regext                                                         J. Latour
Internet-Draft                                                      CIRA
Intended status: Standards Track                          O. Gudmundsson
Expires: January 8, July 14, 2017                                  Cloudflare, Inc.
                                                              P. Wouters
                                                                 Red Hat
                                                             M. Pounsett
                                                   Rightside Group, Ltd.
                                                            July 7, 2016
                                                        January 10, 2017

       Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol


   There are several problems that arise in the standard
   Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is
   neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation.
   Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty
   guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records
   for the delegation.  As this is usually a one time activity when the
   operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a
   serious issue.

   When the domain on the other hand uses DNSSEC it necessary to make regular
   (sometimes annual) changes to the delegation, updating DS record(s)
   in order to track KSK rollover, by updating the delegation's DS record(s). rollover.  Under the current model this is
   prone to delays and errors.  Even when errors, as the Registrant has outsourced the operation of DNS to a third party the
   registrant still has to be must participate in the loop
   updates to update the DS record.

   There is a need for records.

   This document describes a simple protocol that allows a third party
   DNS operator to update DS and NS records for a delegation, in a
   trusted manner for a
   delegation manner, without involving the registrant Registrant for each operation.
   This same protocol can be used by Registrants.

   The protocol described in this draft is REST based, and when used
   through an authenticated channel can be used to establish the DNSSEC
   Initial Trust (to turn on DNSSEC or bootstrap DNSSEC).  Once DNSSEC
   trust is established this channel can be used to trigger maintenance
   of delegation records such as DS, NS, and glue records.  The protocol
   is kept as simple as possible.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, July 14, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   ( in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Notional Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  RFC2119 Keywords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  What is the goal?  Process Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Why DNSSEC? . . . . . . .  Identifying the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  How does  Establishing a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Chain of Trust
           Anchor? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  What checks are needed by parent? . . . . . . .  Maintaining the Chain of Trust  . . . . .   5
   4.  Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries RESTful API   6
     4.1.  Authentication . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Other Delegation Maintenance  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Authorization .   5
     3.5.  Acceptance Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  API Definition  . . .   6
     4.3.  Base URL Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  CDS resource  . . . .
     4.1.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.4.1.  Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC
               validation) . . .   7
     4.2.  RESTful Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.4.2.  Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) . .   7
       4.2.1.  CDS resource  . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.4.3.  DS Maintenance (Key roll over) . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Tokens   7
       4.2.2.  Token resource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.5.1.  Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge  . .   8
     4.6.   9
     4.3.  Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.7.  How to react to 403 on POST cds . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
   5.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
   6.  IANA Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
   7.  Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
     A.1.  Regex versio 01 .  regext Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
     A.2.  Regex version 00  .  regext Version 02 not pushed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.3.  regext Version 01 . . . . .  11
     A.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.4.  regext Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.5.  Version 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.4.  13
     A.6.  Version 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.5.  13
     A.7.  Version 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.6.  13
     A.8.  Version 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  13

1.  Introduction

   Why is this needed?  DNS registration systems today are designed
   around making registrations easy and fast.

   After the a domain has been
   registered there are really registered, one of three options on who maintains parties will
   maintain the DNS zone that is loaded on the "primary" DNS servers for the domain this
   can be servers: the
   Registrant, the Registrar, or a third party DNS Operator.

   Unfortunately operator.  DNS
   registration systems were originally designed around making
   registrations easy and fast, however after registration the ease to make
   complexity of making changes to the delegation differs for each one of
   options.  The Registrant needs to use the interface that the
   registrar provides to update NS and DS records. parties.  The Registrar on the
   other hand can make changes directly into in the registration system.
   Registry systems through some API (typically EPP [RFC5730]).  The
   Registrant is typically limited to using a web interface supplied by
   the Registrar.  A third party DNS Operator on the hand needs must to go through the
   Registrant to update any delegation information.


   In this last case, the operator must contact and engage the
   Registrant in updating NS and DS records for the delegation.  New
   information must be communicated to the Registrant, who must submit
   that information to the Registrar.  Typically this involves cutting
   and pasting between email and a web interface, which is error prone.
   Furthermore, involving Registrants in this way does not scale for
   even moderately sized DNS operators.  Tracking thousands (or
   millions) of changes sent to customers, and following up if those
   changes are not submitted to the Registrar, or are submitted with
   errors, is itself expensive and error prone.

