--- 1/draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-08.txt 2022-01-18 06:13:11.903098143 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-09.txt 2022-01-18 06:13:11.955099447 -0800 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ REGEXT Working Group S. Hollenbeck Internet-Draft Verisign Labs -Intended status: Standards Track 8 November 2021 -Expires: 12 May 2022 +Intended status: Standards Track 18 January 2022 +Expires: 22 July 2022 Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) using OpenID Connect - draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-08 + draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-09 Abstract The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server @@ -31,76 +31,73 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 May 2022. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 July 2022. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4. Specialized Claims for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4.1. Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4.2. Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Token Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 4.4. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 4.5. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 4.6. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 5. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 4.4. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.5. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 4.6. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 5.2. Manual Token Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.2. Manual Token Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1. RDAP Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 6.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 6.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 7.1. Verisign Labs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 7.2. Viagenie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1. Introduction The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web @@ -106,23 +103,23 @@ The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230]. RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481], - "Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC7482], and "JSON + "Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC9082], and "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" - [RFC7483]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and + [RFC9083]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP. 1.1. Problem Statement The traditional "user name and password" authentication method does not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication @@ -212,52 +209,62 @@ Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated by reference. 3.1.2. Overview At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-based client using OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps: - 1. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends an HTTP (or - HTTPS) query containing OAuth 2.0 request parameters to an RDAP - server. - 2. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP)) prepares - an Authentication Request containing the desired request - parameters. - 3. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request + 1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to + determine the type of OpenID Authorization Server that's used by + the RDAP server. This information is returned in the + rdapConformance section of the response. A value of + "rdap_openidc_local_level_0" indicates that the server uses a + local Authorization Server. A value of + "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" indicates that the server uses a + remote Authorization Server. + 2. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends a "tokens" + request (see Section 4.2) to an RDAP server. The request MUST + include an "id" parameter if the server uses only a remote + Authorization Server. The "id" parameter is OPTIONAL if the + server uses a local Authorization Server. + 3. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP)) + prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired + request parameters. + 4. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP) using an HTTP redirect. - 4. The Authorization Server authenticates the RDAP Client. - 5. The Authorization Server obtains RDAP Client consent/ - authorization. + 5. The Authorization Server authenticates the RDAP Client. - 6. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP + 6. The Authorization Server obtains RDAP Client consent/ + authorization. + 7. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect. - 7. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code + 8. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code at the Token Endpoint. - 8. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token and - Access Token in the response body. - 9. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the RDAP + 9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token + and Access Token in the response body. + 10. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the RDAP client's Subject Identifier. The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and access control decisions based on local policies, the ID Token received from the OP, and the received Claims. Note that OpenID Connect describes different process flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command line clients. 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to - use OpenID Connect with RDAP. An OP MUST include support for the + use OpenID Connect with RDAP. An OP SHOULD include support for the claims described in Section 3.1.4 to provide additional information needed for RDAP End-User authorization. OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use OpenID Connect services for an End-User. That process is described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration" protocol [OIDCR]. 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery An RDAP server/RP needs to receive an identifier from an End-User that can be used to discover the End-User's OP. That process is @@ -420,80 +427,98 @@ privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations. Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope of this document. 4. Protocol Parameters This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP: 1. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end- user identity. - 2. A path segment to request an ID Token and an Access Token for a - specific end-user identity. - 3. A query parameter to deliver an ID Token and an Access Token for - use with an RDAP query. + 2. A path segment to request an tokens for a specific end-user + identity. + 3. A query parameter to deliver an Access Token for use with an RDAP + query. 