draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis-05.txt		rfc8608.txt
	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
	Internet-Draft sn3rd		Request for Comments: 8608 sn3rd
	Obsoletes: 8208 (if approved) O. Borchert		Obsoletes: 8208 O. Borchert
	Intended status: Standards Track NIST		Updates: 7935 NIST
	Expires: October 17, 2019 April 15, 2019		Category: Standards Track June 2019
			ISSN: 2070-1721
	BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats		BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
	draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,		This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
	asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats		asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats
	used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document		used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document
	obsoletes RFC 8208 ("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature		updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use
	Formats") by adding Documentation Algorithm IDs, Experimentation		in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure") and obsoletes RFC 8208
	Algorithm IDs, correcting the range of unassigned algorithms IDs to		("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats") by adding
	fill the complete range, and restructured the document for better		Documentation and Experimentation Algorithm IDs, correcting the range
	reading.		of unassigned algorithms IDs to fill the complete range, and
			restructuring the document for better reading.
	This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as		This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as
	the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates		the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
	necessary to validate those signatures.		necessary to validate those signatures.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2018		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8608.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. Algorithm ID Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Algorithm ID Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256) . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256) . . . . . . . . 6
	3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) -		3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA
	(ECDSA-P256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		P-256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Signature Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. Signature Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	A.1. Topology and Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . 13		A.1. Topology and Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document specifies the following:		This document specifies the following:
	o the digital signature algorithm and parameters,		o the digital signature algorithm and parameters,
	o the hash algorithm and parameters,		o the hash algorithm and parameters,
	o the algorithm identifier assignment and classification,		o the algorithm identifier assignment and classification,
	skipping to change at page 3, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 36 ¶
	This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different		This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
	algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by		algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
	BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for		BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
	BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec		BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
	signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec		signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec
	signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature		signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature
	algorithm. The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other		algorithm. The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other
	RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as		RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as
	defined in [RFC8209]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]		defined in [RFC8209]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]
	[DSS] as compared to the rest of the RPKI that provides similar		[DSS] from the rest of the RPKI to provide similar security with
	security with smaller keys making the certificates smaller; these		smaller keys, making the certificates smaller; these algorithms also
	algorithms also result in smaller signatures, which makes the PDUs		result in smaller signatures, which make the PDUs smaller.
	smaller.
	Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as		Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as
	well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the		well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the
	certificates necessary to validate the signatures.		certificates necessary to validate the signatures.
	1.1. Terminology		1.1. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	1.2. Changes from RFC 8208		1.2. Changes from RFC 8208
	This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and		This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and
	this document.		this document.
	o Added Section 2.1 of algorithm ID types. Also, the interpretation		o Added Section 2.1 containing Algorithm ID types. Also, the
	of these IDs is described.		interpretation of these IDs is described.
	o Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding		o Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding
	algorithm suite identifier value.		algorithm suite identifier value.
	o Correction of range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier		o Corrected the range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier
	values.		values.
	o Adding of Documentation algorithm suite identifier values.		o Added Documentation algorithm suite identifier values.
	o Adding of Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values.		o Added Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values.
	o Changed Next-HOP IP in Appendix A's IPv6 Example to use private		o Changed the next-hop IP in Appendix A's IPv6 example to use a
	usage IPv6 address.		private usage IPv6 address.
	2. Algorithms		2. Algorithms
	The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec		The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
	Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as		Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as
	specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935]. This section addresses BGPsec		specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935]. This section addresses
	algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these		algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these
	algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec		algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec
	UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec		UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec
	UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each		UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each
	Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message.		Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message.
	2.1. Algorithm ID Types		2.1. Algorithm ID Types
	Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm		Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm
	Suite Identifier field (Algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see		Suite Identifier field (algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see
	Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]).		Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]).
	This document specifies five types of algorithm IDs:		This document specifies five types of Algorithm IDs:
	o Reserved Algorithm ID		o Reserved Algorithm ID
	Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255).		Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255).
	These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block and if		These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block, and if
	encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as		encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as
	Malformed [RFC4271].		malformed [RFC4271].
	o Signature Algorithm ID		o Signature Algorithm ID
	Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document.		Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document.
	Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature		Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature
	algorithms is described in length in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2		algorithms is described at length in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 of
	of [RFC8205].		[RFC8205].
	o Unassigned Algorithm ID		o Unassigned Algorithm ID
	This type of algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST		This type of Algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST
	NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see		NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see
	Section 7). In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm		Section 7). In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm
	ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the		ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the
	router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as		router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as an unsupported
	"unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].		algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
	o Experimentation Algorithm ID		o Experimentation Algorithm ID
	Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250).		Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250).
	To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment		To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment
	examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is		examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is
	inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm		inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm
	IDs is required. This ensures that experimentation does not clash		IDs is required. This ensures that experimentation does not clash
	with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates		with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the
	the risks to operational integrity of the network through		risks to operational integrity of the network through
	inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal		inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal
	configuration of routing elements on production systems. A router		configuration of routing elements on production systems. A router
	that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an		that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an
	experimental network, SHOULD treat it the same as		experimental network SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported
	"unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].		algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
	o Documentation Algorithm ID		o Documentation Algorithm ID
	Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254).		Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254).
