
Internet-Draft                                             H. Tschofenig
Intended status: Informational Standards Track                             Arm Limited
Expires: April 30, May 7, 2020                                         H. Birkholz
                                                          Fraunhofer SIT
                                                        October 28,
                                                       November 04, 2019

                SUIT CBOR manifest serialisation format
                      draft-ietf-suit-manifest-01

A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization Format
    for the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest
                      draft-ietf-suit-manifest-02

Abstract

   This specification describes the format of a manifest.  A manifest is
   a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an IoT device, where to
   find the firmware, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic
   information protecting the manifest.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, May 7, 2020.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   4
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4   5
   3.  Distributing firmware . .  How to use this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6
   4.  Workflow of a device applying a firmware update  Background  . . . . . . .   5
   5.  SUIT manifest goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Landscape . .   6
   6.  SUIT manifest design overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Manifest Design Evaluation . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Update Workflow Model . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Severable Elements . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  SUIT Manifest goals . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Conventions . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  SUIT manifest design summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.4.  Payloads  .
   5.  Interpreter Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Interpreter Setup . . .   9
   7.  Manifest Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Required Checks . . . .  10
     7.1.  Outer wrapper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Interpreter fundamental properties  . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Manifest . . . . . .  12
     5.4.  Abstract Machine Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.4.1.  Parameters  . . . .  13
     7.3.  SUIT_Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.4.2.  Commands  . . . .  16
     7.4.  SUIT_Component_Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.5.  Manifest Parameters . .  13
       5.4.3.  Command Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       7.5.1.  SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order .  15
     5.5.  Serialized Processing Interpreter . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.5.2.  SUIT_Parameter_Coerce_Condition_Failure  16
     5.6.  Parallel Processing Interpreter . . . . . . .  20
     7.6.  SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info . . . . . .  16
     5.7.  Processing Dependencies . . . . . . .  20
     7.7.  SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Creating Manifests  . . .  20
     7.8.  SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.9.  SUIT_Parameters CDDL . . .  17
     6.1.  Manifest Source Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.10. SUIT_Command_Sequence .  18
     6.2.  Required Template: Compatibility Check  . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.3.  Use Case Template: XIP Secure Boot  . . . . . . . .  22
     7.11. SUIT_Condition . . .  19
     6.4.  Use Case Template: Firmware Download  . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.5.  Use Case Template: Load from External Storage . . . . . .  20
     6.6.  Use Case Template Load & Decompress from External Storage  20
     6.7.  Use Case Template: Dependency . .  24
       7.11.1.  Identifier Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Manifest Structure  . . .  25
       7.11.2.  suit-condition-image-match . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.11.3.  suit-condition-image-not-match . . . . .  21
     7.1.  Severable Elements  . . . . . .  25
       7.11.4.  suit-condition-use-before . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.11.5.  suit-condition-minimum-battery  22
     7.2.  Outer wrapper . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.11.6.  suit-condition-update-authorised . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.11.7.  suit-condition-version .  23
     7.3.  Manifest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.11.8.  SUIT_Condition_Custom . . . . . . . . . .  24
     7.4.  SUIT_Dependency . . . . .  27
       7.11.9.  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     7.5.  SUIT_Component_Reference  . . . .  27
       7.11.10. SUIT_Condition CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.6.  Manifest Parameters . . . .  29
     7.12. SUIT_Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       7.6.1.  SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order . . . . . .  29
       7.12.1.  suit-directive-set-component-index . . . . . . .  30
       7.6.2.  SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure . .  30
       7.12.2.  suit-directive-set-dependency-index . . . . . . . .  31
       7.12.3.  suit-directive-abort . . .  31
     7.7.  SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       7.12.4.  suit-directive-run-sequence
     7.8.  SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       7.12.5.  suit-directive-try-each
     7.9.  SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       7.12.6.  suit-directive-process-dependency .  31
     7.10. SUIT_Parameters CDDL  . . . . . . . . .  32
       7.12.7.  suit-directive-set-parameters . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.11. SUIT_Command_Sequence . . . . . . . . .  33
       7.12.8.  suit-directive-override-parameters . . . . . . . . .  33
       7.12.9.  suit-directive-fetch
     7.12. SUIT_Condition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.12.10. suit-directive-copy . . . . .  35
       7.12.1.  Identifier Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       7.12.11. suit-directive-swap . . . .  36
       7.12.2.  suit-condition-image-match . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       7.12.12. suit-directive-run .  36
       7.12.3.  suit-condition-image-not-match . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.12.4.  suit-condition-use-before  . . . . . . . .  35
       7.12.13. suit-directive-wait . . . . .  36
       7.12.5.  suit-condition-minimum-battery . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       7.12.14. SUIT_Directive CDDL
       7.12.6.  suit-condition-update-authorised . . . . . . . . . .  37
       7.12.7.  suit-condition-version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   8.  Dependency processing
       7.12.8.  SUIT_Condition_Custom  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       7.12.9.  Identifiers  . . . . . . .  39
   9.  Access Control Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       7.12.10. SUIT_Condition CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   10. SUIT digest container
     7.13. SUIT_Directive  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   11. Creating conditional sequences
       7.13.1.  suit-directive-set-component-index . . . . . . . . .  41
       7.13.2.  suit-directive-set-dependency-index  . . . . . . .  41
   12. Full CDDL .  42
       7.13.3.  suit-directive-abort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       7.13.4.  suit-directive-run-sequence  . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       7.13.5.  suit-directive-try-each  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   13. Examples
       7.13.6.  suit-directive-process-dependency  . . . . . . . . .  43
       7.13.7.  suit-directive-set-parameters  . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.13.8.  suit-directive-override-parameters . . . . . .  49
     13.1.  Example 0: . . .  44
       7.13.9.  suit-directive-fetch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.13.10. suit-directive-copy  . . . .  50
     13.2.  Example 1: . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.13.11. suit-directive-swap  . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     13.3.  Example 2: . . . . .  46
       7.13.12. suit-directive-run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       7.13.13. suit-directive-wait  .  54
     13.4.  Example 3: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       7.13.14. SUIT_Directive CDDL  . . . . . . . .  57
     13.5.  Example 4: . . . . . . . .  48
     7.14. SUIT_Text_Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     13.6.  Example 5: . . . . . . .  50
   8.  Access Control Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     13.7.  Example 6: . . . .  50
   9.  SUIT digest container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   14. IANA Considerations .  51
   10. Creating conditional sequences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   11. Full CDDL . . . . .  73
   15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   16. Mailing List Information . .  54
   12. Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   17. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . .  61
     12.1.  Example 0: . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   18. References . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     12.2.  Example 1: . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     18.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . .  64
     12.3.  Example 2: . . . . . . . . .  74
     18.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     12.4.  Example 3: . . .  75
     18.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     12.5.  Example 4: . . . . . .  75
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     12.6.  Example 5: . . . . . .  76

1.  Introduction

   A firmware update mechanism is an essential security feature for IoT
   devices to deal with vulnerabilities.  While the transport of
   firmware images to the devices themselves is important there are
   already . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     12.7.  Example 6: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   15. Mailing List Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   16. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   17. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     17.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     17.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     17.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88

1.  Introduction

   A firmware update mechanism is an essential security feature for IoT
   devices to deal with vulnerabilities.  While the transport of
   firmware images to the devices themselves is important there are
   already various techniques available, such as the Lightweight
   Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol offering Lightweight
   Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol offering device management of IoT
   devices.  Equally important is the inclusion of meta-data about the
   conveyed firmware image (in the form of a manifest) and the use of
   end-to-end security protection to detect modifications and
   (optionally) to make reverse engineering more difficult.  End-to-end
   security allows the author, who builds the firmware image, to be sure
   that no other party (including potential adversaries) can install
   firmware updates on IoT devices without adequate privileges.  This
   authorization process is ensured by the use of dedicated symmetric or
   asymmetric keys installed on the IoT device: for use cases where only
   integrity protection is required it is sufficient to install a trust
   anchor on the IoT device.  For confidentiality protected firmware
   images it is additionally required to install either one or multiple
   symmetric or asymmetric keys on the IoT device.  Starting security
   protection at the author is a risk mitigation technique so firmware
   images and manifests can be stored on untrusted respositories; it
   also reduces the scope of a compromise of any repository or
   intermediate system to be no worse than a denial of service.

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the high-level
   firmware update architecture [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture].

   The SUIT manifest is heavily optimised for consumption by constrained
   devices.  This means that it is not constructed as a conventional
   descriptive document.  Instead, of describing what an update IS, it
   describes what a recipient should DO.

   While the SUIT manifest is informed by and optimised for firmware
   update use cases, there is nothing in the
   [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model] that restricts its use to only
   firmware use cases.  Software update and delivery of arbitrary data
   can equally be managed by SUIT-based metadata.

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   -  SUIT: Sofware Update for the Internet of Things, the IETF working
      group for this standard.

   -  Payload: A piece of information to be delivered.  Typically
      Firmware for the purposes of SUIT.

   -  Resource: A piece of information that is used to construct a
      payload.

   -  Manifest: A piece of information that describes one or more
      payloads, one or more resources, and the processors needed to
      transform resources into payloads.

   -  Update: One or more manifests that describe one or more payloads.

   -  Update Authority: The owner of a cryptographic key used to sign
      updates, trusted by recipient devices.

   -  Recipient: The system, typically an IoT device, that receives a
      manifest.

   -  Condition: A test for a property of the Recipient or its
      components.

   -  Directive: An action for the Recipient to perform.

   -  Command: A Condition or a Directive.

   -  Trusted Execution: A process by which a system ensures that only
      trusted code is executed, for example secure boot.

   -  A/B images: Dividing a device's storage into two or more bootable
      images, at different offsets, such that the active image can write
      to the inactive image(s).

   The map indices in this encoding are reset to 1 for each map within
   the structure.  This is to keep the indices as small as possible.

   The goal is to keep the index objects to single bytes (CBOR positive
   integers 1-23).

   Wherever enumerations are used, they are started at 1.  This allows
   detection of several common software errors that are caused by
   uninitialised variables.  Positive numbers in enumerations are
   reserved for IANA registration.  Negative numbers are used to
   identify application-specific implementations.

   CDDL names are hyphenated and CDDL structures follow the convention
   adopted in COSE [RFC8152]: SUIT_Structure_Name.

3.  How to use this document

   For information about firmware update in general and the background
   of the suit manifest, see Section 4.  To implement an updatable
   device, see Section 5 and Section 7.  To implement a tool that
   generates updates, see Section 6 and Section 7.

4.  Background

   Distributing firmware updates to diverse devices with diverse trust
   anchors in a coordinated system presents unique challenges.  Devices
   have a broad set of constraints, requiring different metadata to make
   appropriate decisions.  There may be many actors in production IoT
   systems, each of whom has some authority.  Distributing firmware in
   such a multi-party environment presents additional challenges.  Each
   party requires a different subset of data.  Some data may not be
   accessible to all parties.  Multiple signatures may be required from
   parties with different authorities.  This topic is covered in more
   depth in [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture].

4.1.  Landscape

   The various constraints on IoT devices creates a broad set of use-
   case requirements.  For example, devices with:

   -  limited processing power and storage may require a simple
      representation of metadata.

   -  bandwidth constraints may require firmware compression or partial
      update support.

   -  bootloader complexity constraints may require simple selection
      between two bootable images.

   -  small internal storage may require external storage support.

   -  multiple processors may require coordinated update of all
      applications.

   -  large storage and complex functionality may require parallel
      update of many software components.

   -  mesh networks may require multicast distribution.

   Supporting the requirements introduced by the constraints on IoT
   devices requires the flexibility to represent a diverse set of
   possible metadata, but also requires that the encoding is kept
   simple.

4.2.  Update Workflow Model

   There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of
   the firmware update workflow:

   -  Compatibility must be checked before any other operation is
      performed

   -  All dependency manifests should be present before any payload is
      fetched

   -  In some applications, payloads must be fetched and validated prior
      to installation

   There are several fundamental assumptions that inform the model of
   the secure boot workflow:

   -  Compatibility must be checked before any other operation is
      performed

   -  All dependencies and payloads must be validated prior to loading

   -  All loaded images must be validated prior to execution

   Based on these assumptions, the manifest is structured to work with a
   pull parser, where each section of the manifest is used in sequence.
   The expected workflow for a device installing an update can be broken
   down into 5 steps:

   1.  Verify the signature of the manifest

   2.  Verify the applicability of the manifest

   3.  Resolve dependencies
   4.  Fetch payload(s)

   5.  Install payload(s)

   When installation is complete, similar information can be used for
   validating and running images in a further 3 steps:

   1.  Verify image(s)

   2.  Load image(s)

   3.  Run image(s)

   If verification and running is implemented in bootloader, then the

   When multiple manifests are used for an update, each manifest's steps
   occur in a lockstep fashion; all manifests have dependency resolution
   performed before any manifest performs a payload fetch, etc.

4.3.  SUIT Manifest goals

   The manifest described in this document is intended to meet several
   goals, as described below.

   1.  Meet the requirements defined in
       [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model].

   2.  Simple to parse on a constrained node

   3.  Simple to process on a constrained node

   4.  Compact encoding

   5.  Comprehensible by an intermediate system

   6.  Expressive enough to enable advanced use cases on advanced nodes

   7.  Extensible

   The SUIT manifest can be used for a variety of purposes throughout
   its lifecycle.  The manifest allows:

   1.  the Firmware Author to reason about releasing a firmware.

   2.  the Network Operator to reason about compatibility of a firmware.

   3.  the Device Operator to reason about the impact of a firmware.

   4.  the Device Operator to manage distribution of firmware to
       devices.

   5.  the Plant Manager to reason about timing and acceptance of
       firmware updates.

   6.  the device to reason about the authority & authenticity of a
       firmware prior to installation.

   7.  the device to reason about the applicability of a firmware.

   8.  the device management to reason about the installation of IoT
   devices.  Equally important a firmware.

   9.  the device to reason about the authenticity & encoding of a
       firmware at boot.

   Each of these uses happens at a different stage of the manifest
   lifecycle, so each has different requirements.

4.4.  SUIT manifest design summary

   In order to provide flexible behaviour to constrained devices, while
   still allowing more powerful devices to use their full capabilities,
   the SUIT manifest encodes the required behaviour of a Recipient
   device.  Behaviour is encoded as a specialised byte code, contained
   in a CBOR list.  This promotes a flat encoding, which simplifies the inclusion
   parser.  The information encoded by this byte code closely matches
   the operations that a device will perform, which promotes ease of meta-data about
   processing.  The core operations used by most update and trusted
   execution operations are represented in the
   conveyed byte code.  The byte code
   can be extended by registering new operations.

   The specialised byte code approach gives benefits equivalent to those
   provided by a scripting language or conventional byte code, with two
   substantial differences.  First, the language is extremely high
   level, consisting of only the operations that a device may perform
   during update and trusted execution of a firmware image (in image.  Second, the
   language specifies behaviours in a linearised form, without reverse
   branches.  Conditional processing is supported, and parallel and out-
   of-order processing may be performed by sufficiently capable devices.

   By structuring the data in this way, the manifest processor becomes a
   very simple engine that uses a pull parser to interpret the form manifest.
   This pull parser invokes a series of command handlers that evaluate a manifest) and
   Condition or execute a Directive.  Most data is structured in a
   highly regular pattern, which simplifies the use parser.

   The results of
   end-to-end security protection to detect modifications and
   (optionally) this allow a Recipient to make reverse engineering more difficult.  End-to-end
   security implement a very small
   parser for constrained applications.  If needed, such a parser also
   allows the author, who builds the firmware image, Recipient to be sure
   that no other party (including potential adversaries) can install
   firmware perform complex updates on IoT devices without adequate privileges.  This
   authorization process with reduced
   overhead.  Conditional execution of commands allows a simple device
   to perform important decisions at validation-time.