4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response - Client authentication is requested using one of two methods: either - by adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax - described in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986], or by including an - HTTP authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme as - described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. Clients can use either method. - Servers MUST support both methods. + Client authentication is requested using one of three methods: + + 1. by adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the + syntax described in Section 3.4 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986], + 2. by including an HTTP authorization header for the Basic + authentication scheme as described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617], or + 3. by including an HTTP authorization header with a Bearer token as + described in RFC 6750 [RFC6750]. + + Clients can use any of these methods. Servers MUST support all + methods. The query used to request client authentication is represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a value component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An example for client identifier "user.idp.example": https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier "user.idp.example": - https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com Authorization: Basic - dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ== + https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com + + Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ== + The HTTP Bearer authorization header contains a Base64url-encoded + representation of the Access Token issued by an OP. An example that + has been abbreviated for clarity: + + https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com + + Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9 The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response - structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the + structures specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. Information that the end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the response. 4.2. Token Request and Response Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to authenticate an end- user and return tokens (an ID Token, an Access Token, and a Refresh Token) from an OP that can be then be passed to the RP/RDAP server to - authenticate and process subsequent queries. An access token can be + authenticate and process subsequent queries. An Access Token can be refreshed as described in Section 12 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC] and Section 6 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. Clients can take advantage of this functionality if it is supported by the OP and accepted by the RDAP server. Identity provider authentication is - requested using a "tokens" path segment and a query parameter with a - key value of "id" and a value component that contains the client - identifier issued by an OP. An example: + requested using a "tokens" path segment and an OPTIONAL query + parameter (the query parameter isn't needed if the RDAP server is + using a local OP) with a key value of "id" and a value component that + contains the client identifier issued by an OP. An example for use + with a remote OP: https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example + An example for use with a local OP: + + https://example.com/rdap/tokens In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this query MUST contain five name-value pairs, in any order, representing the returned ID Token, Access Token, and Refresh Token. The ID Token is represented using a key value of "id_token". The Access Token is - represented using a key value of "access_token". The access token + represented using a key value of "access_token". The Access Token type is represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of "bearer" as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749 - [RFC6749]. The lifetime of the access token is represented using a + [RFC6749]. The lifetime of the Access Token is represented using a key value of "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the - lifetime in seconds of the access token as described in Section 4.2.2 + lifetime in seconds of the Access Token as described in Section 4.2.2 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The Refresh Token is represented using a key value of "refresh_token". The token values returned in the RDAP server response MUST be Base64url-encoded as described in RFCs 7515 [RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519]. An example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity): { "access_token" : "eyJ0...NiJ9", "id_token" : "eyJ0...EjXk", @@ -509,78 +534,78 @@ supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries that include an identifier associated with an unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An RDAP server that receives a query containing an identifier associated with a recognized OP MUST perform the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP using a browser or browser-like client and return encoded tokens to the client. Note that tokens are typically valid for a limited period of time and new tokens will be required when an existing token's validity period has expired. - The tokens can then be passed to the server for use with an RDAP - query by passing the encoded ID Token as a query parameter with a key - value of "id_token" and the encoded Access Token in an HTTP Bearer - authorization header [RFC6750]. An example (the encoded tokens have - been abbreviated and the URI split across multiple lines for - clarity): + The Access Token can then be passed to the server for use with an + RDAP query by including the encoded token in an HTTP Bearer + authorization header [RFC6750]. An example (the encoded token has + been abbreviated for clarity): - https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk + https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9 - - The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response - structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the - end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the - response. + The RDAP server can retrieve user information (such as claims + associated with the user) from the OP by querying the UserInfo + endpoint using the given Access Token. The user information can then + be used to determine if the uiser is authorized to receive the + requested information. The response to an authenticated query MUST + use the response structures specified in RFC 9083 [RFC9083]. + Information that the end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be + omitted from the response. 4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation The refresh token returned in the token response can be used to - refresh an access token. An access token is refreshed using a + refresh an Access Token. An Access Token is refreshed using a "tokens" path segment and a query parameter. The query parameter includes a key value of "refresh_token" and a Base64url-encoded value that represents the refresh token. An example: https://example.com/rdap/tokens?refresh_token=eyJ0...c8da In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this query MUST contain four name-value pairs, in any order, representing a returned Refresh Token and Access Token. The Refresh Token is represented using a key value of "refresh_token". The Access Token - is represented using a key value of "access_token". The access token + is represented using a key value of "access_token". The Access Token type is represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of "bearer" as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749 - [RFC6749]. The lifetime of the access token is represented using a + [RFC6749]. The lifetime of the Access Token is represented using a key value of "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the - lifetime in seconds of the access token as described in Section 4.2.2 + lifetime in seconds of the Access Token as described in Section 4.2.2 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The token values returned in the RDAP server response MUST be Base64url-encoded as described in RFCs 7515 [RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519]. - Example access token refresh response (the encoded tokens have been + Example Access Token refresh response (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity): { "access_token" : "0dac...13b0", "refresh_token" : "f735...d30c", "token_type" : "bearer", "expires_in" : "3600" } Figure 2 Access and refresh tokens can be revoked as described in RFC 7009 [RFC7009] by sending a request to an RDAP server that contains a "tokens/revoke" path segment and a query parameter. The query parameter includes a key value of "token" and a Base64url-encoded - value that represents either the current refresh token or the - associated access token. An example: + value that represents the current refresh token. An example: https://example.com/rdap/tokens/revoke?token=f735...d30c Note that this command will revoke both access and refresh tokens at the same time. In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this query MUST contain a description of the result of processing the revocation request within the RDAP "notices" data structure. Example token revocation success: @@ -617,86 +642,89 @@ scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP can receive tokens with an audience value that does not include the RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and the RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be remedied by having the RP exchange these tokens with the OP for a set of trusted tokens that reset the audience parameter. This token exchange protocol is described in RFC 8693 [RFC8693]. 