draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16.txt   rfc8224.txt 
Network Working Group J. Peterson Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Peterson
Internet-Draft NeuStar Request for Comments: 8224 NeuStar
Obsoletes: 4474 (if approved) C. Jennings Obsoletes: 4474 C. Jennings
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Category: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: August 13, 2017 E. Rescorla ISSN: 2070-1721 E. Rescorla
RTFM, Inc. RTFM, Inc.
C. Wendt C. Wendt
Comcast Comcast
February 9, 2017 February 2018
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol Authenticated Identity Management
(SIP) in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16.txt
Abstract Abstract
The baseline security mechanisms in the Session Initiation Protocol The baseline security mechanisms in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) are inadequate for cryptographically assuring the identity of (SIP) are inadequate for cryptographically assuring the identity of
the end users that originate SIP requests, especially in an the end users that originate SIP requests, especially in an
interdomain context. This document defines a mechanism for securely interdomain context. This document defines a mechanism for securely
identifying originators of SIP requests. It does so by defining a identifying originators of SIP requests. It does so by defining a
SIP header field for conveying a signature used for validating the SIP header field for conveying a signature used for validating the
identity, and for conveying a reference to the credentials of the identity and for conveying a reference to the credentials of the
signer. signer.
Status of This Memo This document obsoletes RFC 4474.
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the Status of This Memo
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Architectural Overview ..........................................5
4. Identity Header Field Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Identity Header Field Syntax ....................................7
4.1. PASSporT Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. PASSporT Construction ......................................8
4.1.1. Example Full and Compact Forms of PASSporT in 4.1.1. Example Full and Compact Forms of PASSporT
Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 in Identity ........................................10
5. Example of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Example of Operations ..........................................11
5.1. Example Identity Header Construction . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Example Identity Header Construction ......................13
6. Signature Generation and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Signature Generation and Validation ............................14
6.1. Authentication Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Authentication Service Behavior ...........................14
6.1.1. Handling Repairable Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.1.1. Handling Repairable Errors .........................16
6.2. Verifier Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. Verifier Behavior .........................................17
6.2.1. Authorization of Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.2.1. Authorization of Requests ..........................19
6.2.2. Failure Response Codes Sent by a Verification Service 18 6.2.2. Failure Response Codes Sent by a
6.2.3. Handling Retried Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Verification Service ...............................19
6.2.4. Handling the full form of PASSporT . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2.3. Handling Retried Requests ..........................21
7. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.2.4. Handling the Full Form of PASSporT .................21
7.1. Credential Use by the Authentication Service . . . . . . 21 7. Credentials ....................................................22
7.2. Credential Use by the Verification Service . . . . . . . 22 7.1. Credential Use by the Authentication Service ..............22
7.3. 'info' parameter URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2. Credential Use by the Verification Service ................23
7.4. Credential System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.3. "info" Parameter URIs .....................................24
8. Identity Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.4. Credential System Requirements ............................25
8.1. Differentiating Telephone Numbers from URIs . . . . . . . 25 8. Identity Types .................................................26
8.2. Authority for Telephone Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8.1. Differentiating Telephone Numbers from URIs ...............26
8.3. Telephone Number Canonicalization Procedures . . . . . . 26 8.2. Authority for Telephone Numbers ...........................27
8.4. Authority for Domain Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 8.3. Telephone Number Canonicalization Procedures ..............28
8.5. URI Normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.4. Authority for Domain Names ................................29
9. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.5. URI Normalization .........................................30
10. Backwards Compatibility with RFC4474 . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 9. Extensibility ..................................................31
11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10. Backwards Compatibility with RFC 4474 .........................32
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11. Privacy Considerations ........................................32
12.1. Protected Request Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 12. Security Considerations .......................................34
12.1.1. Protection of the To Header and Retargeting . . . . 35 12.1. Protected Request Fields .................................34
12.2. Unprotected Request Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 12.1.1. Protection of the To Header and Retargeting .......36
12.3. Malicious Removal of Identity Headers . . . . . . . . . 36 12.2. Unprotected Request Fields ...............................37
12.4. Securing the Connection to the Authentication Service . 36 12.3. Malicious Removal of Identity Headers ....................37
12.5. Authorization and Transitional Strategies . . . . . . . 37 12.4. Securing the Connection to the Authentication Service ....38
12.6. Display-Names and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 12.5. Authorization and Transitional Strategies ................39
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 12.6. Display-Names and Identity ...............................40
13.1. SIP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13. IANA Considerations ...........................................40
13.2. SIP Response Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13.1. SIP Header Fields ........................................40
13.3. Identity-Info Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13.2. SIP Response Codes .......................................41
13.4. Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values . . . . . . . . 40 13.3. Identity-Info Parameters .................................41
14. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 13.4. Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values .................41
15. Changes from RFC4474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 14. Changes from RFC 4474 .........................................41
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 15. References ....................................................42
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 15.1. Normative References .....................................42
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 15.2. Informative References ...................................43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Acknowledgments ...................................................46
Authors' Addresses ................................................46
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document provides enhancements to the existing mechanisms for This document provides enhancements to the existing mechanisms for
authenticated identity management in the Session Initiation Protocol authenticated identity management in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP, [RFC3261]). An identity, for the purposes of this document, is (SIP) [RFC3261]. An identity, for the purposes of this document, is
defined as either a canonical address-of-record (AoR) SIP URI defined as either
employed to reach a user (such as 'sip:alice@atlanta.example.com'),
or a telephone number, which commonly appears in either a TEL URI o a canonical address-of-record (AoR) SIP URI employed to reach a
[RFC3966] or as the user portion of a SIP URI. user (such as "sip:alice@atlanta.example.com") or
o a telephone number, which commonly appears either in a tel URI
[RFC3966] or as the user portion of a SIP URI.
[RFC3261] specifies several places within a SIP request where users [RFC3261] specifies several places within a SIP request where users
can express an identity for themselves, most prominently the user- can express an identity for themselves, most prominently the
populated From header field. However, in the absence of some sort of user-populated From header field. However, in the absence of some
cryptographic authentication mechanism, the recipient of a SIP sort of cryptographic authentication mechanism, the recipient of a
request has no way to verify that the From header field has been SIP request has no way to verify that the From header field has been
populated appropriately. This leaves SIP vulnerable to a category of populated appropriately. This leaves SIP vulnerable to a category of
abuses, including impersonation attacks that facilitate or enable abuses such as impersonation attacks that facilitate or enable
robocalling, voicemail hacking, swatting, and related problems as robocalling, voicemail hacking, swatting, and related problems as
described in [RFC7340]. Ideally, a cryptographic approach to described in [RFC7340]. Ideally, a cryptographic approach to
identity can provide a much stronger and assurance of identity than identity can provide a much stronger assurance of identity than the
the Caller ID services that the telephone network provides today, and Caller ID services that the telephone network provides today, and one
one less vulnerable to spoofing. less vulnerable to spoofing.
[RFC3261] encourages user agents (UAs) to implement a number of [RFC3261] encourages user agents (UAs) to implement a number of
potential authentication mechanisms, including Digest authentication, potential authentication mechanisms, including Digest authentication,
Transport Layer Security (TLS), and S/MIME (implementations may Transport Layer Security (TLS), and S/MIME (implementations may
support other security schemes as well). However, few SIP user support other security schemes as well). However, few SIP UAs today
agents today support the end-user certificates necessary to support the end-user certificates necessary to authenticate
authenticate themselves (via S/MIME, for example), and for its part themselves (via S/MIME, for example), and for its part Digest
Digest authentication is limited by the fact that the originator and authentication is limited by the fact that the originator and
destination must share a prearranged secret. Practically speaking, destination must share a prearranged secret. Practically speaking,
originating user agents need to be able to securely communicate their originating UAs need to be able to securely communicate their users'
users' identity to destinations with which they have no previous identities to destinations with which they have no previous
association. association.
As an initial attempt to address this gap, [RFC4474] specified a As an initial attempt to address this gap, [RFC4474] specified a
means of signing portions of SIP requests in order to provide an means of signing portions of SIP requests in order to provide an
identity assurance. However, RFC4474 was in several ways misaligned identity assurance. However, [RFC4474] was in several ways
with deployment realities (see [I-D.rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns]). misaligned with deployment realities (see [SIP-RFC4474-CONCERNS]).
Most significantly, RFC4474 did not deal well with telephone numbers Most significantly, [RFC4474] did not deal well with telephone
as identifiers, despite their enduring use in SIP deployments. numbers as identifiers, despite their enduring use in SIP
RFC4474 also provided a signature over material that intermediaries deployments. [RFC4474] also provided a signature over material that
in existing deployments commonly altered. This specification intermediaries in existing deployments commonly altered. This
therefore deprecates the RFC4474 syntax and behavior, reconsidering specification therefore deprecates the syntax and behavior specified
the problem space in light of the threat model in [RFC7375] and by [RFC4474], reconsidering the problem space in light of the threat
aligning the signature format with PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport]. model in [RFC7375] and aligning the signature format with PASSporT
Backwards compatibility considerations are given in Section 10. (Personal Assertion Token) [RFC8225]. Backwards-compatibility
considerations are given in Section 10.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. BCP 14 [RFC2119].
In addition, this document uses three terms specific to the In addition, this document uses three terms specific to the
mechanism: mechanism:
Identity: An identifier for the user of a communications service; o Identity: An identifier for the user of a communications service;
for the purposes of SIP, either a SIP URI or a telephone number. for the purposes of SIP, either a SIP URI or a telephone number.
Identities are derived from an "identity field" in a SIP request Identities are derived from an "identity field" in a SIP request
such as the From header field. such as the From header field.
Authentication Service: A logical role played by a SIP entity that o Authentication Service: A logical role played by a SIP entity that
adds Identity headers to SIP requests. adds Identity headers to SIP requests.
Verification Service (or "Verifier"): A logical role played by a o Verification Service (or "Verifier"): A logical role played by a
SIP entity that validates Identity headers in a SIP request. SIP entity that validates Identity headers in a SIP request.
3. Architectural Overview 3. Architectural Overview
The identity architecture for SIP defined in this specification The identity architecture for SIP defined in this specification
depends on a logical "authentication service" which validates depends on a logical "authentication service" that validates outgoing
outgoing requests. An authentication service may be implemented requests. An authentication service may be implemented either as
either as part of a user agent or as a proxy server; typically, it is part of a UA or as a proxy server; typically, it is a component of a
a component of a network intermediary like a proxy to which network intermediary like a proxy to which originating UAs send
originating user agents send unsigned requests. Once the originator unsigned requests. Once the originator of the message has been
of the message has been authenticated, through pre-arranged means authenticated, through prearranged means with the authentication
with the authentication service, the authentication service then service, the authentication service then creates and adds an Identity
creates and adds an Identity header field to the request. This header field to the request. This requires computing cryptographic
requires computing cryptographic information, including a digital information -- including a digital signature over some components of
signature over some components of messages, that lets other SIP messages -- that lets other SIP entities verify that the sending user
entities verify that the sending user has been authenticated and its has been authenticated and its claim of a particular identity has
claim of a particular identity has been authorized. These been authorized. These "verification services" validate the
"verification services" validate the signature and enable policy signature and enable policy decisions to be made based on the results
decisions to be made based on the results of the validation. of the validation.
Policy decisions made after validation depend heavily on the Policy decisions made after validation depend heavily on the
verification service's trust for the credentials that the verification service's trust for the credentials that the
authentication service uses to sign requests. As robocalling, authentication service uses to sign requests. As robocalling,
voicemail hacking, and swatting usually involve impersonation of voicemail hacking, and swatting usually involve impersonation of
telephone numbers, credentials that will be trusted by relying telephone numbers, credentials that will be trusted by relying
parties to sign for telephone numbers are a key component of the parties to sign for telephone numbers are a key component of the
architecture. Authority over telephone numbers is, however, not as architecture. Authority over telephone numbers is, however, not as
easy to establish on the Internet as authority over traditional easy to establish on the Internet as authority over traditional
domain names. This document assumes the existence of credentials for domain names. This document assumes the existence of credentials for
establishing authority over telephone numbers, for cases where the establishing authority over telephone numbers for cases where the
telephone number is the identity of the user, but this document does telephone number is the identity of the user, but does not mandate or
not mandate or specify a credential system; specify a credential system; [RFC8226] describes a credential system
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates] describes a credential system compatible compatible with this architecture.
with this architecture.
Although addressing the vulnerabilities in the STIR problem statement Although addressing the vulnerabilities in the Secure Telephone
and threat model mostly requires dealing with telephone number as Identity Revisited (STIR) problem statement [RFC7340] and threat
identities, SIP must also handle signing for SIP URIs as identities. model mostly requires dealing with telephone number as identities,
This is typically easier to deal with, as these identities are issued SIP must also handle signing for SIP URIs as identities. This is
by organizations that have authority over Internet domains. When a typically easier to deal with, as these identities are issued by
new user becomes associated with example.com, for example, the organizations that have authority over Internet domains. When a new
user becomes associated with example.com, for example, the
administrator of the SIP service for that domain can issue them an administrator of the SIP service for that domain can issue them an
identity in that namespace, such as sip:alice@example.com. Alice may identity in that namespace, such as sip:alice@example.com. Alice may
then send REGISTER requests to example.com that make her user agents then send REGISTER requests to example.com that make her UAs eligible
eligible to receive requests for sip:alice@example.com. In other to receive requests for sip:alice@example.com. In other cases, Alice
cases, Alice may herself be the owner of her own domain, and may may herself be the owner of her own domain and may issue herself
issue herself identities as she chooses. But ultimately, it is the identities as she chooses. But ultimately, it is the controller of
controller of the SIP service at example.com that must be responsible the SIP service at example.com that must be responsible for
for authorizing the use of names in the example.com domain. authorizing the use of names in the example.com domain. Therefore,
Therefore, for the purposes of SIP as defined in [RFC3261], the for the purposes of SIP as defined in [RFC3261], the necessary
necessary credentials needed to prove a user is authorized to use a credentials needed to prove that a user is authorized to use a
particular From header field must ultimately derive from the domain particular From header field must ultimately derive from the domain
owner: either a user agent gives requests to the domain name owner in owner: either (1) a UA gives requests to the domain name owner in
order for them to be signed by the domain owner's credentials, or the order for them to be signed by the domain owner's credentials or
user agent must possess credentials that prove that the domain owner (2) the UA must possess credentials that prove that the domain owner
has given the user agent the right to a name. has given the UA the right to a name.
In order to share a cryptographic assurance of end-user SIP identity In order to share a cryptographic assurance of end-user SIP identity
in an interdomain or intradomain context, an authentication service in an interdomain or intradomain context, an authentication service
constructs tokens based on the PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] constructs tokens based on the PASSporT format [RFC8225], which is
format, which is special encoding of a JSON [RFC7159] object special encoding of a JSON [RFC8259] object comprising values derived
comprising values derived from certain header field values in the SIP from certain header field values in the SIP request. The
request. The authentication service computes a signature over those authentication service computes a signature over those JSON elements
JSON elements as PASSporT specifies. An encoding of the resulting as PASSporT specifies. An encoding of the resulting PASSporT is then
PASSporT is then placed in the SIP Identity header field. In order placed in the SIP Identity header field. In order to assist in the
to assist in the validation of the Identity header field, this validation of the Identity header field, this specification also
specification also describes a parameter of the Identity header field describes a parameter of the Identity header field that can be used
that can be used by the recipient of a request to recover the by the recipient of a request to recover the credentials of the
credentials of the signer. signer.
Note that the scope of this document is limited to providing an Note that the scope of this document is limited to providing an
identity assurance for SIP requests; solving this problem for SIP identity assurance for SIP requests; solving this problem for SIP
responses is outside the scope of this work (see [RFC4916]). Future responses is outside the scope of this work (see [RFC4916]). Future
work might specify ways that a SIP implementation could gateway work might specify ways that a SIP implementation could gateway
PASSporTs to other protocols. PASSporTs to other protocols.
4. Identity Header Field Syntax 4. Identity Header Field Syntax
The Identity and Identity-Info header fields that were previously The Identity and Identity-Info header fields that were previously
defined in RFC4474 are here deprecated. This revised specification defined in [RFC4474] are deprecated by this document. This revised
collapses the grammar of Identity-Info into the Identity header field specification collapses the grammar of Identity-Info into the
via the "info" parameter. Note that unlike the prior specification Identity header field via the "info" parameter. Note that unlike the
in RFC4474, the Identity header field is now allowed to appear more prior specification in [RFC4474], the Identity header field is now
than one time in a SIP request. The revised grammar for the Identity allowed to appear more than one time in a SIP request. The revised
header field builds on the ABNF [RFC5234] in RFC 3261 [RFC3261] grammar for the Identity header field builds on the ABNF [RFC5234] in
Section 25. It is as follows: [RFC3261], Section 25. It is as follows:
Identity = "Identity" HCOLON signed-identity-digest SEMI Identity = "Identity" HCOLON signed-identity-digest SEMI
ident-info *( SEMI ident-info-params ) ident-info *( SEMI ident-info-params )
signed-identity-digest = 1*(base64-char / ".") signed-identity-digest = 1*(base64-char / ".")
ident-info = "info" EQUAL ident-info-uri ident-info = "info" EQUAL ident-info-uri
ident-info-uri = LAQUOT absoluteURI RAQUOT ident-info-uri = LAQUOT absoluteURI RAQUOT
ident-info-params = ident-info-alg / ident-type / ident-info-params = ident-info-alg / ident-type /
ident-info-extension ident-info-extension
ident-info-alg = "alg" EQUAL token ident-info-alg = "alg" EQUAL token
ident-type = "ppt" EQUAL token ident-type = "ppt" EQUAL token
ident-info-extension = generic-param ident-info-extension = generic-param
base64-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "/" / "+" base64-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "/" / "+"
In addition to the "info" parameter, and the "alg" parameter In addition to the "info" parameter, and the "alg" parameter
previously defined in RFC4474, this specification defines the previously defined in [RFC4474], this specification defines the
optional "ppt" parameter (PASSporT Type). The 'absoluteURI' portion optional "ppt" parameter (PASSporT Type). The "absoluteURI" portion
of ident-info-uri MUST contain a URI; see Section 7.3 for more on of ident-info-uri MUST contain a URI; see Section 7.3 for more on
choosing how to advertise credentials through this parameter. choosing how to advertise credentials through this parameter.