   Dependency handling is ensured by the use vastly simplified as well.  Dependencies
   function like subroutines of dedicated symmetric or
   asymmetric keys installed on the IoT device: for use cases where only
   integrity protection is required it is sufficient to install language.  When a trust
   anchor on the IoT device.  For confidentiality protected firmware
   images manifest has a
   dependency, it is additionally required to install either one or multiple
   symmetric or asymmetric keys on the IoT device.  Starting can invoke that dependency's commands and modify their
   behaviour by setting parameters.  Because some parameters come with
   security
   protection at implications, the author is dependencies also have a risk mitigation technique so firmware
   images and manifests can be stored mechanism to
   reject modifications to parameters on untrusted respositories; it
   also reduces the scope of a compromise of any repository or
   intermediate fine-grained level.

   Developing a robust permissions system to be no worse than works in this model too.  The
   Recipient can use a denial of service.

   It simple ACL that is assumed a table of Identities and
   Component Identifier permissions to ensure that only manifests
   authenticated by the reader appropriate identity have access to operate on a
   component.

   Capability reporting is familiar with similarly simplified.  A Recipient can report
   the high-level
   firmware update architecture [Architecture].

   The SUIT manifest is heavily optimised for consumption by constrained
   devices.  This means Commands, Parameters, Algorithms, and Component Identifiers that
   it supports.  This is not constructed as sufficiently precise for a conventional
   descriptive document.  Instead, of describing what an update IS, it
   describes what manifest author to
   create a recipient should DO.

   While the SUIT manifest is informed by and optimised for firmware
   update use cases, there is nothing in the [Information] that
   restricts its use to only firmware use cases.  Software update and
   delivery of arbitrary data the Recipient can equally be managed by SUIT-based
   metadata.

2.  Conventions and Terminology accept.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" simplicity of design in this document are the Recipient due to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   -  SUIT: Sofware Update for the Internet of Things, the IETF working
      group for this standard.

   -  Payload: A piece of information these
   benefits allows even a highly constrained platform to be delivered.  Typically
      Firmware for use advanced
   update capabilities.

5.  Interpreter Behaviour

   This section describes the purposes behaviour of SUIT.

   -  Resource: A piece the manifest interpreter.
   This section focuses primarily on interpreting commands in the
   manifest.  However, there are several other important behaviours of information that is used
   the interpreter: encoding version detection, rollback protection, and
   authenticity verification are chief among these.

5.1.  Interpreter Setup

   Prior to construct a
      payload.

   -  Manifest: A piece of information that describes one or more
      payloads, one executing any command sequence, the interpreter or more resources, its host
   application MUST inspect the manifest version field and fail when it
   encounters an unsupported encoding version.  Next, the processors needed to
      transform resources into payloads.

   -  Update: One or more manifests that describe one interpreter or more payloads.

   -  Update Authority:
   its host application MUST extract the manifest sequence number and
   perform a rollback check using this sequence number.  The owner exact logic
   of a cryptographic key used to sign
      updates, trusted rollback protection may vary by recipient devices. application, but it has the
   following properties:

   -  Recipient: The system, typically an IoT device, that receives a  Whenever the interpreter can choose between several manifests, it
      MUST select the latest valid manifest, authentic manifest.

   -  Condition: A test for a property of  If the Recipient or its
      components.

   -  Directive: An action for latest valid, authentic manifest fails, it MAY select the Recipient to perform.

   -  Command: A Condition or a Directive.

   -  Trusted Execution: A process by which a system ensures
      next latest valid, authentic manifest.

   Here, valid means that only
      trusted code is executed, for example secure boot.

3.  Distributing firmware

   Distributing firmware in a multi-party environment is a difficult
   operation.  Each party requires manifest has a different subset of data.  Some
   data may supported encoding version
   AND it has not been excluded for other reasons.  Reasons for
   excluding typically involve first executing the manifest and MAY
   include:

   -  Test failed (e.g.  Vendor ID/Class ID)

   -  Unsupported command encountered

   -  Unsupported parameter encountered

   -  Unsupported component ID encountered

   -  Payload not available (update interpreter)

   -  Dependency not available (update interpreter)

   -  Application crashed when executed (bootloader interpreter)

   -  Watchdog timeout occurred (bootloader interpreter)

   -  Dependency or Payload verification failed (bootloader interpreter)

   These failure reasons MAY be accessible to all parties.  Multiple signatures may
   be required from parties combined with different authorities.  This topic is
   covered in more depth in [Architecture].

4.  Workflow of a device applying a firmware update

   The manifest is designed retry mechanisms prior to work with
   marking a pull parser, where each
   section of the manifest is used in sequence.  The expected workflow
   for a device installing an update can be broken down into 5 steps:

   1.  Verify as invalid.

   Following these initial tests, the signature of interpreter clears all parameter
   storage.  This ensures that the interpreter begins without any leaked
   data.

5.2.  Required Checks

   Once a valid, authentic manifest

   2.  Verify has been selected, the applicability of interpreter
   MUST examine the manifest

   3.  Resolve dependencies

   4.  Fetch payload(s)

   5.  Install payload(s)

   When installation component list and verify that its maximum number of
   components is complete, similar information can be used for
   validating not exceeded and running images in a further three steps:

   1.  Verify image(s)

   2.  Load image(s)

   3.  Run image(s)

   When multiple manifests are used for an update, that each manifest's steps
   occur in a lockstep fashion; all manifests have dependency resolution
   performed before any manifest performs a payload fetch, etc.

5.  SUIT manifest goals

   The manifest described in this document listed component ID is intended to meet several
   goals, as described below.

   1.  Meet
   supported.

   For each listed component, the requirements defined in [Information].

   2.  Simple to parse on a constrained node

   3.  Simple interpreter MUST provide storage for
   the supported parameters (Section 5.4.1).  If the interpreter does
   not have sufficient temporary storage to process on a constrained node

   4.  Compact encoding

   5.  Comprehensible by an intermediate system

   6.  Expressive enough to enable advanced use cases on advanced nodes

   7.  Extensible

   The SUIT manifest can be used the parameters for
   all components, it MAY process components serially for a variety of purposes throughout
   its lifecycle. each command
   sequence.  See Section 5.5 for more details.

   The manifest allows:

   1. interpreter SHOULD check that the Firmware Author to reason about releasing a firmware.

   2. common section contains at
   least one vendor ID check and at least one class ID check.

   If the Network Operator to reason about compatibility of manifest contains more than one component, each command
   sequence MUST begin with a firmware.

   3. Set Current Component command.

   If a dependency is specified, then the Device Operator to reason about interpreter MUST perform the impact of a firmware.

   4.
   following checks:

   1.  At the Device Operator to manage distribution beginning of firmware to
       devices.

   5. each section in the Plant Manager to reason about timing and acceptance dependent: all previous
       sections of
       firmware updates.

   6.  the device to reason about each dependency have been executed.

   2.  At the authority & authenticity end of a
       firmware prior to installation.

   7. each section in the device to reason about dependent: The corresponding
       section in each dependency has been executed.

   If the applicability of interpreter does not support dependencies and a firmware.

   8.  the device to reason about the installation of manifest
   specifies a firmware.

   9. dependency, then the device to reason about interpreter MUST reject the authenticity & encoding of a
       firmware at boot.

   Each of these uses happens at
   manifest.

5.3.  Interpreter fundamental properties

   The interpreter has a different stage small set of the manifest
   lifecycle, so each has different requirements.

6.  SUIT manifest design overview

   In order to provide flexible behaviour to constrained devices, while
   still allowing more powerful devices to use their full capabilities, goals:

   1.  Executing an update MUST either result in an error, or a
       verifiably correct system state.

   2.  Executing a secure boot MUST either result in an error, or a
       booted system.

   3.  Executing the SUIT same manifest encodes on multiple devices MUST result in
       the required behaviour of a Recipient
   device.  Behaviour is encoded same system state.

   NOTE: when using A/B images, the manifest functions as two (or more)
   logical manifests, each of which applies to a specialised byte code, contained system in a CBOR list.  This promotes a flat encoding, which simplifies the
   parser. particular
   starting state.  With that provision, design goal 3 holds.

5.4.  Abstract Machine Description

   The information encoded by this byte code closely matches
   the operations that a device will perform, which promotes ease forms the bulk of
   processing.  The core operations used the manifest is processed by most update and trusted
   execution operations an
   interpreter.  This interpreter can be modelled as a simple abstract
   machine.  This machine consists of several data storage locations
   that are represented in modified by commands.  Certain commands also affect the byte code.  The byte
   machine's behaviour.

   Every command that modifies system state targets a specific
   component.  Components are units of code or data that can be extended targeted
   by registering new operations.

   The specialised byte code approach gives benefits equivalent to those
   provided an update.  They are identified by Component identifiers, arrays
   of binary-strings-effectively a scripting language or conventional byte code, with two
   substantial differences.  First, the language is extremely high
   level, consisting binary path.  Each component has a
   corresponding set of only configuration, Parameters.  Parameters are used
   as the operations that inputs to commands.

5.4.1.  Parameters

   Some parameters are REQUIRED to implement.  These parameters allow a
   device may to perform
   during update and trusted execution of a firmware image.  Second, the
   language specifies behaviours in a linearised form, without reverse
   branches.  Conditional processing is supported, and parallel and out-
   of-order processing may be performed by sufficiently capable devices.

   By structuring the data in this way, the manifest processor becomes a
   very simple engine that uses core functions.

   -  Vendor ID

   -  Class ID

   -  Image Digest

   Some parameters are RECOMMENDED to implement.  These parameters are
   needed for most use-cases.

   -  Image Size

   -  URI

   Other parameters are OPTIONAL to implement.  These parameters allow a pull parser
   device to interpret implement specific use-cases.

   -  Strict Order

   -  Soft Failure

   -  Device ID

   -  Encryption Info

   -  Unpack Info

   -  Source Component

   -  URI List

   -  Custom Parameters

5.4.2.  Commands

   Commands define the manifest.
   This pull parser invokes a series behaviour of command handlers that evaluate a
   Condition or execute a Directive.  Most data is structured in a
   highly regular pattern, which simplifies the parser. device.  The results of this commands are divided
   into two groups: those that modify state (directives) and those that
   perform tests (conditions).  There are also several Control Flow
   operations.

   Some commands are REQUIRED to implement.  These commands allow a Recipient
   device to implement perform core functions

   -  Check Vendor Identifier (cvid)
   -  Check Class Identifier (ccid)

   -  Verify Image (cimg)

   -  Set Current Component (setc)

   -  Override Parameters (ovrp)

   NOTE: on systems that support only a very small
   parser single component, Set Current
   Component has no effect.

   Some commands are RECOMMENDED to implement.  These commands are
   needed for constrained applications.  If needed, such a parser also
   allows the Recipient most use-cases

   -  Set Current Dependency (setd)

   -  Set Parameters (setp)

   -  Process Dependency (pdep)

   -  Run (run)

   -  Fetch (getc)

   Other commands are OPTIONAL to perform complex updates with reduced
   overhead.  Conditional execution of implement.  These commands allows allow a simple
   device to perform important decisions at validation-time.

   Dependency handling is vastly simplified as well.  Dependencies
   function like subroutines of implement specific use-cases.

   -  Use Before (ubf)

   -  Check Component Offset (cco)

   -  Check Device Identifier (cdid)

   -  Check Image Not Match (nimg)

   -  Check Minimum Battery (minb)

   -  Check Update Authorised (auth)

   -  Check Version (cver)

   -  Abort (abrt)

   -  Try Each (try)

   -  Copy (copy)

   -  Swap (swap)
   -  Wait For Event (wfe)

   -  Run Sequence (srun) mandatory component set

   -  Run with Arguments (arun)

5.4.3.  Command Behaviour

   The following table describes the language.  When a manifest has a
   dependency, it can invoke that dependency's commands and modify their behaviour by setting parameters.  Because some parameters come with
   security implications, of each command. "params"
   represents the dependencies also have a mechanism to
   reject modifications to parameters on a fine-grained level.

   Developing a robust permissions system works for the current component or dependency.

   +------+------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Code | Operation                                                  |
   +------+------------------------------------------------------------+
   | cvid | binary-match(component, params[vendor-id])                 |
   |      |                                                            |
   | ccid | binary-match(component, params[class-id])                  |
   |      |                                                            |
   | cimg | binary-match(digest(component), params[digest])            |
   |      |                                                            |
   | setc | component := components[arg]                               |
   |      |                                                            |
   | ovrp | params[k] := v for k,v in this model too.  The
   Recipient can use a simple ACL that arg                              |
   |      |                                                            |
   | setd | dependency := dependencies[arg]                            |
   |      |                                                            |
   | setp | params[k] := v if not k in params for k,v in arg           |
   |      |                                                            |
   | pdep | exec(dependency[common]); exec(dependency[current-         |
   |      | segment])                                                  |
   |      |                                                            |
   | run  | run(component)                                             |
   |      |                                                            |
   | getc | store(component, fetch(params[uri]))                       |
   |      |                                                            |
   | ubf  | assert(now() < arg)                                        |
   |      |                                                            |
   | cco  | assert(offsetof(component) == arg)                         |
   |      |                                                            |
   | cdid | binary-match(component, params[device-id])                 |
   |      |                                                            |
   | nimg | not binary-match(digest(component), params[digest])        |
   |      |                                                            |
   | minb | assert(battery >= arg)                                     |
   |      |                                                            |
   | auth | assert(isAuthorised())                                     |
   |      |                                                            |
   | cver | assert(version_check(component, arg))                      |
   |      |                                                            |
   | abrt | assert(0)                                                  |
   |      |                                                            |
   | try  | break if exec(seq) is not error for seq in arg             |
   |      |                                                            |
   | copy | store(component, params[src-component])                    |
   |      |                                                            |
   | swap | swap(component, params[src-component])                     |
   |      |                                                            |
   | wfe  | until event(arg), wait                                     |
   |      |                                                            |
   | srun | exec(arg)                                                  |
   |      |                                                            |
   | arun | run(component, arg)                                        |
   +------+------------------------------------------------------------+

5.5.  Serialized Processing Interpreter

   Because each manifest has a table list of Identities components and
   Component Identifier permissions to ensure that only manifests
   authenticated a list of
   components defined by its dependencies, it is possible for the appropriate identity have access
   manifest processor to operate on handle one component at a time, traversing the
   manifest tree once for each listed component.

   Capability reporting  In this mode, the
   interpreter ignores any commands executed while the component index
   is similarly simplified.  A Recipient can report not the Commands, Parameters, Algorithms, and Component Identifiers current component.  This reduces the overall volatile
   storage required to process the update so that the only limit on
   number of components is the size of the manifest.  However, this
   approach requires additional processing power.

5.6.  Parallel Processing Interpreter

   Advanced devices may make use of the Strict Order parameter and
   enable parallel processing of some segments, or it supports.  This may reorder some
   segments.  To perform parallel processing, once the Strict Order
   parameter is sufficiently precise for set to False, the device may fork a manifest author process for each
   command until the Strict Order parameter is returned to
   create True or the
   command sequence ends.  Then, it joins all forked processes before
   continuing processing of commands.  To perform out-of-order
   processing, a manifest that similar approach is used, except the Recipient can accept.

   The simplicity device consumes
   all commands after the Strict Order parameter is set to False, then
   it sorts these commands into its preferred order, invokes them all,
   then continues processing.

   Under each of these scenarios the parallel processing must halt:

   -  Set Parameters

   -  Override Parameters
   -  Set Strict Order = True

   -  Set Dependency Index

   -  Set Component Index

   To perform more useful parallel operations, sequences of design commands may
   be collected in the Recipient due to all a suit-directive-run-sequence.  Then, each of these
   benefits allows even a highly constrained platform to use advanced
   update capabilities.

6.1.  Manifest Design Evaluation

   To evaluate this design, it is compared to the goals stated above.

   Goal evaluation:

   1.
   sequences may be run in parallel.  Each command and condition is anchored sequence defaults to Strict
   Order = True.  To isolate each sequence from each other sequence,
   each sequence must declare a manifest information
       element single target component.  Set Component
   Index is not permitted inside this sequence.

5.7.  Processing Dependencies

   As described in [Information]

   2.  The use Section 5.2, each manifest must invoke each of a byte code encourages flat encoding and reduces
       nesting depth.  This promotes a simple encoding.

   3.  The encoded information closely matches its
   dependencies sections from the operations that a
       device will perform, making corresponding section of the format easy to process.