   The current system does not work well, as there are many types of
   failures that have been reported and they have been at all levels in the registration
   model.  The failures result in either the inability to use DNSSEC or
   in validation failures that case cause the domain to become invalid and all unavailable to
   users that
   are behind validating resolvers will not be able to to access the
   domain. resolvers.

   The goal of this document is to create an automated interface a protocol for establishing a
   secure chain of trust that
   will reduce the friction involves parties not in the traditional
   Registrant/Registrar/Registry (RRR) model, and to reduce the friction
   in maintaining DNSSEC delegations. secured delegations in these cases.  It
   describes a REST-based [RFC6690] protocol which can be used to
   establish DNSSEC initial trust (to enable or bootstrap DNSSEC), and
   to trigger maintenance of delegation records such as DS, NS, and glue

2.  Notional Conventions

2.1.  Definitions

   For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS
   Operator responsible for a zone zone, where the operator is neither the
   Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation.

   Uses of "child" and "parent" refer to the relationship between DNS
   zone operators.  In this document, unless otherwise noted, the child
   is the third-party DNS operator and the parent is the Registry.

   Uses of the word 'Registrar' words "Registrar" or "Registration Entity" in this
   document may also be applied to
   resellers: an entity Resellers or to Registries that sells delegations through a registrar
   engage in registration activities directly with
   whom Registrants.  Unless
   otherwise noted, they are used to refer to the entity which has a reseller agreement.
   direct business relationship with the Registrant.

2.2.  RFC2119 Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  What is  Process Overview

3.1.  Identifying the goal?

   The primary goal is to have a protocol to establish a secure chain Registrar

   As of
   trust that involves parties that are not in the traditional RRR EPP
   model, or when EPP is not used.

   In the general case publication of this document, there should be has never been a way to find
   standardized or widely deployed method for easily and scalably
   identifying the right
   Registrar/Registry entity to talk to, but it does not exist.  Whois[] Registar for a particular registration.

   At this time, WHOIS [RFC3912] is the natural only widely deployed protocol to
   carry such information information, but that protocol
   but is unreliable WHOIS responses are unstructured text,
   and each implementor can lay out its text responses differently.  In
   addition, Registries may include referrals in this unstructured text
   to the WHOIS interfaces of their Registrars, and hard those Registrar
   WHOIS interface in turn have their own layouts.  This presents a text
   parsing problem which is infeasible to parse.  Its proposed solve.

   RDAP, the successor to WHOIS, described in [RFC7480], solves the
   problems of unstructured responses, and a consistently implemented
   referral system, however at this time RDAP
   [RFC7480] has yet to be deployed on at
   most TLD's.

   The preferred communication Registries.

   With no current mechanism is to use is to use a REST
   [RFC6690] call in place to start processing of scalably discover the requested delegation

3.1.  Why DNSSEC?

   DNSSEC [RFC4035] provides data authentication Registar
   for DNS answers, having
   DNSSEC enabled makes it possible to trust the answers.  The biggest
   obstacle in DNSSEC adoption is a particular registration, the initial configuration problem of automatic discovery of
   DNSSEC domain trust anchor at the parent, base URL of the DS record.

3.2.  How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust Anchor? API is considered out of scope of this document.

   The child needs first authors recommend standardization of an RDAP extension to sign obtain
   this information from the domain, then Registry.

3.2.  Establishing a Chain of Trust

   After signing the child can "upload" zone, the DS record to its parent.  The "normal" way child operator needs to upload is to go
   through registration interface, but that fails frequently.  The DNS
   Operator may not have access to the interface thus the registrant
   needs DS
   record(s) to relay the information.  For large operations this does not
   scale, as evident in lack of Trust Anchors for signed deployments
   that are operated by third parties. parent.  The child can signal its desire to have
   DNSSEC validation enabled by publishing one of the special DNS
   records CDS and/or CDNSKEY[RFC7344] CDNSKEY as defined in [RFC7344] and its proposed extension

      [RFC Editor: The above I-D reference should be replaced with the
      correct RFC number upon publication.]