The signed-identity-digest contains a base64 encoding of a PASSporT The signed-identity-digest contains a base64 encoding of a PASSporT
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport], which secures the request with a signature [RFC8225], which secures the request with a signature that PASSporT
that PASSporT generates over the JSON header and payload objects; generates over the JSON header and payload objects; some of those
some of those header and claim element values will mirror values of header and claim element values will mirror values of the SIP
the SIP request. request.
4.1. PASSporT Construction 4.1. PASSporT Construction
For SIP implementations to populate the PASSporT header JSON object For SIP implementations to populate the PASSporT header JSON object
with fields from a SIP request, the following elements MUST be placed with fields from a SIP request, the following elements MUST be placed
as the values corresponding to the designated JSON keys: as the values corresponding to the designated JSON keys:
First, per baseline [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], the JSON "typ" key o First, per the baseline PASSporT specification [RFC8225], the JSON
MUST have the value "passport". "typ" key MUST have the value "passport".
Second, the JSON key "alg" MUST mirror the value of the optional o Second, the JSON key "alg" MUST mirror the value of the optional
"alg" parameter in the SIP Identity header field. Note if the "alg" parameter in the SIP Identity header field. Note that if
"alg" parameter is absent from the Identity header, the default the "alg" parameter is absent from the Identity header, the
value is "ES256". default value is "ES256".
Third, the JSON key "x5u" MUST have a value equivalent to the o Third, the JSON key "x5u" MUST have a value equivalent to the
quoted URI in the "info" parameter, per the simple string quoted URI in the "info" parameter, per the simple string
comparison rules of [RFC3986] section 6.2.1. comparison rules of [RFC3986], Section 6.2.1.
Fourth, if a PASSporT extension is in use, then the optional JSON o Fourth, if a PASSporT extension is in use, then the optional JSON
key "ppt" MUST be present and have a value equivalent to the key "ppt" MUST be present and have a value equivalent to the
quoted value of the "ppt" parameter of the Identity header field. quoted value of the "ppt" parameter of the Identity header field.
An example of the PASSporT header JSON object without any extension An example of the PASSporT header JSON object without any
is: extension is:
{ "typ":"passport", { "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" } "x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" }
To populate the PASSporT payload JSON object from a SIP request, the To populate the PASSporT payload JSON object from a SIP request, the
following elements MUST be placed as values corresponding to the following elements MUST be placed as values corresponding to the
designated JSON keys: designated JSON keys:
First, the JSON "orig" object MUST be populated. If the o First, the JSON "orig" object MUST be populated. If the
originating identity is a telephone number, then the array MUST be originating identity is a telephone number, then the array MUST be
populated with a JSON object containing a "tn" element with a populated with a JSON object containing a "tn" element with a
value set to the value of the quoted originating identity, a value set to the value of the quoted originating identity, a
canonicalized telephone number (see Section 8.3). Otherwise, the canonicalized telephone number (see Section 8.3). Otherwise, the
object MUST be populated with a JSON object containing "uri" object MUST be populated with a JSON object containing a "uri"
element, set to the value of the AoR of the UA sending the message element, set to the value of the AoR of the UA sending the message
as taken from the addr-spec of the From header field, per the as taken from the addr-spec of the From header field, per the
procedures in Section 8.5. procedures in Section 8.5.
Second, the JSON "dest" array MUST be populated. If the o Second, the JSON "dest" array MUST be populated. If the
destination identity is a telephone number, then the array MUST be destination identity is a telephone number, then the array MUST be
populated with a JSON object containing a "tn" element with a populated with a JSON object containing a "tn" element with a
value set to the value of the quoted destination identity, a value set to the value of the quoted destination identity, a
canonicalized telephone number (see Section 8.3). Otherwise, the canonicalized telephone number (see Section 8.3). Otherwise, the
array MUST be populated with a JSON object containing a "uri" array MUST be populated with a JSON object containing a "uri"
element, set to the value of the addr-spec component of the To element, set to the value of the addr-spec component of the
header field, which is the AoR to which the request is being sent, To header field, which is the AoR to which the request is being
per the procedures in Section 8.5. Multiple JSON objects are sent, per the procedures in Section 8.5. Multiple JSON objects
permitted in "dest" for future compatibility reasons. are permitted in "dest" for future compatibility reasons.
Third, the JSON key "iat" MUST appear. The authentication service o Third, the JSON key "iat" MUST appear. The authentication service
SHOULD set the value of "iat" to an encoding of the value of the SHOULD set the value of "iat" to an encoding of the value of the
SIP Date header field as a JSON NumericDate (as UNIX time, per SIP Date header field as a JSON NumericDate (as UNIX time, per
[RFC7519] Section 2), though an authentication service MAY set the [RFC7519], Section 2), though an authentication service MAY set
value of "iat" to its own current clock time. If the the value of "iat" to its own current clock time. If the
authentication service uses its own clock time then the use of the authentication service uses its own clock time, then the use of
full form of PASSporT is REQUIRED. In either case, the the full form of PASSporT is REQUIRED. In either case, the
authentication service MUST NOT generate a PASSporT for a SIP authentication service MUST NOT generate a PASSporT for a SIP
request if the Date header is outside of its local policy for request if the Date header is outside of its local policy for
freshness (recommended sixty seconds). freshness (sixty seconds is RECOMMENDED).
Fourth, if the request contains an SDP message body, and if that o Fourth, if the request contains a Session Description Protocol
SDP contains one or more "a=fingerprint" attributes, then the JSON (SDP) message body and if that SDP contains one or more
key "mky" MUST appear with the algorithm(s) and value(s) of the "a=fingerprint" attributes, then the JSON key "mky" MUST appear
fingerprint attributes (if they differ), following the format with the algorithm(s) and value(s) of the fingerprint attributes
given in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] Section 5.2.2. (if they differ), following the format given in [RFC8225],
Section 5.2.2.
For example: For example:
{ "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}, { "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"dest":{"tn":"12155551213"}, "dest":{"tn":["12155551213"]},
"iat":1443208345 } "iat":1443208345 }
For information on the security properties of these SIP message For information on the security properties of these SIP message
elements, and why their inclusion mitigates replay attacks, see elements and why their inclusion mitigates replay attacks, see
Section 12. Note that future extensions to PASSporT could introduce Section 12. Note that future extensions to PASSporT could introduce
new claims, and that further SIP procedures could be required to new claims and that further SIP procedures could be required to
extract information from the SIP request to populate the values of extract information from the SIP request to populate the values of
those claims; see Section 9 of this document. those claims; see Section 9 of this document.
The "orig" and "dest" arrays may contain identifiers of heterogeneous The "orig" and "dest" arrays may contain identifiers of heterogeneous
type; for example, the "orig" array might contain a "tn" claim, while type; for example, the "orig" array might contain a "tn" claim, while
the "dest" contains a "uri" claim. Also note that in some cases, the the "dest" contains a "uri" claim. Also note that in some cases, the
"dest" array may be populated with more than one value. This could "dest" array may be populated with more than one value. This could,
for example occur when multiple "dest" identities are specified in a for example, occur when multiple "dest" identities are specified in a
meshed conference. Defining how a SIP implementation would align meshed conference. Defining how a SIP implementation would align
multiple destination identities in PASSporT with such systems is left multiple destination identities in PASSporT with such systems is left
as a subject for future specification. as a subject for future specifications.
After these two JSON objects, the header and the payload, have been After these two JSON objects, the header and the payload, have been
constructed and base64-encoded, they must each be hashed and signed constructed and base64-encoded, they must each be hashed and signed
per [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] Section 6. The header, payload and per [RFC8225], Section 6. The header, payload, and signature
signature components comprise a full PASSporT object. The resulting components comprise a full PASSporT object. The resulting PASSporT
PASSporT may be carried in SIP in either a full form, which includes may be carried in SIP in either (1) a full form, which includes the
the header and payload as well as the signature, or a compact form header and payload as well as the signature or (2) a compact form,
which only carries the signature per [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] which only carries the signature per [RFC8225], Section 7. The
Section 7. The hashing and signing algorithm is specified by the hashing and signing algorithm is specified by the "alg" parameter of
'alg' parameter of the Identity header field and the mirrored "alg" the Identity header field and the mirrored "alg" parameter of
parameter of PASSporT. All implementations of this specification PASSporT. All implementations of this specification MUST support the
MUST support the required signing algorithms of PASSporT. At present required signing algorithms of PASSporT. At present, there is one
there is one mandatory-to-support value for the 'alg' parameter: mandatory-to-support value for the "alg" parameter: "ES256", as
'ES256', as defined in [RFC7519], which connotes an ECDSA P-256 defined in [RFC7519], which connotes an Elliptic Curve Digital
digital signature. Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) P-256 digital signature.
4.1.1. Example Full and Compact Forms of PASSporT in Identity 4.1.1. Example Full and Compact Forms of PASSporT in Identity
As Appendix F of the JWS specification [RFC7515] notes, there are As Appendix F of the JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification [RFC7515]
cases where "it is useful to integrity-protect content that is not notes, there are cases where "it is useful to integrity-protect
itself contained in a JWS." Since the fields that make up the content that is not itself contained in a JWS." Since the fields
majority of the PASSporT header and payload have values replicated in that make up the majority of the PASSporT header and payload have
the SIP request, the SIP usage of PASSporT may exclude the base64 values replicated in the SIP request, the SIP usage of PASSporT may
encoded version of the header and payload JSON objects from the exclude the base64-encoded version of the header and payload JSON
Identity header field and instead present a detached signature: what objects from the Identity header field and instead present a detached
PASSporT calls its compact form, see [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] signature: what PASSporT calls its compact form; see [RFC8225],
Section 7. Section 7.
When an authentication service constructs an Identity header, the When an authentication service constructs an Identity header, the
contents of the signed-identity-digest field MUST contain either a contents of the signed-identity-digest field MUST contain either a
full or compact PASSporT. Use of the compact form is RECOMMENDED in full or compact PASSporT. Use of the compact form is RECOMMENDED in
order to reduce message size, but note that extensions often require order to reduce message size, but note that extensions often require
the full form (see Section 9). the full form (see Section 9).
For example, a full form of PASSporT in an Identity header might look For example, a full form of PASSporT in an Identity header might look
as follows (backslashes shown for line folding only): as follows (backslashes shown for line folding only):
skipping to change at page 10, line 18 skipping to change at page 11, line 18
pjlk-cpFYpFYsojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w; \ pjlk-cpFYpFYsojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w; \
info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cert> info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cert>
5. Example of Operations 5. Example of Operations
This section provides an informative (non-normative) high-level This section provides an informative (non-normative) high-level
example of the operation of the mechanisms described in this example of the operation of the mechanisms described in this
document. document.
Imagine a case where Bob, who has the home proxy of example.com and Imagine a case where Bob, who has the home proxy of example.com and
the address-of-record sip:12155551212@example.com;user=phone, wants the AoR sip:12155551212@example.com;user=phone, wants to communicate
to communicate with Alice at sip:alice@example.org. They have no with Alice at sip:alice@example.com. They have no prior
prior relationship, and Alice implements best practices to prevent relationship, and Alice implements best practices to prevent
impersonation attacks. impersonation attacks.
Bob's user agent generates an INVITE and places his address-of-record Bob's UA generates an INVITE and places his AoR in the From header
in the From header field of the request. He then sends an INVITE to field of the request. He then sends an INVITE to an authentication
an authentication service proxy for his domain. service proxy for his domain.
............................ .............................. ............................ ..............................
. . . . . . . .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ . . +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. Signs for | | . Signed . | | . . Signs for | | . Signed . | | .
. 12125551xxx| Auth |------------> | Verif | . . 12125551xxx| Auth |------------> | Verif | .
. | Svc | . INVITE . | Svc | . . | Svc | . INVITE . | Svc | .
. | Proxy | . . | Proxy | . . | Proxy | . . | Proxy | .
. > +-------+ . . +-------+ \ . . > +-------+ . . +-------+ \ .
. / | . -> \ . . / | . -> \ .
skipping to change at page 11, line 5 skipping to change at page 12, line 5
. / | Cert |. . > . . / | Cert |. . > .
. +-------+ | Store |. . +-------+ . . +-------+ | Store |. . +-------+ .
. | | | |. . | | . . | | | |. . | | .
. | Bob | +-------+. . | Alice | . . | Bob | +-------+. . | Alice | .
. | UA | . . | UA | . . | UA | . . | UA | .
. | | . . | | . . | | . . | | .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ . . +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. Domain A . . Domain B . . Domain A . . Domain B .
............................ .............................. ............................ ..............................
The proxy authenticates Bob, and validates that he is authorized to The proxy authenticates Bob and validates that he is authorized to
assert the identity that he populated in the From header field. The assert the identity that he populated in the From header field. The
proxy authentication service then constructs a PASSporT which proxy authentication service then constructs a PASSporT that contains
contains a JSON representation of values which mirror certain parts a JSON representation of values that mirror certain parts of the SIP
of the SIP request, including the identity in the From header field request, including the identity in the From header field value. As a
value. As a part of generating the PASSporT, the authentication part of generating the PASSporT, the authentication service signs a
service signs a hash of that JSON header and payload with the private hash of that JSON header and payload with the private key associated
key associated with the appropriate credential for the identity (in with the appropriate credential for the identity (in this example, a
this example, a certificate with authority to sign for numbers in a certificate with authority to sign for numbers in a range from
range from 12155551000 to 121555519999), and the signature is 12155551000 to 12155551999), and the signature is inserted by the
inserted by the proxy server into the Identity header field value of proxy server into the Identity header field value of the request as a
the request as a compact form of PASSporT. Alternatively, the JSON compact form of PASSporT. Alternatively, the JSON header and payload
header and payload themselves might also have been included in the themselves might also have been included in the object when using the
object when using the full form of PASSporT. full form of PASSporT.
The proxy authentication service, as the holder of a private key with The proxy authentication service, as the holder of a private key with
authority over Bob's telephone number, is asserting that the authority over Bob's telephone number, is asserting that the
originator of this request has been authenticated and that he is originator of this request has been authenticated and that he is
authorized to claim the identity that appears in the From header authorized to claim the identity that appears in the From header
field. The proxy inserts an "info" parameter into the Identity field. The proxy inserts an "info" parameter into the Identity
header field that tells Alice how to acquire keying material header field that tells Alice how to acquire keying material
necessary to validate its credentials (a public key), in case she necessary to validate its credentials (a public key), in case she
doesn't already have it. doesn't already have it.
When Alice's domain receives the request, a proxy verification When Alice's domain receives the request, a proxy verification
service validates the signature provided in the Identity header service validates the signature provided in the Identity header field
field, and then determines that the authentication service and then determines that the authentication service credentials
credentials demonstrate authority over the identity in the From demonstrate authority over the identity in the From header field.
header field. This same validation operation might be performed by a This same validation operation might be performed by a verification
verification service in Alice's user agent server. Ultimately, this service in Alice's UA server (UAS). Ultimately, this valid request
valid request is rendered to Alice. If the validation were is rendered to Alice. If the validation were unsuccessful, some
unsuccessful, some other treatment could be applied by the receiving other treatment could be applied by the receiving domain or
domain or Alice's user agent. Alice's UA.
5.1. Example Identity Header Construction 5.1. Example Identity Header Construction
For the following SIP request: For the following SIP request:
INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.example.org SIP/2.0 INVITE sip:alice@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS pc33.atlanta.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 Via: SIP/2.0/TLS pc33.atlanta.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8
To: Alice <sip:alice@example.com> To: Alice <sip:alice@example.com>
From: Bob <sip:12155551212@example.com;user=phone>;tag=1928301774> From: Bob <sip:12155551212@example.com;user=phone>;tag=1928301774>
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710
CSeq: 314159 INVITE CSeq: 314159 INVITE
Max-Forwards: 70 Max-Forwards: 70
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 19:12:25 GMT Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 19:12:25 GMT
Contact: <sip:12155551212gateway.example.com> Contact: <sip:12155551212@gateway.example.com>
Content-Type: application/sdp Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 147 Content-Length: ...
v=0 v=0
o=UserA 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com o=UserA 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com
s=Session SDP s=Session SDP
c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com
t=0 0 t=0 0
m=audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0 m=audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
An authentication service will create a corresponding PASSporT An authentication service will create a corresponding PASSporT
object. The properly-serialized PASSporT header and payload JSON object. The properly serialized PASSporT header and payload JSON
objects would look as follows. For the header, the values chosen by objects would look as follows. For the header, the values chosen by
the authentication service at "example.org" might read: the authentication service at "example.com" might read:
{"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ {"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.cer"} passport.cer"}
The serialized payload will derive values from the SIP request (the The serialized payload will derive values from the SIP request (the
From, To, and Date header field values) as follows: From, To, and Date header field values) as follows:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":1443208345, {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":1443208345,
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
The authentication service would then generate the signature over the The authentication service would then generate the signature over the
object following the procedures in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] object, following the procedures in [RFC8225], Section 6. That
Section 6. That signature would look as follows: signature would look as follows:
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYs \ rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYs \
ojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w ojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
An authentication service signing this request and using the compact An authentication service signing this request and using the compact
form of PASSporT would thus generate and add to the request an form of PASSporT would thus generate and add to the request an
Identity header field of the following form: Identity header field of the following form:
Identity: ..rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpj \ Identity: ..rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpj \
lk-cpFYpFYsojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w; \ lk-cpFYpFYsojNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w; \
skipping to change at page 13, line 17 skipping to change at page 14, line 25
SIP entities that instantiate the authentication service and SIP entities that instantiate the authentication service and
verification service roles will, respectively, generate and validate verification service roles will, respectively, generate and validate
the Identity header and the signature it contains. the Identity header and the signature it contains.