   4.  Encoding efficiency exceeds 50% when compared to raw data.

   5.  Tooling will be required
   dependent.  Any changes made to reason about the manifest.

   6.  The core operations used parameters by most update and trusted execution
       operations are represented in the byte code.  The use cases
       listed in [Information] are enabled.

   7.  Registration of new standard byte code identifiers enables
       extension dependency persist
   in a comprehensible way.

   The manifest described by this document meets the stated goals.
   Meeting goal 5-comprehensible by intermediate systems-will require
   additional tooling or dependent.

   When a division of metadata.

6.2.  Severable Elements

   Because the manifest can be used by different actors at different
   times, some parts of the manifest can be removed without affecting
   later stages of the lifecycle.  This is called "Severing."  Severing
   of information Process Depdendency command is achieved by separating that information from encountered, the
   signed container so that removing it does not affect interpreter
   loads the signature.
   This means that ensuring authenticity of severable parts of dependency identified by the
   manifest is a requirement for Current Dependency Index.  The
   interpreter first executes the signed portion common-sequence section of the manifest.
   Severing some parts makes
   identified dependency, then it possible to discard parts executes the section of the
   manifest dependency
   that are no longer necessary.  This is important because it
   allows corresponds to the storage used by currently executing section of the manifest dependent.

   The interpreter also performs the checks described in Section 5.2 to be greatly reduced.  For
   example, no text size limits are needed if text
   ensure that the dependent is removed from processing the
   manifest prior to delivery to a constrained device.

   Elements dependency correctly.

6.  Creating Manifests

   Manifests are made severable by removing them from the manifest,
   encoding them in a bstr, created using tools for constructing COSE structures,
   calculating cryptographic values and placing compiling desired system state
   into a SUIT_Digest sequence of the bstr in the
   manifest so operations required to achieve that they can still be authenticated. state.  The SUIT_Digest
   typically consumes 4 bytes more than
   process of constructing COSE structures is covered in [RFC8152] and
   the size calculation of cryptographic values is beyond the raw digest,
   therefore elements smaller than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 SHOULD never scope of this
   document.

   Compiling desired system state into a sequence of operations can be
   severable.  Elements larger than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 MAY
   accomplished in many ways, however several templates are provided
   here to cover common use-cases.  Many of these templates can be
   severable, while elements
   aggregated to produce more complex behaviour.

   NOTE: On systems that are much larger than (Digest Bits)/8 +
   4 SHOULD support only a single component, Set Current
   Component has no effect and can be severable.

6.3.  Conventions

   The map indices omitted.

   NOTE: Digest should always be set using Override Parameters, since
   this prevents a less-privileged dependent from replacing the digest.

6.1.  Manifest Source Material

   When a manifest is constructed from a descriptive document, the
   descriptive document SHOULD be included in this encoding are reset to 1 for each map within the structure. severable text
   section.  This is to keep section MAY be pruned from the indices as small as possible.
   The goal is manifest prior to keep the index objects
   distribution to single bytes (CBOR positive
   integers 1-23).

   Wherever enumerations are used, they are started at 1.  This allows
   detection a device.  The inclusion of text source material
   enables several common software errors that are caused by
   uninitialised variables.  Positive numbers in enumerations are
   reserved for IANA registration.  Negative numbers are used to
   identify application-specific implementations.

   CDDL names are hyphenated use-cases on unconstrained intermediate systems,
   where small manifest size, low parser complexity, and CDDL structures follow pull parsing
   are not required.

   An unconstrained system that makes decisions based on the convention
   adopted in COSE [RFC8152]: SUIT_Structure_Name.

6.4.  Payloads

   Payloads manifest
   can take many forms, for example, binary, hex, s-record,
   elf, binary diff, PEM certificate, CBOR Web Token, serialised
   configuration.  These payloads fall into two broad categories: those use the source material instead so that require installation-time unpacking and those it does not need to
   execute the manifest.

   An unconstrained system that presents data to a user can do not.
   Binary, PEM certificate, and CBOR Web Token do not require
   installation-time unpacking.  Hex, s-record, so
   according to typical usage patterns without first executing the
   manifest, and serialised
   configuration require installation-time unpacking.  Elf may or may
   not require unpacking depending on can trust that information with the target.

   Some payloads cannot same level of
   confidence as the manifest itself.

   A verifier can be directly converted constructed to a writable binary
   stream.  Hex, s-record, and elf may contain gaps emulate execution the manifest and they have no
   guarantee
   compare the results of monotonic increase that execution to the source material,
   providing a check that the manifest performs its stated objectives
   and that the manifest does not exceed the capabilities of address, which makes pre-
   processing them into the target
   device.

6.2.  Required Template: Compatibility Check

   The compatibility check ensures that devices only install compatible
   images.

   Common: Set Current Component Check Vendor Identifier Check Class
   Identifier

   All manifests MUST contain the compatibility check template, except
   as outlined below.

   If a binary stream difficult on constrained
   platforms.  Serialised configuration may be unpacked into device class has a
   configuration database, which makes unique trust anchor, and every element in its
   trust chain is unique-different from every element in any other
   device class, then it impossible to preprocess into
   a binary stream, suitable for direct writing.

   Where MAY include the compatibility check.

   If a specialised unpacking algorithm is needed, manifest includes a digest is not
   always calculable over an installed payload.  For example, an elf,
   s-record or hex file may contain gaps dependency that can contain any data,
   while not changing whether or not an installed payload is valid.
   Serialised configuration may update only some device performs a compatibility
   check, then the dependent manifest MAY include the compatibility
   check.

   The compatibility check template contains a data rather than
   all dependency: Vendor
   Identifier and Class Identifier MUST be set prior to executing the
   template.  One examples of it.  This means that the digest cannot always full template is included below,
   however Parameters may be calculated
   over an installed payload when set within a specialised installer is used.

   This presents two problems for the manifest: first, it must indicate Try-Each block as well.  They
   may also be inherited from a dependent manifest.

   -  Common:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Set Parameters:

         *  Vendor ID

         *  Class ID

      o  Check Vendor Identifier

      o  Check Class Identifier

6.3.  Use Case Template: XIP Secure Boot

   -  Common:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Override Parameters:

         *  Digest

         *  Size

   -  Run:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Check Image Match

      o  Directive Run

6.4.  Use Case Template: Firmware Download

   -  Common:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Override Parameters:

         *  Digest

         *  Size

   -  Install:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Set Parameters:

         *  URI

      o  Fetch

6.5.  Use Case Template: Load from External Storage

   -  Load:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Set Parameters:

         *  Source Index

      o  Copy

6.6.  Use Case Template Load & Decompress from External Storage

   -  Load:

      o  Set Current Component

      o  Set Parameters:

         *  Source Index

         *  Compression Info

      o  Copy

6.7.  Use Case Template: Dependency

   -  Dependency Resolution:

      o  Set Current Dependency

      o  Set Parameters:

         *  URI

      o  Fetch
      o  Check Image Match

      o  Process Dependency

   -  Validate:

      o  Set Current Dependency

      o  Check Image Match

      o  Process Dependency

   For any other section that a specialised installer is needed and, second, it cannot provide
   a hash of the payload that is checkable after installation.  These
   two problems are resolved dependency has, the dependent MUST
   invoke Process Dependency.

   NOTE: Any changes made to parameters in two ways:

   1.  Payloads that need a specialised installer must indicate this in
       suit-payload-info-unpack.

   2.  Payloads that need specialised verification must indicate this dependency persist in the SUIT_Parameter_Image_Digest by indicating a SUIT_Digest
       algorithm that correctly validates their information.
   dependent.

7.  Manifest Structure

   The manifest is divided into several sections in a hierarchy as
   follows:

   1.  The outer wrapper

       1.  The authentication wrapper

       2.  The manifest

           1.   Critical Information

           2.   Information shared by all command sequences

                1.  List of dependencies

                2.  List of payloads

                3.  List of payloads in dependencies

                4.  Common list of conditions, directives

           3.   Dependency resolution Reference or list of conditions,
                directives

           4.   Payload fetch Reference or list of conditions,
                directives

           5.   Installation Reference or list of conditions, directives
           6.   Verification conditions/directives

           7.   Load conditions/directives

           8.   Run conditions/directives

           9.   Text / Reference

           10.  COSWID / Reference

       3.  Dependency resolution conditions/directives

       4.  Payload fetch conditions/directives

       5.  Installation conditions/directives

       6.  Text

       7.  COSWID / Reference

       8.  Intermediate Certificate(s) / CWTs

       9.  Inline Payload(s)

7.1.  Severable Elements

   Because the manifest can be used by different actors at different
   times, some parts of the manifest can be removed without affecting
   later stages of the lifecycle.  This is called "Severing."  Severing
   of information is achieved by separating that information from the
   signed container so that removing it does not affect the signature.
   This means that ensuring authenticity of severable parts of the
   manifest is a requirement for the signed portion of the manifest.
   Severing some parts makes it possible to discard parts of the
   manifest that are no longer necessary.  This is important because it
   allows the storage used by the manifest to be greatly reduced.  For
   example, no text size limits are needed if text is removed from the
   manifest prior to delivery to a constrained device.

   Elements are made severable by removing them from the manifest,
   encoding them in a bstr, and placing a SUIT_Digest of the bstr in the
   manifest so that they can still be authenticated.  The SUIT_Digest
   typically consumes 4 bytes more than the size of the raw digest,
   therefore elements smaller than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 SHOULD never be
   severable.  Elements larger than (Digest Bits)/8 + 4 MAY be
   severable, while elements that are much larger than (Digest Bits)/8 +
   4 SHOULD be severable.

   Because of this, all command sequences in the manifest are encoded in
   a bstr so that there is a single code path needed for all command
   sequences

7.2.  Outer wrapper

   This object is a container for the other pieces of the manifest to
   provide a common mechanism to find each of the parts.  All elements
   of the outer wrapper are contained in bstr objects.  Wherever the
   manifest references an object in the outer wrapper, the bstr is
   included in the digest calculation.

   The CDDL that describes the wrapper is below

SUIT_Outer_Wrapper = {
    suit-authentication-wrapper   => bstr .cbor
                                     SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper / nil,
    $SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped,
    ? suit-dependency-resolution  => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-payload-fetch          => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-install                => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-text-external suit-text                   => bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Info, SUIT_Text_Map,
    ? suit-coswid-external suit-coswid                 => bstr .cbor COSWID
}

SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper = [ + (COSE_Mac_Tagged / COSE_Sign_Tagged /
                                  COSE_Mac0_Tagged / COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]
SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged

SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (suit-manifest  => bstr .cbor SUIT_Manifest)
SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (
    suit-manifest-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper,
    suit-manifest-encrypted       => bstr
)

   All elements of the outer wrapper must be wrapped in a bstr to
   minimize the complexity of the code that evaluates the cryptographic
   integrity of the element and to ensure correct serialisation for
   integrity and authenticity checks.

   The suit-authentication-wrapper contains a list of 1 or more
   cryptographic authentication wrappers for the core part of the
   manifest.  These are implemented as COSE_Mac_Tagged or
   COSE_Sign_Tagged blocks.  The Manifest is authenticated by these
   blocks in "detached payload" mode.  The COSE_Mac_Tagged and
   COSE_Sign_Tagged blocks are described in RFC 8152 [RFC8152] and are
   beyond the scope of this document.  The suit-authentication-wrapper
   MUST come first in the SUIT_Outer_Wrapper, regardless of canonical
   encoding of CBOR.  All validators MUST reject any SUIT_Outer_Wrapper
   that begins with any element other than a suit-authentication-
   wrapper.

   A manifest that has not had authentication information added MUST
   still contain the suit-authentication-wrapper element, but the
   content MUST be nil.

   The outer wrapper MUST contain only one of

   -  a plaintext manifest: SUIT_Manifest

   -  an encrypted manifest: both a SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper and the
      ciphertext of a manifest.

   When the outer wrapper contains SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper, the suit-
   authentication-wrapper MUST authenticate the plaintext of suit-
   manifest-encrypted.

   suit-manifest contains a SUIT_Manifest structure, which describes the
   payload(s) to be installed and any dependencies on other manifests.

   suit-manifest-encryption-info contains a SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper, a
   COSE object that describes the information required to decrypt a
   ciphertext manifest.

   suit-manifest-encrypted contains a ciphertext manifest.

   Each of suit-dependency-resolution, suit-payload-fetch, and suit-
   payload-installation contain the severable contents of the
   identically named portions of the manifest, described in Section 7.2. 7.3.

   suit-text contains all the human-readable information that describes
   any and all parts of the manifest, its payload(s) and its
   resource(s).

   suit-coswid contains a Concise Software Identifier.  This may be
   discarded by the recipient if not needed.

7.2.

7.3.  Manifest

   The manifest describes the critical metadata for the referenced
   payload(s).  In addition, it contains:

   1.  a version number for the manifest structure itself

   2.  a sequence number
   3.  a list of dependencies

   4.  a list of components affected

   5.  a list of components affected by dependencies

   6.  a reference for each of the severable blocks.

   7.  a list of actions that the recipient should perform.

   The following CDDL fragment defines the manifest.

SUIT_Manifest = {
    suit-manifest-version         => 1,
    suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
    suit-common                   => bstr .cbor SUIT_Common,
    ? suit-dependency-resolution  => Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-payload-fetch          => Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-install                => Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-validate               => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-load                   => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-run                    => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-text-info suit-text                   => Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map Digest,
    ? suit-coswid                 => Digest / bstr .cbor COSWID concise-software-identity,
}

SUIT_Common = {
    ? suit-dependencies           => bstr .cbor [ + SUIT_Dependency ],
    ? suit-components             => bstr .cbor [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ],
    ? suit-dependency-components  => bstr .cbor [ + SUIT_Component_Reference ],
    ? suit-common-sequence        => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
}

   Several fields in the Manifest can be either a CBOR structure or a
   SUIT_Digest.  In each of these cases, the SUIT_Digest provides for a
   severable field.  Severable fields are RECOMMENDED to implement.  In
   particular, text SHOULD be severable, since most useful text elements
   occupy more space than a SUIT_Digest, but are not needed by recipient
   devices.  Because SUIT_Digest is a CBOR Array and each severable
   element is a CBOR bstr, it is straight-forward for a recipient to
   determine whether an element is been severable.  The key used for a
   severable element is the same in the SUIT_Manifest and in the
   SUIT_Outer_Wrapper so that a recipient can easily identify the
   correct data in the outer wrapper.

   The suit-manifest-version indicates the version of serialisation used
   to encode the manifest.  Version 1 is the version described in this
   document. suit-manifest-version is REQUIRED.

   The suit-manifest-sequence-number is a monotonically increasing anti-
   rollback counter.  It also helps devices to determine which in a set
   of manifests is the "root" manifest in a given update.  Each manifest
   MUST have a sequence number higher than each of its dependencies.
   Each recipient MUST reject any manifest that has a sequence number
   lower than its current sequence number.  It MAY be convenient to use
   a UTC timestamp in seconds as the sequence number. suit-manifest-
   sequence-number is REQUIRED.

   suit-common encodes all the information that is shared between each
   of the command sequences, including: suit-dependencies, suit-
   components, suit-dependency-components, and suit-common-sequence.
   suit-common is REQUIRED to implement.

   suit-dependencies is a list of SUIT_Dependency blocks that specify
   manifests that must be present before the current manifest can be
   processed. suit-dependencies is OPTIONAL to implement.