   In the case of an insecure delegation, the Registrar will normally
   not be scanning the child zone for CDS/CDNSKEY records.  The child
   operator can use this protocol to notify the Registrar to begin such
   a scan.

   Once the "parent" "sees" Registrar sees these records it SHOULD start acceptance
   processing.  This document covers how to make the CDS records visible

3.3.  Maintaining the right parental agent.

   This document and [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] argue that Chain of Trust

   One the
   publication secure chain of CDS/CDNSKEY record trust is sufficient for established, the parent to
   start Registrar SHOULD
   regularly check the acceptance processing. child zone for CDS/CDNSKEY record changes.  The main point is
   Registrar SHOULD also accept signals via this protocol to provide
   authentication thus if immediately
   check the child is in "good" state then the DS
   upload should be simple zone for CDS/CDNSKEY records.

   Server implementations of this protocol MAY include rate limiting to accept
   protect their systems and publish.  If there is any
   problem the systems of child operators from abuse.

   Each parent does not add the DS.

   In the event this protocols operator and its associated authentication
   mechanism does not address the Registrant's security requirements to
   create Registrar is responsible for developing,
   implementing, and communicating their DNSSEC maintenance policies.

3.4.  Other Delegation Maintenance

      [ Not yet defined ]

3.5.  Acceptance Processing

   The Registrar, upon receiving a secure Trust Anchor delegation then signal or detecting through polling
   that the Registrant always
   has recourse by submitting its DS record via child desires to have its Registrar interface
   with EPP submission delegation updated, SHOULD run a
   series of tests to ensure that updating the Registry.

3.3.  What checks are needed by parent?

   The parent upon receiving a signal that it check zone will not
   create or exacerbate any problems with the child for desire
   for DS record publication. zone.  The basic
   tests include,

   1. Is SHOULD include:

   o  checking that the child zone is is properly signed
   2. The zone has a as per the
      Registrar and parent DNSSEC policy

   o  if updating the DS record, checking that the child CDS signed by RRset
      references a KSK referenced in the current DS,
      referring to a at least one key which is present in the current child DNSKEY RRset
   3. All and
      signs the name-servers for CDS RRset

   o  ensuring all name servers in the apex NS RRset of the child zone
      agree on the apex NS RRset and CDS RRset contents

   Parents can perform

   The Registrar SHOULD NOT make any changes to the DS RRset if the
   child name servers do not agree on the CDS/CDNSKEY content.

      [NOTE: Do we need a new section in the DPS for the CDS management
      policy [RFC6841]?]

   Registrars MAY require compliance with additional tests, defined delays, particularly
   in the case of establishing a new chain of trust, such as:

   o  checking that all child name servers to respond with a consistent
      CDS/CDNSKEY RRset for a number of queries over
   TCP, ensure an extended period
      of time to minimise the possibility of an attacker spoofing

   o  requiring the child name servers to respond with identical CDS/
      CDNSKEY RRsets over TCP

   o  ensuring zone delegation best practice as per practices (for examples, see
      [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements] and even ask

   o  requiring the
   DNS Operator child operator to prove they can add data to the zone, or provide
      zone (for example, by publishing a
   code that is tied to the affected zone.  The particular token)

4.  API Definition

   This protocol is partially- partially synchronous, i.e. meaning the server can elect
   to hold connection connections open until
   the operation has concluded operations have completed, or it can
   return a status code indicating that it has received a request, and
   close the
   request. connection.  It is up to the child to monitor the parent
   for completion of the operation operation, and issue possible follow-up calls.

4.  Third Party DNS operator calls
   to Registrars/Registries RESTful API

   The specification of this API is minimalist, but a realistic one.

   Registry Lock mechanisms that prevents domain hijacking block domains
   prevent certain attributes in the registry to be changed.  This API Registrar.

   Clients may be denied access to change the DS records for domains
   that are Registry Locked (HTTP Status code 401).  Registry Lock is a
   mechanism provided by certain Registries or Registrars that prevents
   domain hijacking by ensuring no attributes of the domain are
   changeable, and no transfer or deletion transactions can be processed
   against the domain name without manual intervention.