6.1. Authentication Service Behavior 6.1. Authentication Service Behavior
Any entity that instantiates the authentication service role MUST Any entity that instantiates the authentication service role MUST
possess the private key of one or more credentials that can be used possess the private key of one or more credentials that can be used
to sign for a domain or a telephone number (see Section 7.1). The to sign for a domain or a telephone number (see Section 7.1). The
authentication service role can be instantiated, for example, by an authentication service role can be instantiated, for example, by an
intermediary such as a proxy server or by a user agent. intermediary such as a proxy server or by a UA. Intermediaries that
Intermediaries that instantiate this role MUST be capable of instantiate this role MUST be capable of authenticating one or more
authenticating one or more SIP users who can register for that SIP users who can register for that identity. Commonly, this role
identity. Commonly, this role will be instantiated by a proxy will be instantiated by a proxy server, since proxy servers are more
server, since proxy servers are more likely to have a static likely to have a static hostname, hold corresponding credentials, and
hostname, hold corresponding credentials, and have access to SIP have access to SIP registrar capabilities that allow them to
registrar capabilities that allow them to authenticate users. It is authenticate users. It is also possible that the authentication
also possible that the authentication service role might be service role might be instantiated by an entity that acts as a
instantiated by an entity that acts as a redirect server, but that is redirect server, but that is left as a topic for future work.
left as a topic for future work.
An authentication service adds the Identity header field to SIP An authentication service adds the Identity header field to SIP
requests. The procedures below define the steps that must be taken requests. The procedures below define the steps that must be taken
when each Identity header field is added. More than one Identity when each Identity header field is added. More than one Identity
header field may appear in a single request, and an authentication header field may appear in a single request, and an authentication
service may add an Identity header field to a request that already service may add an Identity header field to a request that already
contains one or more Identity header fields. contains one or more Identity header fields.
Entities instantiating the authentication service role perform the Entities instantiating the authentication service role perform the
following steps, in order, to generate an Identity header field for a following steps, in order, to generate an Identity header field for a
SIP request: SIP request:
Step 1: Check Authority for the Identity Step 1: Check Authority for the Identity
First, the authentication service must determine whether it is First, the authentication service must determine whether it is
authoritative for the identity of the originator of the request. The authoritative for the identity of the originator of the request. The
authentication service extracts the identity from the URI value from authentication service extracts the identity from the URI value from
the "identity field"; in ordinary operations, that is the addr-spec the "identity field"; in ordinary operations, that is the addr-spec
component of From header field. In order to determine whether the component of the From header field. In order to determine whether
signature for the identity field should be over the entire identity the signature for the identity field should be over the entire
field URI or just a telephone number, the authentication service MUST identity field URI or just a telephone number, the authentication
follow the process described in Section 8.1. That section will service MUST follow the process described in Section 8.1. The
either lead to the telephone number canonicalization procedures in information in that section will lead to either the telephone number
Section 8.3 for telephone numbers, or to the URI normalization canonicalization procedures in Section 8.3 for telephone numbers or
procedures described in Section 8.5 for domain names. Whichever the the URI normalization procedures described in Section 8.5 for domain
result, if the authentication service is not authoritative for the names. Whichever the result, if the authentication service is not
identity in question, it SHOULD process and forward the request authoritative for the identity in question, it SHOULD process and
normally unless the local policy is to block such requests. The forward the request normally unless the local policy is to block such
authentication service MUST NOT add an Identity header field if the requests. The authentication service MUST NOT add an Identity header
authentication service does not have the authority to make the claim field if the authentication service does not have the authority to
it asserts. make the claim it asserts.
Step 2: Authenticate the Originator Step 2: Authenticate the Originator
The authentication service MUST then determine whether or not the The authentication service MUST then determine whether or not the
originator of the request is authorized to claim the identity given originator of the request is authorized to claim the identity given
in the identity field. In order to do so, the authentication service in the identity field. In order to do so, the authentication service
MUST authenticate the originator of the message. Some possible ways MUST authenticate the originator of the message. Some possible ways
in which this authentication might be performed include: in which this authentication might be performed include the
following:
If the authentication service is instantiated by a SIP o If the authentication service is instantiated by a SIP
intermediary (proxy server), it may authenticate the request with intermediary (proxy server), it may authenticate the request with
the authentication scheme used for registration in its domain the authentication scheme used for registration in its domain
(e.g., Digest authentication). (e.g., Digest authentication).
If the authentication service is instantiated by a SIP user agent, o If the authentication service is instantiated by a SIP UA, a UA
a user agent may authenticate its own user through any system- may authenticate its own user through any system-specific means,
specific means, perhaps simply by virtue of having physical access perhaps simply by virtue of having physical access to the UA.
to the user agent.
Authorization of the use of a particular username or telephone number Authorization of the use of a particular username or telephone number
in the user part of the From header field is a matter of local policy in the user part of the From header field is a matter of local policy
for the authentication service; see Section 7.1 for more information. for the authentication service; see Section 7.1 for more information.
Note that this check is performed only on the addr-spec in the Note that this check is performed only on the addr-spec in the
identity field (e.g., the URI of the originator, like identity field (e.g., the URI of the originator, like
'sip:alice@atlanta.example.com'); it does not cover the display-name "sip:alice@atlanta.example.com"); it does not cover the display-name
portion of the From header field (e.g., 'Alice Atlanta'). For more portion of the From header field (e.g., "Alice Atlanta"). For more
information, see Section 12.6. information, see Section 12.6.
Step 3: Verify Date is Present and Valid Step 3: Verify Date is Present and Valid
An authentication service MUST add a Date header field to SIP An authentication service MUST add a Date header field to SIP
requests that do not have one. The authentication service MUST requests that do not have one. The authentication service MUST
ensure that any preexisting Date header field in the request is ensure that any preexisting Date header field in the request is
accurate. Local policy can dictate precisely how accurate the Date accurate. Local policy can dictate precisely how accurate the Date
must be; a RECOMMENDED maximum discrepancy of sixty seconds will must be; a RECOMMENDED maximum discrepancy of sixty seconds will
ensure that the request is unlikely to upset any verifiers. If the ensure that the request is unlikely to upset any verifiers. If the
Date header field value contains a time different by more than one Date header field value contains a time different by more than
minute from the current time noted by the authentication service, the one minute from the current time noted by the authentication service,
authentication service SHOULD reject the request. This behavior is the authentication service SHOULD reject the request. Finally, the
not mandatory because a user agent client (UAC) could only exploit
the Date header field in order to cause a request to fail
verification; the Identity header field is not intended to provide a
perfect record of when messages are processed. Finally, the
authentication service MUST verify that both the Date header field authentication service MUST verify that both the Date header field
and the current time fall within the validity period of its and the current time fall within the validity period of its
credential. credential.
See Section 12.1 for information on how the Date header field assists See Section 12.1 for information on how the Date header field assists
verifiers. verifiers.
Step 4: Populate and Add the Identity Header Step 4: Populate and Add the Identity Header
Subsequently, the authentication service MUST form a PASSporT object Subsequently, the authentication service MUST form a PASSporT object
and add a corresponding Identity header field to the request and add a corresponding Identity header field to the request
containing either the full or compact form of PASSporT. For the containing either the full or compact form of PASSporT. For the
baseline PASSporT header (headers containing no "ppt" parameter), baseline PASSporT header (headers containing no "ppt" parameter),
this follows the procedures in Section 4; if the authentication this follows the procedures in Section 4; if the authentication
service is using an alternative "ppt" format, it MUST add an service is using an alternative "ppt" format, it MUST add an
appropriate "ppt" parameter and follow the procedures associated with appropriate "ppt" parameter and follow the procedures associated with
that extension (see Section 9). After the Identity header field has that extension (see Section 9). After the Identity header field has
been added to the request, the authentication service MUST also add a been added to the request, the authentication service MUST also add
"info" parameter to the Identity header field. The "info" parameter an "info" parameter to the Identity header field. The "info"
contains a URI from which the authentication service's credential can parameter contains a URI from which the authentication service's
be acquired; see Section 7.3 for more on credential acquisition. credential can be acquired; see Section 7.3 for more on credential
acquisition.
An authentication service MAY use the full form of the PASSporT in An authentication service MAY use the full form of the PASSporT in
the Identity header field. The presence of the full form is OPTIONAL the Identity header field. The presence of the full form is OPTIONAL
because the information carried in the baseline PASSporT headers and because the information carried in the baseline PASSporT headers and
claims is usually redundant with information already carried claims is usually redundant with information already carried
elsewhere in the SIP request. Using the compact form can elsewhere in the SIP request. Using the compact form can
significantly reduce SIP message size, especially when the PASSporT significantly reduce SIP message size, especially when the PASSporT
payload contains media keys. The syntax of the compact form is given payload contains media keys. The syntax of the compact form is given
in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] Section 7; essentially, it contains only in [RFC8225], Section 7; essentially, it contains only the signature
the signature component of the PASSporT. component of the PASSporT.
Note that per the behavior specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], use Note that per the behavior specified in [RFC8225], use of the full
of the full form is mandatory when optional extensions are included. form is mandatory when optional extensions are included. See
See Section 9. Section 9.
6.1.1. Handling Repairable Errors 6.1.1. Handling Repairable Errors
Also, in some cases, a request signed by an authentication service Also, in some cases, a request signed by an authentication service
will be rejected by the verification service on the receiving side, will be rejected by the verification service on the receiving side,
and the authentication service will receive a SIP 4xx status code in and the authentication service will receive a SIP 4xx status code in
the backwards direction, such as a 438 indicating a verification the backwards direction, such as a 438 ("Invalid Identity Header")
failure. If the authentication service did not originally send the response indicating a verification failure. If the authentication
full form of the PASSporT object in the Identity header field, it service did not originally send the full form of the PASSporT object
SHOULD retry the request with the full form after receiving a 438 in the Identity header field, it SHOULD retry the request with the
response; however implementations SHOULD NOT retry the request more full form after receiving a 438 response; however, implementations
than once. Authentication services implemented at proxy servers SHOULD NOT retry the request more than once. Authentication services
would retry such a request as a ssequential for, by re-processing the implemented at proxy servers would retry such a request as a
destination as a new target and handling it serially as described in sequential fork, by reprocessing the destination as a new target and
Section 16.6 of [RFC3261]. handling it serially as described in Section 16.6 of [RFC3261].
The information in the full form is useful on the verification side The information in the full form is useful on the verification side
for debugging errors, and there are some known causes of verification for debugging errors, and there are some known causes of verification
failures (such as the Date header field value changing in transit, failures (such as the Date header field value changing in transit;
see Section 12.1 for more information) that can be resolved by the see Section 12.1 for more information) that can be resolved by the
inclusion of the full form of PASSporT. inclusion of the full form of PASSporT.
Finally, the authentication service forwards the message normally. Finally, the authentication service forwards the message normally.
6.2. Verifier Behavior 6.2. Verifier Behavior
This document specifies a logical role for SIP entities called a This document specifies a logical role for SIP entities; this role is
verification service, or verifier. When a verifier receives a SIP called a verification service, or verifier. When a verifier receives
message containing one or more Identity header fields, it inspects a SIP message containing one or more Identity header fields, it
the signature(s) to verify the identity of the originator of the inspects the signature(s) to verify the identity of the originator of
message. The results of a verification are provided as input to an the message. The results of a verification are provided as input to
authorization process that is outside the scope of this document. an authorization process that is outside the scope of this document.
A SIP request may contain zero, one, or more Identity header fields. A SIP request may contain zero, one, or more Identity header fields.
A verification service performs the steps below on each Identity A verification service performs the steps below on each Identity
header field that appears in a request. If a verification service header field that appears in a request. If a verification service
cannot use any Identity header in a request, due to the absence of cannot use any Identity header in a request, due to the absence of
Identity headers or unsupported "ppt" parameters, and the presence of Identity headers or unsupported "ppt" parameters, and the presence of
an Identity header field is required by local policy (for example, an Identity header field is required by local policy (for example,
based on a per-sending-domain policy, or a per-sending-user policy), based on a per-sending-domain policy or a per-sending-user policy),
then a 428 'Use Identity Header' response MUST be sent in the then a 428 "Use Identity Header" response MUST be sent in the
backwards direction. For more on this and other verifier responses, backwards direction. For more on this and other verifier responses,
see Section 6.2.2. see Section 6.2.2.
In order to verify an Identity header field in a message, an entity In order to verify an Identity header field in a message, an entity
acting as a verifier MUST perform the following steps, in the order acting as a verifier MUST perform the following steps, in the order
here specified. Note that when an Identity header field contains a specified below. Note that when an Identity header field contains a
full form PASSporT object, the verifier MUST follow the additional full-form PASSporT object, the verifier MUST follow the additional
procedures in Section 6.2.4. procedures in Section 6.2.4.
Step 1: Check for an Unsupported "ppt" Step 1: Check for an Unsupported "ppt"
The verifier MUST inspect any optional "ppt" parameter appearing in The verifier MUST inspect any optional "ppt" parameter appearing in
the Identity header. If no "ppt" parameter is present, then the the Identity header. If no "ppt" parameter is present, then the
verifier proceeds normally below. If a "ppt" parameter value is verifier proceeds normally with Steps 2 through 5. If a "ppt"
present, and the verifier does not support it, it MUST ignore the parameter value is present and the verifier does not support it,
Identity header field. If a supported "ppt" parameter value is it MUST ignore the Identity header field. If a supported "ppt"
present, the verifier proceeds with Step 2, and will ultimately parameter value is present, the verifier proceeds with Step 2 and
follow the "ppt" variations described in Step 5. will ultimately follow the "ppt" variations described in Step 5.
Step 2: Determine the Originator's Identity Step 2: Determine the Originator's Identity
In order to determine whether the signature for the identity field In order to determine whether the signature for the identity field
should be over the entire identity field URI or just a telephone should be over the entire identity field URI or just a telephone
number, the verification service MUST follow the process described in number, the verification service MUST follow the process described in
Section 8.1. That section will either lead to the telephone number Section 8.1. The information in that section will lead to either the
canonicalization procedures in Section 8.3 for telephone numbers, or telephone number canonicalization procedures in Section 8.3 for
to the URI normalization procedures described in Section 8.5 for telephone numbers or the URI normalization procedures described in
domain names. Section 8.5 for domain names.
Step 3: Identify Credential for Validation Step 3: Identify Credential for Validation
The verifier must ensure that it has access to the proper keying The verifier must ensure that it has access to the proper keying
material to validate the signature in the Identity header field, material to validate the signature in the Identity header field; this
which usually involves dereferencing a URI in the "info" parameter of usually involves dereferencing a URI in the "info" parameter of the
the Identity header field. See Section 7.2 for more information on Identity header field. See Section 7.2 for more information on these
these procedures. If the verifier does not support the credential procedures. If the verifier does not support the credential
described in the "info" parameter, then it treats the credential for described in the "info" parameter, then it treats the credential for
this header field as unsupported. this header field as unsupported.
Step 4: Check the Freshness of Date Step 4: Check the Freshness of Date
The verifier furthermore ensures that the value of the Date header The verifier furthermore ensures that the value of the Date header
field of the request meets local policy for freshness (sixty seconds field of the request meets local policy for freshness (sixty seconds
is RECOMMENDED) and that it falls within the validity period of the is RECOMMENDED) and that it falls within the validity period of the
credential used to sign the Identity header field. For more on the credential used to sign the Identity header field. For more on the
attacks this prevents, see Section 12.1. If the full form of the attacks this prevents, see Section 12.1. If the full form of the
PASSporT is present, the verifier SHOULD compare the "iat" value in PASSporT is present, the verifier SHOULD compare the "iat" value in
the PASSporT to the Date header field value in the request. If the the PASSporT to the Date header field value in the request. If the
two are different, and the "iat" value differs from the Date header two are different, and the "iat" value differs from the Date header
field value but remains within verification service policy for field value but remains within verification service policy for
freshness, the verification service SHOULD perform the computation freshness, the verification service SHOULD perform the computation
required by Step 5 using the "iat" value instead of the Date header required by Step 5, using the "iat" value instead of the Date header
field value. field value.
Step 5: Validate the Signature Step 5: Validate the Signature
The verifier MUST validate the signature in the Identity header field The verifier MUST validate the signature in the Identity header field
over the PASSporT object. For baseline PASSporT objects (with no over the PASSporT object. For baseline PASSporT objects (with no
Identity header field "ppt" parameter) the verifier MUST follow the Identity header field "ppt" parameter), the verifier MUST follow the
procedures for generating the signature over a PASSporT object procedures for generating the signature over a PASSporT object as
described in Section 4. If a "ppt" parameter is present (and per described in Section 4. If a "ppt" parameter is present (and, per
Step 1, is supported), the verifier follows the procedures for that Step 1, is supported), the verifier follows the procedures for that
"ppt" (see Section 9). If a verifier determines that the signature "ppt" (see Section 9). If a verifier determines that the signature
in the Identity does not correspond to the reconstructed signed- in the Identity header field does not correspond to the reconstructed
identity-digest, then the Identity header field should be considered signed-identity-digest, then the Identity header field should be
invalid. considered invalid.