   In order to distinguish between components that are affected by the
   current manifest and components that are affected by a dependency,
   they are kept in separate lists.  Components affected by the current
   manifest only list the component identifier.  Components affected by
   a dependency include the component identifier and the index of the
   dependency that defines the component.

   suit-components is a list of SUIT_Component blocks that specify the
   component identifiers that will be affected by the content of the
   current manifest. suit-components is OPTIONAL, but at least one
   manifest MUST contain a suit-components block.

   suit-dependency-components is a list of SUIT_Component_Reference
   blocks that specify component identifiers that will be affected by
   the content of a dependency of the current manifest. suit-dependency-
   components is OPTIONAL.

   suit-common-sequence is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute prior to
   executing any other command sequence.  Typical actions in suit-
   common-sequence include setting expected device identity and image
   digests when they are conditional (see Section 11 10 for more
   information on conditional sequences). suit-common-sequence is
   RECOMMENDED.

   suit-dependency-resolution is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in
   order to perform dependency resolution.  Typical actions include
   configuring URIs of dependency manifests, fetching dependency
   manifests, and validating dependency manifests' contents. suit-
   dependency-resolution is REQUIRED when suit-dependencies is present.

   suit-payload-fetch is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to
   obtain a payload.  Some manifests may include these actions in the
   suit-install section instead if they operate in a streaming
   installation mode.  This is particularly relevant for constrained
   devices without any temporary storage for staging the update. suit-
   payload-fetch is OPTIONAL.

   suit-install is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to
   install a payload.  Typical actions include verifying a payload
   stored in temporary storage, copying a staged payload from temporary
   storage, and unpacking a payload. suit-install is OPTIONAL.

   suit-validate is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to
   validate that the result of applying the update is correct.  Typical
   actions involve image validation and manifest validation. suit-
   validate is REQUIRED.  If the manifest contains dependencies, one
   process-dependency invocation per dependency or one process-
   dependency invocation targeting all dependencies SHOULD be present in
   validate.

   suit-load is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to prepare a
   payload for execution.  Typical actions include copying an image from
   permanent storage into RAM, optionally including actions such as
   decryption or decompression. suit-load is OPTIONAL.

   suit-run is a SUIT_Command_Sequence to execute in order to run an
   image. suit-run typically contains a single instruction: either the
   "run" directive for the bootable manifest or the "process
   dependencies" directive for any dependents of the bootable manifest.
   suit-run is OPTIONAL.  Only one manifest in an update may contain the
   "run" directive.

   suit-text-info

   suit-text is a digest that uniquely identifies the content of the
   Text that is packaged in the OuterWrapper. text is OPTIONAL.

   suit-coswid is a digest that uniquely identifies the content of the
   concise-software-identifier that is packaged in the OuterWrapper.
   coswid is OPTIONAL.

7.3.

7.4.  SUIT_Dependency

   SUIT_Dependency specifies a manifest that describes a dependency of
   the current manifest.

   The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Dependency structure.

   SUIT_Dependency = {
       suit-dependency-digest => SUIT_Digest,
       ? suit-dependency-prefix => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
   }

   The suit-dependency-digest specifies the dependency manifest uniquely
   by identifying a particular Manifest structure.  The digest is
   calculated over the Manifest structure instead of the COSE
   Sig_structure or Mac_structure.  This means that a digest may need to
   be calculated more than once, however this is necessary to ensure
   that removing a signature from a manifest does not break dependencies
   due to missing signature elements.  This is also necessary to support
   the trusted intermediary use case, where an intermediary re-signs the
   Manifest, removing the original signature, potentially with a
   different algorithm, or trading COSE_Sign for COSE_Mac.

   The suit-dependency-prefix element contains a
   SUIT_Component_Identifier.  This specifies the scope at which the
   dependency operates.  This allows the dependency to be forwarded on
   to a component that is capable of parsing its own manifests.  It also
   allows one manifest to be deployed to multiple dependent devices
   without those devices needing consistent component hierarchy.  This
   element is OPTIONAL.

7.4.

7.5.  SUIT_Component_Reference

   The SUIT_Component_Reference describes an image that is defined by
   another manifest.  This is useful for overriding the behaviour of
   another manifest, for example by directing the recipient to look at a
   different URI for the image or by changing the expected format, such
   as when a gateway performs decryption on behalf of a constrained
   device.  The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Component_Reference.

   SUIT_Component_Reference = {
       suit-component-identifier => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
       suit-component-dependency-index => uint
   }

7.5.

7.6.  Manifest Parameters

   Many conditions and directives require additional information.  That
   information is contained within parameters that can be set in a
   consistent way.  Parameters MUST only be:

   1. Integers
   2. Byte strings
   3. Booleans  This allows reduction of manifest size and
   replacement of parameters from one manifest to the next.  Byte strings MAY contain CBOR-encoded
   objects.

   The defined manifest parameters are described below.

   +--------+-------+------+---------------+----------+----------------+

   +-----+--------+-------------------+------------+-------------------+
   | Parame ID  | CBOR   | Defa | Scope             | Name       | Description       |
   | ter     | Type   | ult  |                   |            |                   |
   | Code   |       |      |               |          |                |
   +--------+-------+------+---------------+----------+----------------+
   +-----+--------+-------------------+------------+-------------------+
   | 1   | boole | True boolea | Global            | Strict     | Requires that the |
   |     | an    | n      |                   | Order      | the manifest   |
   |        |       |      |               |          | is processed   |       |
   |     |        |                   |            | processed in a strictly  |    |
   |     |        |                   |            | strictly linear   |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | fashion. Set to 0 |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | to 0 to enable         |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | parallel       |
   |        |       |      |               |          | handling of    | |
   |     |        |                   |            | of manifest       |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | directives.       |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 2   | boole | Fals boolea | Command       | Coerce C | Coerces the    |
   |        | an    | e    | Segment   | ondition | success code Soft       | Condition         |
   |     | n      |                   | Failure    | of a command   |
   |        |       |      |               |          | segment to     |
   |        |       |      |               |          | success even   |
   |        |       |      |               |          | when aborted   |
   |        |       | failures only     |
   |     | due to a        |                   |            | terminate the     |
   |     |        | condition                   |            | current command   |
   |     |        |                   | failure.            | segment.          |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | 3   | bstr   | nil  | Component/Glo Component/Global  | Vendor ID  | A RFC4122 UUID    |
   |     |        |                   | bal           | ID            | representing the  |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | the vendor of the     |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | the device or         |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | component         |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 4   | bstr   | nil  | Component/Glo Component/Global  | Class ID   | A RFC4122 UUID    |
   |     |        |                   | bal           |            | representing the  |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | the class of the      |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | the device or         |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | component         |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 5   | bstr   | nil  | Component/Glo Component/Global  | Device ID  | A RFC4122 UUID    |
   |     |        |                   | bal           | ID            | representing the  |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | the device or         |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | component         |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 6   | bstr  | nil tstr   | Component/Dep Component/Depende | URI        | A URI from which  |
   |     |        |      | endency ncy               |            | which to fetch a        |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | a resource          |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 7   | bstr   | nil  | Component/Dep Component/Depende | Encrypti Encryption | A COSE object     |
   |     |        | ncy               | endency       | on Info       | defining the   |
   |        |       |      |               |          | encryption     | the      |
   |     |        |                   |            | encryption mode of a      |   |
   |     |        |                   |            | of a resource     |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 8   | bstr   | nil  | Component         | Compress | A SUIT_Compres Compressio | The information   |
   |     |        |                   | ion n Info     | sion_Info required to       |
   |     |        |                   |            | decompress the    |
   | object     |        |                   |            | image             |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | 9   | bstr   | nil  | Component         | Unpack     | A SUIT_Unpack_ | The information   |
   |     |        |                   | Info       | Info object required to       |
   |     |        |                   |            | unpack the image  |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | 10  | uint   | nil  | Component         | Source C     | A Component Index |
   |     |        |                   |               | omponent | Index Component  |                   |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | 11  | bstr   | nil  | Component/Dep Component/Depende | Image      | A SUIT_Digest     |
   |     |        |      | endency ncy               | Digest     |                   |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 12  | bstr  | nil uint   | Component/Dep Component/Depende | Image Size | Integer size      |
   |     |        |      | endency       | Size ncy               |            |                   |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | 24  | bstr   | nil  | Component/Dep Component/Depende | URI List   | A CBOR encoded    |
   |     |        |      | endency ncy               |            | list of ranked    |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | URIs              |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   |
   | 25  | boole | Fals boolea | Component/Dep Component/Depende | URI List   | A CBOR encoded    |
   |     | an    | e n      | endency ncy               | Append     | list of ranked    |
   |     |        |                   |            |          | URIs              |
   |     |        |                   |            |                   |
   | nin | nint   | int/b | nil int/bs | Custom            | Custom P     | Application-      |
   | t   | str   | tr     |                   | arameter Parameter  | defined        |
   |        |       |      |               |          | parameter |
   +--------+-------+------+---------------+----------+----------------+
   +-----+--------+-------------------+------------+-------------------+

   CBOR-encoded object parameters are still wrapped in a bstr.  This is
   because it allows a parser that is aggregating parameters to
   reference the object with a single pointer and traverse it without
   understanding the contents.  This is important for modularisation and
   division of responsibility within a pull parser.  The same
   consideration does not apply to Conditions and Directives because
   those elements are invoked with their arguments immediately

7.5.1.

7.6.1.  SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order

   The Strict Order Parameter allows a manifest to govern when
   directives can be executed out-of-order.  This allows for systems
   that have a sensitivity to order of updates to choose the order in
   which they are executed.  It also allows for more advanced systems to
   parallelise their handling of updates.  Strict Order defaults to
   True.  It MAY be set to False when the order of operations does not
   matter.  When arriving at the end of a command sequence, ALL commands
   MUST have completed, regardless of the state of
   SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order.  If SUIT_Parameter_Strict_Order is
   returned to True, ALL preceding commands MUST complete before the
   next command is executed.

7.5.2.  SUIT_Parameter_Coerce_Condition_Failure

7.6.2.  SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure

   When executing a command sequence inside SUIT_Run_Sequence SUIT_Directive_Try_Each and
   a condition failure occurs, the manifest processor aborts the
   sequence.  If Coerce Condition Soft Failure is True, it returns Success.  Otherwise,
   it returns the original condition failure.
   SUIT_Parameter_Coerce_Condition_Failure
   SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure is scoped to the enclosing
   SUIT_Directive_Run_Sequence.
   SUIT_Command_Sequence.  Its value is discarded when
   SUIT_Directive_Run_Sequence
   SUIT_Command_Sequence terminates.

7.6.

7.7.  SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info

   Encryption Info defines the mechanism that Fetch or Copy should use
   to decrypt the data they transfer.  SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info is
   encoded as a COSE_Encrypt_Tagged or a COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged, wrapped
   in a bstr

7.7.

7.8.  SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info

   Compression Info defines any information that is required for a
   device to perform decompression operations.  Typically, this includes
   the algorithm identifier.

   SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info is defined by the following CDDL:

   SUIT_Compression_Info = {
       suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms
       ? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
   }

   SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
   SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
   SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate
   SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_LZ4
   SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma

7.8.

7.9.  SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info

   SUIT_Unpack_Info defines the information required for a device to
   interpret a packed format, such as elf, hex, or binary diff.
   SUIT_Unpack_Info is defined by the following CDDL:

   SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
       suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms
       ? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
   }

   SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
   SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
   SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf

7.9.

7.10.  SUIT_Parameters CDDL

   The following CDDL describes all SUIT_Parameters.

SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-strict-order => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-coerce-condition-failure (suit-parameter-soft-failure => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-vendor-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-class-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-device-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri => bstr) tstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-compression-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Compression_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-unpack-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Unpack_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-source-component => bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_Identifier) uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-digest => bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-size => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri-list => bstr .cbor SUIT_URI_List) SUIT_Component_URI_List)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter_custom (suit-parameter-custom => int/bool/bstr)

SUIT_URI_List int/bool/tstr/bstr)

SUIT_Component_URI_List = [ + [priority: int, uri: tstr] ]

SUIT_Encryption_Info= COSE_Encrypt_Tagged/COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
SUIT_Compression_Info = {
    suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms
    ? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
}

SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_LZ4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma

SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
    suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms
    ? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
}

SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms //= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf

7.10.

7.11.  SUIT_Command_Sequence

   A SUIT_Command_Sequence defines a series of actions that the
   recipient MUST take to accomplish a particular goal.  These goals are
   defined in the manifest and include:

   1.  Dependency Resolution

   2.  Payload Fetch
   3.  Payload Installation

   4.  Image Validation

   5.  Image Loading

   6.  Run or Boot

   Each of these follows exactly the same structure to ensure that the
   parser is as simple as possible.

   Lists of commands are constructed from two kinds of element:

   1.  Conditions that MUST be true-any failure is treated as a failure
       of the update/load/boot

   2.  Directives that MUST be executed.

   The lists of commands are logically structured into sequences of zero
   or more conditions followed by zero or more directives.  The
   *logical* structure is described by the following CDDL:

   Command_Sequence = {
       conditions => [ * Condition],
       directives => [ * Directive]
   }

   This introduces significant complexity in the parser, however, so the
   structure is flattened to make parsing simpler:

   SUIT_Command_Sequence = [ + (SUIT_Condition/SUIT_Directive) ]

   Each condition and directive is composed of:

   1.  A command code identifier

   2.  An argument block

   Argument blocks are defined for each type of command.

   Many conditions and directives apply to a given component, and these
   generally grouped together.  Therefore, a special command to set the
   current component index is provided with a matching command to set
   the current dependency index.  This index is a numeric index into the
   component ID tables defined at the beginning of the document.  For
   the purpose of setting the index, the two component ID tables are
   considered to be concatenated together.

   To facilitate optional conditions, a special directive is provided.
   It runs several new lists of conditions/directives, one after
   another, that are contained as an argument to the directive.  By
   default, it assumes that a failure of a condition should not indicate
   a failure of the update/boot, but a parameter is provided to override
   this behaviour.

7.11.

7.12.  SUIT_Condition

   Conditions are used to define mandatory properties of a system in
   order for an update to be applied.  They can be pre-conditions or
   post-conditons of any directive or series of directives, depending on
   where they are placed in the list.  Conditions include:

    +----------------+-------------------+----------------------------+
    | Condition Code | Condition Name    | Argument Type              |
    +----------------+-------------------+----------------------------+
    | 1              | Vendor Identifier | nil                        |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 2              | Class Identifier  | nil                        |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 3              | Image Match       | nil                        |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 4              | Use Before        | Unsigned Integer timestamp |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 5              | Component Offset  | Unsigned Integer           |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 24             | Device Identifier | nil                        |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 25             | Image Not Match   | nil                        |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 26             | Minimum Battery   | Unsigned Integer           |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 27             | Update Authorised | Integer                    |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | 28             | Version           | List of Integers           |
    |                |                   |                            |
    | nint           | Custom Condition  | bstr                       |
    +----------------+-------------------+----------------------------+

   Each condition MUST report a success code on completion.  If a
   condition reports failure, then the current sequence of commands MUST
   terminate.  If a recipient encounters an unknown Condition Code, it
   MUST report a failure.

   Positive Condition numbers are reserved for IANA registration.
   Negative numbers are reserved for proprietary, application-specific
   directives.

7.11.1.

7.12.1.  Identifier Conditions

   There are three identifier-based conditions: suit-condition-vendor-
   identifier, suit-condition-class-identifier, and suit-condition-
   device-identifier.  Each of these conditions match a RFC 4122
   [RFC4122] UUID that MUST have already been set as a parameter.  The
   installing device MUST match the specified UUID in order to consider
   the manifest valid.  These identifiers MAY be scoped by component.

   The recipient uses the ID parameter that has already been set using
   the Set Parameters directive.  If no ID has been set, this condition
   fails. suit-condition-class-identifier and suit-condition-vendor-
   identifier are REQUIRED to implement. suit-condition-device-
   identifier is OPTIONAL to implement.

7.11.2.

7.12.2.  suit-condition-image-match

   Verify that the current component matches the digest parameter for
   the current component.  The digest is verified against the digest
   specified in the Component's parameters list.  If no digest is
   specified, the condition fails. suit-condition-image-match is
   REQUIRED to implement.

7.11.3.

7.12.3.  suit-condition-image-not-match

   Verify that the current component does not match the supplied digest.
   If no digest is specified, then the digest is compared against the
   digest specified in the Components list.  If no digest is specified
   and the component is not present in the Components list, the
   condition fails. suit-condition-image-not-match is OPTIONAL to
   implement.

7.11.4.

