draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17.txt   draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-18.txt 
Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed. Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Qu Intended status: Standards Track Y. Qu
Expires: September 28, 2017 Huawei Expires: October 13, 2017 Huawei
D. Yeung D. Yeung
Arrcus, Inc Arrcus, Inc
I. Chen I. Chen
Jabil Jabil
J. Zhang J. Zhang
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
March 27, 2017 April 11, 2017
Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17.txt draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-18.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. Key chains This document describes the key chain YANG data model. Key chains
are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other
applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list of applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list of
elements each containing a key string, send lifetime, accept elements each containing a key string, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly
overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain
elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1. Simple Key Chain with Always Valid Single Key . . . . . . 20 A.1. Simple Key Chain with Always Valid Single Key . . . . . . 21
A.2. Key Chain with Keys having Different Lifetimes . . . . . 21 A.2. Key Chain with Keys having Different Lifetimes . . . . . 22
A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes . . 23 A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes . . 23
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes the key chain YANG [YANG] data model. Key This document describes the key chain YANG [YANG] data model. Key
chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and
other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list
of elements each containing a key string, send lifetime, accept of elements each containing a key string, send lifetime, accept
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC-KEYWORDS]. [RFC-KEYWORDS].
1.2. Tree Diagrams 1.2. Tree Diagrams
A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is
presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used. presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used.
o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys. o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose YANG list keys. These YANG list keys
should not be confused with the key-chain keys.
o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that
make the corresponding node conditional. make the corresponding node conditional.
o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration
(read-write), "ro" state data (read-only), "-x" RPC operations, (read-write), "ro" state data (read-only), "-x" RPC operations,
and "-n" notifications. and "-n" notifications.
o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" a o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" a
container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list". container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list".
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network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will
facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key
rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core
routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT]. routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].
A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a
Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated
authentication or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by authentication or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by
any service or application requiring authentication or encryption. any service or application requiring authentication or encryption.
In essence, the key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be In essence, the key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be
referenced whereever it is required. The key-chain construct has referenced wherever it is required. The key-chain construct has been
been implemented by most networking vendors and deployed in many implemented by most networking vendors and deployed in many networks.
networks.
A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well
as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the
key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment
model where the details of the applications or services requiring model where the details of the applications or services requiring
authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The
YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection
criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does
not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes
augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection
criteria. criteria.
2.1. Applicability 2.1. Applicability
Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain
names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type
has been provided to facilate reference to the key-chain name without has been provided to facilitate reference to the key-chain name
having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath) without having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath)
selector. selector.
2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains 2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains
Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key string and/or Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key string and/or
algorithm used by an application for authentication or encryption. algorithm used by an application for authentication or encryption.
This MAY be accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid This MAY be accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid
accept lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send accept lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send
lifetime. One scenario for facilitating key rollover is to: lifetime. One scenario for facilitating key rollover is to:
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the keys used for transmission. the keys used for transmission.
2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the 2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the
updated key chain and that their system times are roughly updated key chain and that their system times are roughly
synchronized. The system times of devices within an synchronized. The system times of devices within an
administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be
automated. automated.
3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network 3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network
devices within the domain of key chain will start sending the new devices within the domain of key chain will using the new key for
key. transmissions.
4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key 4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key
removed may be distributed to the network devices within the removed may be distributed to the network devices within the
domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the
next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always
include two keys; either the current and future key (during key include two keys; either the current and future key (during key
rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key
rollovers). rollovers).
3. Design of the Key Chain Model 3. Design of the Key Chain Model
The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed
by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the
Key ID is used to identify the key chain key to be used. In addition Key ID is used to identify the key chain key to be used. In addition
to the Key ID, each key chain key includes a key-string and a to the Key ID, each key chain key includes a key-string and a
cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain keys include cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain keys include
send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is unspecified, send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is unspecified,
the key is always considered valid. the key is always considered valid.
Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for Note that different key values for transmission versus acceptance may
transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key be supported with multiple key chain elements where the accept-
chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not lifetime or send-lifetime is not valid (e.g., has an end-time equal
valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time). to the start-time).
Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various
vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Finally, the crypto vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Finally, the crypto
algorithm identities are provided for reuse when configuring legacy algorithm identities are provided for reuse when configuring legacy
authentication and encryption not using key-chains. authentication and encryption not using key-chains.
A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the
network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other
YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain. The YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain. The
"key-chain-state=ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other YANG modules "key-chain-state=ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other YANG modules
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minimize visibility similar to what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs. minimize visibility similar to what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs.
The timestamp of the last key-chain modification is also maintained The timestamp of the last key-chain modification is also maintained
in the operational state. Additionally, the operational state in the operational state. Additionally, the operational state
includes an indication of whether or not a key chain key is valid for includes an indication of whether or not a key chain key is valid for
sending or acceptance. sending or acceptance.
3.2. Key Chain Model Features 3.2. Key Chain Model Features
Features are used to handle differences between vendor Features are used to handle differences between vendor
implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration
an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in of an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in
hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements
(e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by (e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by
vendors or only a single vendor. vendors or only a single vendor.