4.5. Parameter Processing - Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP request that - does not include an "id" query component MUST be processed as an - unauthenticated query. An RDAP server that processes an - authenticated query MUST determine if the identifier is associated - with an OP that is recognized and supported by the server. Servers - MUST reject queries that include an identifier associated with an - unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An RDAP - server that receives a query containing an identifier associated with - a recognized OP MUST perform the steps required to authenticate the - user with the OP, process the query, and return an RDAP response that - is appropriate for the end user's level of authorization and access. + Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that + processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the end-user + identification information is associated with an OP that is + recognized and supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries + that include identification information that is not associated with a + supported OP by returning an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An + RDAP server that receives a query containing identification + information associated with a recognized OP MUST perform the steps + required to authenticate the user with the OP, process the query, and + return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end user's level + of authorization and access. An RDAP server that receives a query containing tokens associated with a recognized OP and authenticated end user MUST process the query and return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end user's level of authorization and access. Errors based on processing either the ID Token or the Access Token MUST be signaled with an appropriate HTTP status code as described in Section 3.1 of RFC 6750 [RFC6750]. On receiving a query containing tokens, the RDAP server MUST validate - the ID Token. It can do this independently of the OP, because the ID - Token is a JWT that contains all the data necessary for validation. - The Access Token, however, is an opaque value, and can only be - validated by sending a request using it to the UserInfo Endpoint and - confirming that a successful response is received. This is different - from the OpenID Connect Authorization Code and Implicit flows, where - the Access Token can be validated against the at_hash claim from the - ID Token. With a query containing tokens, the Access Token might not - validate against the at_hash claim because the Access Token may have - been refreshed since the ID Token was issued. + the identity information received from a UserInfo endpoint. It can + do this independently of the OP, because the response is a JSON + object that contains all the data necessary for validation. The + Access Token can be validated by sending a request using it to the + UserInfo Endpoint and confirming that a successful response is + received. This is different from the OpenID Connect Authorization + Code and Implicit flows, where the Access Token can be validated + against the at_hash claim from the ID Token. With a query containing + tokens, the Access Token might not validate against the at_hash claim + because the Access Token may have been refreshed since the ID Token + was issued. An RDAP server that processes requests without needing the UserInfo claims does not need to retrieve the claims merely in order to validate the Access Token. Similarly, an RDAP server that has cached the UserInfo claims for an end user, in accordance with the HTTP headers of a previous UserInfo Endpoint response, does not need to - retrieve those claims again in order to revalidate the Access Token. + retrieve those claims again in order to re-validate the Access Token. 4.6. RDAP Conformance RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST indicate conformance with this specification by including an - rdapConformance ([RFC7483]) value of "rdap_openidc_level_0". The + rdapConformance ([RFC9083]) value of "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" or + "rdap_openidc_local_level_0". Both values MAY be present if a server + supports both local and remote OpenID Authorization Servers. The information needed to register this value in the RDAP Extensions Registry is described in Section 6.1. Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified: "rdapConformance" : [ "rdap_level_0", - "rdap_openidc_level_0" + "rdap_openidc_remote_level_0" ] Figure 5 5. Clients with Limited User Interfaces - The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires a client to interact - with a server using a web browser. This will not work well in - situations where the client is automated or an end-user is using a - command line user interface such as curl (http://curl.haxx.se/) or - wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/). There are multiple ways - to address this limitation using a web browser on a second device. - Two are described here. + The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires an end-user to interact + with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This + will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an + end-user is using a command line user interface such as curl + (http://curl.haxx.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/). + There are multiple ways to address this limitation using a web + browser on a second device. Two are described here. 5.1. OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant The "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides one method to request user authorization from devices that have an Internet connection, but lack a suitable browser for a more traditional OAuth flow. This method requires a client to use a second device (such as a smart telephone) that has access to a web browser for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the constrained device. @@ -704,70 +732,71 @@ 5.2. Manual Token Management A second method of requesting user authorization from a constrained device is possible by producing and managing tokens manually as follows: 1. Authenticate with the OP as described in Section 4.2 using a browser or browser-like client. 