draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-01.txt   draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-02.txt 
Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed. Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed.
Internet-Draft Y. Qu Internet-Draft Y. Qu
Intended status: Standards Track D. Yeung Intended status: Standards Track D. Yeung
Expires: August 15, 2016 Cisco Systems Expires: September 16, 2016 Cisco Systems
I. Chen I. Chen
Ericsson Ericsson
J. Zhang J. Zhang
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
Y. Yang Y. Yang
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
February 12, 2016 March 15, 2016
Key Chain YANG Data Model Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-01.txt draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-02.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be
gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key
distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for distribution can be automated. Key chains are commonly used for
routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some routing protocol authentication and other applications. In some
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 16, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 31 skipping to change at page 2, line 31
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Relationship to other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Relationship to other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain
is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept
lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetime, and algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept
lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, keys and algorithms may be
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routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT]. routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].
A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a
Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication
or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or
application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the
key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced where ever key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced where ever
it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most
networking vendors and deployed in many networks. networking vendors and deployed in many networks.
The module name was change from ietf-key-chain to ietf-routing-key-
chain to avoid disambiguate it from the ietf-system-keychain module
defined in [NETCONF-SERVER-CONF].
A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well
as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the
key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment
model where the details of the applications or services requiring model where the details of the applications or services requiring
authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The
YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection
criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does
not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes
augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection
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4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key 4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key
removed may be distributed to the network devices within the removed may be distributed to the network devices within the
domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the
next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always
include two keys; either the current and future key (during key include two keys; either the current and future key (during key
rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key
rollovers). rollovers).
3. Design of the Key Chain Model 3. Design of the Key Chain Model
The ietf-keychain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed The ietf-routing-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys
by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the indexed by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3
Key-Id is used to identify the key chain entry to be used. In [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the Key-Id is used to identify the key chain entry to
addition to the Key-ID, each key chain entry includes a key-string be used. In addition to the Key-ID, each key chain entry includes a
and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain entries key-string and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain
include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is entries include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime
unspecified, the key is always considered valid. is unspecified, the key is always considered valid.
Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for
transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key
chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not
valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time). valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time).
Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various
vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Additionally, the vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Additionally, the
key-chain is made a grouping so that an implementation could support key-chain is made a grouping so that an implementation could support
scoping other than at the global level. Finally, the crypto- scoping other than at the global level. Finally, the crypto-
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Features are used to handle differences between vendor Features are used to handle differences between vendor
implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration
an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in
hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements
(e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by (e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by
vendors or only a single vendor. vendors or only a single vendor.
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree
+--rw key-chains +--rw key-chains
+--rw key-chain-list* [name] +--rw key-chain-list* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--ro name-state? string | +--ro name-state? string
| +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}? | +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?
| | +--rw duration? uint32 | | +--rw duration? uint32
| +--ro accept-tolerance-state | +--ro accept-tolerance-state
| | +--ro duration? uint32 | | +--ro duration? uint32
| +--rw key-chain-entry* [key-id] | +--rw key-chain-entry* [key-id]
| +--rw key-id uint64 | +--rw key-id uint64
| +--ro key-id-state? uint64 | +--ro key-id-state? uint64
| +--rw key-string | +--rw key-string
| | +--rw (key-string-style)? | | +--rw (key-string-style)?
| | +--:(keystring) | | +--:(keystring)
| | | +--rw keystring? string | | | +--rw keystring? string
| | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? | | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
| | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string | | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string
| +--rw lifetime | +--rw lifetime
| | +--rw (lifetime)? | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime) | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)
| | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime | | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime
| | | +--rw (lifetime)? | | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | | +--:(always) | | | +--:(always)
| | | | +--rw always? empty | | | | +--rw always? empty
| | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--rw start-date-time? | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | | yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | | +--rw (end-time)? | | | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--:(infinite) | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | +--:(duration)
| | | +--:(duration) | | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--:(end-date-time) | | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | | +--rw end-date-time? | | | yang:date-and-time
| | | yang:date-and-time | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)
| | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime) | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?
| | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}? | | +--rw send-lifetime
| | +--rw send-lifetime | | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | | +--rw (lifetime)? | | | +--:(always)
| | | +--:(always) | | | | +--rw always? empty
| | | | +--rw always? empty | | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--rw start-date-time? | | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | | | yang:date-and-time | | | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--rw (end-time)? | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(infinite) | | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | | +--:(duration) | | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | | +--:(end-date-time) | | | yang:date-and-time
| | | +--rw end-date-time? | | +--rw accept-lifetime
| | | yang:date-and-time | | +--rw (lifetime)?
| | +--rw accept-lifetime | | +--:(always)
| | +--rw (lifetime)? | | | +--rw always? empty
| | +--:(always) | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--rw always? empty | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | +--:(start-end-time) | | +--rw (end-time)?
| | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | +--:(infinite)
| | +--rw (end-time)? | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty
| | +--:(infinite) | | +--:(duration)
| | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | +--rw duration? uint32
| | +--:(duration) | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | +--rw end-date-time?
| | +--:(end-date-time) | | yang:date-and-time
| | +--rw end-date-time? | +--ro lifetime-state
| | yang:date-and-time | | +--ro send-lifetime
| +--ro lifetime-state | | | +--ro (lifetime)?
| | +--ro send-lifetime | | | +--:(always)
| | | +--ro (lifetime)? | | | | +--ro always? empty
| | | +--:(always) | | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | | +--ro always? empty | | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--ro (end-time)?
| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--ro (end-time)? | | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
| | | +--:(infinite) | | | +--:(duration)
| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty | | | | +--ro duration? uint32
| | | +--:(duration) | | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | | +--ro duration? uint32 | | | +--ro end-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | +--:(end-date-time) | | +--ro send-valid? boolean
| | | +--ro end-date-time? | | +--ro accept-lifetime
| | | yang:date-and-time | | | +--ro (lifetime)?
