--- 1/draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-01.txt 2017-01-10 14:13:08.978134356 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-02.txt 2017-01-10 14:13:09.006135026 -0800 @@ -1,501 +1,603 @@ regext J. Latour Internet-Draft CIRA Intended status: Standards Track O. Gudmundsson -Expires: January 8, 2017 Cloudflare, Inc. +Expires: July 14, 2017 Cloudflare, Inc. P. Wouters Red Hat M. Pounsett Rightside Group, Ltd. - July 7, 2016 + January 10, 2017 Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol - draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-01.txt + draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-02.txt Abstract There are several problems that arise in the standard Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation. Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records for the delegation. As this is usually a one time activity when the operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a serious issue. - When the domain on the other hand uses DNSSEC it necessary to make - regular (sometimes annual) changes to the delegation, in order to - track KSK rollover, by updating the delegation's DS record(s). Under - the current model this is prone to delays and errors. Even when the - Registrant has outsourced the operation of DNS to a third party the - registrant still has to be in the loop to update the DS record. - - There is a need for a simple protocol that allows a third party DNS - operator to update DS and NS records in a trusted manner for a - delegation without involving the registrant for each operation. This - same protocol can be used by Registrants. + When the domain hand uses DNSSEC it necessary to make regular + (sometimes annual) changes to the delegation, updating DS record(s) + in order to track KSK rollover. Under the current model this is + prone to delays and errors, as the Registrant must participate in + updates to DS records. - The protocol described in this draft is REST based, and when used - through an authenticated channel can be used to establish the DNSSEC - Initial Trust (to turn on DNSSEC or bootstrap DNSSEC). Once DNSSEC - trust is established this channel can be used to trigger maintenance - of delegation records such as DS, NS, and glue records. The protocol - is kept as simple as possible. + This document describes a simple protocol that allows a third party + DNS operator to update DS and NS records for a delegation, in a + trusted manner, without involving the Registrant for each operation. + This same protocol can be used by Registrants. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2017. + This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Notional Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. RFC2119 Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3. What is the goal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.1. Why DNSSEC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust - Anchor? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 3.3. What checks are needed by parent? . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries RESTful API 6 - 4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.3. Base URL Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.4. CDS resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC - validation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4.4.2. Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.4.3. DS Maintenance (Key roll over) . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.5. Tokens resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 4.5.1. Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge . . 8 - 4.6. Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 4.7. How to react to 403 on POST cds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6. IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.1. Regex versio 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.2. Regex version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.3. Version 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.4. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.5. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - A.6. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3. Process Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1. Identifying the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.2. Establishing a Chain of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.3. Maintaining the Chain of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.4. Other Delegation Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.5. Acceptance Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 4. API Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 4.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.2. RESTful Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.2.1. CDS resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.2.2. Token resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 4.3. Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 6. IANA Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 7. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + A.1. regext Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + A.2. regext Version 02 not pushed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + A.3. regext Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + A.4. regext Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + A.5. Version 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + A.6. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + A.7. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + A.8. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Introduction - Why is this needed? DNS registration systems today are designed - around making registrations easy and fast. After the domain has been - registered there are really three options on who maintains the DNS - zone that is loaded on the "primary" DNS servers for the domain this - can be the Registrant, Registrar, or a third party DNS Operator. - - Unfortunately the ease to make changes differs for each one of these - options. The Registrant needs to use the interface that the - registrar provides to update NS and DS records. The Registrar on the - other hand can make changes directly into the registration system. - The third party DNS Operator on the hand needs to go through the + After a domain has been registered, one of three parties will + maintain the DNS zone loaded on the "primary" DNS servers: the + Registrant, the Registrar, or a third party DNS operator. DNS + registration systems were originally designed around making + registrations easy and fast, however after registration the + complexity of making changes to the delegation differs for each of + these parties. The Registrar can make changes directly in the + Registry systems through some API (typically EPP [RFC5730]). The + Registrant is typically limited to using a web interface supplied by + the Registrar. A third party DNS Operator must to go through the Registrant to update any delegation information. - Current system does not work well, there are many types of failures - have been reported and they have been at all levels in the - registration model. + In this last case, the operator must contact and engage the + Registrant in updating NS and DS records for the delegation. New + information must be communicated to the Registrant, who must submit + that information to the Registrar. Typically this involves cutting + and pasting between email and a web interface, which is error prone. + Furthermore, involving Registrants in this way does not scale for + even moderately sized DNS operators. Tracking thousands (or + millions) of changes sent to customers, and following up if those + changes are not submitted to the Registrar, or are submitted with + errors, is itself expensive and error prone. - The failures result either inability to use DNSSEC or in validation - failures that case the domain to become invalid and all users that - are behind validating resolvers will not be able to to access the - domain. + The current system does not work well, as there are many types of + failures that have been reported at all levels in the registration + model. The failures result in either the inability to use DNSSEC or + in validation failures that cause the domain to become unavailable to + users behind validating resolvers. - The goal of this document is to create an automated interface that - will reduce the friction in maintaining DNSSEC delegations. + The goal of this document is to create a protocol for establishing a + secure chain of trust that involves parties not in the traditional + Registrant/Registrar/Registry (RRR) model, and to reduce the friction + in maintaining DNSSEC secured delegations in these cases. It + describes a REST-based [RFC6690] protocol which can be used to + establish DNSSEC initial trust (to enable or bootstrap DNSSEC), and + to trigger maintenance of delegation records such as DS, NS, and glue + records. 2. Notional Conventions 2.1. Definitions For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS - Operator responsible for a zone where the operator is neither the + Operator responsible for a zone, where the operator is neither the Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation. - Uses of the word 'Registrar' in this document may also be applied to - resellers: an entity that sells delegations through a registrar with - whom the entity has a reseller agreement. + Uses of "child" and "parent" refer to the relationship between DNS + zone operators. In this document, unless otherwise noted, the child + is the third-party DNS operator and the parent is the Registry. + + Uses of the words "Registrar" or "Registration Entity" in this + document may also be applied to Resellers or to Registries that + engage in registration activities directly with Registrants. Unless + otherwise noted, they are used to refer to the entity which has a + direct business relationship with the Registrant. 2.2. RFC2119 Keywords The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. -3. What is the goal? +3. Process Overview - The primary goal is to have a protocol to establish a secure chain of - trust that involves parties that are not in the traditional RRR EPP - model, or when EPP is not used. +3.1. Identifying the Registrar - In the general case there should be a way to find the right - Registrar/Registry entity to talk to, but it does not exist. Whois[] - is the natural protocol to carry such information but that protocol - but is unreliable and hard to parse. Its proposed successor RDAP - [RFC7480] has yet be deployed on most TLD's. + As of publication of this document, there has never been a + standardized or widely deployed method for easily and scalably + identifying the Registar for a particular registration. - The preferred communication mechanism is to use is to use a REST - [RFC6690] call to start processing of the requested delegation - information. + At this time, WHOIS [RFC3912] is the only widely deployed protocol to + carry