6.2.1. Authorization of Requests 6.2.1. Authorization of Requests
The verification of an Identity header field does not entail any The verification of an Identity header field does not entail any
particular treatment of the request. The handling of the message particular treatment of the request. The handling of the message
after the verification process depends on how the verification after the verification process depends on how the verification
service is implemented and on local policy. This specification does service is implemented and on local policy. This specification
not propose any authorization policy for user agents or proxy servers does not propose any authorization policy for UAs or proxy servers to
to follow based on the presence of a valid Identity header field, the follow based on the presence of a valid Identity header field, the
presence of an invalid Identity header field, or the absence of an presence of an invalid Identity header field, the absence of an
Identity header field, or a stale Date header field value, but it is Identity header field, or the presence of a stale Date header field
anticipated that local policies could involve making different value. However, it is anticipated that local policies could involve
forwarding decisions in intermediary implementations, or changing how making different forwarding decisions in intermediary
the user is alerted, or how identity is rendered, in user agent implementations, or changing how the user is alerted or how identity
implementations. is rendered in UA implementations.
The presence of multiple Identity header fields within a message The presence of multiple Identity header fields within a message
raises the prospect that a verification services could receive a raises the prospect that a verification service could receive a
message containing some valid and some invalid Identity header message containing both valid and invalid Identity header fields. As
fields. As a guideline, this specification recommends that only if a a guideline, this specification recommends that only if a verifier
verifier determines all Identity header fields within a message are determines that all Identity header fields within a message are
invalid should the request be considered to have an invalid identity. invalid should the request be considered to have an invalid identity.
If at least one Identity header field value is valid and from a If at least one Identity header field value is valid and from a
trusted source, then relying parties can use that header for trusted source, then relying parties can use that header for
authorization decisions regardless of whether other untrusted or authorization decisions regardless of whether other untrusted or
invalid Identity headers appear in a request. invalid Identity headers appear in a request.
6.2.2. Failure Response Codes Sent by a Verification Service 6.2.2. Failure Response Codes Sent by a Verification Service
RFC4474 originally defined four response codes for failure conditions [RFC4474] originally defined four response codes for failure
specific to the Identity header field and its original mechanism. conditions specific to the Identity header field and its original
These status codes are retained in this specification, with some mechanism. These status codes are retained in this specification,
slight modifications. Also, this specification details responding with some slight modifications. Also, this specification details
with 403 when a stale Date header field value is received. responding with a 403 "Forbidden" response when a stale Date header
field value is received; see below.
A 428 response will be sent (per Section 6.2) when an Identity header A 428 response will be sent (per Section 6.2) when an Identity header
field is required, but no Identity header field without a "ppt" field is required but no Identity header field without a "ppt"
parameter, or with a supported "ppt" value, has been received. In parameter or with a supported "ppt" value has been received. In the
the case where one or more Identity header fields with unsupported case where one or more Identity header fields with unsupported "ppt"
"ppt" values have been received, then a verification service may send values have been received, then a verification service may send a 428
a 428 with a human-readable reason phrase like "Use Supported with a human-readable reason phrase like "Use Supported PASSporT
PASSporT Format". Note however that this specification gives no Format". Note, however, that this specification gives no guidance on
guidance on how a verification service might decide to require an how a verification service might decide to require an Identity header
Identity header field for a particular SIP request. Such field for a particular SIP request. Such authorization policies are
authorization policies are outside the scope of this specification. outside the scope of this specification.
The 436 'Bad Identity Info' response code indicates an inability to The 436 "Bad Identity Info" response code indicates an inability to
acquire the credentials needed by the verification service for acquire the credentials needed by the verification service for
validating the signature in an Identity header field. Again, given validating the signature in an Identity header field. Again, given
the potential presence of multiple Identity header fields, this the potential presence of multiple Identity header fields, this
response code should only be sent when the verification service is response code should only be sent when the verification service is
unable to deference the URIs and/or acquire the credentials unable to dereference the URIs and/or acquire the credentials
associated with all Identity header fields in the request. This associated with all Identity header fields in the request. This
failure code could be repairable if the authentication service failure code could be repairable if the authentication service
resends the request with an 'info' parameter pointing to a credential resends the request with an "info" parameter pointing to a credential
that the verification service can access. that the verification service can access.
The 437 'Unsupported Credential' is sent when a verification service The 437 "Unsupported Credential" response (previously
can acquire, or already holds, the credential represented by the "Unsupported Certificate"; see Section 13.2) is sent when a
'info' parameter of at least one Identity header field in the verification service can acquire, or already holds, the credential
request, but does not support said credential(s), for reasons such as represented by the "info" parameter of at least one Identity header
failing to trust the issuing CA, or failing to support the algorithm field in the request but does not support said credential(s), for
with which the credential was signed. reasons such as failing to trust the issuing certification authority
(CA) or failing to support the algorithm with which the credential
was signed.
The 438 'Invalid Identity Header' response indicates that of the set The 438 "Invalid Identity Header" response indicates that of the set
of Identity header fields in a request, no header field with a valid of Identity header fields in a request, no header field with a valid
and supported PASSporT object has been received. Like the 428 and supported PASSporT object has been received. Like the 428
response, this is sent by a verification service when its local response, this is sent by a verification service when its local
policy dictates that a broken signature in an Identity header field policy dictates that a broken signature in an Identity header field
is grounds for rejecting a request. Note that in some cases, an is grounds for rejecting a request. Note that in some cases, an
Identity header field may be broken for other reasons than that an Identity header field may be broken for other reasons than that an
originator is attempting to spoof an identity: for example, when a originator is attempting to spoof an identity: for example, when a
transit network alters the Date header field of the request. Sending transit network alters the Date header field of the request. Sending
a full form PASSporT can repair some of these conditions (see a full-form PASSporT can repair some of these conditions (see
Section 6.2.4), so the recommended way to attempt to repair this Section 6.2.4), so the recommended way to attempt to repair this
failure is to retry the request with the full form of PASSporT if it failure is to retry the request with the full form of PASSporT if it
had originally been sent with the compact form. The alternative had originally been sent with the compact form. The alternative
reason phrase 'Invalid PASSporT' can be used when an extended full reason phrase "Invalid PASSporT" can be used when an extended
form PASSporT lacks required headers or claims, or when an extended full-form PASSporT lacks required headers or claims, or when an
full form PASSporT signaled with the "ppt" parameter lacks required extended full-form PASSporT signaled with the "ppt" parameter lacks
claims for that extension. Sending a string along these lines will required claims for that extension. Sending a string along these
help humans debugging the sending system. lines will help humans debugging the sending system.
Finally, a 403 response may be sent when the verification service Finally, a 403 response may be sent when the verification service
receives a request with a Date header field value that is older than receives a request with a Date header field value that is older than
the local policy for freshness permits. The same response may be the local policy for freshness permits. The same response may be
used when the "iat" in the full form of a PASSporT has a value older used when the "iat" in the full form of a PASSporT has a value older
than the local policy for freshness permits. The reason phrase than the local policy for freshness permits. The reason phrase
"Stale Date" can be sent to help humans debug the failure. "Stale Date" can be sent to help humans debug the failure.
Future specifications may explore ways, including Reason codes or Future specifications may explore ways, including Reason codes or
Warning headers, to communicate further information that could be Warning headers, to communicate further information that could be
used to disambiguate the source of errors in cases with multiple used to disambiguate the source of errors in cases with multiple
Identity headers in a single request, or provide similar detailed Identity headers in a single request or to provide similar detailed
feedback for debugging purposes. feedback for debugging purposes.
6.2.3. Handling Retried Requests 6.2.3. Handling Retried Requests
If a verification service sends a failure response in the backwards If a verification service sends a failure response in the backwards
direction, the authentication service may retry the request as direction, the authentication service may retry the request as
described in Section 6.1.1. If the authentication service is described in Section 6.1.1. If the authentication service is
instantiated at a proxy server, then it will retry the request as a instantiated at a proxy server, then it will retry the request as a
sequential fork. Verification services implemented at a proxy server sequential fork. Verification services implemented at a proxy server
will recognize this request as a spiral rather than a loop due to the will recognize this request as a spiral rather than a loop due to the
proxy behavior fix documented in [RFC5393] Section 4.2. However, if proxy behavior fix documented in [RFC5393], Section 4.2. However, if
the verification service is implemented in an endpoint, the endpoint the verification service is implemented in an endpoint, the endpoint
will need to override the default UAS behavior (in particular, the will need to override the default UAS behavior (in particular, the
SHOULD in [RFC3261] Section 8.2.2.2) to accept this request as a SHOULD in [RFC3261], Section 8.2.2.2) to accept this request as a
spiral rather than a loop. spiral rather than a loop.
6.2.4. Handling the full form of PASSporT 6.2.4. Handling the Full Form of PASSporT
If the full form of PASSporT is present in an Identity header, this If the full form of PASSporT is present in an Identity header, this
permits the use of optional extensions as described in permits the use of optional extensions as described in [RFC8225],
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] Section 8.3. Furthermore, the verification Section 8.3. Furthermore, the verification service can extract from
service can extract from the "orig" and "dest" elements of the the "orig" and "dest" elements of the PASSporT full form the
PASSporT full form the canonical telephone numbers created by the canonical telephone numbers created by the authentication service, as
authentication service, as well as an "iat" claim corresponding to well as an "iat" claim corresponding to the Date header field that
the Date header field that the authentication service used. These the authentication service used. These values may be used to debug
values may be used to debug canonicalization problems, or to avoid canonicalization problems or to avoid unnecessary signature breakage
unnecessary signature breakage caused by intermediaries that alter caused by intermediaries that alter certain SIP header field values
certain SIP header field values in transit. in transit.
However, the verification service MUST NOT treat the value in the However, the verification service MUST NOT treat the value in the
"orig" of a full form PASSporT as the originating identity of the "orig" of a full-form PASSporT as the originating identity of the
call: the originating identity of the call is always derived from the call: the originating identity of the call is always derived from the
SIP signaling, and it is that value, per the procedures above in SIP signaling, and it is that value, per the procedures above in
Section 6.2 Step 2, which is used to recompute the signature at the Section 6.2 Step 2, that is used to recompute the signature at the
verification service. That value, rather than the value inside the verification service. That value, rather than the value inside the
PASSporT object, is rendered to an end user in ordinary SIP PASSporT object, is rendered to an end user in ordinary SIP
operations, and if a verification service were to simply trust that operations, and if a verification service were to simply trust that
the value in the "orig" corresponded to the call that it received the value in the "orig" corresponded to the call that it received
without comparing it to the call signaling, this would enable various without comparing it to the call signaling, this would enable various
cut-and-paste attacks. As an optimization, when the full form is cut-and-paste attacks. As an optimization, when the full form is
present, the verification service MAY delay performing that present, the verification service MAY delay performing that
cryptographic operation and first compute its own canonicalization of cryptographic operation and first compute its own canonicalization of
an originating telephone number to compare it to the values in the an originating telephone number to compare it to the values in the
"orig" element of PASSporT. This would allow the verification "orig" element of PASSporT. This would allow the verification
skipping to change at page 21, line 12 skipping to change at page 22, line 22
canonical number form; if they do not, then surely the signature canonical number form; if they do not, then surely the signature
validation would fail. validation would fail.
7. Credentials 7. Credentials
This section gives general guidance on the use of credential systems This section gives general guidance on the use of credential systems
by authentication and verification services, as well as requirements by authentication and verification services, as well as requirements
that must be met by credential systems that conform with this that must be met by credential systems that conform with this
architecture. It does not mandate any specific credential system. architecture. It does not mandate any specific credential system.
Furthermore, this specification allows either a user agent or a proxy Furthermore, this specification allows either a UA or a proxy server
server to provide the authentication service function and/or the to provide the authentication service function and/or the
verification service function. For the purposes of end-to-end verification service function. For the purposes of end-to-end
security, it is obviously preferable for end systems to acquire their security, it is obviously preferable for end systems to acquire their
own credentials; in this case user agents can act as authentication own credentials; in this case, UAs can act as authentication
services. However, for some deployments, end-user credentials may be services. However, for some deployments, end-user credentials may be
neither practical nor affordable, given the potentially large number neither practical nor affordable, given the potentially large number
of SIP user agents (phones, PCs, laptops, PDAs, gaming devices) that of SIP UAs (phones, PCs, laptops, PDAs, gaming devices) that may be
may be employed by a single user. Synchronizing keying material employed by a single user. Synchronizing keying material across
across multiple devices may be prohibitively complex and require multiple devices may be prohibitively complex and require quite a
quite a good deal of additional endpoint behavior. Managing several good deal of additional endpoint behavior. Managing several
credentials for the various devices could also be burdensome. Thus, credentials for the various devices could also be burdensome. Thus,
for reasons of credential management alone, implementing the for reasons of credential management alone, implementing the
authentication service at an intermediary may be more practical. authentication service at an intermediary may be more practical.
This trade-off needs to be understood by implementers of this This trade-off needs to be understood by implementers of this
specification. specification.
7.1. Credential Use by the Authentication Service 7.1. Credential Use by the Authentication Service
In order to act as an authentication service, a SIP entity must In order to act as an authentication service, a SIP entity must
possess the private keying material of one or more credentials that possess the private keying material of one or more credentials that
skipping to change at page 21, line 45 skipping to change at page 23, line 10
domains enumerated by the credential. Similarly, a credential may domains enumerated by the credential. Similarly, a credential may
represent authority over a single telephone number or a range of represent authority over a single telephone number or a range of
telephone numbers. The way that the scope of a credential's telephone numbers. The way that the scope of a credential's
authority is expressed is specific to the credential mechanism. authority is expressed is specific to the credential mechanism.
Authorization of the use of a particular username or telephone number Authorization of the use of a particular username or telephone number
in the From header field value is a matter of local policy for the in the From header field value is a matter of local policy for the
authentication service, one that depends greatly on the manner in authentication service, one that depends greatly on the manner in
which authentication is performed. For non-telephone number user which authentication is performed. For non-telephone number user
parts, one policy might be as follows: the username given in the parts, one policy might be as follows: the username given in the
'username' parameter of the Proxy-Authorization header field must "username" parameter of the Proxy-Authorization header field must
correspond exactly to the username in the From header field of the correspond exactly to the username in the From header field of the
SIP message. However, there are many cases in which this is too SIP message. However, there are many cases in which this is too
limiting or inappropriate; a realm might use 'username' parameters in limiting or inappropriate; a realm might use "username" parameters in
Proxy-Authorization header field that do not correspond to the user- the Proxy-Authorization header field that do not correspond to the
portion of From header fields, or a user might manage multiple user portion of From header fields, or a user might manage multiple
accounts in the same administrative domain. In this latter case, a accounts in the same administrative domain. In this latter case, a
domain might maintain a mapping between the values in the 'username' domain might maintain a mapping between the values in the "username"
parameter of the Proxy-Authorization header field and a set of one or parameter of the Proxy-Authorization header field and a set of one or
more SIP URIs that might legitimately be asserted for that more SIP URIs that might legitimately be asserted for that
'username'. For example, the username can correspond to the 'private "username". For example, the username can correspond to the "private
identity' as defined in Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), identity" as defined by the Third Generation Partnership Project
in which case the From header field can contain any one of the public (3GPP) [TS-3GPP.23.228], in which case the From header field can
identities associated with this private identity. In this instance, contain any one of the public identities associated with this private
another policy might be as follows: the URI in the From header field identity. In this instance, another policy might be as follows: the
must correspond exactly to one of the mapped URIs associated with the URI in the From header field must correspond exactly to one of the
'username' given in the Proxy-Authorization header field. This is a mapped URIs associated with the "username" given in the
suitable approach for telephone numbers in particular. Proxy-Authorization header field. This is a suitable approach for
telephone numbers in particular.
This specification could also be used with credentials that cover a This specification could also be used with credentials that cover a
single name or URI, such as alice@example.com or single name or URI, such as alice@example.com or
sip:alice@example.com. This would require a modification to sip:alice@example.com. This would require a modification to
authentication service behavior to operate on a whole URI rather than authentication service behavior to operate on a whole URI rather than
a domain name. Because this is not believed to be a pressing use a domain name. Because this is not believed to be a pressing use
case, this is deferred to future work, but implementers should note case, this is deferred to future work, but implementers should note
this as a possible future direction. this as a possible future direction.
Exceptions to such authentication service policies arise for cases Exceptions to such authentication service policies arise for cases
like anonymity; if the AoR asserted in the From header field uses a like anonymity; if the AoR asserted in the From header field uses a
form like 'sip:anonymous@example.com' (see [RFC3323]), then the form like "sip:anonymous@example.com" (see [RFC3323]), then the
'example.com' proxy might authenticate only that the user is a valid "example.com" proxy might authenticate only that the user is a valid
user in the domain and insert the signature over the From header user in the domain and insert the signature over the From header
field as usual. field as usual.