	To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples,		To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples,
	the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a		the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a
	reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required. This		reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required. This
	ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm		ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm
	IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates the risks to operational		IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the risks to operational
	integrity of the network through inappropriate use of		integrity of the network through inappropriate use of
	documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements		documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements
	on production systems. A router that encounters an algorithm ID		on production systems. A router that encounters an algorithm ID
	of this type SHOULD treat it the same as "unsupported algorithm"		of this type SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported algorithm
	as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].		as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
	2.2. Signature Algorithms		2.2. Signature Algorithms
	2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256)		2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
	o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital		o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
	Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].		Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].
	o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].		o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
	Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or		Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
	BGPsec UPDATE messages. They are represented by an OID that combines		BGPsec UPDATE messages. They are represented by an OID that combines
	the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:		the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:
	skipping to change at page 6, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 35 ¶
	identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the		identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the
	Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.		Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
	3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats		3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
	The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec		The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
	Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of		Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
	[RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec		[RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
	Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.		Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.
	3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256)		3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
	The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate		The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
	requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256		requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256
	curve domain parameters [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the		elliptic curve domain parameters [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST
	uncompressed form.		use the uncompressed form.
	3.1.1. Public Key Format		3.1.1. Public Key Format
	The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo		The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
	[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.		[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
	The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:		The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
	o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID		o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
	MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1		MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1
	of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be		of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be
	skipping to change at page 8, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 44 ¶
	[RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates. The security		[RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates. The security
	considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]		considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]
	apply to certification requests. The security considerations of		apply to certification requests. The security considerations of
	[RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.		[RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.
	No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this		No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this
	specification.		specification.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the		The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the
	"BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key		"BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet "BGPsec Algorithm Suite		Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet algorithm suite
	Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm		identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm and
	and signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's		signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's
	Algorithm Suite Identifier field.		Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
	[RFC8208] directed IANA to register a single algorithm suite		Per [RFC8208], IANA registered a single algorithm suite identifier
	identifier for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the		for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the signature
	signature algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS]. This		algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS]. This identifier
	identifier is still valid, and IANA has updated registration to refer		is still valid, and IANA has updated the registration to refer to
	to this document.		this document.
	IANA is asked to modify the previously registered "Unassigned"
	address space.
	Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
	Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
	Identifier
	+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
	| 0x2-0xEF | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
	+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
	To be modified to:		IANA has modified the range of the "Unassigned" address space from
			"0x2-0xEF" to "0x02-0xF6":
	Algorithm Digest Signature Specification		Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
	Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer		Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
	Identifier		Identifier
	+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+		+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
	| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |		| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
	+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+		+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
	In addition IANA is asked to register the following address space for		In addition, IANA has registered the following address spaces for
	"Documentation" and "Experimentation":		"Experimentation" and "Documentation":
	Algorithm Digest Signature Specification		Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
	Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer		Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
	Identifier		Identifier
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document |		| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This Document |		| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	After the requested modification, the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite
	Registry" in the RPKI group should contain the following values:
	BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry		The "BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the RPKI group now contains
			the following values:
	Algorithm Digest Signature Specification		Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
	Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer		Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
	Identifier		Identifier
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document |		| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] |		| 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] |
	| | | | [RFC6090] |		| | | | [RFC6090] |
	| | | | This document |		| | | | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |		| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document |		| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This Document |		| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	| 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This document |		| 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
	+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+		+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
	Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process		Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
	defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm		defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
	suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and		suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
	signature algorithm name.		signature algorithm name.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	skipping to change at page 10, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 14 ¶
	Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process		Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
	defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm		defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
	suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and		suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
	signature algorithm name.		signature algorithm name.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification		[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
	Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI		Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
	10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
	editor.org/info/rfc2986>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
	[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and		[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
	Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key		Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April		(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
	2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.		2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
	[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure		[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
	Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI		Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
	10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
	editor.org/info/rfc4211>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
	Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI		Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
	10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
	editor.org/info/rfc4271>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
	[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,		[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
	"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key		"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
	Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,		Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
	[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic		[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
	Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI		Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
	10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
	editor.org/info/rfc6090>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
	[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility		[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
	Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure		Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
	(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April		(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
	2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.		2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
	[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for		[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
	Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public		Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
	Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,		Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
	August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.		August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
	[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for		[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
	Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,		Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
	RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,		RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol		[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
	Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September		Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
	2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.		2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
	[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key		[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
	Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, DOI		Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
	10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
	editor.org/info/rfc8208>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
	[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for		[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
	BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,		BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
	and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, DOI		and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
	10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
	editor.org/info/rfc8209>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
	[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital		[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
	Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,		Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
	DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,		DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/		<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
	NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.		NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
	[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure		[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
	Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4,		Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4,
	DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,		DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
	<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/		<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
	NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.		NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for		[RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
	Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,		Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,
	December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.		December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.
	[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature		[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
	Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature		Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
	skipping to change at page 13, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 15 ¶
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	A.1. Topology and Experiment Description		A.1. Topology and Experiment Description
	Topology:		Topology:
	AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)		AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)
	Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32		Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32
	The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256 using the		The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256, using
	algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7 of		the algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7
	this document.		of this document.
	A.2. Keys		A.2. Keys
	For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to		For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to
	make the result deterministic.		make the result deterministic.
	The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],		The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],
	Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".		Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".
	Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, the are still		Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, they are still
	useful within the constraint of this document.		useful within the constraint of this document.
	k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C		k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
	3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60		3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60
	Keys of AS64496:		Keys of AS64496:
	================		================
	ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154		ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
	private key:		private key:
	skipping to change at page 23, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 13 ¶
	55058E8053F4ACD3		55058E8053F4ACD3
	Acknowledgements		Acknowledgements
	The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for		The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
	producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. The		producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. The
	authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg,		authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg,
	Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and		Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and
	comments. Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery		comments. Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery
	were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.		were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.
	Additionally we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from		Additionally, we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from
	where we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document.		which we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Sean Turner		Sean Turner
	sn3rd		sn3rd
	Email: sean@sn3rd.com		Email: sean@sn3rd.com
	Oliver Borchert		Oliver Borchert
	NIST		NIST
End of changes. 56 change blocks.
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