such information, but WHOIS responses are unstructured text, + and each implementor can lay out its text responses differently. In + addition, Registries may include referrals in this unstructured text + to the WHOIS interfaces of their Registrars, and those Registrar + WHOIS interface in turn have their own layouts. This presents a text + parsing problem which is infeasible to solve. -3.1. Why DNSSEC? + RDAP, the successor to WHOIS, described in [RFC7480], solves the + problems of unstructured responses, and a consistently implemented + referral system, however at this time RDAP has yet to be deployed at + most Registries. - DNSSEC [RFC4035] provides data authentication for DNS answers, having - DNSSEC enabled makes it possible to trust the answers. The biggest - obstacle in DNSSEC adoption is the initial configuration of the - DNSSEC domain trust anchor at the parent, the DS record. + With no current mechanism in place to scalably discover the Registar + for a particular registration, the problem of automatic discovery of + the base URL of the API is considered out of scope of this document. -3.2. How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust Anchor? + The authors recommend standardization of an RDAP extension to obtain + this information from the Registry. - The child needs first to sign the domain, then the child can "upload" - the DS record to its parent. The "normal" way to upload is to go - through registration interface, but that fails frequently. The DNS - Operator may not have access to the interface thus the registrant - needs to relay the information. For large operations this does not - scale, as evident in lack of Trust Anchors for signed deployments - that are operated by third parties. +3.2. Establishing a Chain of Trust - The child can signal its desire to have DNSSEC validation enabled by - publishing one of the special DNS records CDS and/or CDNSKEY[RFC7344] - and its proposed extension [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds]. + After signing the zone, the child operator needs to upload the DS + record(s) to the parent. The child can signal its desire to have + DNSSEC validation enabled by publishing one of the special DNS + records CDS and/or CDNSKEY as defined in [RFC7344] and + [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds]. - Once the "parent" "sees" these records it SHOULD start acceptance - processing. This document covers how to make the CDS records visible - to the right parental agent. + [RFC Editor: The above I-D reference should be replaced with the + correct RFC number upon publication.] - This document and [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] argue that the - publication of CDS/CDNSKEY record is sufficient for the parent to - start the acceptance processing. The main point is to provide - authentication thus if the child is in "good" state then the DS - upload should be simple to accept and publish. If there is any - problem the parent does not add the DS. + In the case of an insecure delegation, the Registrar will normally + not be scanning the child zone for CDS/CDNSKEY records. The child + operator can use this protocol to notify the Registrar to begin such + a scan. - In the event this protocols and its associated authentication - mechanism does not address the Registrant's security requirements to - create a secure Trust Anchor delegation then the Registrant always - has recourse by submitting its DS record via its Registrar interface - with EPP submission to the Registry. + Once the Registrar sees these records it SHOULD start acceptance + processing. -3.3. What checks are needed by parent? +3.3. Maintaining the Chain of Trust - The parent upon receiving a signal that it check the child for desire - for DS record publication. The basic tests include, + One the secure chain of trust is established, the Registrar SHOULD + regularly check the child zone for CDS/CDNSKEY record changes. The + Registrar SHOULD also accept signals via this protocol to immediately + check the child zone for CDS/CDNSKEY records. - 1. Is the zone is signed - 2. The zone has a CDS signed by a KSK referenced in the current DS, - referring to a at least one key in the current DNSKEY RRset - 3. All the name-servers for the zone agree on the CDS RRset contents + Server implementations of this protocol MAY include rate limiting to + protect their systems and the systems of child operators from abuse. - Parents can perform additional tests, defined delays, queries over - TCP, ensure zone delegation best practice as per - [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements] and even ask the - DNS Operator to prove they can add data to the zone, or provide a - code that is tied to the affected zone. The protocol is partially- - synchronous, i.e. the server can elect to hold connection open until - the operation has concluded or it can return that it received the - request. It is up to the child to monitor the parent for completion - of the operation and issue possible follow-up calls. + Each parent operator and Registrar is responsible for developing, + implementing, and communicating their DNSSEC maintenance policies. -4. Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries RESTful API +3.4. Other Delegation Maintenance - The specification of this API is minimalist, but a realistic one. + [ Not yet defined ] - Registry Lock mechanisms that prevents domain hijacking block domains - prevent certain attributes in the registry to be changed. This API - may be denied access to change the DS records for domains that are - Registry Locked (HTTP Status code 401). +3.5. Acceptance Processing + + The Registrar, upon receiving a signal or detecting through polling + that the child desires to have its delegation updated, SHOULD run a + series of tests to ensure that updating the parent zone will not + create or exacerbate any problems with the child zone. The basic + tests SHOULD include: + + o checking that the child zone is is properly signed as per the + Registrar and parent DNSSEC policy + + o if updating the DS record, checking that the child CDS RRset + references a KSK which is present in the child DNSKEY RRset and + signs the CDS RRset + + o ensuring all name servers in the apex NS RRset of the child zone + agree on the apex NS RRset and CDS RRset contents + + The Registrar SHOULD NOT make any changes to the DS RRset if the + child name servers do not agree on the CDS/CDNSKEY content. + + [NOTE: Do we need a new section in the DPS for the CDS management + policy [RFC6841]?] + + Registrars MAY require compliance with additional tests, particularly + in the case of establishing a new chain of trust, such as: + + o checking that all child name servers to respond with a consistent + CDS/CDNSKEY RRset for a number of queries over an extended period + of time to minimise the possibility of an attacker spoofing + responses + + o requiring the child name servers to respond with identical CDS/ + CDNSKEY RRsets over TCP + + o ensuring zone delegation best practices (for examples, see + [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements] + + o requiring the child operator to prove they can add data to the + zone (for example, by publishing a particular token) + +4. API Definition + + This protocol is partially synchronous, meaning the server can elect + to hold connections open until operations have completed, or it can + return a status code indicating that it has received a request, and + close the connection. It is up to the child to monitor the parent + for completion of the operation, and issue possible follow-up calls + to the Registrar. + + Clients may be denied access to change the DS records for domains + that are Registry Locked (HTTP Status code 401). Registry Lock is a + mechanism provided by certain Registries or Registrars that prevents + domain hijacking by ensuring no attributes of the domain are + changeable, and no transfer or deletion transactions can be processed + against the domain name without manual intervention. 4.1. Authentication The API does not impose any unique server authentication requirements. The server authentication provided by TLS fully - addresses the needs. In general, the API SHOULD be provided over + addresses the needs of this protocol. The API MUST be provided over TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or VPN. -4.2. Authorization + Client authentication is considered out of scope of this document. + The publication of CDS/CDNSKEY records in the child zone is an + indication that the child operator intends to perform DS-record- + updating activities (add/delete) in the parent zone. Since this + protocol is simply a signal to the Registrar that they should examine + the child zone for such intentions, additional authentication of the + client making the request is considered unnecessary. - Authorization is outside the scope of this document. The CDS records - present in the zone file are indications of intention to sign/unsign/ - update the DS records of the domain in the parent zone. This means - the proceeding of the action is not determined by who issued the - request. Therefore, authorization is out of scope. Registries and - registrars who plan to provide this service can, however, implement - their own policy such as IP white listing, API key, etc. + Registrars MAY implement their own policy to protect access to the + API, such as with IP whitelisting, client TLS certificates, etc.. + Registrars SHOULD take steps to ensure that a lack of additional + authentication does not open up a denial of service mechanism against + the systems of the Registrar, the Registry, or the child operator. -4.3. Base URL Locator +4.2. RESTful Resources - The base URL for registries or registrars who want to provide this - service to DNS Operators can be made auto-discoverable as an RDAP - extension. + In the following text, "{domain}" is the child zone to be operated + on. -4.4. CDS resource +4.2.1. CDS resource - Path: /domains/{domain}/cds {domain}: is the domain name to be - operated on + Path: /domains/{domain}/cds -4.4.1. Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC validation) +4.2.1.1. Establishing Initial Trust (Enabling DNSSEC) -4.4.1.1. Request +4.2.1.1.1. Request Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds - A DS record based on the CDS record in the child zone file will be - inserted into the registry and the parent zone file upon the - successful completion of such request. If there are multiple CDS + Request that an initial set of DS records based on the CDS record in + the child zone be inserted into the Registry and the parent zone upon + the successful completion of the request. If there are multiple CDS records in the CDS RRset, multiple DS records will be added. - Either the CDS/CDNSKEY or the DNSKEY can be used to create the DS - record. Note: entity expecting CDNSKEY is still expected accept the - /cds command. - -4.4.1.2. Response +4.2.1.1.2. Response o HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success. o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation. o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access. o HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid challenge token. o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist. + o HTTP Status code 409 indicates the delegation already has a DS + RRset. + + o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited. + o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable reasons. -4.4.2. Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) + This request is for setting up initial trust in the delegation. The + Registrar SHOULD return a status code 409 if it already has a DS + RRset for the child zone. -4.4.2.1. Request + Upon receipt of a 403 response the child operator SHOULD issue a POST + for the "token" resource to fetch a challenge token to insert into + the zone. + +4.2.1.2. Removing DS Records + +4.2.1.2.1. Request Syntax: DELETE /domains/{domain}/cds - A null CDS or CDNSKEY record mean the entire DS RRset must be - removed. + Request that the Registrar check for a null CDS or CDNSKEY record in + the child zone, indicating a request that the entire DS RRset be + removed. This will make the delegation insecure. -4.4.2.2. Response +4.2.1.2.2. Response o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation. o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access. o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist. + o HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset + + o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited. + o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable reasons. -4.4.3. DS Maintenance (Key roll over) +4.2.1.3. Modifying DS Records -4.4.3.1. Request +4.2.1.3.1. Request Syntax: PUT /domains/{domain}/cds - Maintenance activities are performed based on the CDS available in - the child zone. DS records may be added, removed. But the entire DS - RRset must not be deleted. + Request that the Registrar modify the DS RRset based on the CDS/ + CDNSKEY available in the child zone. As a result of this request the + Registrar SHOULD add or delete DS records as indicated by the CDS/ + CDNSKEY RRset, but MUST NOT delete the entire DS RRset. -4.4.3.2. Response +4.2.1.3.2. Response o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. o HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation. o HTTP Status code 401 indicates an unauthorized resource access. o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist. + o HTTP Status code 412 indicates the parent does not have a DS RRset + + o HTTP Status code 429 indicates the client has been rate-limited. + o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable reasons. -4.5. Tokens resource +4.2.2. Token resource - Path: /domains/{domain}/tokens {domain}: is the domain name to be - operated on + Path: /domains/{domain}/token -4.5.1. Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge +4.2.2.1. Establish Initial Trust with Challenge -4.5.1.1. Request +4.2.2.1.1. Request - Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/tokens + Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/token - A random token to be included as a _delegate TXT record prior - establishing the DNSSEC initial trust. + The DNSSEC policy of the Registrar may require proof that the DNS + Operator is in control of the domain. The token API call returns a + random token to be included as a TXT record for the _delegate.@ + domain name (where @ is the apex of the child zone) prior + establishing the DNSSEC initial trust. This is an additional trust + control mechanism to establish the initial chain of trust. -4.5.1.2. Response + Once the child operator has received a token, it SHOULD be inserted + in the zone and the operator SHOULD proceed with a POST of the cds + resource. - o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. Token included in the - body of the response, as a valid TXT record + Note that the _delegate TXT record is publicly available and not a + secret token. + +4.2.2.1.2. Response + + o HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success. A token is included in + the body of the response, as a valid TXT record o HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist. o HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable reasons. -4.6. Customized Error Messages - - Service providers can provide a customized error message in the - response body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the - previous section. - - This can include an Identifying number/string that can be used to - track the requests. - - #Using the definitions This section at the moment contains comments - from early implementers - -4.7. How to react to 403 on POST cds +4.3. Customized Error Messages - The basic reaction to a 403 on POST /domains/{domain}/cds is to issue - POST /domains/{domain}/tokens command to fetch the challenge to - insert into the zone. + Registrars MAY provide a customized error message in the response + body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the previous + section. This response MAY include an identifying number/string that + can be used to track the request. 