7.2. Credential Use by the Verification Service 7.2. Credential Use by the Verification Service
In order to act as a verification service, a SIP entity must have a In order to act as a verification service, a SIP entity must have a
way to acquire credentials for authorities over particular domain way to acquire credentials for authorities over particular domain
names, telephone numbers and/or number ranges. Dereferencing the URI names, telephone numbers, and/or number ranges. Dereferencing the
found in the "info" parameter of the Identity header field (as URI found in the "info" parameter of the Identity header field (as
described Section 7.3) MUST be supported by all verification service described in Section 7.3) MUST be supported by all verification
implementations to create a baseline means of credential acquisition. service implementations to create a baseline means of credential
Provided that the credential used to sign a message is not previously acquisition. Provided that the credential used to sign a message is
known to the verifier, SIP entities SHOULD discover this credential not previously known to the verifier, SIP entities SHOULD discover
by dereferencing the "info" parameter, unless they have some this credential by dereferencing the "info" parameter, unless they
implementation-specific way of acquiring the needed keying material, have some implementation-specific way of acquiring the needed keying
such as an offline store of periodically-updated credentials. The material, such as an offline store of periodically updated
436 'Bad Identity Info' response exists for cases where the credentials. The 436 "Bad Identity Info" response exists for cases
verification service cannot deference the URI in the "info" where the verification service cannot dereference the URI in the
parameter. "info" parameter.
This specification does not propose any particular policy for a This specification does not propose any particular policy for a
verification service to determine whether or not the holder of a verification service to determine whether or not the holder of a
credential is the appropriate party to sign for a given SIP identity. credential is the appropriate party to sign for a given SIP identity.
Guidance on this is deferred to credential mechanism specifications. Guidance on this is deferred to credential mechanism specifications.
Verification service implementations supporting this specification Verification service implementations supporting this specification
may wish to have some means of retaining credentials (in accordance may wish to have some means of retaining credentials (in accordance
with normal practices for credential lifetimes and revocation) in with normal practices for credential lifetimes and revocation) in
order to prevent themselves from needlessly downloading the same order to prevent themselves from needlessly downloading the same
credential every time a request from the same identity is received. credential every time a request from the same identity is received.
Credentials cached in this manner may be indexed in accordance with Credentials cached in this manner may be indexed in accordance with
local policy: for example, by their scope of authority, or the URI local policy: for example, by their scope of authority or by the URI
given in the "info" parameter value. Further consideration of how to given in the "info" parameter value. Further consideration of how to
cache credentials is deferred to the credential mechanism cache credentials is deferred to the credential mechanism
specifications. specifications.
7.3. 'info' parameter URIs 7.3. "info" Parameter URIs
An "info" parameter MUST contain a URI which dereferences to a An "info" parameter MUST contain a URI that dereferences to a
resource that contains the public key components of the credential resource that contains the public key components of the credential
used by the authentication service to sign a request. It is used by the authentication service to sign a request. It is
essential that a URI in the "info" parameter be dereferencable by any essential that a URI in the "info" parameter be dereferencable by any
entity that could plausibly receive the request. For common cases, entity that could plausibly receive the request. For common cases,
this means that the URI SHOULD be dereferencable by any entity on the this means that the URI SHOULD be dereferencable by any entity on the
public Internet. In constrained deployment environments, a service public Internet. In constrained deployment environments, a service
private to the environment MAY be used instead. private to the environment MAY be used instead.
Beyond providing a means of accessing credentials for an identity, Beyond providing a means of accessing credentials for an identity,
the "info" parameter further serves as a means of differentiating the "info" parameter further serves as a means of differentiating
which particular credential was used to sign a request, when there which particular credential was used to sign a request, when there
are potentially multiple authorities eligible to sign. For example, are potentially multiple authorities eligible to sign. For example,
imagine a case where a domain implements the authentication service imagine a case where a domain implements the authentication service
role for a range of telephone numbers and a user agent belonging to role for a range of telephone numbers and a UA belonging to Alice has
Alice has acquired a credential for a single telephone number within acquired a credential for a single telephone number within that
that range. Either would be eligible to sign a SIP request for the range. Either would be eligible to sign a SIP request for the number
number in question. Verification services however need a means to in question. Verification services, however, need a means to
differentiate which one performed the signature. The "info" differentiate which one performed the signature. The "info"
parameter performs that function. parameter performs that function.
7.4. Credential System Requirements 7.4. Credential System Requirements
This document makes no recommendation for the use of any specific This document makes no recommendation for the use of any specific
credential system. Today, there are two primary credential systems credential system. Today, there are two primary credential systems
in place for proving ownership of domain names: certificates (e.g., in place for proving ownership of domain names: certificates (e.g.,
X.509 v3, see [RFC5280]) and the domain name system itself (e.g., X.509 v3; see [RFC5280]) and the domain name system itself (e.g.,
DANE, see [RFC6698]). It is envisioned that either could be used in DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE); see [RFC6698]).
the SIP identity context: an "info" parameter could for example give It is envisioned that either could be used in the SIP identity
an HTTP URL of the Content-Type 'application/pkix-cert' pointing to a context: an "info" parameter could, for example, give an HTTP URL of
certificate (following the conventions of [RFC2585]). The "info" the Content-Type "application/pkix-cert" pointing to a certificate
parameter might use the DNS URL scheme (see [RFC4501]) to designate (following the conventions of [RFC2585]). The "info" parameter might
keys in the DNS. use the DNS URL scheme (see [RFC4501]) to designate keys in the DNS.
While no comparable public credentials exist for telephone numbers, While no comparable public credentials exist for telephone numbers,
either approach could be applied to telephone numbers. A credential either approach could be applied to telephone numbers. A credential
system based on certificates is given in system based on certificates is given in [RFC8226], but this
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates], but this specification can work with specification can work with other credential systems; for example,
other credential systems; for example, using the DNS was proposed in using the DNS was proposed in [CIDER].
[I-D.kaplan-stir-cider].
In order for a credential system to work with this mechanism, its In order for a credential system to work with this mechanism, its
specification must detail: specification must detail:
which URIs schemes the credential will use in the "info" o which URI schemes the credential will use in the "info" parameter,
parameter, and any special procedures required to dereference the and any special procedures required to dereference the URIs,
URIs
how the verifier can learn the scope of the credential o how the verifier can learn the scope of the credential,
any special procedures required to extract keying material from o any special procedures required to extract keying material from
the resources designated by the URI the resources designated by the URI,
any algorithms required to validate the credentials (e.g. for o any algorithms required to validate the credentials (e.g., for
certificates, any algorithms used by certificate authorities to certificates, any algorithms used by certificate authorities to
sign certificates themselves), and sign certificates themselves), and
how the associated credentials will support the mandatory signing o how the associated credentials will support the mandatory signing
algorithm(s) required by PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport]. algorithm(s) required by PASSporT [RFC8225].
SIP entities cannot reliably predict where SIP requests will SIP entities cannot reliably predict where SIP requests will
terminate. When choosing a credential scheme for deployments of this terminate. When choosing a credential scheme for deployments of this
specification, it is therefore essential that the trust anchor(s) for specification, it is therefore essential that the trust anchor(s) for
credentials be widely trusted, or that deployments restrict the use credentials be widely trusted or that deployments restrict the use of
of this mechanism to environments where the reliance on particular this mechanism to environments where the reliance on particular trust
trust anchors is assured by business arrangements or similar anchors is assured by business arrangements or similar constraints.
constraints.
Note that credential systems must address key lifecycle management Note that credential systems must address key lifecycle management
concerns: were a domain to change the credential available at the concerns: were a domain to change the credential available at the
Identity header field "info" parameter URI before a verifier Identity header field "info" parameter URI before a verifier
evaluates a request signed by an authentication service, this would evaluates a request signed by an authentication service, this would
cause obvious verifier failures. When a rollover occurs, cause obvious verifier failures. When a rollover occurs,
authentication services SHOULD thus provide new "info" URIs for each authentication services SHOULD thus provide new "info" URIs for each
new credential, and SHOULD continue to make older key acquisition new credential and SHOULD continue to make older key acquisition URIs
URIs available for a duration longer than the plausible lifetime of a available for a duration longer than the plausible lifetime of a SIP
SIP transaction (a minute would most likely suffice). transaction (a minute would most likely suffice).
8. Identity Types 8. Identity Types
The problem statement of STIR [RFC7340] focuses primarily on cases The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] focuses primarily on cases where
where the called and calling parties identified in the To and From the called and calling parties identified in the To and From header
header field values use telephone numbers, as this remains the field values use telephone numbers, as this remains the dominant use
dominant use case in the deployment of SIP. However, the Identity case in the deployment of SIP. However, the Identity header
header mechanism also works with SIP URIs without telephone numbers mechanism also works with SIP URIs without telephone numbers (of the
(of the form "sip:user@host"), and potentially other identifiers when form "sip:user@host") and, potentially, other identifiers when SIP
SIP interworks with other protocols. interworks with other protocols.
Authentication services confirm the identity of the originator of a Authentication services confirm the identity of the originator of a
call, which is typically found in the From header field value. The call, which is typically found in the From header field value. The
guidance in this specification also applies to extracting the URI guidance in this specification also applies to extracting the URI
containing the originator's identity from the P-Asserted-Identity containing the originator's identity from the P-Asserted-Identity
header field value instead of the From header field value. In some header field value instead of the From header field value. In some
trusted environments, the P-Asserted-Identity header field is used in trusted environments, the P-Asserted-Identity header field is used
lieu of the From header field to convey the address-of-record or in lieu of the From header field to convey the AoR or telephone
telephone number of the originator of a request; where it does, local number of the originator of a request; where it does, local policy
policy might therefore dictate that the canonical identity derives might therefore dictate that the canonical identity derives from the
from the P-Asserted-Identity header field rather than the From header P-Asserted-Identity header field rather than the From header field.
field.
Ultimately, in any case where local policy canonicalizes the identity Ultimately, in any case where local policy canonicalizes the identity
into a form different from how it appears in the From header field, into a form different from how it appears in the From header field,
the use of the full form of PASSporT by authentication services is the use of the full form of PASSporT by authentication services is
RECOMMENDED, but because the "orig" claim of PASSporT itself could RECOMMENDED, but because the "orig" claim of PASSporT itself could
then divulge information about users or networks, implementers should then divulge information about users or networks, implementers should
be mindful of the guidelines in Section 11. be mindful of the guidelines in Section 11.
8.1. Differentiating Telephone Numbers from URIs 8.1. Differentiating Telephone Numbers from URIs
In order to determine whether or not the user portion of a SIP URI is In order to determine whether or not the user portion of a SIP URI is
a telephone number, authentication services and verification services a telephone number, authentication services and verification services
MUST perform the following procedure on any SIP URI they inspect MUST perform the following procedure on any SIP URI they inspect that
which contains a numeric user part. Note that the same procedures contains a numeric user part. Note that the same procedures are
are followed for creating the canonical form of a URI found in the followed for creating the canonical form of a URI found in the From
From header field as they are for one found in the To header field or header field as the procedures used for a URI found in the To header
the P-Asserted-Identity header field. field or the P-Asserted-Identity header field.
First, implementations will ascertain if the user-portion of the URI First, implementations will ascertain if the user portion of the URI
constitutes a telephone number. Telephone numbers most commonly constitutes a telephone number. Telephone numbers most commonly
appear in SIP header field values in the username portion of a SIP appear in SIP header field values in the username portion of a SIP
URI (e.g., 'sip:+17005551008@chicago.example.com;user=phone'). The URI (e.g., "sip:+17005551008@chicago.example.com;user=phone"). The
user part of SIP URIs with the "user=phone" parameter conforms to the user part of SIP URIs with the "user=phone" parameter conforms to the
syntax of the TEL URI scheme (RFC 3966 [RFC3966]). It is also syntax of the tel URI scheme [RFC3966]. It is also possible for a
possible for a TEL URI to appear in SIP header fields outside the tel URI to appear in SIP header fields outside the context of a SIP
context of a SIP or SIPS URI (e.g., 'tel:+17005551008'). Thus, in or Session Initiation Protocol Secure (SIPS) URI (e.g.,
standards-compliant environments, numbers will be explicitly labeled "tel:+17005551008"). Thus, in standards-compliant environments,
by the use of TEL URIs or the 'user=phone' parameter. numbers will be explicitly labeled by the use of tel URIs or the
"user=phone" parameter.
Alternatively, implementations in environments that do not conform to Alternatively, implementations in environments that do not conform to
those standards MAY follow local policies for identifying telephone those standards MAY follow local policies for identifying telephone
numbers. For example, implementations could infer that the user part numbers. For example, implementations could infer that the user part
is a telephone number due to the presence of the '+' indicator at the is a telephone number due to the presence of the "+" indicator at the
start of the user-portion. Absent even that indication, if there are start of the user portion. Absent even that indication, if there are
numbers present in the user-portion, implementations might numbers present in the user portion, implementations might
conceivably also detect that the user-portion of the URI contains a conceivably also detect that the user portion of the URI contains a
telephone number by determining whether or not those numbers would be telephone number by determining whether or not those numbers would be
dialable or routable in the local environment -- bearing in mind that dialable or routable in the local environment -- bearing in mind that
the telephone number may be a valid [E.164] number, a nationally- the telephone number may be a valid E.164 number [E.164], a
specific number, or even a private branch exchange number. nationally specific number, or even a private branch exchange number.
Implementations could also rely on external hints: for example, a Implementations could also rely on external hints: for example, a
verification service implementation could infer from the type of verification service implementation could infer from the type of
credential that signed a request that the signature must be over a credential that signed a request that the signature must be over a
telephone number. telephone number.
Regardless of how the implementation detects telephone numbers, once Regardless of how the implementation detects telephone numbers, once
a telephone number has been detected, implementations SHOULD follow a telephone number has been detected, implementations SHOULD follow
the procedures in Section 8.3. If the URI field does not contain a the procedures in Section 8.3. If the URI field does not contain a
telephone number, or if the result of the canonicalization of the telephone number or if the result of the canonicalization of the From
From header field value does not form a valid E.164 telephone number, header field value does not form a valid E.164 telephone number, the
the authentication service and/or verification service SHOULD treat authentication service and/or verification service SHOULD treat the
the entire URI as a SIP URI, and apply the procedures in Section 8.5. entire URI as a SIP URI and apply the procedures in Section 8.5.
These URI normalization procedures are invoked to canonicalize the These URI normalization procedures are invoked to canonicalize the
URI before it is included in a PASSporT object in, for example, a URI before it is included in a PASSporT object in, for example, a
"uri" claim. See Section 8.5 for that behavior. "uri" claim. See Section 8.5 for that behavior.
8.2. Authority for Telephone Numbers 8.2. Authority for Telephone Numbers
In order for telephone numbers to be used with the mechanism In order for telephone numbers to be used with the mechanism
described in this document, authentication services must receive described in this document, authentication services must receive
credentials from an authority for telephone numbers or telephone credentials from an authority for telephone numbers or telephone
number ranges, and verification services must trust the authority number ranges, and verification services must trust the authority
employed by the authentication service that signs a request. Per employed by the authentication service that signs a request. Per
Section 7.4, enrollment procedures and credential management are Section 7.4, enrollment procedures and credential management are
outside the scope of this document; approaches to credential outside the scope of this document; approaches to credential
management for telephone numbers are discussed in management for telephone numbers are discussed in [RFC8226].
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates].
8.3. Telephone Number Canonicalization Procedures 8.3. Telephone Number Canonicalization Procedures
Once an implementation has identified a telephone number, it must Once an implementation has identified a telephone number, it must
construct a number string. That requires performing the following construct a number string. That requires performing the following
steps: steps:
Implementations MUST drop any "+"s, any internal dashes, o Implementations MUST drop any "+"s, internal dashes, parentheses,
parentheses or other non-numeric characters, excepting only the or other non-numeric characters, except for the "#" or "*" keys
"#" or "*" keys used in some special service numbers (typically, used in some special service numbers (typically, these will appear
these will appear only in the To header field value). This MUST only in the To header field value). This MUST result in an ASCII
result in an ASCII string limited to "#", "*" and digits without string limited to "#", "*", and digits without whitespace or
whitespace or visual separators. visual separators.
Next, an implementation must assess if the number string is a o Next, an implementation must assess if the number string is a
valid, globally-routable number with a leading country code. If valid, globally routable number with a leading country code.
not, implementations SHOULD convert the number into E.164 format,
adding a country code if necessary; this may involve transforming
the number from a dial string (see [RFC3966]), removing any
national or international dialing prefixes or performing similar
procedures. It is only in the case that an implementation cannot
determine how to convert the number to a globally-routable format
that this step may be skipped. This will be the case, for
example, for nationally-specific service numbers (e.g. 911, 112);
however, calls to those numbers are routed in a very strict
fashion which ordinarily prevents them from reaching entities that
don't understand the numbers.
Some domains may need to take unique steps to convert their If not, implementations SHOULD convert the number into E.164
format, adding a country code if necessary; this may involve
transforming the number from a dial string (see [RFC3966]),
removing any national or international dialing prefixes or
performing similar procedures. It is only in the case that an
implementation cannot determine how to convert the number to a
globally routable format that this step may be skipped. This will
be the case, for example, for nationally specific service numbers
(e.g., 911, 112); however, calls to those numbers are routed in a
very strict fashion, which ordinarily prevents them from reaching
entities that don't understand the numbers.
o Some domains may need to take unique steps to convert their
numbers into a global format, and such transformations during numbers into a global format, and such transformations during
canonicalization can also be made in accordance with specific canonicalization can also be made in accordance with specific
policies used within a local domain. For example, one domain may policies used within a local domain. For example, one domain may
only use local number formatting and need to convert all To/From only use local number formatting and need to convert all To/From
header field user portions to E.164 by prepending country-code and header field user portions to E.164 by prepending country-code and
region code digits; another domain might have prefixed usernames region-code digits; another domain might have prefixed usernames
with trunk-routing codes, in which case the canonicalization will with trunk-routing codes, in which case the canonicalization will
need to remove the prefix. This specification cannot anticipate need to remove the prefix. This specification cannot anticipate
all of the potential transformations that might be useful. all of the potential transformations that might be useful.