7.12.4.  suit-condition-use-before

   Verify that the current time is BEFORE the specified time. suit-
   condition-use-before is used to specify the last time at which an
   update should be installed.  One argument is required, encoded as a
   POSIX timestamp, that is seconds after 1970-01-01 00:00:00.
   Timestamp conditions MUST be evaluated in 64 bits, regardless of
   encoded CBOR size. suit-condition-use-before is OPTIONAL to
   implement.

7.11.5.

7.12.5.  suit-condition-minimum-battery

   suit-condition-minimum-battery provides a mechanism to test a
   device's battery level before installing an update.  This condition
   is for use in primary-cell applications, where the battery is only
   ever discharged.  For batteries that are charged, suit-directive-wait
   is more appropriate, since it defines a "wait" until the battery
   level is sufficient to install the update. suit-condition-minimum-
   battery is specified in mWh. suit-condition-minimum-battery is
   OPTIONAL to implement.

7.11.6.

7.12.6.  suit-condition-update-authorised

   Request Authorisation from the application and fail if not
   authorised.  This can allow a user to decline an update.  Argument is
   an integer priority level.  Priorities are application defined. suit-
   condition-update-authorised is OPTIONAL to implement.

7.11.7.

7.12.7.  suit-condition-version

   suit-condition-version allows comparing versions of firmware.
   Verifying image digests is preferred to version checks because
   digests are more precise.  The image can be compared as:

   -  Greater

   -  Greater or Equal

   -  Equal

   -  Lesser or Equal

   -  Lesser

   Versions are encoded as a CBOR list of integers.  Comparisons are
   done on each integer in sequence.  Comparison stops after all
   integers in the list defined by the manifest have been consumed OR
   after a non-equal match has occured.  For example, if the manifest
   defines a comparison, "Equal [1]", then this will match all version
   sequences starting with 1.  If a manifest defines both "Greater or
   Equal [1,0]" and "Lesser [1,10]", then it will match versions 1.0.x
   up to, but not including 1.10.

   The following CDDL describes SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument

SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument = [
    suit-condition-version-comparison: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types,
    suit-condition-version-comparison: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value
]
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Greater
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Greater_Equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Lesser_Equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Lesser
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Greater = 1
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Greater_Equal = 2
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Equal = 3
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Lesser_Equal = 4
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Lesser = 5

SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]

   While the exact encoding of versions is application-defined, semantic
   versions map conveniently.  For example,

   -  1.2.3 = [1,2,3]

   -  1.2-rc3 = [1,2,-1,3]

   -  1.2-beta = [1,2,-2]

   -  1.2-alpha = [1,2,-3]

   -  1.2-alpha4 = [1,2,-3,4]

   suit-condition-version is OPTIONAL to implement.

7.11.8.

7.12.8.  SUIT_Condition_Custom

   SUIT_Condition_Custom describes any proprietary, application specific
   condition.  This is encoded as a negative integer, chosen by the
   firmware developer, and a bstr that encodes the parameters passed to
   the system that evaluates the condition matching that integer.
   SUIT_Condition_Custom is OPTIONAL to implement.

7.11.9.

7.12.9.  Identifiers

   Many conditions use identifiers to determine whether a manifest
   matches a given recipient or not.  These identifiers are defined to
   be RFC 4122 [RFC4122] UUIDs.  These UUIDs are explicitly NOT human-
   readable.  They are for machine-based matching only.

   A device may match any number of UUIDs for vendor or class
   identifier.  This may be relevant to physical or software modules.
   For example, a device that has an OS and one or more applications
   might list one Vendor ID for the OS and one or more additional Vendor
   IDs for the applications.  This device might also have a Class ID
   that must be matched for the OS and one or more Class IDs for the
   applications.

   A more complete example: A device has the following physical
   components: 1.  A host MCU 2.  A WiFi module

   This same device has three software modules: 1.  An operating system
   2.  A WiFi module interface driver 3.  An application

   Suppose that the WiFi module's firmware has a proprietary update
   mechanism and doesn't support manifest processing.  This device can
   report four class IDs:

   1.  hardware model/revision

   2.  OS

   3.  WiFi module model/revision

   4.  Application

   This allows the OS, WiFi module, and application to be updated
   independently.  To combat possible incompatibilities, the OS class ID
   can be changed each time the OS has a change to its API.

   This approach allows a vendor to target, for example, all devices
   with a particular WiFi module with an update, which is a very
   powerful mechanism, particularly when used for security updates.

7.11.9.1.

7.12.9.1.  Creating UUIDs:

   UUIDs MUST be created according to RFC 4122 [RFC4122].  UUIDs SHOULD
   use versions 3, 4, or 5, as described in RFC4122.  Versions 1 and 2
   do not provide a tangible benefit over version 4 for this
   application.

   The RECOMMENDED method to create a vendor ID is: Vendor ID =
   UUID5(DNS_PREFIX, vendor domain name)

   The RECOMMENDED method to create a class ID is: Class ID =
   UUID5(Vendor ID, Class-Specific-Information)
   Class-specific information is composed of a variety of data, for
   example:

   -  Model number

   -  Hardware revision

   -  Bootloader version (for immutable bootloaders)

7.11.10.

7.12.10.  SUIT_Condition CDDL

   The following CDDL describes SUIT_Condition:

SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-vendor-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-class-identifier,  nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-device-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-match,       nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-not-match,   nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-use-before,        uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-minimum-battery,   uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-update-authorised, int)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-version,           SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-component-offset,  uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-custom,            bstr)

SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument = [
    suit-condition-version-comparison: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types,
    suit-condition-version-comparison: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value
]
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-greater
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser

SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]

7.12.

7.13.  SUIT_Directive

   Directives are used to define the behaviour of the recipient.
   Directives include:

                 +----------------+----------------------+
                 | Directive Code | Directive Name       |
                 +----------------+----------------------+
                 | 12             | Set Component Index  |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 13             | Set Dependency Index |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 14             | Abort                |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 15             | Try Each             |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 16             | Reserved             |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 17             | Reserved             |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 18             | Process Dependency   |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 19             | Set Parameters       |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 20             | Override Parameters  |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 21             | Fetch                |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 22             | Copy                 |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 23             | Run                  |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 29             | Wait                 |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 30             | Run Sequence         |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 31             | Run with Arguments   |
                 |                |                      |
                 | 32             | Swap                 |
                 +----------------+----------------------+

   When a Recipient executes a Directive, it MUST report a success code.
   If the Directive reports failure, then the current Command Sequence
   MUST terminate.

7.12.1.

7.13.1.  suit-directive-set-component-index

   Set Component Index defines the component to which successive
   directives and conditions will apply.  The supplied argument MUST be
   either a boolean or an unsigned integer index into the concatenation
   of suit-components and suit-dependency-components.  If the following
   directives apply to ALL components, then the boolean value "True" is
   used instead of an index.  True does not apply to dependency
   components.  If the following directives apply to NO components, then
   the boolean value "False" is used.  When suit-directive-set-
   dependency-index is used, suit-directive-set-component-index = False
   is implied.  When suit-directive-set-component-index is used, suit-
   directive-set-dependency-index = False is implied.

   The following CDDL describes the argument to suit-directive-set-
   component-index.

   SUIT_Directive_Set_Component_Index_Argument = uint/bool

7.12.2.

7.13.2.  suit-directive-set-dependency-index

   Set Dependency Index defines the manifest to which successive
   directives and conditions will apply.  The supplied argument MUST be
   either a boolean or an unsigned integer index into the dependencies.
   If the following directives apply to ALL dependencies, then the
   boolean value "True" is used instead of an index.  If the following
   directives apply to NO dependencies, then the boolean value "False"
   is used.  When suit-directive-set-component-index is used, suit-
   directive-set-dependency-index = False is implied.  When suit-
   directive-set-dependency-index is used, suit-directive-set-component-
   index = False is implied.

   Typical operations that require suit-directive-set-dependency-index
   include setting a source URI, invoking "Fetch," or invoking "Process
   Dependency" for an individual dependency.

   The following CDDL describes the argument to suit-directive-set-
   dependency-index.

   SUIT_Directive_Set_Manifest_Index_Argument = uint/bool

7.12.3.

7.13.3.  suit-directive-abort

   Unconditionally fail.  This operation is typically used in
   conjunction with suit-directive-try-each.

7.12.4.

7.13.4.  suit-directive-run-sequence

   To enable conditional commands, and to allow several strictly ordered
   sequences to be executed out-of-order, suit-directive-run-sequence
   allows the manifest processor to execute its argument as a
   SUIT_Command_Sequence.  The argument must be wrapped in a bstr.

   When a sequence is executed, any failure of a condition causes
   immediate termination of the sequence.

   The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Run_Sequence argument.

 SUIT_Directive_Run_Sequence_Argument = bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence

   When suit-directive-run-sequence completes, it forwards the last
   status code that occurred in the sequence.  If the Coerce on
   Condition Soft Failure
   parameter is true, then suit-directive-run-sequence only fails when a
   directive in the argument sequence fails.

   SUIT_Parameter_Coerce_Condition_Failure

   SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure defaults to False when suit-
   directive-run-sequence suit-directive-
   run-sequence begins.  Its value is discarded when suit-
   directive-run-sequence suit-directive-run-
   sequence terminates.

7.12.5.

7.13.5.  suit-directive-try-each

   This command runs several suit-directive-run-sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence, one after another,
   in a strict order.  Use this command to implement a "try/
   catch-try/catch" "try/catch-try/
   catch" sequence.  Manifest processors MAY implement this command.

   SUIT_Parameter_Coerce_Condition_Failure

   SUIT_Parameter_Soft_Failure is initialised to True at the beginning
   of each sequence.  If one sequence aborts due to a condition failure,
   the next is started.  If no sequence completes without condition
   failure, then suit-directive-try-each returns an error.  If a
   particular application calls for all sequences to fail and still
   continue, then an empty sequence (nil) can be added to the Try Each
   Argument.

   The following CDDL describes the SUIT_Try_Each argument.

   SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
       + bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
       nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
   ]

7.12.6.

7.13.6.  suit-directive-process-dependency

   Execute the commands in the common section of the current dependency,
   followed by the commands in the equivalent section of the current
   dependency.  For example, if the current section is "fetch payload,"
   this will execute "common" in the current dependency, then "fetch
   payload" in the current dependency.  Once this is complete, the
   command following suit-directive-process-dependency will be
   processed.

   If the current dependency is False, this directive has no effect.  If
   the current dependency is True, then this directive applies to all
   dependencies.  If the current section is "common," this directive
   MUST have no effect.

   When SUIT_Process_Dependency completes, it forwards the last status
   code that occurred in the dependency.

   The argument to suit-directive-process-dependency is defined in the
   following CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Process_Dependency_Argument = nil

7.12.7.

7.13.7.  suit-directive-set-parameters

   suit-directive-set-parameters allows the manifest to configure
   behaviour of future directives by changing parameters that are read
   by those directives.  When dependencies are used, suit-directive-set-
   parameters also allows a manifest to modify the behaviour of its
   dependencies.

   Available parameters are defined in Section 7.5. 7.6.

   If a parameter is already set, suit-directive-set-parameters will
   skip setting the parameter to its argument.  This provides the core
   of the override mechanism, allowing dependent manifests to change the
   behaviour of a manifest.

   The argument to suit-directive-set-parameters is defined in the
   following CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Set_Parameters_Argument = {+ SUIT_Parameters}

   N.B.: A directive code is reserved for an optimisation: a way to set
   a parameter to the contents of another parameter, optionally with
   another component ID.

7.12.8.

7.13.8.  suit-directive-override-parameters

   suit-directive-override-parameters replaces any listed parameters
   that are already set with the values that are provided in its
   argument.  This allows a manifest to prevent replacement of critical
   parameters.

   Available parameters are defined in Section 7.5. 7.6.

   The argument to suit-directive-override-parameters is defined in the
   following CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Override_Parameters_Argument = {+ SUIT_Parameters}

7.12.9.

7.13.9.  suit-directive-fetch

   suit-directive-fetch instructs the manifest processor to obtain one
   or more manifests or payloads, as specified by the manifest index and
   component index, respectively.

   suit-directive-fetch can target one or more manifests and one or more
   payloads. suit-directive-fetch retrieves each component and each
   manifest listed in component-index and manifest-index, respectively.
   If component-index or manifest-index is True, instead of an integer,
   then all current manifest components/manifests are fetched.  The
   current manifest's dependent-components are not automatically
   fetched.  In order to pre-fetch these, they MUST be specified in a
   component-index integer.

   suit-directive-fetch typically takes no arguments unless one is
   needed to modify fetch behaviour.  If an argument is needed, it must
   be wrapped in a bstr.

   suit-directive-fetch reads the URI or URI List parameter to find the
   source of the fetch it performs.

   The behaviour of suit-directive-fetch can be modified by setting one
   or more of SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info,
   SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info.  These
   three parameters each activate and configure a processing step that
   can be applied to the data that is transferred during suit-directive-
   fetch.

   The argument to suit-directive-fetch is defined in the following
   CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Fetch_Argument = nil/bstr

7.12.10.

7.13.10.  suit-directive-copy

   suit-directive-copy instructs the manifest processor to obtain one or
   more payloads, as specified by the component index. suit-directive-
   copy retrieves each component listed in component-index,
   respectively.  If component-index is True, instead of an integer,
   then all current manifest components are copied.  The current
   manifest's dependent-components are not automatically copied.  In
   order to copy these, they MUST be specified in a component-index
   integer.

   The behaviour of suit-directive-copy can be modified by setting one
   or more of SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info,
   SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info, SUIT_Parameter_Unpack_Info.  These
   three parameters each activate and configure a processing step that
   can be applied to the data that is transferred during suit-directive-
   copy.

   *N.B.* Fetch and Copy are very similar.  Merging them into one
   command may be appropriate.

   suit-directive-copy reads its source from
   SUIT_Parameter_Source_Component.

   The argument to suit-directive-copy is defined in the following CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Copy_Argument = nil

7.12.11.

7.13.11.  suit-directive-swap

   suit-directive-swap instructs the manifest processor to move the
   source to the destination and the destination to the source
   simultaneously.  Swap has nearly identical semantics to suit-
   directive-copy except that suit-directive-swap replaces the source
   with the current contents of the destination in an application-
   defined way.  If SUIT_Parameter_Compression_Info or
   SUIT_Parameter_Encryption_Info are present, they must be handled in a
   symmetric way, so that the source is decompressed into the
   destination and the destination is compressed into the source.  The
   source is decrypted into the destination and the destination is
   encrypted into the source. suit-directive-swap is OPTIONAL to
   implement.

7.12.12.

7.13.12.  suit-directive-run

   suit-directive-run directs the manifest processor to transfer
   execution to the current Component Index.  When this is invoked, the
   manifest processor MAY be unloaded and execution continues in the
   Component Index.  Arguments provided to Run are forwarded to the
   executable code located in Component Index, in an application-
   specific way.  For example, this could form the Linux Kernel Command
   Line if booting a linux device.

   If the executable code at Component Index is constructed in such a
   way that it does not unload the manifest processor, then the manifest
   processor may resume execution after the executable completes.  This
   allows the manifest processor to invoke suitable helpers and to
   verify them with image conditions.

   The argument to suit-directive-run is defined in the following CDDL.

   SUIT_Directive_Run_Argument = nil/bstr

7.12.13.

7.13.13.  suit-directive-wait

   suit-directive-wait directs the manifest processor to pause until a
   specified event occurs.  Some possible events include:

   1.  Authorisation

   2.  External Power

   3.  Network availability

   4.  Other Device Firmware Version

   5.  Time

   6.  Time of Day

   7.  Day of Week

   The following CDDL defines the encoding of these events.

SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorisation => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
    => SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
    => uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
    => uint); Days since Sunday

SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Authorisation = int ; priority
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Power = int ; Power Level
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Network = int ; Network State
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
    other-device: bstr,
    other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time = uint ; Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time_Of_Day = uint ; Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Day_Of_Week = uint ; Days since Sunday
7.12.14.
7.13.14.  SUIT_Directive CDDL

   The following CDDL describes SUIT_Directive:

SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-component-index,  uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-dependency-index, uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-sequence,
                    bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-try-each,
                    SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-process-dependency,   nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-parameters,
                    {+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-override-parameters,
                    {+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-fetch,                nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-copy,                 nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run,                  nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-wait,
                    { + SUIT_Wait_Events })
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-with-arguments,   bstr)

SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
    + bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
]

SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorisation => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
    => SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
    => uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
    => uint); Days since Sunday

SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Authorisation = int ; priority
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Power = int ; Power Level
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Network = int ; Network State
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
    other-device: bstr,
    other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time = uint ; Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time_Of_Day = uint ; Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Day_Of_Week = uint ; Days since Sunday
8.  Dependency processing

   Dependencies need careful handling on constrained systems.  A
   dependency tree that is too deep can cause recursive handling to
   overflow stack space.  Systems that parse all dependencies into an
   object tree can easily fill up available memory.  Too many
   dependencies can overrun available storage space.

   The dependency handling system in this document is designed to
   address as many of these problems as possible.

   Dependencies MAY be addressed in one of three ways:

   1.  Iterate by component

   2.  Iterate by manifest

   3.  Out-of-order

   Because each manifest has a list of components and a list of
   components defined by its dependencies, it is possible for the
   manifest processor to handle one component at a time, traversing the
   manifest tree once for each listed component.  This, however consumes
   significant processing power.

   Alternatively, it is possible for a device with sufficient memory to
   accumulate Sunday
7.14.  SUIT_Text_Map

   The SUIT_Text_Map contains all parameters text descriptions needed for all listed component IDs.  This will
   naturally consume more memory, but it allows the device to process
   the manifests in a single pass.

   It this
   manifest.  The text section is expected that typically severable, allowing
   manifests to be distributed without the simplest and most power sensitive devices
   will use option 2, with a fixed maximum number text, since end-nodes do not
   require text.  The meaning of components.

   Advanced devices may make use each field is described below.

   Each section MAY be present.  If present, each section MUST be as
   described.  Negative integer IDs are reserved for application-
   specific text values.

   +----+-----------------------+--------------------------------------+
   | ID | Name                  | Summary                              |
   +----+-----------------------+--------------------------------------+
   | 1  | manifest-description  | Free text description of the Strict Order parameter and
   enable parallel processing         |
   |    |                       | manifest                             |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 2  | update-description    | Free text description of some segments, or it may reorder some
   segments.  To perform parallel processing, once the Strict Order
   parameter is set update  |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 3  | vendor-name           | Free text vendor name                |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 4  | model-name            | Free text model name                 |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 5  | vendor-domain         | The domain used to False, create the device may fork a process for        |
   |    |                       | vendor-id (Section 7.12.9.1)         |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 6  | model-info            | The information used to create the   |
   |    |                       | class-id (Section 7.12.9.1)          |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 7  | component-description | Free text description of each
   command until        |
   |    |                       | component in the Strict Order parameter is returned manifest            |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 8  | json-source           | The JSON-formated document that was  |
   |    |                       | used to create the manifest          |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 9  | yaml-source           | The yaml-formated document that was  |
   |    |                       | used to True or create the
   command sequence ends.  Then, it joins all forked processes before
   continuing processing manifest          |
   |    |                       |                                      |
   | 10 | version-dependencies  | List of commands.  To perform out-of-order
   processing, a similar approach is used, except the device consumes
   all commands after component versions required  |
   |    |                       | by the Strict Order parameter is set to False, then
   it sorts these commands into its preferred order, invokes them all,
   then continues processing.

9. manifest                      |
   +----+-----------------------+--------------------------------------+

8.  Access Control Lists

   To manage permissions in the manifest, there are three models that
   can be used.

   First, the simplest model requires that all manifests are
   authenticated by a single trusted key.  This mode has the advantage
   that only a root manifest needs to be authenticated, since all of its
   dependencies have digests included in the root manifest.

   This simplest model can be extended by adding key delegation without
   much increase in complexity.

   A second model requires an ACL to be presented to the device,
   authenticated by a trusted party or stored on the device.  This ACL
   grants access rights for specific component IDs or component ID
   prefixes to the listed identities or identity groups.  Any identity
   may verify an image digest, but fetching into or fetching from a
   component ID requires approval from the ACL.

   A third model allows a device to provide even more fine-grained
   controls: The ACL lists the component ID or component ID prefix that
   an identity may use, and also lists the commands that the identity
   may use in combination with that component ID.

10.

9.  SUIT digest container

   RFC 8152 [RFC8152] provides containers for signature, MAC, and
   encryption, but no basic digest container.  The container needed for
   a digest requires a type identifier and a container for the raw
   digest data.  Some forms of digest may require additional parameters.
   These can be added following the digest.  This structure is described
   by the following CDDL.

   The algorithms listed are sufficient for verifying integrity of
   Firmware Updates as of this writing, however this may change over
   time.

   SUIT_Digest = [
    suit-digest-algorithm-id : $suit-digest-algorithm-ids,
    suit-digest-bytes : bytes,
    ? suit-digest-parameters : any
   ]

   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha224
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha256
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha384
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha512
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-224
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-256
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-384
   digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-512

   algorithm-id-sha224 = 1
   algorithm-id-sha256 = 2
   algorithm-id-sha384 = 3
   algorithm-id-sha512 = 4
   algorithm-id-sha3-224 = 5
   algorithm-id-sha3-256 = 6
   algorithm-id-sha3-384 = 7
   algorithm-id-sha3-512 = 8

11.

10.  Creating conditional sequences

   For some use cases, it is important to provide a sequence that can
   fail without terminating an update.  For example, a dual-image XIP
   MCU may require an update that can be placed at one of two offsets.
   This has two implications, first, the digest of each offset will be
   different.  Second, the image fetched for each offset will have a
   different URI.  Conditional sequences allow this to be resolved in a
   simple way.

   The following JSON representation of a manifest demonstrates how this
   would be represented.  It assumes that the bootloader and manifest
   processor take care of A/B switching and that the manifest is not
   aware of this distinction.

  {
      "structure-version" : 1,
      "sequence-number" : 7,
      "common" :{
          "components" : [
              [b'0']
          ],
          "common-sequence" : [
              {
                  "directive-set-var" : {
                      "size": 32567
                  },
              },
              {
                  "try-each" : [
                      [
                          {"condition-component-offset" : "<offset A>"},
                          {
                              "directive-set-var": {
                                  "digest" : "<SHA256 A>"
                              }
                          }
                      ],
                      [
                          {"condition-component-offset" : "<offset B>"},
                          {
                              "directive-set-var": {
                                  "digest" : "<SHA256 B>"
                              }
                          }
                      ],
                      [{ "abort" : null }]
                  ]
              }
          ]
      }
      "fetch" : [
          {
              "try-each" : [
                  [
                      {"condition-component-offset" : "<offset A>"},
                      {
                          "directive-set-var": {
                              "uri" : "<URI A>"
                          }
                      }
                  ],
                  [
                      {"condition-component-offset" : "<offset B>"},
                      {
                          "directive-set-var": {
                              "uri" : "<URI B>"
                          }
                      }
                  ],
                  [{ "directive-abort" : null }]
              ]

          },
          "fetch" : null
      ]
  }

12.

11.  Full CDDL

   In order to create a valid SUIT Manifest document the structure of
   the corresponding CBOR message MUST adhere to the following CDDL data
   definition.

SUIT_Outer_Wrapper = {
    suit-authentication-wrapper => bstr .cbor SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper / nil,
    $$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped,
    suit-dependency-resolution  => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    suit-payload-fetch          => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    suit-install                => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    suit-text                   => bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map,
    suit-coswid                 => bstr .cbor concise-software-identity
}

SUIT_Authentication_Wrapper = [ + (
    COSE_Mac_Tagged /
    COSE_Sign_Tagged /
    COSE_Mac0_Tagged /
    COSE_Sign1_Tagged)
]

SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged

$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (suit-manifest  => bstr .cbor SUIT_Manifest)
$$SUIT_Manifest_Wrapped //= (
    suit-manifest-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Wrapper,
    suit-manifest-encrypted       => bstr
)

COSE_Mac_Tagged = any
COSE_Sign_Tagged = any
COSE_Mac0_Tagged = any
COSE_Sign1_Tagged = any
COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = any
COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged = any

SUIT_Digest = [
  suit-digest-algorithm-id : $suit-digest-algorithm-ids,
  suit-digest-bytes : bytes, bstr,
  ? suit-digest-parameters : any
]
; Named Information Hash Algorithm Identifiers
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha224
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha256
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha384
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha512
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-224
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-256
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-384
suit-digest-algorithm-ids /= algorithm-id-sha3-512

algorithm-id-sha224 = 1
algorithm-id-sha256 = 2
algorithm-id-sha384 = 3
algorithm-id-sha512 = 4
algorithm-id-sha3-224 = 5
algorithm-id-sha3-256 = 6
algorithm-id-sha3-384 = 7
algorithm-id-sha3-512 = 8

SUIT_Manifest = {
    suit-manifest-version         => 1,
    suit-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
    ? suit-common                 => bstr .cbor SUIT_Common,
    ? suit-dependency-resolution  => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-payload-fetch          => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-install                => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-validate               => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-load                   => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-run                    => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    ? suit-text                   => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor SUIT_Text_Map SUIT_Digest,
    ? suit-coswid                 => SUIT_Digest / bstr .cbor concise-software-identity concise-software-identity,
}

SUIT_Common = {
    ? suit-dependencies           => bstr .cbor SUIT_Dependencies,
    ? suit-components             => bstr .cbor SUIT_Components,
    ? suit-dependency-components  => bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_References,
    ? suit-common-sequence        => bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
}

SUIT_Dependencies         = [ + SUIT_Dependency ]
SUIT_Components           = [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ]
SUIT_Component_References = [ + SUIT_Component_Reference ]

concise-software-identity = any

SUIT_Dependency = {
    suit-dependency-digest => SUIT_Digest,
    suit-dependency-prefix => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
}

SUIT_Component_Identifier =  [* bstr]

SUIT_Component_Reference = {
    suit-component-identifier => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
    suit-component-dependency-index => uint
}

SUIT_Command_Sequence = [ + (SUIT_Condition // SUIT_Directive // SUIT_Command_Custom) ]

SUIT_Command_Custom = (nint, bstr)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-vendor-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-class-identifier,  nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-device-identifier, nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-match,       nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-image-not-match,   nil)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-use-before,        uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-minimum-battery,   uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-update-authorised, int)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-version,           SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-component-offset,  uint)
SUIT_Condition //= (suit-condition-custom,            bstr)

RFC4122_UUID = bstr .size 16

SUIT_Condition_Version_Argument = [
    suit-condition-version-comparison:
    suit-condition-version-comparison-type: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types,
    suit-condition-version-comparison:
    suit-condition-version-comparison-value: SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value
]
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-greater
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal
SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Types /= suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser

suit-condition-version-comparison-greater = 1
suit-condition-version-comparison-greater-equal = 2
suit-condition-version-comparison-equal = 3
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser-equal = 4
suit-condition-version-comparison-lesser = 5

SUIT_Condition_Version_Comparison_Value = [+int]

SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-component-index,      uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-dependency-index,     uint/bool)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-sequence,             bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-try-each,                 SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-process-dependency,       nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-set-parameters,           {+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-override-parameters,      {+ SUIT_Parameters})
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-fetch,                    nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-copy,                     nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-swap,                     nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run,                      nil)
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-wait,                     { + SUIT_Wait_Events })
SUIT_Directive //= (suit-directive-run-with-arguments,       bstr)

SUIT_Directive_Try_Each_Argument = [
    + bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence,
    nil / bstr .cbor SUIT_Command_Sequence
]

SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-authorisation => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-power => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-network => int)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-other-device-version
    => SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time => uint); Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-time-of-day
    => uint); Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Events //= (suit-wait-event-day-of-week
    => uint); Days since Sunday

SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Authorisation = int ; priority
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Power = int ; Power Level
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Network = int ; Network State
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Other_Device_Version = [
    other-device: bstr,
    other-device-version: [+int]
]
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time = uint ; Timestamp
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Time_Of_Day = uint ; Time of Day (seconds since 00:00:00)
SUIT_Wait_Event_Argument_Day_Of_Week = uint ; Days since Sunday

SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-strict-order => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-coerce-condition-failure (suit-parameter-soft-failure => bool)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-vendor-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-class-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-device-id => bstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri => bstr) tstr)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-encryption-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Encryption_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-compression-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Compression_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-unpack-info => bstr .cbor SUIT_Unpack_Info)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-source-component => bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_Identifier) uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-digest => bstr .cbor SUIT_Digest)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-image-size => uint)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-uri-list => bstr .cbor SUIT_Component_URI_List)
SUIT_Parameters //= (suit-parameter-custom => int/bool/bstr) int/bool/tstr/bstr)

SUIT_Component_URI_List = [ + [priority: int, uri: tstr] ]
SUIT_Priority_Parameter_List = [ + [priority: int, parameters: { + SUIT_Parameters }] ]

SUIT_Encryption_Info = COSE_Encrypt_Tagged/COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged
SUIT_Compression_Info = {
    suit-compression-algorithm => SUIT_Compression_Algorithms SUIT_Compression_Algorithms,
    ? suit-compression-parameters => bstr
}

SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lz4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithms /= SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma

SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_gzip = 1
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_bzip2 = 2
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_deflate = 3
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lz4 = 4
SUIT_Compression_Algorithm_lzma = 7

SUIT_Unpack_Info = {
    suit-unpack-algorithm => SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms,
    ? suit-unpack-parameters => bstr
}

SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithms /= SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf

SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Delta = 1
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Hex = 2
SUIT_Unpack_Algorithm_Elf = 3

SUIT_Text_Map = {int => tstr}

suit-authentication-wrapper = 1
suit-manifest = 2

suit-manifest-encryption-info = 3
suit-manifest-encrypted       = 4
suit-manifest-version = 1
suit-manifest-sequence-number = 2
suit-common = 3
suit-dependency-resolution = 7
suit-payload-fetch = 8
suit-install = 9
suit-validate = 10
suit-load = 11
suit-run = 12
suit-text = 13
suit-coswid = 14

suit-dependencies = 1
suit-components = 2
suit-dependency-components = 3
suit-common-sequence = 4

suit-dependency-digest = 1
suit-dependency-prefix = 2

suit-component-identifier = 1
suit-component-dependency-index = 2

suit-command-custom = nint

suit-condition-vendor-identifier = 1
suit-condition-class-identifier  = 2
suit-condition-image-match       = 3
suit-condition-use-before        = 4
suit-condition-component-offset  = 5
suit-condition-custom = 6

suit-condition-device-identifier        = 24
suit-condition-image-not-match          = 25
suit-condition-minimum-battery          = 26
suit-condition-update-authorised        = 27
suit-condition-version                  = 28

suit-directive-set-component-index      = 12
suit-directive-set-dependency-index     = 13
suit-directive-abort                    = 14
suit-directive-try-each                 = 15
suit-directive-do-each                  = 16 ; TBD
suit-directive-map-filter               = 17 ; TBD
suit-directive-process-dependency       = 18
suit-directive-set-parameters           = 19
suit-directive-override-parameters      = 20
suit-directive-fetch                    = 21
suit-directive-copy                     = 22
suit-directive-run                      = 23

suit-directive-wait                     = 29
suit-directive-run-sequence             = 30
suit-directive-run-with-arguments       = 31
suit-directive-swap                     = 32

suit-wait-event-argument-authorisation = 1
suit-wait-event-power = 2
suit-wait-event-network = 3
suit-wait-event-other-device-version = 4
suit-wait-event-time = 5
suit-wait-event-time-of-day = 6
suit-wait-event-day-of-week = 7
suit-wait-event-authorisation = 8

suit-parameter-strict-order = 1
suit-parameter-coerce-condition-failure
suit-parameter-soft-failure = 2
suit-parameter-vendor-id = 3
suit-parameter-class-id = 4
suit-parameter-device-id = 5
suit-parameter-uri = 6
suit-parameter-encryption-info = 7
suit-parameter-compression-info = 8
suit-parameter-unpack-info = 9
suit-parameter-source-component = 10
suit-parameter-image-digest = 11
suit-parameter-image-size = 12

suit-parameter-uri-list = 24
suit-parameter-uri-list-append = 25
suit-parameter-prioritised-parameters = 26

suit-parameter-custom = nint

suit-compression-algorithm = 1
suit-compression-parameters = 2

suit-unpack-algorithm  = 1
suit-unpack-parameters = 2

13.

suit-text-manifest-description  = 1
suit-text-update-description    = 2
suit-text-vendor-name           = 3
suit-text-model-name            = 4
suit-text-vendor-domain         = 5
suit-text-model-info            = 6
suit-text-component-description = 7
suit-text-manifest-json-source  = 8
suit-text-manifest-yaml-source  = 9
suit-text-version-dependencies  = 10

12.  Examples

   The following examples demonstrate a small subset of the
   functionality of the manifest.  However, despite this, even a simple
   manifest processor can execute most of these manifests.

