draft-ietf-quic-v2-02.txt		draft-ietf-quic-v2-03.txt
	QUIC M. Duke		QUIC M. Duke
	Internet-Draft Google LLC		Internet-Draft Google LLC
	Intended status: Standards Track 28 April 2022		Intended status: Standards Track 12 May 2022
	Expires: 30 October 2022		Expires: 13 November 2022
	QUIC Version 2		QUIC Version 2
	draft-ietf-quic-v2-02		draft-ietf-quic-v2-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies QUIC version 2, which is identical to QUIC		This document specifies QUIC version 2, which is identical to QUIC
	version 1 except for some trivial details. Its purpose is to combat		version 1 except for some trivial details. Its purpose is to combat
	various ossification vectors and exercise the version negotiation		various ossification vectors and exercise the version negotiation
	framework. It also serves as a template for the minimum changes in		framework. It also serves as a template for the minimum changes in
	any future version of QUIC.		any future version of QUIC.
	Note that "version 2" is an informal name for this proposal that		Note that "version 2" is an informal name for this proposal that
	skipping to change at page 2, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 15 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 October 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 November 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as		extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
	described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Changes from QUIC Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Differences with QUIC Version 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1. Version Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1. Version Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.2. Long Header Packet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.2. Long Header Packet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3. Cryptography changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3. Cryptography changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3.1. Initial Salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3.1. Initial Salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3.2. HKDF Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3.2. HKDF Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3.3. Retry Integrity Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.3.3. Retry Integrity Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Version Negotiation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Version Negotiation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. Compatible Negotiation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. Compatible Negotiation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. TLS Resumption and NEW_TOKEN Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. TLS Resumption and NEW_TOKEN Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. Ossification Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		6. Ossification Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	A.1. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		A.1. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	A.2. Client Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		A.2. Client Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	A.3. Server Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		A.3. Server Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	A.4. Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		A.4. Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet . . . . . . . . . . 13		A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Appendix B. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Appendix B. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	B.1. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		B.1. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	B.2. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		B.2. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	B.3. since draft-duke-quic-v2-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		B.3. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	B.4. since draft-duke-quic-v2-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		B.4. since draft-duke-quic-v2-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	B.5. since draft-duke-quic-v2-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		B.5. since draft-duke-quic-v2-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
			B.6. since draft-duke-quic-v2-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	QUIC [QUIC] has numerous extension points, including the version		QUIC [QUIC] has numerous extension points, including the version
	number that occupies the second through fifth octets of every long		number that occupies the second through fifth bytes of every long
	header (see [RFC8999]). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC		header (see [QUIC-INVARIANTS]). If experimental versions are rare,
	version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the		and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic,
	potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version octets always		there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version bytes
	being 0x00000001.		always being 0x00000001.
	Furthermore, version 1 Initial packets are encrypted with keys		In QUIC version 1, Initial packets are encrypted with the version-
	derived from a universally known salt, which allow observers to		specific salt as described in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]. Protecting
	inspect the contents of these packets, which include the TLS Client		Initial packets in this way allows observers to inspect their
	Hello and Server Hello messages. Again, middleboxes may ossify on		contents, which includes the TLS Client Hello or Server Hello
			messages. Again, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on
	the version 1 key derivation and packet formats.		the version 1 key derivation and packet formats.
	Finally [QUIC-VN] provides two mechanisms for endpoints to negotiate		Finally [QUIC-VN] provides two mechanisms for endpoints to negotiate
	the QUIC version to use. The "incompatible" version negotiation		the QUIC version to use. The "incompatible" version negotiation
	method can support switching from any initial QUIC version to any		method can support switching from any initial QUIC version to any
	other version with full generality, at the cost of an additional		other version with full generality, at the cost of an additional
	round-trip at the start of the connection. "Compatible" version		round-trip at the start of the connection. "Compatible" version
	negotiation eliminates the round-trip penalty but levies some		negotiation eliminates the round-trip penalty but levies some
	restrictions on how much the two versions can differ semantically.		restrictions on how much the two versions can differ semantically.
	QUIC version 2 is meant to mitigate ossification concerns and		QUIC version 2 is meant to mitigate ossification concerns and
	exercise the version negotiation mechanisms. The only change is a		exercise the version negotiation mechanisms. The only change is a
	tweak to the inputs of some crypto derivation functions to enforce		tweak to the inputs of some crypto derivation functions to enforce
	full key separation. Any endpoint that supports two versions needs		full key separation. Any endpoint that supports two versions needs
	to implement version negotiation to protect against downgrade		to implement version negotiation to protect against downgrade
	attacks.		attacks.
	[I-D.duke-quic-version-aliasing] is a more robust, but much more
	complicated, proposal to address these ossification problems. By
	design, it requires incompatible version negotiation. QUICv2 enables
	exercise of compatible version negotiation mechanism.