The resulting canonical number string will be used as input to the o The resulting canonical number string will be used as input to the
hash calculation during signing and verifying processes. hash calculation during signing and verifying processes.
The ABNF of this number string is: The ABNF of this number string is:
tn-spec = 1*tn-char tn-spec = 1*tn-char
tn-char = "#" / "*" / DIGIT tn-char = "#" / "*" / DIGIT
The resulting number string is used in the construction of the The resulting number string is used in the construction of the
telephone number field(s) in a PASSporT object. telephone number field(s) in a PASSporT object.
skipping to change at page 28, line 17 skipping to change at page 29, line 30
A verifier MUST evaluate the correspondence between the user's A verifier MUST evaluate the correspondence between the user's
identity and the signing credential by following the procedures identity and the signing credential by following the procedures
defined in [RFC5922], Section 7.2. While [RFC5922] deals with the defined in [RFC5922], Section 7.2. While [RFC5922] deals with the
use of TLS and is specific to certificates, the procedures described use of TLS and is specific to certificates, the procedures described
are applicable to verifying identity if one substitutes the "hostname are applicable to verifying identity if one substitutes the "hostname
of the server" for the domain portion of the user's identity in the of the server" for the domain portion of the user's identity in the
From header field of a SIP request with an Identity header field. From header field of a SIP request with an Identity header field.
This process is complicated by two deployment realities. In the This process is complicated by two deployment realities. In the
first place, credentials have varying ways of describing their first place, credentials have varying ways of describing their
subjects, and may indeed have multiple subjects, especially in subjects and may indeed have multiple subjects, especially in
'virtual hosting' cases where multiple domains are managed by a "virtual hosting" cases where multiple domains are managed by a
single application (see [RFC5922] Section 7.8). Secondly, some SIP single application (see [RFC5922], Section 7.8). Secondly, some SIP
services may delegate SIP functions to a subordinate domain and services may delegate SIP functions to a subordinate domain and
utilize the procedures in [RFC3263] that allow requests for, say, utilize the procedures in [RFC3263] that allow requests for, say,
'example.com' to be routed to 'sip.example.com'. As a result, a user "example.com" to be routed to "sip.example.com". As a result, a user
with the AoR 'sip:alice@example.com' may process requests through a with the AoR "sip:alice@example.com" may process requests through a
host like 'sip.example.com', and it may be that latter host that acts host like "sip.example.com", and it may be that latter host that acts
as an authentication service. as an authentication service.
To address the second of these problems, a domain that deploys an To address the second of these problems, a domain that deploys an
authentication service on a subordinate host might supply that host authentication service on a subordinate host might supply that host
with the private keying material associated with a credential whose with the private keying material associated with a credential whose
subject is a domain name that corresponds to the domain portion of subject is a domain name that corresponds to the domain portion of
the AoRs that the domain distributes to users. Note that this the AoRs that the domain distributes to users. Note that this
corresponds to the comparable case of routing inbound SIP requests to corresponds to the comparable case of routing inbound SIP requests to
a domain. When the NAPTR and SRV procedures of RFC 3263 are used to a domain. When the NAPTR and SRV procedures of [RFC3263] are used to
direct requests to a domain name other than the domain in the direct requests to a domain name other than the domain in the
original Request-URI (e.g., for 'sip:alice@example.com', the original Request-URI (e.g., for "sip:alice@example.com", the
corresponding SRV records point to the service 'sip1.example.org'), corresponding SRV records point to the service "sip1.example.org"),
the client expects that the certificate passed back in any TLS the client expects that the certificate passed back in any TLS
exchange with that host will correspond exactly with the domain of exchange with that host will correspond exactly with the domain of
the original Request-URI, not the domain name of the host. the original Request-URI, not the domain name of the host.
Consequently, in order to make inbound routing to such SIP services Consequently, in order to make inbound routing to such SIP services
work, a domain administrator must similarly be willing to share the work, a domain administrator must similarly be willing to share the
domain's private key with the service. This design decision was made domain's private key with the service. This design decision was made
to compensate for the insecurity of the DNS, and it makes certain to compensate for the insecurity of the DNS, and it makes certain
potential approaches to DNS-based 'virtual hosting' unsecurable for potential approaches to DNS-based "virtual hosting" unsecurable for
SIP in environments where domain administrators are unwilling to SIP in environments where domain administrators are unwilling to
share keys with hosting services. share keys with hosting services.
8.5. URI Normalization 8.5. URI Normalization
Just as telephone numbers may undergo a number of syntactic Just as telephone numbers may undergo a number of syntactic
transformations during transit, the same can happen to SIP and SIPS transformations during transit, the same can happen to SIP and SIPS
URIs without telephone numbers as they traverse certain URIs without telephone numbers as they traverse certain
intermediaries. Therefore, when generating a PASSporT object based intermediaries. Therefore, when generating a PASSporT object based
on a SIP request, any SIP and SIPS URIs must be transformed into a on a SIP request, any SIP and SIPS URIs must be transformed into a
canonical form which captures the address-of-record represented by canonical form that captures the AoR represented by the URI before
the URI before they are provisioned in PASSporT claims such as "uri". they are provisioned in PASSporT claims such as "uri". The URI
The URI normalization procedures required are as follows. normalization procedures required are as follows.
Following the ABNF of RFC3261, the SIP or SIPS URI in question MUST Following the ABNF of [RFC3261], the SIP or SIPS URI in question MUST
discard all elements after the "hostport" of the URI, including all discard all elements after the "hostport" of the URI, including all
uri-parameters and escaped headers, from its syntax. Of the userinfo uri-parameters and escaped headers, from its syntax. Of the userinfo
component of the SIP URI, only the user element will be retained: any component of the SIP URI, only the user element will be retained: any
password (and any leading ":" before the password) MUST be removed, password (and any leading ":" before the password) MUST be removed,
and since this userinfo necessarily does not contain a telephone- and since this userinfo necessarily does not contain a
subscriber component, no further parameters can appear in the user telephone-subscriber component, no further parameters can appear in
portion. the user portion.
The hostport portion of the SIP or SIPS URI MUST similarly be The hostport portion of the SIP or SIPS URI MUST similarly be
stripped of any trailing port along with the ":" that proceeds the stripped of any trailing port along with the ":" that proceeds the
port, leaving only the host. port, leaving only the host.
The ABNF of this canonical URI form (following the syntax defined in The ABNF of this canonical URI form (following the syntax defined in
RFC3261) is: [RFC3261]) is:
canon-uri = ( "sip" / "sips" ) ":" user "@" host canon-uri = ( "sip" / "sips" ) ":" user "@" host
Finally, the URI will be subject to syntax-based URI normalization Finally, the URI will be subject to the syntax-based URI
procedures of [RFC3986] Section 6.2.2. Implementations MUST perform normalization procedures of [RFC3986], Section 6.2.2.
case normalization (rendering the scheme, user, and host all Implementations MUST perform case normalization (rendering the
lowercase) and percent-encoding normalization (decoding any percent- scheme, user, and host all lowercase) and percent-encoding
encoded octet that corresponds to an unreserved character, per normalization (decoding any percent-encoded octet that corresponds to
[RFC3986] Section 2.3). However, note that normalization procedures an unreserved character, per [RFC3986], Section 2.3). However, note
face known challenges in some internationalized environments (see that normalization procedures face known challenges in some
[I-D.ietf-iri-comparison]) and that perfect normalization of URIs may internationalized environments (see [IRI-COMPARISON]) and that
not be possible in those environments. perfect normalization of URIs may not be possible in those
environments.
For future PASSporT applications, it may be desirable to provide an For future PASSporT applications, it may be desirable to provide an
identifier without an attached protocol scheme. Future identifier without an attached protocol scheme. Future
specifications that define PASSporT claims for SIP as a using specifications that define PASSporT claims for SIP as a using
protocol could use these basic procedures, but eliminate the scheme protocol could use these basic procedures but could eliminate the
component. A more exact definition is left to future specifications. scheme component. A more exact definition is left to future
specifications.
9. Extensibility 9. Extensibility
As future requirements may warrant increasing the scope of the As future requirements may warrant increasing the scope of the
Identity mechanism, this specification specifies an optional "ppt" Identity mechanism, this specification specifies an optional "ppt"
parameter of the Identity header field, which mirrors the "ppt" parameter of the Identity header field, which mirrors the "ppt"
header in PASSporT. The "ppt" parameter value MUST consist of a header in PASSporT. The "ppt" parameter value MUST consist of a
token containing an extension specification, which denotes an token containing an extension specification, which denotes an
extended set of one or more signed claims per the type extensibility extended set of one or more signed claims per the type extensibility
mechanism specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] Section 8. Note that mechanism specified in [RFC8225], Section 8. Note that per the
per the guidance in that section, "ppt" is used only to enforce a guidance in that section, "ppt" is used only to enforce a mandatory
mandatory extension: optional claims may be added to any PASSporT extension: optional claims may be added to any PASSporT object
object without requiring the use of "ppt", but the compact form of without requiring the use of "ppt", but the compact form of PASSporT
PASSporT MUST NOT be used when optional claims are present in the MUST NOT be used when optional claims are present in the PASSporT
PASSporT payload. payload.
The potential for extensions is one the primary motivations for The potential for extensions is one of the primary motivations for
allowing the presence of multiple Identity header fields in the same allowing the presence of multiple Identity header fields in the same
SIP request. It is envisioned that future extensions might allow for SIP request. It is envisioned that future extensions might allow for
alternate information to be signed, or to explicitly allow different alternate information to be signed or explicitly allow different
parties to provide the signatures than the authorities envisioned by parties to provide the signatures than the authorities envisioned by
baseline STIR. A request might, for example, have one Identity added baseline STIR. A request might, for example, have one Identity added
by an authentication service at the originating administrative by an authentication service at the originating administrative domain
domain, and then another Identity header field added by some further and then another Identity header field added by some further
intermediary using a PASSporT extension. While this specification intermediary using a PASSporT extension. While this specification
does not define any such specific purpose for multiple Identity does not define any such specific purpose for multiple Identity
header fields, implementations MUST support receiving multiple header header fields, implementations MUST support receiving multiple header
fields for future compatibility reasons. fields for reasons of future compatibility.
An authentication service cannot assume that verifiers will An authentication service cannot assume that verifiers will
understand any given extension. Verifiers that do support an understand any given extension. Verifiers that do support an
extension may then trigger appropriate application-level behavior in extension may then trigger appropriate application-level behavior in
the presence of an extension; authors of extensions should provide the presence of an extension; authors of extensions should provide
appropriate extension-specific guidance to application developers on appropriate extension-specific guidance to application developers on
this point. this point.
10. Backwards Compatibility with RFC4474 10. Backwards Compatibility with RFC 4474
This specification introduces several significant changes from the This specification introduces several significant changes from the
RFC4474 version of the Identity header field. However, due to the version of the Identity header field defined by [RFC4474]. However,
problems enumerated in [I-D.rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns], it is due to the problems enumerated in [SIP-RFC4474-CONCERNS], it is not
not believed that the original Identity header field has seen any believed that the original Identity header field has seen any
deployment, or even implementation in deployed products. deployment, or even implementation in deployed products.
As such, this mechanism contains no provisions for signatures As such, this mechanism contains no provisions for signatures
generated with this specification to work with RFC4474-compliant generated with this specification to work with implementations
implementations, nor any related backwards-compatibility provisions. compliant with [RFC4474], nor does it contain any related backwards-
Hypothetically, were an RFC4474-compliant implementation to receive compatibility provisions. Hypothetically, were an implementation
messages containing this revised version of the Identity header compliant with [RFC4474] to receive messages containing this revised
field, it would likely fail the request with a 436 response code due version of the Identity header field, it would likely fail the
to the absence of an Identity-Info header field. Implementations of request with a 436 response code due to the absence of an
this specification, for debugging purposes, might interpret a 436 Identity-Info header field (Section 4). Implementations of this
with a reason phrase of "Bad Identity-Info" as an indication that the specification, for debugging purposes, might interpret a 436 with a
request has failed because it reached a (hypothetical) reason phrase of "Bad Identity Info" (previously "Bad Identity-Info";
RFC4474-compliant verification service. see Section 13.2) as an indication that the request has failed
because it reached a (hypothetical) verification service that is
compliant with [RFC4474].
11. Privacy Considerations 11. Privacy Considerations
The purpose of this mechanism is to provide a reliable identification The purpose of this mechanism is to provide a reliable identification
of the originator of a SIP request, specifically a cryptographic of the originator of a SIP request, specifically a cryptographic
assurance that an authority asserts the originator can claim the URI assurance that an authority asserts the originator can claim the URI
the identity stipulated in the request. This URI may contain or the identity stipulated in the request. This URI may contain or
imply a variety of personally identifying information, including the imply a variety of personally identifying information, including the
name of a human being, their place of work or service provider, and name of a human being, their place of work or service provider, and,
possibly further details. The intrinsic privacy risks associated possibly, further details. The intrinsic privacy risks associated
with that URI are, however, no different from those of baseline SIP. with that URI are, however, no different from those of baseline SIP.
Per the guidance in [RFC6973], implementers should make users aware Per the guidance in [RFC6973], implementers should make users aware
of the privacy trade-off of providing secure identity. of the privacy trade-off of providing secure identity.
The identity mechanism presented in this document is compatible with The identity mechanism presented in this document is compatible with
the standard SIP practices for privacy described in [RFC3323]. A SIP the standard SIP practices for privacy described in [RFC3323]. A SIP
proxy server can act both as a RFC3323 privacy service and as an proxy server can act as both a privacy service as described in
authentication service. Since a user agent can provide any From [RFC3323] and an authentication service. Since a UA can provide any
header field value that the authentication service is willing to From header field value that the authentication service is willing to
authorize, there is no reason why private SIP URIs that contain authorize, there is no reason why private SIP URIs that contain
legitimate domains (e.g., sip:anonymous@example.com) cannot be signed legitimate domains (e.g., sip:anonymous@example.com) cannot be signed
by an authentication service. The construction of the Identity by an authentication service. The construction of the Identity
header field is the same for private URIs as it is for any other sort header field is the same for private URIs as it is for any other sort
of URIs. Similar practices could be used to support opportunistic of URIs. Similar practices could be used to support opportunistic
signing of SIP requests for UA-integrated authentication services signing of SIP requests for UA-integrated authentication services
with self-signed certificates, though that is outside the scope of with self-signed certificates, though that is outside the scope of
this specification and is left as a matter for future investigation. this specification and is left as a matter for future investigation.
Note, however, that even when using anonymous SIP URIs, an Note, however, that even when using anonymous SIP URIs, an
authentication service must possess a certificate corresponding to authentication service must possess a certificate corresponding to
the host portion of the addr-spec of the From header field value of the host portion of the addr-spec of the From header field value of
the request; accordingly, using domains like 'anonymous.invalid' will the request; accordingly, using domains like "anonymous.invalid"
not be usable by privacy services that simultaneously act as will not be usable by privacy services that simultaneously act as
authentication services. The assurance offered by the usage of authentication services. The assurance offered by the usage of
anonymous URIs with a valid domain portion is "this is a known user anonymous URIs with a valid domain portion is "this is a known user
in my domain that I have authenticated, but I am keeping its identity in my domain that I have authenticated, but I am keeping its identity
private". private."
It is worth noting two features of this more anonymous form of It is worth noting two features of this more anonymous form of
identity. One can eliminate any identifying information in a domain identity. One can eliminate any identifying information in a domain
through the use of the domain 'anonymous.invalid," but we must then through the use of the domain "anonymous.invalid", but we must then
acknowledge that it is difficult for a domain to be both anonymous acknowledge that it is difficult for a domain to be both anonymous
and authenticated. The use of the "anonymous.invalid" domain entails and authenticated. The use of the domain "anonymous.invalid" entails
that no corresponding authority for the domain can exist, and as a that no corresponding authority for the domain can exist, and as a
consequence, authentication service functions for that domain are consequence, authentication service functions for that domain are
meaningless. The second feature is more germane to the threats this meaningless. The second feature is more germane to the threats this
document mitigates [RFC7375]. None of the relevant attacks, all of document mitigates [RFC7375]. None of the relevant attacks, all of
which rely on the attacker taking on the identity of a victim or which rely on the attacker taking on the identity of a victim or
hiding their identity using someone else's identity, are enabled by hiding their identity using someone else's identity, are enabled by
an anonymous identity. As such, the inability to assert an authority an anonymous identity. As such, the inability to assert an authority
over an anonymous domain is irrelevant to our threat model. over an anonymous domain is irrelevant to our threat model.
[RFC3325] defines the "id" priv-value token, which is specific to the [RFC3325] defines the "id" priv-value token, which is specific to the
skipping to change at page 32, line 32 skipping to change at page 33, line 47
use this identity for billing or security purposes. The danger of use this identity for billing or security purposes. The danger of
this network-specific information leaking outside of the closed this network-specific information leaking outside of the closed
network motivated the "id" priv-value token. The "id" priv-value network motivated the "id" priv-value token. The "id" priv-value
token has no implications for the Identity header field, and privacy token has no implications for the Identity header field, and privacy
services MUST NOT remove the Identity header field when a priv-value services MUST NOT remove the Identity header field when a priv-value
of "id" appears in a Privacy header field. of "id" appears in a Privacy header field.