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree
+--rw key-chains +--rw key-chains
| +--rw key-chain* [name] | +--rw key-chain* [name]
| | +--rw name string | | +--rw name string
| | +--rw description? string | | +--rw description? string
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| | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--rw (end-time)? | | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | | +--:(infinite) | | | +--:(infinite)
| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(duration) | | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | | +--:(end-date-time) | | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--rw end-date-time? | | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | | yang:date-and-time | | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--rw crypto-algorithm identityref | | +--rw crypto-algorithm identityref
| | +--rw key-string | | +--rw key-string
| | +--rw (key-string-style)? | | +--rw (key-string-style)?
| | +--:(keystring) | | +--:(keystring)
| | | +--rw keystring? string | | | +--rw keystring? string
| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? | | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
| | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string | | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
| +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}? | +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
| +--rw enable? boolean | +--rw enable? boolean
+--ro key-chains-state +--ro key-chains-state
+--ro key-chain* [name] +--ro key-chain* [name]
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| | +--:(start-end-time) | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | +--ro (end-time)? | | +--ro (end-time)?
| | +--:(infinite) | | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--ro no-end-time? empty | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
| | +--:(duration) | | +--:(duration)
| | | +--ro duration? uint32 | | | +--ro duration? uint32
| | +--:(end-date-time) | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | +--ro end-date-time? | | +--ro end-date-time?
| | yang:date-and-time | | yang:date-and-time
| +--ro crypto-algorithm identityref | +--ro crypto-algorithm identityref
| +--ro key-string | +--ro key-string
| | +--ro (key-string-style)? | | +--ro (key-string-style)?
| | +--:(keystring) | | +--:(keystring)
| | | +--ro keystring? string | | | +--ro keystring? string
| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? | | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
| | +--ro hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string | | +--ro hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
| +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean | +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean
| +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean | +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean
+--ro aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}? +--ro aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
+--ro enable? boolean +--ro enable? boolean
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description description
"Key string in ASCII format."; "Key string in ASCII format.";
} }
} }
case hexadecimal { case hexadecimal {
if-feature "hex-key-string"; if-feature "hex-key-string";
leaf hexadecimal-string { leaf hexadecimal-string {
type yang:hex-string; type yang:hex-string;
description description
"Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared "Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared
to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords
greater key entropy with the same number of greater key entropy with the same number of
octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of
well-known words or numbers."; well-known words or numbers.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping key-chain-common { grouping key-chain-common {
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The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
via network management protocols such as NETCONF [NETCONF] or via network management protocols such as NETCONF [NETCONF] or
RESTCONF [RESTCONF]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure RESTCONF [RESTCONF]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure
transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is
Secure Shell (SSH) [NETCONF-SSH]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is Secure Shell (SSH) [NETCONF-SSH]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is
HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [TLS]. HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [TLS].
The NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] provides the means to The NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] provides the means to
restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a pre- restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a pre-
configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
operations and content. operations and content. The key strings are not accessible by
default and NETCONF Access Control Mode [NETCONF-ACM] rules are
required to configure or retrieve them.
When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key
Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is
not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent
of key-chain configuration. of key-chain configuration. When AES key-encryption is used, the
hex-key-string feature is also required since the encrypted keys will
The key strings are not accessible by default and NETCONF Access contain characters that are not representable in the YANG string
Control Mode [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or built-in type [YANG]. AES key-encryption MAY be used for added key
retrieve them. security in situations where the NETCONF Access Control Mode is not
available.
The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT
RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no
other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must
authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many
peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used
with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT
be reused with more secure algorithms. be reused with more secure algorithms.
Similarly, the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms have been proven to be
insecure ([Dobb96a], [Dobb96b], and [SHA-SEC-CON]) and usage is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Usage should be confined to deployments where it is
required for backward compatibility.
It is RECOMMENDED that keys be encrypted or otherwise obfuscated when It is RECOMMENDED that keys be encrypted or otherwise obfuscated when
stored internally on a network device supporting this specification. stored internally on a network device supporting this specification.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry
[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the [XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the
following registration is requested to be made: following registration is requested to be made:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
skipping to change at page 20, line 9 skipping to change at page 20, line 19
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August
2009. 2009.
[BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010. (BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010.
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang, Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,
"Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014. "Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014.
[Dobb96a] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", Technical
Report (Presented at the RUMP Session of EuroCrypt 1996),
2 May 1996.
[Dobb96b] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
CryptoBytes Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1996.
[IAB-REPORT] [IAB-REPORT]
Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC
4948, August 2007. 4948, August 2007.
[NETCONF-SSH] [NETCONF-SSH]
Wasserman, M., "NETCONF over SSH", RFC 6242, June 2011. Wasserman, M., "NETCONF over SSH", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[NTP-PROTO] [NTP-PROTO]
Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
skipping to change at page 20, line 30 skipping to change at page 20, line 47
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[OSPFV3-AUTH] [OSPFV3-AUTH]
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014. Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.
[RESTCONF] [RESTCONF]
Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017. Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017.
[SHA-SEC-CON]
Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, February 2011.
[TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP [TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS] [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]
Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010. June 2010.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol", RFC 5246, August 2008.
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requirements. requirements.
Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments. Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments.
Thanks to Ladislav Lhotka for YANG Doctor comments. Thanks to Ladislav Lhotka for YANG Doctor comments.
Thanks to Martin Bjorklund for additional YANG Doctor comments. Thanks to Martin Bjorklund for additional YANG Doctor comments.
Thanks to Tom Petch for comments during IETF last call. Thanks to Tom Petch for comments during IETF last call.
Thanks to Matthew Miller for comments made during the Gen-ART review.
Thanks to Vincent Roca for comments made during the Security
Directorate review.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Acee Lindem (editor) Acee Lindem (editor)
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
301 Midenhall Way 301 Midenhall Way
Cary, NC 27513 Cary, NC 27513
USA USA
Email: acee@cisco.com Email: acee@cisco.com
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