RADIUS Extensions Working Group                                S. Winter
Internet-Draft                                                   RESTENA
Intended status: Experimental                                M. McCauley
Expires: January 14, September 6, 2010                                           OSC
                                                           July 13, 2009
                                                          March 05, 2010

     NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS over TLS and DTLS
                 draft-ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery-01
                 draft-ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery-02

Abstract

   This document specifies a means to find authoritative AAA servers for
   a given NAI realm.  It can be used in conjunction with RADIUS over
   TLS and RADIUS over DTLS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, September 6, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

Abstract

   This  Code Components extracted from this document specifies a means to find authoritative AAA servers for
   a given NAI realm must
   include Simplified BSD License text as defined in [RFC4282].  It can be used described in
   conjunction with RADIUS over TLS Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and RADIUS over DTLS. are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  DNS-based NAPTR/SRV Peer Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.2.  DNS RR definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.3.  Realm to AAA server resolution algorithm  . . . . . . . . . 5
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
   5.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Requirements Language

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   RFC 2119.  [RFC2119]

1.2.  Terminology

   RadSec node: a RadSec client or server

   RadSec

   RADIUS/TLS Client: a RadSec RADIUS/TLS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] instance
   which initiates a new connection.

   RadSec

   RADIUS/TLS Server: a RadSec RADIUS/TLS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] instance
   which listens on a RadSec RADIUS/TLS port and accepts new connections

   RADIUS/TLS node: a RADIUS/TLS client or server

2.  DNS-based NAPTR/SRV Peer Discovery

2.1.  Applicability

   Dynamic server discovery as defined in this document is only
   applicable for AAA transactions where a AAA server receives a request
   with a NAI realm for which no home AAA server is known.  I.e. where
   static server configuration does not contain a known home
   authentication server, or where the server configuration explicitly
   states that the realm destination is to be looked up dynamically.
   Furthermore, it is only applicable for new user sessions, i.e. for
   the initial Access-Request.  Subsequent messages concerning this
   session, for example Access-Challenges, Access-Accepts, Accounting
   Messages or Change-of-Authorisation messages use the previously-
   established communication channel between client and server.

2.2.  DNS RR definition

   DNS definitions of RadSec RADIUS/TLS servers can be either NAPTR S-NAPTR records
   (see [RFC3958]) or SRV records.  When both are defined, the
   resolution algorithm prefers
   NAPTR S-NAPTR results (see section Section 2.3
   below).  The NAPTR

   This specification defines two S-NAPTR service
   field used is "AAAS+RADSECT".  The tag: a general-purpose
   tag "nai-roaming" and a special-purpose tag "eduroam" for the eduroam
   roaming consortium.  This specification defines two S-NAPTR protocol
   tags: "radius.tls" for RADIUS over TLS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] and
   "radius.dtls" for RADIUS over DTLS [I-D.dekok-radext-dtls].

   This specification defines the SRV prefix used is "_radsec._tcp". "_radiustls._tcp" for
   RADIUS over TLS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] and "_radiustls._udp" for
   RADIUS over DTLS [I-D.dekok-radext-dtls].  It is expected that in
   most cases, the label used for the records is the DNS representation
   (punycode) of the literal realm name for which the server is the AAA
   server.

   However, arbitrary other labels may be used if, for example, a
   roaming consortium uses realm names which are not associated to DNS
   names or special-purpose consortia where a globally valid discovery
   is not a use case.  Such other labels require a consortium-wide
   agreement about the transformation from realm name to lookup label.

   Examples:

   a.  A general-purpose AAA server for realm example.com might have DNS
       entries as follows:

          example.com.  IN NAPTR 50 50 "s" "AAAS+RADSECT" "nai-roaming:radius.tls" ""
          _radsec._tcp.foobar.example.com.

          _radsec._tcp.example.com.
          _radiustls._tcp.foobar.example.com.