The full form of the PASSporT object provides the complete JSON The full form of the PASSporT object provides the complete JSON
objects used to generate the signed-identity-digest of the Identity objects used to generate the signed-identity-digest of the Identity
header field value, including the canonicalized form of the telephone header field value, including the canonicalized form of the telephone
number of the originator of a call, if the signature is over a number of the originator of a call if the signature is over a
telephone number. In some contexts, local policy may require a telephone number. In some contexts, local policy may require a
canonicalization which differs substantially from the original From canonicalization that differs substantially from the original From
header field. Depending on those policies, potentially the full form header field. Depending on those policies, potentially the full form
of PASSporT might divulge information about the originating network of PASSporT might divulge information about the originating network
or user that might not appear elsewhere in the SIP request. Were it or user that might not appear elsewhere in the SIP request. Were it
to be used to reflect the contents of the P-Asserted-Identity header to be used to reflect the contents of the P-Asserted-Identity header
field, for example, then the object would need to be converted to the field, for example, then the object would need to be converted to the
compact form when the P-Asserted-Identity header is removed to avoid compact form when the P-Asserted-Identity header is removed to avoid
any such leakage outside of a trust domain. Since, in those any such leakage outside of a trust domain. Since, in those
contexts, the canonical form of the originator's identity could not contexts, the canonical form of the originator's identity could not
be reassembled by a verifier, and thus the Identity signature be reassembled by a verifier and thus the Identity signature
validation process would fail, using P-Asserted-Identity with the validation process would fail, using P-Asserted-Identity with the
full form of PASSporT in this fashion is NOT RECOMMENDED outside of full form of PASSporT in this fashion is NOT RECOMMENDED outside of
environments where SIP requests will never leave the trust domain. environments where SIP requests will never leave the trust domain.
As a side note, history shows that closed networks never stay closed As a side note, history shows that closed networks never stay closed
and one should design their implementation assuming connectivity to and one should design their implementation assuming connectivity to
the broader Internet. the broader Internet.
Finally, note that unlike [RFC3325], the mechanism described in this Finally, note that unlike [RFC3325], the mechanism described in this
specification adds no information to SIP requests that has privacy specification adds no information to SIP requests that has privacy
implications - apart from disclosing that an authentication service implications -- apart from disclosing that an authentication service
is willing to sign for an originator. is willing to sign for an originator.
12. Security Considerations 12. Security Considerations
This document describes a mechanism that provides a signature over This document describes a mechanism that provides a signature over
the Date header field of SIP requests, parts of the To and From the Date header field of SIP requests, parts of the To and From
header fields, and when present any media keying material in the header fields, and (when present) any media keying material in the
message body. In general, the considerations related to the security message body. In general, the considerations related to the security
of these header fields are the same as those given in [RFC3261] for of these header fields are the same as those given in [RFC3261] for
including header fields in tunneled 'message/sip' MIME bodies (see including header fields in tunneled "message/sip" MIME bodies (see
Section 23 of RFC3261 in particular). The following section details Section 23 of [RFC3261] in particular). This section details the
the individual security properties obtained by including each of individual security properties obtained by including each of these
these header fields within the signature; collectively, this set of header fields within the signature; collectively, this set of header
header fields provides the necessary properties to prevent fields provides the necessary properties to prevent impersonation.
impersonation. It addresses the solution-specific attacks against It addresses the solution-specific attacks against in-band solutions
in-band solutions enumerated in [RFC7375] Section 4.1. enumerated in [RFC7375], Section 4.1.
12.1. Protected Request Fields 12.1. Protected Request Fields
The From header field value (in ordinary operations) indicates the The From header field value (in ordinary operations) indicates the
identity of the originator of the message. The SIP address-of-record identity of the originator of the message; for the purposes of this
URI, or an embedded telephone number, in the From header field is the document, either the SIP AoR URI or an embedded telephone number
identity of a SIP user, for the purposes of this document. Note that provides the identity of a SIP user. Note that in some deployments
in some deployments the identity of the originator may reside in P- the identity of the originator may reside in P-Asserted-Identity
Asserted-Id instead. The originator's identity is the key piece of instead. The originator's identity is the key piece of information
information that this mechanism secures; the remainder of the signed that this mechanism secures; the remainder of the signed parts of a
parts of a SIP request are present to provide reference integrity and SIP request are present to provide reference integrity and to prevent
to prevent certain types of cut-and-paste attacks. certain types of cut-and-paste attacks.
The Date header field value protects against cut-and-paste attacks, The Date header field value protects against cut-and-paste attacks,
as described in [RFC3261], Section 23.4.2. That specification as described in [RFC3261], Section 23.4.2. That specification
recommends that implementations notify the user of a potential recommends that implementations notify the user of a potential
security issue if the signed Date header field value is stale by an security issue if the signed Date header field value is stale by an
hour or more. To prevent cut-and-paste of recently-observed hour or more. To prevent cut-and-paste of recently observed
messages, this specification instead RECOMMENDS a shorter interval of messages, this specification instead RECOMMENDS a shorter interval of
sixty seconds. Implementations of this specification MUST NOT deem sixty seconds. Implementations of this specification MUST NOT deem
valid a request with an outdated Date header field. Note that per valid a request with an outdated Date header field. Note that per
[RFC3893] Section 10 behavior, servers can keep state of recently the behavior described in [RFC3893], Section 10, servers can keep
received requests, and thus if an Identity header field is replayed state of recently received requests, and thus if an Identity header
by an attacker within the Date interval, verifiers can detect that it field is replayed by an attacker within the Date interval, verifiers
is spoofed because a message with an identical Date from the same can detect that it is spoofed because a message with an identical
source had recently been received. Date from the same source had recently been received.
It has been observed in the wild that some networks change the Date It has been observed in the wild that some networks change the Date
header field value of SIP requests in transit, and that alternative header field value of SIP requests in transit; to accommodate that
behavior might be necessary to accommodate that use case. type of scenario, alternative behavior might be necessary.
Verification services that observe a signature validation failure MAY Verification services that observe a signature validation failure MAY
therefore reconstruct the Date header field component of the therefore reconstruct the Date header field component of the
signature from the "iat" carried in the full form of PASSporT: signature from the "iat" carried in the full form of PASSporT:
provided that time recorded by "iat" falls within the local policy provided that time recorded by "iat" falls within the local policy
for freshness that would ordinarily apply to the Date header, the for freshness that would ordinarily apply to the Date header, the
verification service MAY treat the signature as valid, provided it verification service MAY treat the signature as valid, provided it
keeps adequate state to detect recent replays. Note that this will keeps adequate state to detect recent replays. Note that this will
require the inclusion of the full form of the PASSporT object by require the inclusion of the full form of the PASSporT object by
authentication services in networks where such failures are observed. authentication services in networks where such failures are observed.
The To header field value provides the identity of the SIP user that The To header field value provides the identity of the SIP user that
this request originally targeted. Covering the identity in the To this request originally targeted. Covering the identity in the To
header field with the Identity signature serves two purposes. First, header field with the Identity signature serves two purposes. First,
it prevents cut-and-paste attacks in which an Identity header field it prevents cut-and-paste attacks in which an Identity header field
from a legitimate request for one user is cut-and-pasted into a from a legitimate request for one user is cut-and-pasted into a
request for a different user. Second, it preserves the starting URI request for a different user. Second, it preserves the starting URI
scheme of the request, which helps prevent downgrade attacks against scheme of the request; this helps prevent downgrade attacks against
the use of SIPS. The To identity offers additional protection the use of SIPS. The To identity offers additional protection
against cut-and-paste attacks beyond the Date header field. For against cut-and-paste attacks beyond the Date header field. For
example, without a signature over the To identity, an attacker who example, without a signature over the To identity, an attacker who
receives a call from a target could immediately cut-and-paste the receives a call from a target could immediately cut-and-paste the
Identity and From header field value from that INVITE into a new Identity and From header field value from that INVITE into a new
request to the target's voicemail service within the Date interval, request to the target's voicemail service within the Date interval,
and the voicemail service would have no way knowing that the Identity and the voicemail service would have no way of knowing that the
header field it received had been originally signed for a call Identity header field it received had been originally signed for a
intended for a different number. However, note the caveats below in call intended for a different number. However, note the caveats
Section 12.1.1. below in Section 12.1.1.
When signing a request that contains a fingerprint of keying material When signing a request that contains a fingerprint of keying material
in SDP for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763], this mechanism always provides a in SDP for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763], this mechanism always provides a
signature over that fingerprint. This signature prevents certain signature over that fingerprint. This signature prevents certain
classes of impersonation attacks in which an attacker forwards or classes of impersonation attacks in which an attacker forwards or
cut-and-pastes a legitimate request. Although the target of the cut-and-pastes a legitimate request. Although the target of the
attack may accept the request, the attacker will be unable to attack may accept the request, the attacker will be unable to
exchange media with the target as they will not possess a key exchange media with the target, as they will not possess a key
corresponding to the fingerprint. For example, there are some corresponding to the fingerprint. For example, there are some
baiting attacks, launched with the REFER method or through social baiting attacks, launched with the REFER method or through social
engineering, where the attacker receives a request from the target engineering, where the attacker receives a request from the target
and reoriginates it to a third party. These might not be prevented and reoriginates it to a third party. These might not be prevented
by only a signature over the From, To and Date, but could be by only a signature over the From, To, and Date, but they could be
prevented by securing a fingerprint for DTLS-SRTP. While this is a prevented by securing a fingerprint for DTLS-SRTP. While this is a
different form of impersonation than is commonly used for different form of impersonation than is commonly used for
robocalling, ultimately there is little purpose in establishing the robocalling, ultimately there is little purpose in establishing the
identity of the user that originated a SIP request if this assurance identity of the user that originated a SIP request if this assurance
is not coupled with a comparable assurance over the contents of the is not coupled with a comparable assurance over the contents of the
subsequent media communication. This signature also reduces the subsequent media communication. This signature also reduces the
potential for active eavesdropping attacks against the SIP media. In potential for active eavesdropping attacks against the SIP media. In
environments where DTLS-SRTP is unsupported, however, no field is environments where DTLS-SRTP is unsupported, however, no field is
signed and no protections are provided. signed and no protections are provided.
12.1.1. Protection of the To Header and Retargeting 12.1.1. Protection of the To Header and Retargeting
Armed with the original value of the To header field, the recipient Armed with the original value of the To header field, the recipient
of a request may be tempted compare it to their own identity in order of a request may be tempted to compare it to their own identity in
to determine whether or not the identity information in this call order to determine whether or not the identity information in this
might have been replayed. However, any request may be legitimately call might have been replayed. However, any request may be
retargeted as well, and as a result legitimate requests may reach a legitimately retargeted as well, and as a result legitimate requests
SIP endpoint whose user is not identified by the URI designated in may reach a SIP endpoint whose user is not identified by the URI
the To header field value. It is therefore difficult for any designated in the To header field value. It is therefore difficult
verifier to decide whether or not some prior retargeting was for any verifier to decide whether or not some prior retargeting was
"legitimate." Retargeting can also cause confusion when identity "legitimate". Retargeting can also cause confusion when identity
information is provided for requests sent in the backwards direction information is provided for requests sent in the backwards direction
in a dialog, as the dialog identifiers may not match credentials held in a dialog, as the dialog identifiers may not match credentials held
by the ultimate target of the dialog. For further information on the by the ultimate target of the dialog. For further information on the
problems of response identity see [I-D.peterson-sipping-retarget]. problems of response identity, see [SIP-RETARGET].
Any means for authentication services or verifiers to anticipate Any means for authentication services or verifiers to anticipate
retargeting is outside the scope of this document, and likely to have retargeting is outside the scope of this document and is likely to
equal applicability to response identity as it does to requests in have the same applicability to response identity as it does to
the backwards direction within a dialog. Consequently, no special requests in the backwards direction within a dialog. Consequently,
guidance is given for implementers here regarding the 'connected no special guidance is given for implementers here regarding the
party' problem (see [RFC4916]); authentication service behavior is "connected party" problem (see [RFC4916]); authentication service
unchanged if retargeting has occurred for a dialog-forming request. behavior is unchanged if retargeting has occurred for a dialog-
Ultimately, the authentication service provides an Identity header forming request. Ultimately, the authentication service provides an
field for requests in the dialog only when the user is authorized to Identity header field for requests in the dialog only when the user
assert the identity given in the From header field, and if they are is authorized to assert the identity given in the From header field,
not, an Identity header field is not provided. And per the threat and if they are not, an Identity header field is not provided. And
model of [RFC7375], resolving problems with 'connected' identity has per the threat model of [RFC7375], resolving problems with
little bearing on detecting robocalling or related impersonation "connected" identity has little bearing on detecting robocalling or
attacks. related impersonation attacks.
12.2. Unprotected Request Fields 12.2. Unprotected Request Fields
RFC4474 originally had protections for the Contact, Call-ID and CSeq. [RFC4474] originally provided protections for Contact, Call-ID, and
These are removed from RFC4474bis. The absence of these header field CSeq. This document removes protection for these fields. The
values creates some opportunities for determined attackers to absence of these header field values creates some opportunities for
impersonate based on cut-and-paste attacks; however, the absence of determined attackers to impersonate based on cut-and-paste attacks;
these header field values does not seem impactful to preventing the however, the absence of these header field values does not seem
simple unauthorized claiming of an identity for the purposes of impactful to the primary focus of this document, which is the
robocalling, voicemail hacking, or swatting, which is the primary prevention of the simple unauthorized claiming of an identity for the
scope of the current document. purposes of robocalling, voicemail hacking, or swatting.
It might seem attractive to provide a signature over some of the It might seem attractive to provide a signature over some of the
information present in the Via header field value(s). For example, information present in the Via header field value(s). For example,
without a signature over the sent-by field of the topmost Via header without a signature over the sent-by field of the topmost Via header
field, an attacker could remove that Via header field and insert its field, an attacker could remove that Via header field and insert its
own in a cut-and-paste attack, which would cause all responses to the own in a cut-and-paste attack, which would cause all responses to the
request to be routed to a host of the attacker's choosing. However, request to be routed to a host of the attacker's choosing. However,
a signature over the topmost Via header field does not prevent a signature over the topmost Via header field does not prevent
attacks of this nature, since the attacker could leave the topmost attacks of this nature, since the attacker could leave the topmost
Via intact and merely insert a new Via header field directly after Via intact and merely insert a new Via header field directly after
it, which would cause responses to be routed to the attacker's host it, which would cause responses to be routed to the attacker's host
"on their way" to the valid host, which has exactly the same end "on their way" to the valid host; the end result would be exactly the
result. Although it is possible that an intermediary-based same. Although it is possible that an intermediary-based
authentication service could guarantee that no Via hops are inserted authentication service could guarantee that no Via hops are inserted
between the sending user agent and the authentication service, it between the sending UA and the authentication service, it could not
could not prevent an attacker from adding a Via hop after the prevent an attacker from adding a Via hop after the authentication
authentication service, and thereby preempting responses. It is service and thereby preempting responses. It is necessary for the
necessary for the proper operation of SIP for subsequent proper operation of SIP for subsequent intermediaries to be capable
intermediaries to be capable of inserting such Via header fields, and of inserting such Via header fields, and thus it cannot be prevented.
thus it cannot be prevented. As such, though it is desirable, As such, though it is desirable, securing Via is not possible through
securing Via is not possible through the sort of identity mechanism the sort of identity mechanism described in this document; the best
described in this document; the best known practice for securing Via known practice for securing Via is the use of SIPS.
is the use of SIPS.
12.3. Malicious Removal of Identity Headers 12.3. Malicious Removal of Identity Headers
In the end analysis, the Identity header field cannot protect itself. In the end analysis, the Identity header field cannot protect itself.
Any attacker could remove the header field from a SIP request, and Any attacker could remove the header field from a SIP request and
modify the request arbitrarily afterwards. However, this mechanism modify the request arbitrarily afterwards. However, this mechanism
is not intended to protect requests from men-in-the-middle who is not intended to protect requests from men-in-the-middle who
interfere with SIP messages; it is intended only to provide a way interfere with SIP messages; it is intended only to provide a way
that the originators of SIP requests can prove that they are who they that the originators of SIP requests can prove that they are who they
claim to be. At best, by stripping identity information from a claim to be. At best, by stripping identity information from a
request, a man-in-the-middle could make it impossible to distinguish request, a man-in-the-middle could make it impossible to distinguish
any illegitimate messages he would like to send from those messages any illegitimate messages he would like to send from those messages
sent by an authorized user. However, it requires a considerably sent by an authorized user. However, it requires a considerably
greater amount of energy to mount such an attack than it does to greater amount of energy to mount such an attack than it does to
mount trivial impersonations by just copying someone else's From mount trivial impersonations by just copying someone else's
header field. This mechanism provides a way that an authorized user From header field. This mechanism provides a way that an authorized
can provide a definitive assurance of his identity that an user can provide a definitive assurance of his identity that an
unauthorized user, an impersonator, cannot. unauthorized user, an impersonator, cannot.