| | +--ro send-valid? boolean | | | +--:(always)
| | +--ro accept-lifetime | | | | +--ro always? empty
| | | +--ro (lifetime)? | | | +--:(start-end-time)
| | | +--:(always) | | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | | +--ro always? empty | | | +--ro (end-time)?
| | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--:(infinite)
| | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty
| | | +--ro (end-time)? | | | +--:(duration)
| | | +--:(infinite) | | | | +--ro duration? uint32
| | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty | | | +--:(end-date-time)
| | | +--:(duration) | | | +--ro end-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| | | | +--ro duration? uint32 | | +--ro accept-valid? boolean
| | | +--:(end-date-time) | +--rw crypto-algorithm
| | | +--ro end-date-time? | | +--rw (algorithm)?
| | | yang:date-and-time | | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
| | +--ro accept-valid? boolean | | | +--rw hmac-sha1-12? empty
| +--rw crypto-algorithm | | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
| | +--rw (algorithm)? | | | +--rw aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}? | | +--:(md5)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha1-12? empty | | | +--rw md5? empty
| | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}? | | +--:(sha-1)
| | | +--rw aes-cmac-prf-128? empty | | | +--rw sha-1? empty
| | +--:(md5) | | +--:(hmac-sha-1)
| | | +--rw md5? empty | | | +--rw hmac-sha-1? empty
| | +--:(sha-1) | | +--:(hmac-sha-256)
| | | +--rw sha-1? empty | | | +--rw hmac-sha-256? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-1) | | +--:(hmac-sha-384)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-1? empty | | | +--rw hmac-sha-384? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-256) | | +--:(hmac-sha-512)
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-256? empty | | | +--rw hmac-sha-512? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-384) | | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}?
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-384? empty | | +--rw clear-text? empty
| | +--:(hmac-sha-512) | +--ro crypto-algorithm-state
| | | +--rw hmac-sha-512? empty | +--ro (algorithm)?
| | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}? | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}?
| | +--rw clear-text? empty | | +--ro hmac-sha1-12? empty
| +--ro crypto-algorithm-state | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}?
| +--ro (algorithm)? | | +--ro aes-cmac-prf-128? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}? | +--:(md5)
| | +--ro hmac-sha1-12? empty | | +--ro md5? empty
| +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}? | +--:(sha-1)
| | +--ro aes-cmac-prf-128? empty | | +--ro sha-1? empty
| +--:(md5) | +--:(hmac-sha-1)
| | +--ro md5? empty | | +--ro hmac-sha-1? empty
| +--:(sha-1) | +--:(hmac-sha-256)
| | +--ro sha-1? empty | | +--ro hmac-sha-256? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-1) | +--:(hmac-sha-384)
| | +--ro hmac-sha-1? empty | | +--ro hmac-sha-384? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-256) | +--:(hmac-sha-512)
| | +--ro hmac-sha-256? empty | | +--ro hmac-sha-512? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-384) | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}?
| | +--ro hmac-sha-384? empty | +--ro clear-text? empty
| +--:(hmac-sha-512) +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
| | +--ro hmac-sha-512? empty | +--rw enable? boolean
| +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}? +--ro aes-key-wrap-state {aes-key-wrap}?
| +--ro clear-text? empty +--ro enable? boolean
+--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}?
| +--rw enable? boolean
+--ro aes-key-wrap-state {aes-key-wrap}?
+--ro enable? boolean
4. Key Chain YANG Model 4. Key Chain YANG Model
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2016-02-16.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-routing-key-chain@2016-03-15.yang"
module ietf-key-chain { module ietf-routing-key-chain {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing-key-chain";
// replace with IANA namespace when assigned // replace with IANA namespace when assigned
prefix "key-chain"; prefix "key-chain";
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix "yang"; prefix "yang";
} }
organization organization
"IETF RTG (Routing) Working Group"; "IETF RTG (Routing) Working Group";
contact contact
skipping to change at page 9, line 10 skipping to change at page 9, line 10
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2016-03-15 {
description
"Rename module from ietf-key-chain to
ietf-routing-key-chain.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Routing key-chain";
}
revision 2016-02-16 { revision 2016-02-16 {
description description
"Updated version. Added clear-text algorithm as a "Updated version. Added clear-text algorithm as a
feature."; feature.";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain"; "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for key-chain";
} }
revision 2015-10-15 { revision 2015-10-15 {
description description
"Updated version, organization, and copyright. "Updated version, organization, and copyright.
skipping to change at page 17, line 30 skipping to change at page 17, line 40
peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used
with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT
be reused with more secure algorithms. be reused with more secure algorithms.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry
[XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following [XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following
registration is requested to be made: registration is requested to be made:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing-key-chain
Registrant Contact: The IESG. Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [YANG]. registry [YANG].
name: ietf-acl namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key- name: ietf-acl namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-
chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX routing-key-chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC
6241, June 2011. 6241, June 2011.
[NETCONF-SSH] [NETCONF-SSH]
skipping to change at page 18, line 40 skipping to change at page 18, line 48
[CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]
Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang, Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,
"Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014. "Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014.
[IAB-REPORT] [IAB-REPORT]
Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC
4948, August 2007. 4948, August 2007.
[NETCONF-SERVER-CONF]
Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and
RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", draft-ietf-netconf-
server-model-08.txt (work in progress), October 2015.
[NTP-PROTO] [NTP-PROTO]
Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[OSPFV3-AUTH] [OSPFV3-AUTH]
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014. Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014.
[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS] [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]
 End of changes. 14 change blocks. 
162 lines changed or deleted 174 lines changed or added

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