          _radiustls._tcp.example.com.  IN SRV 0 10 2083
          radsec.example.com.

   b.  Consortium  The consortium "foo" provides roaming services for banks. its members
       only.  The realms used are of the form enterprise-name.foobankroam. enterprise-name.example.
       The consortium operates a special purpose DNS server for the
       (private) TLD
       "foobankroam" "example" which all AAA servers use to resolve
       realm names.
       "Rupt,  "Bad, Inc." is part of the consortium.  On the
       consortium's DNS server, realm bank-rupt.foobankroam bad.example might have the
       following DNS entries:

          bank-rupt.foobankroam

          bad.example IN NAPTR 50 50 "a" "AAAS+RADSECT" "nai-roaming:radius.dtls" ""
          "triple-a.bank-rupt.com"

          _radsec._tcp.bank-rupt.foobankroam IN SRV 0 10 2083 triple-a-
          backup.bank-rupt.com"
          "very.bad.example"

   c.  the eduroam consortium uses realms based on DNS, but provides its
       services to a closed community only.  However, a AAA domain
       participating in eduroam may also want to expose AAA services to
       other, general-purpose, applications (on the same or other AAA
       servers).  Due to that, the eduroam consortium uses labels
       prefixed with "eduroam." the service
       tag "eduroam" and eduroam AAA servers use these labels this tag to look up
       other eduroam servers.  An eduroam participant example.org which
       also provides general-purpose AAA on a different server might have uses the
       following DNS entries:

          eduroam.restena.lu.
       general "nai-roaming" tag:

          example.org.  IN NAPTR 50 50 "a" "AAAS+RADSECT" "s" "eduroam:radius.tls" "" aaa-
          eduroam.restena.lu

          restena.lu.
          _radiustls._tcp.eduroam.example.org.

          example.org.  IN NAPTR 50 50 "a" "AAAS+RADSECT" "s" "nai-roaming:radius.tls" "" aaa-
          default.restena.lu

          _radsec._tcp.eduroam.restena.lu.
          _radiustls._tcp.aaa.example.org

          _radiustls._tcp.eduroam.example.org.  IN SRV 0 10 2083 aaa-
          eduroam.restena.lu.

          _radsec._tcp.restena.lu.
          eduroam.example.org.

          _radiustls._tcp.aaa.example.org.  IN SRV 0 10 2083 aaa-
          default.restena.lu.
          default.example.org.

2.3.  Realm to AAA server resolution algorithm

   Input I to the algorithm is a User-Name in the form of a NAI as
   defined in [RFC4282] as extracted from the User-Name attribute in an
   Access-Request.  Output O of the algorithm is a set of hostname:port
   and an assoiciated associated order/preference; the set can be empty.

   Note well: The attribute User-Name does not necessarily contain well-
   formed NAIs and may not even contain well-formed UTF-8 strings.  This
   document describes server discovery only for well-formed NAIs in
   UTF-8 encoding.  The result of all other possible contents of User-
   Name is unspecified; this includes, but is not limited to:

      Usage of separators other than @

      Usage of multiple @ separators

      Encoding of User-Name in local encodings

   The algorithm to determine the AAA server to contact is as follows:

   1.   Determine P = (position of first "@" character) in I.

   2.   generate R = (substring from P+1 to end of I)

   3.   Optional: modify R according to agreed consortium procedures

   4.   Using the host's name resolution library, perform a NAPTR query
        for service "AAAS+RADSECT" for R

   5. R. If no result, continue at step 9.  If name resolution
        returns with error, O = { }.  Terminate.

   5.   Extract NAPTR records with service tag "nai-roaming" (replace
        with other service tags where applicable).

   6.   If no result, continue at step 9.

   7.   Evaluate NAPTR result, result(s) for desired protocol tag, perform
        subsequent lookup steps until lookup yields one or more
        hostnames.  O = (set of {Order/
        Preference, {Order/Preference, hostname:port} for
        all lookup results).

   8.   Terminate.

   9.   Generate R' = (prefix R with "_radsec._tcp.") "_radiustls._tcp." or
        "_radiustls._udp")

   10.  Using the host's name resolution library, perform SRV lookup
        with R' as label.

   11.  If name resolution returns with error, O = { }.  Terminate.

   12.  If no result, O = {}; terminate.

   13.  Perform subsequent lookup steps until lookup yields one or more
        hostnames.  O = (set of {Order/Preference, hostname} for all
        hostnames).  Terminate.