12.4. Securing the Connection to the Authentication Service 12.4. Securing the Connection to the Authentication Service
In the absence of user agent-based authentication services, the In the absence of UA-based authentication services, the assurance
assurance provided by this mechanism is strongest when a user agent provided by this mechanism is strongest when a UA forms a direct
forms a direct connection, preferably one secured by TLS, to an connection, preferably one secured by TLS, to an intermediary-based
intermediary-based authentication service. The reasons for this are authentication service. The reasons for this are twofold:
twofold:
If a user does not receive a certificate from the authentication o If a user does not receive a certificate from the authentication
service over the TLS connection that corresponds to the expected service over the TLS connection that corresponds to the expected
domain (especially when the user receives a challenge via a domain (especially when the user receives a challenge via a
mechanism such as Digest), then it is possible that a rogue server mechanism such as Digest), then it is possible that a rogue server
is attempting to pose as an authentication service for a domain is attempting to pose as an authentication service for a domain
that it does not control, possibly in an attempt to collect shared that it does not control, possibly in an attempt to collect shared
secrets for that domain. A similar practice could be used for secrets for that domain. A similar practice could be used for
telephone numbers, though the application of certificates for telephone numbers, though the application of certificates for
telephone numbers to TLS is left as a matter for future study. telephone numbers to TLS is left as a matter for future study.
Without TLS, the various header field values and the body of the o Without TLS, the various header field values and the body of the
request will not have integrity protection when the request request will not have integrity protection when the request
arrives at an authentication service. Accordingly, a prior arrives at an authentication service. Accordingly, a prior
legitimate or illegitimate intermediary could modify the message legitimate or illegitimate intermediary could modify the message
arbitrarily. arbitrarily.
Of these two concerns, the first is most material to the intended Of these two concerns, the first is most material to the intended
scope of this mechanism. This mechanism is intended to prevent scope of this mechanism. This mechanism is intended to prevent
impersonation attacks, not man-in-the-middle attacks; integrity over impersonation attacks, not man-in-the-middle attacks; integrity over
parts of the header and body is provided by this mechanism only to parts of the header and body is provided by this mechanism only to
prevent replay attacks. However, it is possible that applications prevent replay attacks. However, it is possible that applications
relying on the presence of the Identity header field could leverage relying on the presence of the Identity header field could leverage
this integrity protection for services other than replay protection. this integrity protection for services other than replay protection.
Accordingly, direct TLS connections SHOULD be used between the UAC Accordingly, direct TLS connections SHOULD be used between the
and the authentication service whenever possible. The opportunistic UA client (UAC) and the authentication service whenever possible.
nature of this mechanism, however, makes it very difficult to The opportunistic nature of this mechanism, however, makes it very
constrain UAC behavior, and moreover there will be some deployment difficult to constrain UAC behavior, and moreover there will be some
architectures where a direct connection is simply infeasible and the deployment architectures where a direct connection is simply
UAC cannot act as an authentication service itself. Accordingly, infeasible and the UAC cannot act as an authentication service
when a direct connection and TLS are not possible, a UAC should use itself. Accordingly, when a direct connection and TLS are not
the SIPS mechanism, Digest 'auth-int' for body integrity, or both possible, a UAC should use the SIPS mechanism, Digest "auth-int" for
when it can. The ultimate decision to add an Identity header field body integrity, or both when it can. The ultimate decision to add an
to a request lies with the authentication service, of course; domain Identity header field to a request lies with the authentication
policy must identify those cases where the UAC's security association service, of course; domain policy must identify those cases where the
with the authentication service is too weak. UAC's security association with the authentication service is
too weak.
12.5. Authorization and Transitional Strategies 12.5. Authorization and Transitional Strategies
Ultimately, the worth of an assurance provided by an Identity header Ultimately, the worth of an assurance provided by an Identity header
field is limited by the security practices of the authentication field is limited by the security practices of the authentication
service that issues the assurance. Relying on an Identity header service that issues the assurance. Relying on an Identity header
field generated by a remote administrative domain assumes that the field generated by a remote administrative domain assumes that the
issuing domain uses recommended administrative practices to issuing domain uses recommended administrative practices to
authenticate its users. However, it is possible that some authenticate its users. However, it is possible that some
authentication services will implement policies that effectively make authentication services will implement policies that effectively make
skipping to change at page 38, line 12 skipping to change at page 39, line 26
field from such authentication services is questionable. While there field from such authentication services is questionable. While there
is no magic way for a verifier to distinguish "good" from "bad" is no magic way for a verifier to distinguish "good" from "bad"
signers by inspecting a SIP request, it is expected that further work signers by inspecting a SIP request, it is expected that further work
in authorization practices could be built on top of this identity in authorization practices could be built on top of this identity
solution; without such an identity solution, many promising solution; without such an identity solution, many promising
approaches to authorization policy are impossible. That much said, approaches to authorization policy are impossible. That much said,
it is RECOMMENDED that authentication services based on proxy servers it is RECOMMENDED that authentication services based on proxy servers
employ strong authentication practices. employ strong authentication practices.
One cannot expect the Identity header field to be supported by every One cannot expect the Identity header field to be supported by every
SIP entity overnight. This leaves the verifier in a compromising SIP entity overnight. This leaves the verifier in a difficult
position; when it receives a request from a given SIP user, how can position; when it receives a request from a given SIP user, how can
it know whether or not the originator's domain supports Identity? In it know whether or not the originator's domain supports Identity? In
the absence of ubiquitous support for identity, some transitional the absence of ubiquitous support for Identity, some transitional
strategies are necessary. strategies are necessary.
A verifier could remember when it receives a request from a domain o A verifier could remember when it receives a request from a domain
or telephone number that uses Identity, and in the future, view or telephone number that uses Identity and, in the future, view
messages received from that source without an Identity header messages received from that source without an Identity header
field with skepticism. field with skepticism.
A verifier could consult some sort of directory that indicates o A verifier could consult some sort of directory that indicates
whether a given caller should have a signed identity. There are a whether a given caller should have a signed identity. There are a
number of potential ways in which this could be implemented. This number of potential ways in which this could be implemented. This
is left as a subject for future work. is left as a subject for future work.
In the long term, some sort of identity mechanism, either the one In the long term, some sort of identity mechanism, either the one
documented in this specification or a successor, must become documented in this specification or a successor, must become
mandatory-to-use for the SIP protocol; that is the only way to mandatory-to-use for SIP; that is the only way to guarantee that this
guarantee that this protection can always be expected by verifiers. protection can always be expected by verifiers.
Finally, it is worth noting that the presence or absence of the Finally, it is worth noting that the presence or absence of the
Identity header fields cannot be the sole factor in making an Identity header fields cannot be the sole factor in making an
authorization decision. Permissions might be granted to a message on authorization decision. Permissions might be granted to a message on
the basis of the specific verified Identity or really on any other the basis of the specific verified Identity or really on any other
aspect of a SIP request. Authorization policies are outside the aspect of a SIP request. Authorization policies are outside the
scope of this specification, but this specification advises any scope of this specification, but this specification advises any
future authorization work not to assume that messages with valid future authorization work not to assume that messages with valid
Identity header fields are always good. Identity header fields are always good.
12.6. Display-Names and Identity 12.6. Display-Names and Identity
As a matter of interface design, SIP user agents might render the As a matter of interface design, SIP UAs might render the
display-name portion of the From header field of a caller as the display-name portion of the From header field of a caller as the
identity of the caller; there is a significant precedent in email identity of the caller; there is a significant precedent in email
user interfaces for this practice. Securing the display-name user interfaces for this practice. Securing the display-name
component of the From header field value is outside the scope of this component of the From header field value is outside the scope of this
document, but may be the subject of future work, such as through the document but may be the subject of future work, such as through the
"ppt" name mechanism. "ppt" name mechanism.
In the absence of signing the display-name, authentication services In the absence of signing the display-name, authentication services
might check and validate it, and compare it to a list of acceptable might check and validate it, and compare it to a list of acceptable
display-names that may be used by the originator; if the display-name display-names that may be used by the originator; if the display-name
does not meet policy constraints, the authentication service could does not meet policy constraints, the authentication service could
return a 403 response code. In this case, the reason phrase should return a 403 response code. In this case, the reason phrase should
indicate the nature of the problem; for example, "Inappropriate indicate the nature of the problem: for example, "Inappropriate
Display Name". However, the display-name is not always present, and Display Name". However, the display-name is not always present, and
in many environments the requisite operational procedures for in many environments the requisite operational procedures for
display-name validation may not exist, so no normative guidance is display-name validation may not exist, so no normative guidance is
given here. given here.
13. IANA Considerations 13. IANA Considerations
This document contains a number of actions for IANA. Primarily, the IANA has completed a number of actions described in this document.
previous references to RFC4474 in the sip-parameters registry should, Primarily, the previous references to [RFC4474] in the "Session
unless specified otherwise below, be updated to point to [RFCthis]. Initiation Protocol (SIP) Parameters" registry have been updated to
point to this document, unless specified otherwise below.
13.1. SIP Header Fields 13.1. SIP Header Fields
The Identity-Info header in the SIP Header Fields registry should be The Identity-Info header in the SIP "Header Fields" registry has been
marked as deprecated by [RFCThis]. marked as deprecated by this document.
Also, the Identity-Info header reserved the compact form "n" at its Also, the Identity-Info header reserved the compact form "n" at its
time of registration. Please remove that compact form from the time of registration. That compact form has been removed from the
registry. The Identity header however retains the compact form "y" registry. The Identity header, however, retains the compact form "y"
reserved by RFC4474. reserved by [RFC4474].
13.2. SIP Response Codes 13.2. SIP Response Codes
The Reason phrase for the 436 response default reason phrase should The 436 "Bad Identity-Info" default reason phrase has been changed to
be changed from "Bad Identity-Info" to "Bad Identity Info" in the SIP "Bad Identity Info" in the SIP "Response Codes" registry.
Response Code registry.
The 437 "Unsupported Certificate" default reason phrase should be The 437 "Unsupported Certificate" default reason phrase has been
changed to "Unsupported Credential". changed to "Unsupported Credential".
13.3. Identity-Info Parameters 13.3. Identity-Info Parameters
The IANA manages a registry for Identity-Info parameters. The IANA manages a registry for Identity-Info parameters. Per this
specification asks the IANA to change the name of this registry to specification, IANA has changed the name of this registry to
"Identity Parameters". "Identity Parameters".
This specification defines one new value for the registry: "info" as This specification defines one new value for the registry: "info" as
defined in this specification in Section 7.3. defined in Section 7.3.
13.4. Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values 13.4. Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values
This IANA manages an Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values IANA managed an "Identity-Info Algorithm Parameter Values" registry;
registry which this specification deprecates. We request that the per this specification, IANA has deprecated and closed this registry.
IANA deprecate and close this registry. Since the algorithms for Since the algorithms for signing PASSporTs are defined in [RFC8225]
signing PASSporTs are defined in [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] rather than rather than in this specification, there is no longer a need for an
in this specification, there is no longer a need for an algorithm algorithm parameter registry for the Identity header field.
parameter registry for the Identity header field.
14. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Adam Roach, Jim Schaad, Ning Zhang,
Syed Ali, Olle Jacobson, Dave Frankel, Robert Sparks, Dave Crocker,
Stephen Kent, Brian Rosen, Alex Bobotek, Paul Kyzviat, Jonathan
Lennox, Richard Shockey, Martin Dolly, Andrew Allen, Hadriel Kaplan,
Sanjay Mishra, Anton Baskov, Pierce Gorman, David Schwartz, Eric
Burger, Alan Ford, Christer Holmberg, Philippe Fouquart, Michael
Hamer, Henning Schulzrinne, and Richard Barnes for their comments.
15. Changes from RFC4474 14. Changes from RFC 4474
The following are salient changes from the original RFC 4474: The following are salient changes from the original RFC 4474:
Generalized the credential mechanism; credential enrollment, o The credential mechanism has been generalized; credential
acquisition and trust is now outside the scope of this document enrollment, acquisition, and trust are now outside the scope of
this document.
Reduced the scope of the Identity signature to remove CSeq, Call- o This document reduces the scope of the Identity signature to
ID, Contact, and the message body; signing of key fingerprints in remove CSeq, Call-ID, Contact, and the message body; signing of
SDP is now included key fingerprints in SDP is now included.
Deprecated the Identity-Info header field and relocated its o The Identity-Info header field has been deprecated, and its
components into parameters of the Identity header field (which components have been relocated into parameters of the Identity
obsoletes the previous version of the header field) header field (which obsoletes the previous version of the header
field).
The Identity header field can now appear multiple times in one o The Identity header field can now appear multiple times in one
request request.
Replaced previous signed-identity-digest format with PASSporT o The previous signed-identity-digest format has been replaced with
(signing algorithms now defined in a separate specification) PASSporT (signing algorithms are now defined in a separate
specification).
Revised status code descriptions o Status code descriptions have been revised.
16. References 15. References
16.1. Normative References
[E.164] ITU-T, "The international public telecommunication 15.1. Normative References
numbering plan", E 164, February 2005,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.164/en>.
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] [E.164] International Telecommunication Union, "The international
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token public telecommunication numbering plan",
(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-10 (work in ITU-T Recommendation E.164, November 2010,
progress), October 2016. <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.164/en>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation [RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3263, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3263, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3263>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3263>.
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers", [RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
RFC 3966, DOI 10.17487/RFC3966, December 2004, RFC 3966, DOI 10.17487/RFC3966, December 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3966>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3966>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain [RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain
Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
RFC 5922, DOI 10.17487/RFC5922, June 2010, RFC 5922, DOI 10.17487/RFC5922, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5922>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5922>.
16.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-iri-comparison]
Masinter, L. and M. D&#258;&#378;rst, "Comparison,
Equivalence and Canonicalization of Internationalized
Resource Identifiers", draft-ietf-iri-comparison-02 (work
in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates] [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
Credentials: Certificates", draft-ietf-stir- <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
certificates-11 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.kaplan-stir-cider] 15.2. Informative References
Kaplan, H., "A proposal for Caller Identity in a DNS-based
Entrusted Registry (CIDER)", draft-kaplan-stir-cider-00
(work in progress), July 2013.
[I-D.peterson-sipping-retarget] [CIDER] Kaplan, H., "A proposal for Caller Identity in a DNS-based
Peterson, J., "Retargeting and Security in SIP: A Entrusted Registry (CIDER)", Work in Progress,
Framework and Requirements", draft-peterson-sipping- draft-kaplan-stir-cider-00, July 2013.
retarget-00 (work in progress), February 2005.
[I-D.rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns] [IRI-COMPARISON]
Rosenberg, J., "Concerns around the Applicability of RFC Masinter, L. and M. Duerst, "Comparison, Equivalence and
4474", draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns-00 (work in Canonicalization of Internationalized Resource
progress), February 2008. Identifiers", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-iri-
comparison-02, October 2012.
[RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP", Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999, RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>.
[RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session [RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3323, November 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3323, November 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3323>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3323>.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private [RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325, Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3325, November 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3325, November 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3325>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3325>.
[RFC3893] Peterson, J., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3893] Peterson, J., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Authenticated Identity Body (AIB) Format", RFC 3893, Authenticated Identity Body (AIB) Format", RFC 3893,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3893, September 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3893, September 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3893>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3893>.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for [RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>.
[RFC4501] Josefsson, S., "Domain Name System Uniform Resource [RFC4501] Josefsson, S., "Domain Name System Uniform Resource
Identifiers", RFC 4501, DOI 10.17487/RFC4501, May 2006, Identifiers", RFC 4501, DOI 10.17487/RFC4501, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4501>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4501>.
[RFC4916] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation [RFC4916] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916, June Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, DOI 10.17487/RFC4916,
2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>. June 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4916>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5393] Sparks, R., Ed., Lawrence, S., Hawrylyshen, A., and B. [RFC5393] Sparks, R., Ed., Lawrence, S., Hawrylyshen, A., and B.
Campen, "Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Campen, "Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies", Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies",
RFC 5393, DOI 10.17487/RFC5393, December 2008, RFC 5393, DOI 10.17487/RFC5393, December 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5393>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5393>.
[RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework [RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763,
2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>. May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698,
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>. August 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>. DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model", [RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014, RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515,
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
[SIP-RETARGET]
Peterson, J., "Retargeting and Security in SIP: A
Framework and Requirements", Work in Progress,
draft-peterson-sipping-retarget-00, February 2005.
[SIP-RFC4474-CONCERNS]
Rosenberg, J., "Concerns around the Applicability of
RFC 4474", Work in Progress, draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-
concerns-00, February 2008.
[TS-3GPP.23.228]
3GPP, "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2", 3GPP
TS 23.228 7.7.0, March 2007,
<http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/23228.htm>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Adam Roach, Jim Schaad, Ning Zhang,
Syed Ali, Olle Jacobson, Dave Frankel, Robert Sparks, Dave Crocker,
Stephen Kent, Brian Rosen, Alex Bobotek, Paul Kyzivat, Jonathan
Lennox, Richard Shockey, Martin Dolly, Andrew Allen, Hadriel Kaplan,
Sanjay Mishra, Anton Baskov, Pierce Gorman, David Schwartz, Eric
Burger, Alan Ford, Christer Holmberg, Philippe Fouquart, Michael
Hamer, Henning Schulzrinne, and Richard Barnes for their comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jon Peterson Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc. Neustar, Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570 1800 Sutter St. Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520 Concord, CA 94520
US United States of America
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
Cullen Jennings Cullen Jennings
Cisco Cisco
400 3rd Avenue SW, Suite 350 400 3rd Avenue SW, Suite 350
Calgary, AB T2P 4H2 Calgary, AB T2P 4H2
Canada Canada
Email: fluffy@cisco.com Email: fluffy@cisco.com
Eric Rescorla Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc. RTFM, Inc.
2064 Edgewood Drive 2064 Edgewood Drive
Palo Alto, CA 94303 Palo Alto, CA 94303
USA United States of America
Email: ekr@rtfm.com Email: ekr@rtfm.com
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA United States of America
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
 End of changes. 250 change blocks. 
824 lines changed or deleted 834 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.46. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/