4.1.  Authentication

   The API does not impose any unique server authentication
   requirements.  The server authentication provided by TLS fully
   addresses the needs.  In general, the needs of this protocol.  The API SHOULD MUST be provided over
   TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or VPN.

4.2.  Authorization


   Client authentication is outside the considered out of scope of this document.
   The CDS publication of CDS/CDNSKEY records
   present in the child zone file are indications of intention to sign/unsign/
   update the DS records of is an
   indication that the domain child operator intends to perform DS-record-
   updating activities (add/delete) in the parent zone.  This means  Since this
   protocol is simply a signal to the Registrar that they should examine
   the proceeding child zone for such intentions, additional authentication of the action is not determined by who issued
   client making the
   request.  Therefore, authorization request is out of scope.  Registries and
   registrars who plan to provide this service can, however, considered unnecessary.

   Registrars MAY implement their own policy to protect access to the
   API, such as with IP white listing, API key, etc.

4.3.  Base URL Locator

   The base URL for registries or registrars who want whitelisting, client TLS certificates, etc..
   Registrars SHOULD take steps to provide this ensure that a lack of additional
   authentication does not open up a denial of service mechanism against
   the systems of the Registrar, the Registry, or the child operator.

4.2.  RESTful Resources

   In the following text, "{domain}" is the child zone to DNS Operators can be made auto-discoverable as an RDAP

4.4. operated

4.2.1.  CDS resource

   Path: /domains/{domain}/cds {domain}: is the domain name to be
   operated on

4.4.1.  Establishing Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC validation) (Enabling DNSSEC)  Request

   Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds


   Request that an initial set of DS record records based on the CDS record in
   the child zone file will be inserted into the registry Registry and the parent zone file upon
   the successful completion of such the request.  If there are multiple CDS
   records in the CDS RRset, multiple DS records will be added.

   Either the CDS/CDNSKEY or the DNSKEY can be used to create the DS
   record.  Note: entity expecting CDNSKEY is still expected accept the
   /cds command.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.

   o  HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.

   o  HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid
      challenge token.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 409 indicates the delegation already has a DS

   o  HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable

4.4.2.  Removing

   This request is for setting up initial trust in the delegation.  The
   Registrar SHOULD return a status code 409 if it already has a DS (turn off DNSSEC)
   RRset for the child zone.

   Upon receipt of a 403 response the child operator SHOULD issue a POST
   for the "token" resource to fetch a challenge token to insert into
   the zone.  Removing DS Records  Request

   Syntax: DELETE /domains/{domain}/cds


   Request that the Registrar check for a null CDS or CDNSKEY record mean in
   the child zone, indicating a request that the entire DS RRset must be
   removed.  This will make the delegation insecure.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.

   o  HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset

   o  HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable

4.4.3.  Modifying DS Maintenance (Key roll over) Records  Request

   Syntax: PUT /domains/{domain}/cds

   Maintenance activities are performed

   Request that the Registrar modify the DS RRset based on the CDS CDS/
   CDNSKEY available in the child zone.  As a result of this request the
   Registrar SHOULD add or delete DS records may be added, removed.  But as indicated by the CDS/
   CDNSKEY RRset, but MUST NOT delete the entire DS
   RRset must not be deleted. RRset.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.

   o  HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset

   o  HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable

4.5.  Tokens

4.2.2.  Token resource

   Path: /domains/{domain}/tokens {domain}: is the domain name to be
   operated on

4.5.1.  Setup /domains/{domain}/token  Establish Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge  Request

   Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/tokens

   A /domains/{domain}/token

   The DNSSEC policy of the Registrar may require proof that the DNS
   Operator is in control of the domain.  The token API call returns a
   random token to be included as a _delegate TXT record for the _delegate.@
   domain name (where @ is the apex of the child zone) prior
   establishing the DNSSEC initial trust.  This is an additional trust
   control mechanism to establish the initial chain of trust.