   None of these

   The examples include authentication.  This is provided via
   RFC 8152 [RFC8152], and is omitted for clarity.

13.1. are signed using the following ECDSA secp256r1 key:

   -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
   MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgApZYjZCUGLM50VBC
   CjYStX+09jGmnyJPrpDLTz/hiXOhRANCAASEloEarguqq9JhVxie7NomvqqL8Rtv
   P+bitWWchdvArTsfKktsCYExwKNtrNHXi9OB3N+wnAUtszmR23M4tKiW
   -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

   The corresponding public key can be used to verify these examples:

   -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
   MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEhJaBGq4LqqvSYVcYnuzaJr6qi/Eb
   bz/m4rVlnIXbwK07HypLbAmBMcCjbazR14vTgdzfsJwFLbM5kdtzOLSolg==
   -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

12.1.  Example 0:

   Secure boot only.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

   {
       "structure-version": 1,
       "sequence-number": 1,
       "run-image": [
           { "directive-set-component": 0 },
           { "condition-image": null },
           { "directive-run": null }
       ],
       "common": {
           "common-sequence": [
               {
                   "directive-set-var": {
                       "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                                 "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                       "size": 34768
                   }
               }
           ],
           "components": [
               [
                   "Flash",
                   78848
               ]
           ]
       }
   }

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658405e5f'
                        h'b84f9e9729a4d74096ad485921e842b4e320cc3fa177'
                        h'8c2807377e1969e42449b3261109d273df4b3ceb9a61'
                        h'06a46f0a7938de9a8441ab515b82463b39ee', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840ebec'
                        h'b66cbecb19dcedacf8459c1a22a1453781ba98d8ffb9'
                        h'd4e2912f29d23bac5ae3d51f1ff0c1b1df05e207ca17'
                        h'483a57ede914cf826b73599137881c8364c8',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a40101020103583ea2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'582c8213a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                     h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c47'
                     h'860c0003f617f6' h'a401010201035840a2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'582e8213a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                     h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                     h'0c47860c0003f617f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 1,
        / common / 3 : h'a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582c8213a20b82'
                       h'02582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                       h'89abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' h'a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582e8213a20b58'
                       h'248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123'
                       h'456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'818245466c61736843003401' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8213a20b820258200011223344556677'
                                    h'8899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef'
                                    h'fedcba98765432100c1987d0' h'8213a20b582482025820001122334455'
                                    h'66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                                    h'cdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
            ],
        },
        / run-image / 12 : h'860c0003f617f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 85 87

   Outer:

a201f602584fa40101020103583ea2024c818245466c6173684300340104582c8213a20b
8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
0c1987d00c47860c0003f617f6

a201f6025851a401010201035840a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582e8213a20b
58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654
32100c1987d00c47860c0003f617f6
   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 170 172

   Signed Outer:

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658405e5fb84f9e9729a4d74096ad
485921e842b4e320cc3fa1778c2807377e1969e42449b3261109d273df4b3ceb9a6106a4
6f0a7938de9a8441ab515b82463b39ee02584fa40101020103583ea2024c818245466c61
73684300340104582c8213a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345
6789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c47860c0003f617f6

13.2.

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840ebecb66cbecb19dcedacf845
9c1a22a1453781ba98d8ffb9d4e2912f29d23bac5ae3d51f1ff0c1b1df05e207ca17483a
57ede914cf826b73599137881c8364c8025851a401010201035840a2024c818245466c61
73684300340104582e8213a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01
23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c47860c0003f617f6

12.2.  Example 1:

   Simultaneous download and installation of payload.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

   {
       "structure-version": 1,
       "sequence-number": 2,
       "apply-image": [
           { "directive-set-component": 0 },
           {
               "directive-set-var": {
                   "uri": "http://example.com/file.bin"
               }
           },
           { "directive-fetch": null }
       ],
       "common": {
           "common-sequence": [
               {
                   "directive-set-var": {
                       "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                                 "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                       "size": 34768
                   }
               }
           ],
           "components": [
               [
                   "Flash",
                   78848
               ]
           ]
       }
   }

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658403d4e'
                        h'9ff1ca8803a81ae1e2b13df28c527a4d6975e860035e'
                        h'e9a88576b5e6f2bf12f33017e88157bcff58d712e7f8'
                        h'010821ae0f82f78eb681b61697345e655cf4', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840b531'
                        h'42132ebddbf0c523378d16fc904badc56553e41c6713'
                        h'b758dbd39f47effec5e7a583c418129f456d0aaaa3c4'
                        h'3fe06dd30d664b709edf0ad05b70dad38bc2',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a40101020203583ea2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'582c8213a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                     h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00958'
                     h'25860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e'
                     h'636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' h'a401010202035840a2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'582e8213a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                     h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                     h'095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c'
                     h'652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 2,
        / common / 3 : h'a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582c8213a20b82'
                       h'02582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                       h'89abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' h'a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582e8213a20b58'
                       h'248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123'
                       h'456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'818245466c61736843003401' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8213a20b820258200011223344556677'
                                    h'8899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef'
                                    h'fedcba98765432100c1987d0' h'8213a20b582482025820001122334455'
                                    h'66778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                                    h'cdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file.bin,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 116 118

   Outer:

a201f602586ea40101020203583ea2024c818245466c6173684300340104582c8213a20b
8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
0c1987d0095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6669
6c652e62696e15f6

a201f6025870a401010202035840a2024c818245466c6173684300340104582e8213a20b
58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654
32100c1987d0095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f
66696c652e62696e15f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 201 203

   Signed Outer:

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658403d4e9ff1ca8803a81ae1e2b1
3df28c527a4d6975e860035ee9a88576b5e6f2bf12f33017e88157bcff58d712e7f80108
21ae0f82f78eb681b61697345e655cf402586ea40101020203583ea2024c818245466c61
73684300340104582c8213a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345
6789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f65
78616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6

13.3.

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840b53142132ebddbf0c523378d
16fc904badc56553e41c6713b758dbd39f47effec5e7a583c418129f456d0aaaa3c43fe0
6dd30d664b709edf0ad05b70dad38bc2025870a401010202035840a2024c818245466c61
73684300340104582e8213a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01
23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f
2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6

12.3.  Example 2:

   Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, and
   secure boot.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

{
    "structure-version": 1,
    "sequence-number": 3,
    "common": {
        "common-sequence": [
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "vendor-id": "fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-be9d-e663e4d41ffe",
                    "class-id": "1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45",
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "condition-vendor-id": null },
            { "condition-class-id": null }
        ],
        "components": [
            [
                "Flash",
                78848
            ]
        ]
    },
    "apply-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "run-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-run": null }
    ]
}

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840e637'
                        h'5a57596cb4a35a90a30b4099bccf7e2352a9829bf7bb'
                        h'1b56cfc0e713955be4fd360e366c94e32dfc344695b1'
                        h'20b2c59732b2e3f079fc2693c5a459d9ce44', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658400014'
                        h'750c013f7e1cdbec6f14b99b49195e081d1030508a6b'
                        h'8d271bd99dfb382a7767dc45f20c9943ed22a1eaac9d'
                        h'07a041ec1acfc10ad7e45e6424629ff3e3e5',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a501010203035866a2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'58548613a40350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04'
                     h'501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b820258200011'
                     h'2233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedc'
                     h'ba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a10678'
                     h'1b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65'
                     h'2e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6' h'a501010203035868a2024c818245466c6173684300340104'
                     h'58568613a40350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04'
                     h'501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b582482025820'
                     h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdef'
                     h'fedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a1'
                     h'06781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f6669'
                     h'6c652e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 3,
        / common / 3 : h'a2024c818245466c617368430034010458548613a40350' h'a2024c818245466c617368430034010458568613a40350'
                       h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425'
                       h'695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b8202582000112233445566'
                       h'778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                       h'32100c1987d001f602f6'
                       h'695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b5824820258200011223344'
                       h'5566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                       h'765432100c1987d001f602f6' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'818245466c61736843003401' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8613a40350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6'
                                    h'63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450b8202582000112233'
                                    h'445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                                    h'89abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                                    h'01f602f6'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450b5824820258200011'
                                    h'2233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123'
                                    h'456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c19'
                                    h'87d001f602f6' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / vendor-id / 3 : h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                                      h'fe',
                    / class-id / 4 : h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45',
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / condition-vendor-id / 1, None,
                / condition-class-id / 2, None,
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file.bin,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / run-image / 12 : h'860c0003f617f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 165 167

   Outer:

a201f602589fa501010203035866a2024c818245466c617368430034010458548613a403

a201f60258a1a501010203035868a2024c818245466c617368430034010458568613a403
50fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b
8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210
0c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f
6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6
58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654
32100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e
636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 250 252

   Signed Outer:

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840e6375a57596cb4a35a90a30b
4099bccf7e2352a9829bf7bb1b56cfc0e713955be4fd360e366c94e32dfc344695b120b2
c59732b2e3f079fc2693c5a459d9ce4402589fa501010203035866a2024c818245466c61
7368430034010458548613a40350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af14
25695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345
6789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b68747470
3a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6

13.4.

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658400014750c013f7e1cdbec6f14
b99b49195e081d1030508a6b8d271bd99dfb382a7767dc45f20c9943ed22a1eaac9d07a0
41ec1acfc10ad7e45e6424629ff3e3e50258a1a501010203035868a2024c818245466c61
7368430034010458568613a40350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af14
25695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01
23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b6874
74703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c47860c0003f617f6

12.4.  Example 3:

   Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, load from
   external storage, and secure boot.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

{
    "structure-version": 1,
    "sequence-number": 4,
    "common": {
        "common-sequence": [
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "vendor-id": "fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-be9d-e663e4d41ffe",
                    "class-id": "1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45"
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 0 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 1 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "condition-vendor-id": null },
            { "condition-class-id": null }
        ],
        "components": [
            [
                "Flash",
                78848
            ],
            [
                "RAM",
                1024
            ]
        ]
    },
    "apply-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "run-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "source-index": 0
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-run": null }
    ]
}

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840ef4b'
                        h'399c55131a51bebafb46da6e6b79c59417fdefea7b87'
                        h'e4234bf8f978094e3092c8506d8a912fbacaec5ba365'
                        h'24ae0e4bb1aa14197e4d0afe10ba47e29e5a', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f6584070eb'
                        h'70f2552533fc954e934f50f42bdd9b6f7d4fd7e11463'
                        h'6b9cdbef2a065f9640243a7857f66c4389aea906c4f3'
                        h'b45150c8e55461e9bfda945904033fc70a84',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a50101020403589fa20254828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'4352414d4200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe' h'a5010102040358a3a20254828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'4352414d4200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe'
                     h'9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab'
                     h'450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                     h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c01'
                     h'13a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01'
                     h'23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f609'
                     h'5825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c65'
                     h'2e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c518e0c0003f60c01'
                     h'13a10a0015f603f617f6'
                     h'450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                     h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                     h'0c0113a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbcc'
                     h'ddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001'
                     h'f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f657861'
                     h'6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c518e0c00'
                     h'03f60c0113a10a0015f603f617f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 4,
        / common / 3 : h'a20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d420004'
                       h'0458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                       h'0458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                       h'fe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a2'
                       h'0b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123'
                       h'456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b'
                       h'8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff012345'
                       h'6789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6'
                       h'0b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                       h'0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113'
                       h'a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                       h'ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f6'
                       h'02f6' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200'
                               h'04' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
                [h'52414d', h'0004'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6'
                                    h'63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b82025820'
                                    h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                                    h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                                    h'0c1987d00c0113a20b82025820001122'
                                    h'33445566778899aabbccddeeff012345'
                                    h'6789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987'
                                    h'd001f602f6'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202'
                                    h'582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                                    h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                                    h'32100c1987d00c0113a20b5824820258'
                                    h'2000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                                    h'ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432'
                                    h'100c1987d001f602f6' \ [

                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / vendor-id / 3 : h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                                      h'fe',
                    / class-id / 4 : h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45',
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 0,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 1,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / condition-vendor-id / 1, None,
                / condition-class-id / 2, None,
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file.bin,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / run-image / 12 : h'8e0c0003f60c0113a10a0015f603f617f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / source-component / 10 : 0,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}
   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 232 236

   Outer:

a201f60258e2a50101020403589fa20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200
040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf
429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567
89abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b8202582000112233445566778899aa
bbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013
a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60c518e
0c0003f60c0113a10a0015f603f617f6

a201f60258e6a5010102040358a3a20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200
040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf
429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123
456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b58248202582000112233445566
778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d001f602f6095825
860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15
f60c518e0c0003f60c0113a10a0015f603f617f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 317 321

   Signed Outer:
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13.5.
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12.5.  Example 4:

   Compatibility test, simultaneous download and installation, load and
   decompress from external storage, and secure boot.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

{
    "structure-version": 1,
    "sequence-number": 5,
    "common": {
        "common-sequence": [
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "vendor-id": "fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-be9d-e663e4d41ffe",
                    "class-id": "1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45"
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 0 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 1 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210"
                              "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "condition-vendor-id": null },
            { "condition-class-id": null }
        ],
        "components": [
            [
                "Flash",
                78848
            ],
            [
                "RAM",
                1024
            ]
        ]
    },
    "apply-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "load-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "source-index": 0,
                "compression-info": {
                    "algorithm": "gzip"
                }
            }
        },
        { "directive-copy": null }

    ],
    "run-image": [
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-run": null }
    ]
}

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840e90d'
                        h'ab6e502bad8132adf86b4d78defaebac64fa6c6b2882'
                        h'd12b36f492b14ce75819ed3524de4d66ddfd5e1d80a5'
                        h'984004c1ac9b003b2da32589583a93c541dd', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658403491'
                        h'5619c1ef02b4a7ffbbb69083e8b3fb82febd9ecd6feb'
                        h'f666d700fb981b208ec6d3df8735f36fd4a0a84e0189'
                        h'43ef80e25f57fc130a43e57c6634f337b7fa',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a60101020503589fa20254828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'4352414d4200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe' h'a6010102050358a3a20254828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'4352414d4200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe'
                     h'9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab'
                     h'450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                     h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c01'
                     h'13a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000'
                     h'112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f609'
                     h'5825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c65'
                     h'2e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528a0c0003f60c01'
                     h'13a20843a101010a0016f60c458403f617f6'
                     h'450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                     h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                     h'0c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba9876'
                     h'54321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001'
                     h'f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f657861'
                     h'6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528a0c00'
                     h'03f60c0113a20843a101010a0016f60c458403f617f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 5,
        / common / 3 : h'a20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d420004'
                       h'0458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                       h'0458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                       h'fe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a2'
                       h'0b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123'
                       h'456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b'
                       h'820258200123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122'
                       h'33445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f6'
                       h'0b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                       h'0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113'
                       h'a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432'
                       h'1000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f6'
                       h'02f6' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200'
                               h'04' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
                [h'52414d', h'0004'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6'
                                    h'63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b82025820'
                                    h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                                    h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                                    h'0c1987d00c0113a20b82025820012345'
                                    h'6789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122'
                                    h'33445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987'
                                    h'd001f602f6'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202'
                                    h'582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                                    h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                                    h'32100c1987d00c0113a20b5824820258'
                                    h'200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432'
                                    h'1000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                                    h'ff0c1987d001f602f6' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / vendor-id / 3 : h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                                      h'fe',
                    / class-id / 4 : h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45',
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 0,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' ] h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768 34768,
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 1,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'7654321000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122334455'
                        h'66778899aabbccddeeff' h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233'
                             h'445566778899aabbccddeeff' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / condition-vendor-id / 1, None,
                / condition-class-id / 2, None,
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file.bin,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / load-image / 11 : h'8a0c0003f60c0113a20843a101010a0016f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / compression-info / 8 : h'a10101',
                / source-component / 10 : 0,
            },
            / copy / 22, None,
        ],
        / run-image / 12 : h'8403f617f6' \ [
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 240 244