2. Store the returned ID Token, Access Token, and Refresh Token locally. - 3. Send a request to the content provider/RP along with the ID Token - and Access Token received from the OP. + 3. Send a request to the content provider/RP along with the client + ID and Access Token received from the OP. - The Access Token MAY be passed to the RP in an HTTP "Authorization" - header [RFC7235] or as a query parameter. The Access Token MUST be - specified using the "Bearer" authentication scheme [RFC6750] if it is - passed in an "Authorization" header. The ID Token MUST be passed to - the RP as a query parameter. + The Access Token MUST be passed to the RP in an HTTP "Authorization" + header [RFC7235]. The Access Token MUST be specified using the + "Bearer" authentication scheme [RFC6750]. Here are two examples using the curl and wget utilities. Start by authenticating with the OP: https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example Save the token information and pass it to the RP along with the URI representing the RDAP query. Using curl (encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity: curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\-k - https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk - - curl -k https://example.com/rdap/domain/ - example.com\?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9 + https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\?id=user.idp.example Using wget: wget --header="Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\https://example.com/rdap/domain/ - example.com\?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk - - wget https://example.com/rdap/domain/ - example.com\?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9 + example.com\id=user.idp.example Refresh tokens can be useful to automated or command line clients who wish to continue a session without explicitly re-authenticating an end user. See Section 4.3 for more information. 6. IANA Considerations 6.1. RDAP Extensions Registry - IANA is requested to register the following value in the RDAP + IANA is requested to register the following values in the RDAP Extensions Registry: - * Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_level_0 + * Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_remote_level_0 * Registry operator: Any * Published specification: This document. * Contact: IESG * Intended usage: This extension describes a federated - authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect. + authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, + and a remote Authorization Server. + + * Extension identifier: rdap_openidc_local_level_0 + * Registry operator: Any + * Published specification: This document. + * Contact: IESG + * Intended usage: This extension describes a federated + authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, + and a local Authorization Server. 6.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry IANA is requested to register the following values in the JSON Web Token Claims Registry: * Claim Name: "purpose" * Claim Description: This claim describes the stated purpose for submitting a request to access a protected RDAP resource. * Change Controller: IESG @@ -902,65 +931,24 @@ implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist. According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit". -7.1. Verisign Labs - - * Responsible Organization: Verisign Labs - * Location: https://rdap.verisignlabs.com/ - * Description: This implementation includes support for domain - registry RDAP queries using live data from the .cc and .tv country - code top-level domains and the .career generic top-level domain. - Three access levels are provided based on the authenticated - identity of the client: - 1. Unauthenticated: Limited information is returned in response - to queries from unauthenticated clients. - - 2. Basic: Clients who authenticate using a publicly available - identity provider like Google Gmail or Microsoft Hotmail will - receive all of the information available to an unauthenticated - client plus additional registration metadata, but no - personally identifiable information associated with entities. - 3. Advanced: Clients who authenticate using a more restrictive - identity provider will receive all of the information - available to a Basic client plus whatever information the - server operator deems appropriate for a fully authorized - client. Currently supported identity providers include those - developed by Verisign Labs - (https://testprovider.rdap.verisignlabs.com/) and CZ.NIC - (https://www.mojeid.cz/). - * Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research - implementation. - * Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features - described in this specification. - * Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com - -7.2. Viagenie - - * Responsible Organization: Viagenie - * Location: https://auth.viagenie.ca - * Description: This implementation is an OpenID identity provider - enabling users and registries to connect to the federation. It - also includes a barebone RDAP client and RDAP server in order to - test the authentication framework. Various level of purposes are - available for testing. - * Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research - implementation. - * Coverage: This implementation includes most features described in - this specification as an identity provider. - * Contact Information: Marc Blanchet, marc.blanchet@viagenie.ca + Version -09 of this specification introduced changes that are + incompatible with earlier implementations. Implementations that are + consistent with this specification will be added as they are + identified. 8. Security Considerations Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481]. Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality services as needed. Security services for ID Tokens and Access Tokens (with references to the JWT specification) are described in @@ -1054,30 +1042,20 @@ [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015, . [RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015, . - [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access - Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, - DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, - . - - [RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the - Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483, - DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015, - . - [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, @@ -1090,51 +1068,64 @@ [RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628, DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019, . [RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020, . + [RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access + Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021, + . + + [RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the + Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, + RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021, + . + 10.2. Informative References [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . Appendix A. Change Log 00: Initial working group version ported from draft-hollenbeck- regext-rdap-openid-10. 01: Modified ID Token delivery approach to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header. - 02: Modified token delivery approach (access token is the bearer + 02: Modified token delivery approach (Access Token is the bearer token) to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header, fixing the change made in -01. 03: Updated OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant description and reference due to publication of RFC 8628. 04: Updated OAuth 2.0 token exchange description and reference due to publication of RFC 8693. Corrected the RDAP conformance identifier to be registered with IANA. 05: Keepalive refresh. 06: Keepalive refresh. 07: Added "login_hint" description to Section 3.1.3.2. Added some text to Section 3.1.4.2 to note that "do not track" requires compliance with local regulations. 08: Rework of token management processing in Sections 4 and 5. + 09: Updated RDAP specification references. Added text to describe + both local and remote Authorization Server processing. Removed + text that described passing of ID Tokens as query parameters. Author's Address Scott Hollenbeck Verisign Labs 12061 Bluemont Way Reston, VA 20190 United States of America Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com