	2. Conventions		2. Conventions
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	3. Changes from QUIC Version 1		3. Differences with QUIC Version 1
	QUIC version 2 endpoints MUST implement the QUIC version 1		QUIC version 2 endpoints MUST implement the QUIC version 1
	specification as described in [QUIC], [QUIC-TLS], and [RFC9002], with		specification as described in [QUIC], [QUIC-TLS], and [RFC9002].
	the following changes.		However, the following differences apply in version 2.
	3.1. Version Field		3.1. Version Field
	The version field of long headers is 0x709a50c4.		The Version field of long headers is 0x709a50c4.
	3.2. Long Header Packet Types		3.2. Long Header Packet Types
	Initial packets use a packet type field of 0b01. 0-RTT packets use a		All version 2 long header packet types are different. The Type field
	packet type field of 0b10. Handshake packets use a packet type field		values are:
	of 0b11. Retry packets use a packet type field of 0b00.
			* Initial: 0b01
			* 0-RTT: 0b10
			* Handshake: 0b11
			* Retry: 0b00
	3.3. Cryptography changes		3.3. Cryptography changes
	3.3.1. Initial Salt		3.3.1. Initial Salt
	The salt used to derive Initial keys in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]		The salt used to derive Initial keys in Section 5.2 of [QUIC-TLS]
	changes to:		changes to:
	initial_salt = 0xa707c203a59b47184a1d62ca570406ea7ae3e5d3		initial_salt = 0xa707c203a59b47184a1d62ca570406ea7ae3e5d3
	skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶
	The client MUST NOT send 0-RTT packets using the negotiated version,		The client MUST NOT send 0-RTT packets using the negotiated version,
	even after processing a packet of that version from the server.		even after processing a packet of that version from the server.
	Servers can apply original version 0-RTT packets to a connection		Servers can apply original version 0-RTT packets to a connection
	without additional considerations.		without additional considerations.
	5. TLS Resumption and NEW_TOKEN Tokens		5. TLS Resumption and NEW_TOKEN Tokens
	TLS session tickets and NEW_TOKEN tokens are specific to the QUIC		TLS session tickets and NEW_TOKEN tokens are specific to the QUIC
	version of the connection that provided them. Clients SHOULD NOT use		version of the connection that provided them. Clients SHOULD NOT use
	a session ticket or token from a QUICv1 connection to initiate a		a session ticket or token from a QUIC version 1 connection to
	QUICv2 connection, or vice versa.		initiate a QUIC version 2 connection, or vice versa.
	Servers MUST validate the originating version of any session ticket		Servers MUST validate the originating version of any session ticket
	or token and not accept one issued from a different version. A		or token and not accept one issued from a different version. A
	rejected ticket results in falling back to a full TLS handshake,		rejected ticket results in falling back to a full TLS handshake,
	without 0-RTT. A rejected token results in the client address		without 0-RTT. A rejected token results in the client address
	remaining unverified, which limits the amount of data the server can		remaining unverified, which limits the amount of data the server can
	send.		send.
	After compatible version negotiation, any resulting session ticket		After compatible version negotiation, any resulting session ticket
	maps to the negotiated version rather than original one.		maps to the negotiated version rather than original one.
	6. Ossification Considerations		6. Ossification Considerations
	QUIC version 2 provides protection against some forms of		QUIC version 2 provides protection against some forms of
	ossification. Devices that assume that all long headers will contain		ossification. Devices that assume that all long headers will encode
	encode version 1, or that the version 1 Initial key derivation		version 1, or that the version 1 Initial key derivation formula will
	formula will remain version-invariant, will not correctly process		remain version-invariant, will not correctly process version 2
	version 2 packets.		packets.
	However, many middleboxes such as firewalls focus on the first packet		However, many middleboxes such as firewalls focus on the first packet
	in a connection, which will often remain in the version 1 format due		in a connection, which will often remain in the version 1 format due
	to the considerations above.		to the considerations above.
	Clients interested in combating firewall ossification can initiate a		Clients interested in combating firewall ossification can initiate a
	connection using version 2 if they are either reasonably certain the		connection using version 2 if they are either reasonably certain the
	server supports it, or are willing to suffer a round-trip penalty if		server supports it, or are willing to suffer a round-trip penalty if
	they are incorrect.		they are incorrect.
	7. Applicability		7. Applicability
	This version of QUIC provides no change from QUIC version 1 relating		This version of QUIC provides no change from QUIC version 1 relating
	to the capabilities available to applications. Therefore, all		to the capabilities available to applications. Therefore, all
	Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ([RFC7301]) codepoints		Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ([RFC7301]) codepoints
	specified to operate over QUICv1 can also operate over this version		specified to operate over QUIC version 1 can also operate over this
	of QUIC. In particular, both the "h3" [I-D.ietf-quic-http] and "doq"		version of QUIC. In particular, both the "h3" [I-D.ietf-quic-http]
	[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic] ALPNs can operate over QUICv2.		and "doq" [I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic] ALPNs can operate over QUIC
			version 2.