   Once the child operator has received a token, it SHOULD be inserted
   in the zone and the operator SHOULD proceed with a POST of the cds

   Note that the _delegate TXT record is publicly available and not a
   secret token.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.  Token  A token is included in
      the body of the response, as a valid TXT record

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable


4.3.  Customized Error Messages

   Service providers can

   Registrars MAY provide a customized error message in the response
   body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the previous
   section.  This can response MAY include an Identifying identifying number/string that
   can be used to track the requests.

   #Using the definitions This section at the moment contains comments
   from early implementers

4.7.  How to react to 403 on POST cds

   The basic reaction to a 403 on POST /domains/{domain}/cds is to issue
   POST /domains/{domain}/tokens command to fetch the challenge to
   insert into the zone. request.

5.  Security considerations


   When zones are properly provisioned, and delegations follow standards
   and best practices (e.g.
   [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements]), the DS record as proof of control is not realistic since Registrar or
   Registry can trust the DNS information it receives from multiple
   child name servers, over time, and/or over TCP to establish the domain is already publicly signed and
   initial chain of trust.

   In addition, the CDS/DS is readily

   Open question:?? JL?: It is not recommended Registrar or Registry can require the protocol be used with
   high profile domains such as TLDs and governments that are DNS
   operators.  This protocol is meant Operator
   to allow third party DNS prove they control the zone by requiring the child operator to submit the initial DS in
   navigate additional hurdles, such as adding a trusted manner without involving challenge token to the

   This protocol should increase the adoption of DNSSEC and get DNSSEC, enabling more
   zones to become validated thus overall the security gain outweighs
   the possible drawbacks.

   TBD This will hopefully get more zones to become validated thus

   Registrants and DNS Operators always have the security gain out weights option to establish the possible drawbacks.

   risk of takeover ? risk
   chain of validation errors < declines transfer
   issues trust in band via the standard Registrant/Registrar/Registry

6.  IANA Actions

   URI ??? TBD

   This document has no actions for IANA

7.  Internationalization Considerations

   This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications communications.
   Clients and servers should use punycode [RFC3492] when operating on
   internationalized domain names.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

              Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records from
              parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-03
              (work in progress), June 2016.

              Wallstrom, P. and J. Schlyter, "DNS Delegation
              Requirements", draft-wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-
              requirements-00 draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-04
              (work in progress), February October 2016.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications

   [RFC3492]  Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
              for the DNS Security
              Extensions", Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
              (IDNA)", RFC 4035, 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2005,
              <>. 2003,

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,

8.2.  Informative References

              Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and

              Wallstrom, P. Wouters, "Managing DS records
              from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ogud-dnsop-maintain-
              ds-00 and J. Schlyter, "DNS Delegation
              Requirements", draft-wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-
              requirements-03 (work in progress), October 2015. 2016.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 6690, 3912, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690,
              10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004,

   [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
              STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2012,
              <>. 2009,

   [RFC6841]  Ljunggren, F., Eklund Lowinder, AM., and T. Okubo, "A
              Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice
              Statements", RFC 6841, DOI 10.17487/RFC6841, January 2013,

   [RFC7480]  Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
              Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,

Appendix A.  Document History

A.1.  Regex versio  regext Version 02

   o  simplify abstract

   o  move all justification text to Intro

   o  added HTTP response codes for rate limiting (429), missing DS
      RRsets (412)

   o  expanded on Internationalization Considerations

   o  corrected informative/normative document references

   o  clarify parent/Registrar references in the draft

   o  general spelling/grammar/style cleanup

A.2.  regext Version 02 not pushed

   o  Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors

   o  Text edits and clarifications.

A.3.  regext Version 01

   o  Rewrote Abstract and Into (MP)

   o  Introduced code 401 when changes are not allowed

   o  Text edits and clarifications.

A.2.  Regex version

A.4.  regext Version 00

   o  Working group document same as 03, just track changed to standard


A.5.  Version 03

   o  Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors


A.6.  Version 02

   o  Reflected comments on mailing lists


A.7.  Version 01

   o  This version adds a full REST definition this is based on
      suggestions from Jakob Schlyter.


A.8.  Version 00

   o  First rough version

Authors' Addresses

   Jacques Latour


   Olafur Gudmundsson
   Cloudflare, Inc.


   Paul Wouters
   Red Hat


   Matthew Pounsett
   Rightside Group, Ltd.