5. Security considerations - Supplying the DS record as proof of control is not realistic since - the domain is already publicly signed and the CDS/DS is readily - available. + When zones are properly provisioned, and delegations follow standards + and best practices (e.g. + [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements]), the Registrar or + Registry can trust the DNS information it receives from multiple + child name servers, over time, and/or over TCP to establish the + initial chain of trust. - Open question:?? JL?: It is not recommended the protocol be used with - high profile domains such as TLDs and governments that are DNS - operators. This protocol is meant to allow third party DNS operator - to submit the initial DS in a trusted manner without involving the - registrant. + In addition, the Registrar or Registry can require the DNS Operator + to prove they control the zone by requiring the child operator to + navigate additional hurdles, such as adding a challenge token to the + zone. - This protocol should increase the adoption of DNSSEC and get more + This protocol should increase the adoption of DNSSEC, enabling more zones to become validated thus overall the security gain outweighs the possible drawbacks. - TBD This will hopefully get more zones to become validated thus - overall the security gain out weights the possible drawbacks. - - risk of takeover ? risk of validation errors < declines transfer - issues + Registrants and DNS Operators always have the option to establish the + chain of trust in band via the standard Registrant/Registrar/Registry + model. 6. IANA Actions - URI ??? TBD + This document has no actions for IANA 7. Internationalization Considerations - This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications + This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications. + Clients and servers should use punycode [RFC3492] when operating on + internationalized domain names. 8. References 8.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds] Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records from - parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-03 - (work in progress), June 2016. + parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-04 + (work in progress), October 2016. - [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements] - Wallstrom, P. and J. Schlyter, "DNS Delegation - Requirements", draft-wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation- - requirements-00 (work in progress), February 2016. + [RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode + for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications + (IDNA)", RFC 3492, DOI 10.17487/RFC3492, March 2003, + . - [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. - Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security - Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, - . + [RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link + Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012, + . [RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014, . 8.2. Informative References - [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] - Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records - from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ogud-dnsop-maintain- - ds-00 (work in progress), October 2015. + [I-D.wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation-requirements] + Wallstrom, P. and J. Schlyter, "DNS Delegation + Requirements", draft-wallstrom-dnsop-dns-delegation- + requirements-03 (work in progress), October 2016. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ RFC2119, March 1997, . - [RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link - Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012, - . + [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, DOI + 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, + . + + [RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", + STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009, + . + + [RFC6841] Ljunggren, F., Eklund Lowinder, AM., and T. Okubo, "A + Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice + Statements", RFC 6841, DOI 10.17487/RFC6841, January 2013, + . [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015, . Appendix A. Document History -A.1. Regex versio 01 +A.1. regext Version 02 - Rewrote Abstract and Into (MP) Introduced code 401 when changes are - not allowed Text edits and clarifications. + o simplify abstract -A.2. Regex version 00 + o move all justification text to Intro - Working group document same as 03, just track changed to standard + o added HTTP response codes for rate limiting (429), missing DS + RRsets (412) -A.3. Version 03 + o expanded on Internationalization Considerations - Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors + o corrected informative/normative document references -A.4. Version 02 + o clarify parent/Registrar references in the draft - Reflected comments on mailing lists + o general spelling/grammar/style cleanup -A.5. Version 01 +A.2. regext Version 02 not pushed - This version adds a full REST definition this is based on suggestions - from Jakob Schlyter. + o Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors + (JL) -A.6. Version 00 + o Text edits and clarifications. - First rough version +A.3. regext Version 01 + + o Rewrote Abstract and Into (MP) + + o Introduced code 401 when changes are not allowed + + o Text edits and clarifications. + +A.4. regext Version 00 + + o Working group document same as 03, just track changed to standard + +A.5. Version 03 + + o Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors + +A.6. Version 02 + + o Reflected comments on mailing lists + +A.7. Version 01 + + o This version adds a full REST definition this is based on + suggestions from Jakob Schlyter. + +A.8. Version 00 + + o First rough version Authors' Addresses Jacques Latour CIRA Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca Olafur Gudmundsson Cloudflare, Inc.