   Outer:

a201f60258eaa60101020503589fa20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200
040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf
429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567
89abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba
987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013
a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528a
0c0003f60c0113a20843a101010a0016f60c458403f617f6

a201f60258eea6010102050358a3a20254828245466c61736843003401824352414d4200
040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf
429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123
456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcd
effedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f6095825
860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15
f60b528a0c0003f60c0113a20843a101010a0016f60c458403f617f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 325 329

   Signed Outer:

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840e90dab6e502bad8132adf86b
4d78defaebac64fa6c6b2882d12b36f492b14ce75819ed3524de4d66ddfd5e1d80a59840
04c1ac9b003b2da32589583a93c541dd0258eaa60101020503589fa20254828245466c61
736843003401824352414d4200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d4
1ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566
778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b8202
58200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c19
87d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f
66696c652e62696e15f60b528a0c0003f60c0113a20843a101010a0016f60c458403f617
f6

13.6.
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12.6.  Example 5:

   Compatibility test, download, installation, and secure boot.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

{
    "structure-version": 1,
    "sequence-number": 6,
    "common": {
        "common-sequence": [
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "vendor-id": "fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-be9d-e663e4d41ffe",
                    "class-id": "1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45"

                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 0 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 1 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210"
                              "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "condition-vendor-id": null },
            { "condition-class-id": null }
        ],
        "components": [
            [
                "ext-Flash",
                78848
            ],
            [
                "Flash",
                1024
            ]
        ]
    },
    "apply-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "load-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        { "condition-not-image": null },
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "source-index": 0
            }
        },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "run-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-run": null }
    ]
}

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658402282'
                        h'c1e7770b1806afb0cf78e74003af39166b9db14b0a7c'
                        h'172d18598c8be16e3cec48770fb8471675a5b3bab05a'
                        h'22e370a03320a7346f252f9629c3417ed153', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840a516'
                        h'466c62602aa017422f23d1469339e40c5cf06f9090da'
                        h'09bd9939ecfc4c1ffe3e6ce50e0620fe9948f76552da'
                        h'703a4c0bf2532d073be2d1f215ec83483f46',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a6010102060358a2a202578282467b1b4595ab2143003401'
                     h'8245466c6173684200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad' h'a6010102060358a6a202578282467b1b4595ab2143003401'
                     h'8245466c6173684200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad'
                     h'5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d'
                     h'51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aa'
                     h'bbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987'
                     h'd00c0113a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                     h'321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f6'
                     h'02f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d'
                     h'706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528e0c0118'
                     h'19f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f60c47860c0103f617f6'
                     h'51f2ab450c0013a20b582482025820001122334455667788'
                     h'99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c'
                     h'1987d00c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedc'
                     h'ba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c19'
                     h'87d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f'
                     h'6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b52'
                     h'8e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f60c47860c0103'
                     h'f617f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 6,
        / common / 3 : h'a202578282467b1b4595ab21430034018245466c617368'
                       h'4200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663'
                       h'4200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663'
                       h'e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c'
                       h'0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                       h'ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c01'
                       h'13a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                       h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602'
                       h'f6'
                       h'0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbcc'
                       h'ddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                       h'0c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                       h'7654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987'
                       h'd001f602f6' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'8282467b1b4595ab21430034018245466c6173'
                               h'68420004' \
            [
                [h'7b1b4595ab21', h'003401'],
                [h'466c617368', h'0004'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6'
                                    h'63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b82025820'
                                    h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                                    h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                                    h'0c1987d00c0113a20b82025820012345'
                                    h'6789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122'
                                    h'33445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987'
                                    h'd001f602f6'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202'
                                    h'582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                                    h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                                    h'32100c1987d00c0113a20b5824820258'
                                    h'200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432'
                                    h'1000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                                    h'ff0c1987d001f602f6' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / vendor-id / 3 : h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                                      h'fe',
                    / class-id / 4 : h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45',
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 0,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 1,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'7654321000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122334455'
                        h'66778899aabbccddeeff' h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233'
                             h'445566778899aabbccddeeff' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / condition-vendor-id / 1, None,
                / condition-class-id / 2, None,
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file.bin,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / load-image / 11 : h'8e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / condition-not-image / 25, None,
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / source-component / 10 : 0,
            },
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / run-image / 12 : h'860c0103f617f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 245 249

   Outer:

a201f60258efa6010102060358a2a202578282467b1b4595ab21430034018245466c6173
684200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af142569
5e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01
23456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b820258200123456789abcdef
fedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f609582586
0c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f6
0b528e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f60c47860c0103f617f6

a201f60258f3a6010102060358a6a202578282467b1b4595ab21430034018245466c6173
684200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af142569
5e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccddee
ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b58248202582001234567
89abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f6
095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62
696e15f60b528e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f60c47860c0103f617f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 330 334

   Signed Outer:

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658402282c1e7770b1806afb0cf78
e74003af39166b9db14b0a7c172d18598c8be16e3cec48770fb8471675a5b3bab05a22e3
70a03320a7346f252f9629c3417ed1530258efa6010102060358a2a202578282467b1b45
95ab21430034018245466c6173684200040458858e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6
63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233
445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a2
0b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddee
ff0c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e63
6f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015f60c4786
0c0103f617f6

13.7.

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840a516466c62602aa017422f23
d1469339e40c5cf06f9090da09bd9939ecfc4c1ffe3e6ce50e0620fe9948f76552da703a
4c0bf2532d073be2d1f215ec83483f460258f3a6010102060358a6a202578282467b1b45
95ab21430034018245466c6173684200040458898e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6
63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b5824820258200011
2233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c01
13a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aa
bbccddeeff0c1987d001f602f6095825860c0013a106781b687474703a2f2f6578616d70
6c652e636f6d2f66696c652e62696e15f60b528e0c011819f60c0003f60c0113a10a0015
f60c47860c0103f617f6

12.7.  Example 6:

   Compatibility test, 2 images, simultaneous download and installation,
   and secure boot.

   The following JSON shows the intended behaviour of the manifest.

{
    "structure-version": 1,
    "sequence-number": 7,
    "common": {
        "common-sequence": [
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "vendor-id": "fa6b4a53-d5ad-5fdf-be9d-e663e4d41ffe",
                    "class-id": "1492af14-2569-5e48-bf42-9b2d51f2ab45"
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 0 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
                              "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210",
                    "size": 34768
                }
            },
            { "directive-set-component": 1 },
            {
                "directive-set-var": {
                    "digest": "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210"
                              "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff",
                    "size": 76834
                }
            },
            { "condition-vendor-id": null },
            { "condition-class-id": null }
        ],
        "components": [
            [
                "Flash",
                78848
            ],
            [
                "Flash",
                132096
            ]
        ]
    },
    "apply-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file1.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-set-component": 1 },
        {
            "directive-set-var": {
                "uri": "http://example.com/file2.bin"
            }
        },
        { "directive-set-component": true },
        { "directive-fetch": null }
    ],
    "run-image": [
        { "directive-set-component": true },
        { "condition-image": null },
        { "directive-set-component": 0 },
        { "directive-run": null }
    ]
}

   Converted into the SUIT manifest, this produces:

{
    / auth object / 1 : h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f65840d00c'
                        h'd62be643247904621f2956b11b97fcbcd22f87701dd9'
                        h'008e949f8c801f55d7095b545d6db0060bd47c5f78ee'
                        h'5cb1fea17c875a36a599aec4e8b876cfdae7', h'd28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658400d44'
                        h'c766566a88c5bbe61b544edd14effa7d53c9a6d43221'
                        h'99c6285490460b910c8e96c6a1065cc1be9cfa438f7b'
                        h'eeaffa9922e2ae440d6c8d0b9cb26bed2ffe',
    / manifest / 2 : h'a5010102070358a4a20257828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'45466c617368430004020458878e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad' h'a5010102070358a8a20257828245466c6173684300340182'
                     h'45466c6173684300040204588b8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad'
                     h'5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d'
                     h'51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aa'
                     h'bbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987'
                     h'd00c0113a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                     h'321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00012c22'
                     h'01f602f609584b8c0c0013a106781c687474703a2f2f6578'
                     h'616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e0c0113a106'
                     h'781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c'
                     h'65322e62696e0cf515f60c49880cf503f60c0017f6'
                     h'51f2ab450c0013a20b582482025820001122334455667788'
                     h'99aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c'
                     h'1987d00c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedc'
                     h'ba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a'
                     h'00012c2201f602f609584b8c0c0013a106781c687474703a'
                     h'2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e0c'
                     h'0113a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d'
                     h'2f66696c65322e62696e0cf515f60c49880cf503f60c0017'
                     h'f6' \
    {
        / structure-version / 1 : 1,
        / sequence-number / 2 : 7,
        / common / 3 : h'a20257828245466c617368430034018245466c61736843'
                       h'0004020458878e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663'
                       h'00040204588b8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663'
                       h'e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c'
                       h'0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                       h'ff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c01'
                       h'13a20b820258200123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                       h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00012c2201'
                       h'f602f6'
                       h'0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbcc'
                       h'ddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d0'
                       h'0c0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                       h'7654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00'
                       h'012c2201f602f6' \ {
            / components / 2 : h'828245466c617368430034018245466c617368'
                               h'43000402' \
            [
                [h'466c617368', h'003401'],
                [h'466c617368', h'000402'],
            ],
            / common-sequence / 4 : h'8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de6'
                                    h'63e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b82025820'
                                    h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
                                    h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210'
                                    h'0c1987d00c0113a20b82025820012345'
                                    h'6789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122'
                                    h'33445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00'
                                    h'012c2201f602f6'
                                    h'429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202'
                                    h'582000112233445566778899aabbccdd'
                                    h'eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba987654'
                                    h'32100c1987d00c0113a20b5824820258'
                                    h'200123456789abcdeffedcba98765432'
                                    h'1000112233445566778899aabbccddee'
                                    h'ff0c1a00012c2201f602f6' \ [
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / vendor-id / 3 : h'fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41f'
                                      h'fe',
                    / class-id / 4 : h'1492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab45',
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 0,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'8202582000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'76543210' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789ab'
                        h'cdeffedcba9876543210' h'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff01234567'
                             h'89abcdeffedcba9876543210' ],
                    / size / 12 : 34768,
                },
                / set-component-index / 12, 1,
                / set-vars / 19, {
                    / digest / 11 : h'820258200123456789abcdeffedcba98'
                                    h'7654321000112233445566778899aabb'
                                    h'ccddeeff' \
                        [ 2,
                        h'0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210001122334455'
                        h'66778899aabbccddeeff' h'0123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233'
                             h'445566778899aabbccddeeff' ],
                    / size / 12 : 76834,
                },
                / condition-vendor-id / 1, None,
                / condition-class-id / 2, None,
            ],
        },
        / apply-image / 9 : h'8c0c0013a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d70'
                            h'6c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e0c0113a1'
                            h'06781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f'
                            h'6d2f66696c65322e62696e0cf515f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file1.bin http://example.com/file1.bin,

            },
            / set-component-index / 12, 1,
            / set-vars / 19, {
                / uri / 6 : http://example.com/file2.bin http://example.com/file2.bin,
            },
            / set-component-index / 12, True,
            / fetch / 21, None,
        ],
        / run-image / 12 : h'880cf503f60c0017f6' \ [
            / set-component-index / 12, True,
            / condition-image / 3, None,
            / set-component-index / 12, 0,
            / run / 23, None,
        ],
    }
}

   Total size of outer wrapper without COSE authentication object: 268 272

   Outer:

a201f602590105a5010102070358a4a20257828245466c617368430034018245466c6173
68430004020458878e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425
695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b8202582000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b820258200123456789abcd
effedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00012c2201f602f609
584b8c0c0013a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62
696e0c0113a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e6269
6e0cf515f60c49880cf503f60c0017f6

a201f602590109a5010102070358a8a20257828245466c617368430034018245466c6173
684300040204588b8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9de663e4d41ffe04501492af1425
695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202582000112233445566778899aabbccdd
eeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c0113a20b582482025820012345
6789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0c1a00012c2201
f602f609584b8c0c0013a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c
65312e62696e0c0113a106781c687474703a2f2f6578616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65
322e62696e0cf515f60c49880cf503f60c0017f6

   Total size of outer wrapper with COSE authentication object: 353 357

   Signed Outer:
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14.

a2015854d28443a10126a1044874657374206b6579f658400d44c766566a88c5bbe61b54
4edd14effa7d53c9a6d4322199c6285490460b910c8e96c6a1065cc1be9cfa438f7beeaf
fa9922e2ae440d6c8d0b9cb26bed2ffe02590109a5010102070358a8a20257828245466c
617368430034018245466c6173684300040204588b8e13a20350fa6b4a53d5ad5fdfbe9d
e663e4d41ffe04501492af1425695e48bf429b2d51f2ab450c0013a20b58248202582000
112233445566778899aabbccddeeff0123456789abcdeffedcba98765432100c1987d00c
0113a20b5824820258200123456789abcdeffedcba987654321000112233445566778899
aabbccddeeff0c1a00012c2201f602f609584b8c0c0013a106781c687474703a2f2f6578
616d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65312e62696e0c0113a106781c687474703a2f2f657861
6d706c652e636f6d2f66696c65322e62696e0cf515f60c49880cf503f60c0017f6
13.  IANA Considerations

   Several registries will be required for:

   -  standard Commands

   -  standard Parameters

   -  standard Algorithm identifiers

   -  standard text values

15.

14.  Security Considerations

   This document is about a manifest format describing and protecting
   firmware images and as such it is part of a larger solution for
   offering a standardized way of delivering firmware updates to IoT
   devices.  A more detailed discussion about security can be found in
   the architecture document [Architecture] [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] and in [Information].

16.
   [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model].

15.  Mailing List Information

   The discussion list for this document is located at the e-mail
   address suit@ietf.org [1].  Information on the group and information
   on how to subscribe to the list is at
   https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit [2]

   Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
   archive/web/suit/current/index.html [3]

17.

16.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank the following persons for their support in
   designing this mechanism:

   -  Milosch Meriac

   -  Geraint Luff

   -  Dan Ros

   -  John-Paul Stanford

   -  Hugo Vincent

   -  Carsten Bormann
   -  Oeyvind Roenningstad

   -  Frank Audun Kvamtroe

   -  Krzysztof Chru&#347;ci&#324;ski

   -  Andrzej Puzdrowski

   -  Michael Richardson

   -  David Brown

   -  Emmanuel Baccelli

18.

17.  References

18.1.

17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

18.2.

17.2.  Informative References

   [Architecture]

   [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]
              Moran, B., Meriac, M., Tschofenig, H., and D. Brown, "A
              Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things
              Devices", January 2019,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-suit-architecture-
              02>.

   [Information] draft-ietf-suit-architecture-07 (work in
              progress), October 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-suit-information-model]
              Moran, B., "Firmware Updates for Internet of Things
              Devices - An Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "An
              Information Model for Manifests", January
              2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-suit-
              information-model-02>.

   [RFC6920]  Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,
              Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with
              Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.

18.3. Firmware Updates in IoT Devices",
              draft-ietf-suit-information-model-04 (work in progress),
              October 2019.

17.3.  URIs

   [1] mailto:suit@ietf.org

   [2] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit

   [3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/suit/current/index.html

Authors' Addresses

   Brendan Moran
   Arm Limited

   EMail: Brendan.Moran@arm.com

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Arm Limited

   EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com

   Henk Birkholz
   Fraunhofer SIT

   EMail: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de