   Example: Assume a user from the Technical University of Munich,
   Germany, has a RADIUS User-Name of
   "foobar@tu-m[U+00FC]nchen.example".  If DNS contains the following
   records:

      xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN NAPTR 50 50 "s" "AAAS+RADSECT" "nai-
      roaming:radius.tls" ""
      _radsec._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      _radsec._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. _radiustls._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN NAPTR 50 50 "s" "fooservice:
      bar.dccp" "" _abc._def.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      _radiustls._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN SRV 0 10 2083
      radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      _radsec._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      _radiustls._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN SRV 0 20 2083
      backup.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

      radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN AAAA 2001:0DB8::202:44ff:
      fe0a:f704

      radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN A 192.0.2.3

      backup.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.  IN A 192.0.2.7

   Then the algorithm executes as follows, with I =
   "foobar@tu-m[U+00FC]nchen.example", and no consortium name mangling
   in use:

   1.   P = 7
   2.   R = "tu-m[U+00FC]nchen.example"

   3.   NOOP

   4.   Query result: ( 0 10 2083 radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. 50 50 "s" "nai-roaming:radius.tls" ""
        _radiustls._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. ; 0
        20 2083 backup.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. 50 50 "s"
        "fooservice:bar.dccp" "" _abc._def.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example. )

   5.   NOOP   Result: 50 50 "s" "nai-roaming:radius.tls" ""
        _radiustls._tcp.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.

   6.   NOOP

   7.   O = {(10,radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.:2083),(20,backup.xn--
        tu-mnchen-t9a.example.:2083)}
        tu-mnchen-t9a. example.:2083)}

   8.   Terminate.

   9.   (not executed)

   10.  (not executed)

   11.  (not executed)

   12.  (not executed)

   13.  (not executed)

   The implementation will then attempt to connect to two servers, with
   preference to radsec.xn--tu-mnchen-t9a.example.:2083, using either
   the AAAA or A addresses depending on the host configuration and its
   IP stack's capabilities.

3.  Security Considerations

   When using DNS without security, the replies to NAPTR, SRV and A/AAAA
   requests as described in section Section 2 can not be trusted.
   RADIUS transports have an out-of-DNS-band means to verify that the
   discovery attempt led to the intended target (TLS/DTLS: ceritifcate
   verification or TLS shared secret ciphers; UDP/TCP: the RADIUS shared
   secret) and are safe from DNS-based redirection attacks.  [Note:
   assuming here that a hypothetical RADIUS/UDP SRV discovery will NOT
   deliver the shared secret in the DNS response!]

   The discovery process is always susceptible to bidding down attacks
   if a realm has SRV records for RADIUS/UDP and/or RADIUS/TCP as well
   as for RADIUS/TLS and/or RADIUS/DTLS.  While the SRV query will
   expose both transports, an attacker in the routing path might
   suppress the subsequent A/AAAA results for the TLS or DTLS peer and
   trick the initiating peer into using the weakly protected UDP or TCP
   transports.  The use of DNSSEC can not fully mitigate this attack,
   since it does not provide a means to detect packet suppression.  The
   only way to disable such bidding down attacks is by intiating
   connections only to the peer(s) which match or exceed a configured
   minimum security level.  All implementations SHOULD provide a means
   to configure the administratively desired minimum security level.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains no actions for IANA.  Maybe.  Not sure about requests IANA registration of the labels "AAAS+RADSECT" and "_radsec._tcp.". following S-NAPTR
   parameters:

   o  Application Service Tags

      *  nai-roaming

      *  eduroam

   o  Application Protocol Tags

      *  radius.tls

      *  radius.dtls

5.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]                 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
                             Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
                             RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3958]                 Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based
                             Application Service Location Using SRV RRs
                             and the Dynamic Delegation Discovery
                             Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, January 2005.

   [RFC4282]                 Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P.
                             Eronen, "The Network Access Identifier",
                             RFC 4282, December 2005.

   [I-D.dekok-radext-dtls]   DeKok, A., "DTLS as a Transport Layer for
                             RADIUS", draft-dekok-radext-dtls-01 (work
                             in progress), June 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec]  Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and
                             K. Wierenga, "TLS encryption for RADIUS
                             over TCP", draft-ietf-radext-radsec-06
                             (work in progress), March 2010.

Authors' Addresses

   Stefan Winter
   Fondation RESTENA
   6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
   Luxembourg  1359
   LUXEMBOURG

   Phone: +352 424409 1
   Fax:   +352 422473
   EMail: stefan.winter@restena.lu
   URI:   http://www.restena.lu.

   Mike McCauley
   Open Systems Consultants
   9 Bulbul Place
   Currumbin Waters  QLD 4223
   AUSTRALIA

   Phone: +61 7 5598 7474
   Fax:   +61 7 5598 7070
   EMail: mikem@open.com.au
   URI:   http://www.open.com.au.