	All QUIC extensions defined to work with version 1 also work with		All QUIC extensions defined to work with version 1 also work with
	version 2.		version 2.
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	QUIC version 2 introduces no changes to the security or privacy		QUIC version 2 introduces no changes to the security or privacy
	properties of QUIC version 1.		properties of QUIC version 1.
	The mandatory version negotiation mechanism guards against downgrade		The mandatory version negotiation mechanism guards against downgrade
	skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶
	draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-07, 5 April 2022,		draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation-07, 5 April 2022,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
	version-negotiation-07>.		version-negotiation-07>.
	[RFC9002] Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection		[RFC9002] Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
	and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,		and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
	May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9002>.		May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9002>.
	10.2. Informative References		10.2. Informative References
	[I-D.duke-quic-version-aliasing]
	Duke, M., "QUIC Version Aliasing", Work in Progress,
	Internet-Draft, draft-duke-quic-version-aliasing-07, 25
	October 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
	draft-duke-quic-version-aliasing-07>.
	[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]		[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic]
	Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over		Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
	Dedicated QUIC Connections", Work in Progress, Internet-		Dedicated QUIC Connections", Work in Progress, Internet-
	Draft, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-12, 20 April 2022,		Draft, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-12, 20 April 2022,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-
	dnsoquic-12>.		dnsoquic-12>.
	[I-D.ietf-quic-http]		[I-D.ietf-quic-http]
	Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3		Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
	(HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-		(HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
	quic-http-34, 2 February 2021,		quic-http-34, 2 February 2021,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
	http-34>.		http-34>.
			[QUIC-INVARIANTS]
			Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
			RFC 8999, DOI 10.17487/RFC8999, May 2021,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8999>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,		[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
	Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,		Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
	July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7301>.		July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7301>.
	[RFC7838] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP		[RFC7838] Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
	Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,		Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
	April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7838>.		April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7838>.
	[RFC8999] Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
	RFC 8999, DOI 10.17487/RFC8999, May 2021,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8999>.
	Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection		Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection
	This section shows examples of packet protection so that		This section shows examples of packet protection so that
	implementations can be verified incrementally. Samples of Initial		implementations can be verified incrementally. Samples of Initial
	packets from both client and server plus a Retry packet are defined.		packets from both client and server plus a Retry packet are defined.
	These packets use an 8-byte client-chosen Destination Connection ID		These packets use an 8-byte client-chosen Destination Connection ID
	of 0x8394c8f03e515708. Some intermediate values are included. All		of 0x8394c8f03e515708. Some intermediate values are included. All
	values are shown in hexadecimal.		values are shown in hexadecimal.
	A.1. Keys		A.1. Keys
	skipping to change at page 15, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 10 ¶
	The protected packet is the smallest possible packet size of 21		The protected packet is the smallest possible packet size of 21
	bytes.		bytes.
	packet = 5558b1c60ae7b6b932bc27d786f4bc2bb20f2162ba		packet = 5558b1c60ae7b6b932bc27d786f4bc2bb20f2162ba
	Appendix B. Changelog		Appendix B. Changelog
	*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to		*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
	publication of a final version of this document.		publication of a final version of this document.
	B.1. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-01		B.1. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-02
			* Editorial comments from Lucas Pardue
			B.2. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-01
	* Ban use of NEW_TOKEN tokens across versions		* Ban use of NEW_TOKEN tokens across versions
	* version-info transport parameter required for all v2 endpoints		* version-info transport parameter required for all v2 endpoints
	* Explicitly list known ALPN compatibility		* Explicitly list known ALPN compatibility
	B.2. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-00		B.3. since draft-ietf-quic-v2-00
	* Expanded requirements for compatible version negotiation		* Expanded requirements for compatible version negotiation
	* Added test vectors		* Added test vectors
	* Greased the packet type codepoints		* Greased the packet type codepoints
	* Random version number		* Random version number
	* Clarified requirement to use QUIC-VN		* Clarified requirement to use QUIC-VN
	* Banned use of resumption tokens across versions		* Banned use of resumption tokens across versions
	B.3. since draft-duke-quic-v2-02		B.4. since draft-duke-quic-v2-02
	* Converted to adopted draft		* Converted to adopted draft
	* Deleted references to QUIC improvements		* Deleted references to QUIC improvements
	* Clarified status of QUIC extensions		* Clarified status of QUIC extensions
	B.4. since draft-duke-quic-v2-01		B.5. since draft-duke-quic-v2-01
	* Made the final version number TBD.		* Made the final version number TBD.
	* Added ALPN considerations		* Added ALPN considerations
	B.5. since draft-duke-quic-v2-00		B.6. since draft-duke-quic-v2-00
	* Added provisional versions for interop		* Added provisional versions for interop
	* Change the v1 Retry Tag secret		* Change the v1 Retry Tag secret
	* Change labels to create full key separation		* Change labels to create full key separation
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Martin Duke		Martin Duke
End of changes. 24 change blocks.
	56 lines changed or deleted		60 lines changed or added
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