draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-06.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-07.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: 31 January 2022 JetLend Expires: 4 August 2022 JetLend
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus Arrcus
J. Snijders J. Snijders
Fastly Fastly
R. Housley R. Housley
Vigil Security Vigil Security
30 July 2021 31 January 2022
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-06 draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-07
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An
Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System that provides a means of validating that a Customer Autonomous System
holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream
providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the
Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and
peers. peers.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
skipping to change at page 2, line 10 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 January 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 August 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to to validate that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder
send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this validation
verification mechanism. mechanism.
The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic
validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be
validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current
infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in
[RFC6485], or its successor. [RFC6485], or its successor.
To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of
 End of changes. 11 change blocks. 
16 lines changed or deleted 16 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.48. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/