draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-04.txt | draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-05.txt | |||
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PERC Working Group C. Jennings | PERC Working Group C. Jennings | |||
Internet-Draft Cisco | Internet-Draft Cisco | |||
Intended status: Standards Track J. Mattsson, Ed. | Intended status: Standards Track J. Mattsson, Ed. | |||
Expires: October 30, 2017 Ericsson | Expires: December 31, 2017 Ericsson | |||
D. McGrew | D. McGrew | |||
D. Wing | D. Wing | |||
F. Andreasen | F. Andreasen | |||
Cisco | Cisco | |||
April 28, 2017 | June 29, 2017 | |||
Encrypted Key Transport for DTLS and Secure RTP | Encrypted Key Transport for DTLS and Secure RTP | |||
draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-04 | draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-05 | |||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to DTLS and Secure | Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to DTLS and Secure | |||
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that provides for the secure | Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that provides for the secure | |||
transport of SRTP master keys, rollover counters, and other | transport of SRTP master keys, rollover counters, and other | |||
information within SRTP. This facility enables SRTP for | information within SRTP. This facility enables SRTP for | |||
decentralized conferences by distributing a common key to all of the | decentralized conferences by distributing a common key to all of the | |||
conference endpoints. | conference endpoints. | |||
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 ¶ | skipping to change at page 1, line 40 ¶ | |||
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering | |||
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute | |||
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- | |||
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. | |||
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months | |||
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any | |||
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference | |||
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." | |||
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 30, 2017. | This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2017. | |||
Copyright Notice | Copyright Notice | |||
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the | |||
document authors. All rights reserved. | document authors. All rights reserved. | |||
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal | |||
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | Provisions Relating to IETF Documents | |||
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of | |||
publication of this document. Please review these documents | publication of this document. Please review these documents | |||
skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶ | skipping to change at page 2, line 33 ¶ | |||
4.4.1. Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | 4.4.1. Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 | |||
4.4.2. Defining New EKT Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 4.4.2. Defining New EKT Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
4.5. Synchronizing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 4.5. Synchronizing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
4.6. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | 4.6. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 | |||
4.7. Timing and Reliability Consideration . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 4.7. Timing and Reliability Consideration . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
5. Use of EKT with DTLS-SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | 5. Use of EKT with DTLS-SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 | |||
5.1. DTLS-SRTP Recap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 5.1. DTLS-SRTP Recap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
5.2. SRTP EKT Key Transport Extensions to DTLS-SRTP . . . . . 14 | 5.2. SRTP EKT Key Transport Extensions to DTLS-SRTP . . . . . 14 | |||
5.3. Offer/Answer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.3. Offer/Answer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
5.4. Sending the DTLS EKT_Key Reliably . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.4. Sending the DTLS EKT_Key Reliably . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 | 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | |||
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
7.1. EKT Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 7.1. EKT Message Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
7.2. EKT Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 7.2. EKT Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
7.3. TLS Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 7.3. TLS Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
7.4. TLS Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 7.4. TLS Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | |||
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 | Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 | |||
1. Introduction | 1. Introduction | |||
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is designed to allow decentralized | Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is designed to allow decentralized | |||
groups with minimal control to establish sessions, such as for | groups with minimal control to establish sessions, such as for | |||
multimedia conferences. Unfortunately, Secure RTP ( SRTP [RFC3711]) | multimedia conferences. Unfortunately, Secure RTP ( SRTP [RFC3711]) | |||
cannot be used in many minimal-control scenarios, because it requires | cannot be used in many minimal-control scenarios, because it requires | |||
that synchronization source (SSRC) values and other data be | that synchronization source (SSRC) values and other data be | |||
coordinated among all of the participants in a session. For example, | coordinated among all of the participants in a session. For example, | |||
if a participant joins a session that is already in progress, that | if a participant joins a session that is already in progress, that | |||
skipping to change at page 17, line 32 ¶ | skipping to change at page 17, line 32 ¶ | |||
ekt_key_ack --------> | ekt_key_ack --------> | |||
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | |||
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | |||
ekt_key (rekey) <------- | ekt_key (rekey) <------- | |||
ekt_key_ack --------> | ekt_key_ack --------> | |||
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | |||
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets | |||
Figure 5: DTLS/SRTP Message Flow | Figure 5: DTLS/SRTP Message Flow | |||
Note that when used in PERC [I-D.ietf-perc-private-media-framework], | ||||
the Server is actually split between the Media Distrbutor and Key | ||||
Distributor. The messages in the above figure that are "SRTP | ||||
packets" will not got to the Key Distributor but the oter packets | ||||
will be relayed by the Media Distributor to the Key Distributor. | ||||
5.3. Offer/Answer Considerations | 5.3. Offer/Answer Considerations | |||
When using EKT with DTLS-SRTP, the negotiation to use EKT is done at | When using EKT with DTLS-SRTP, the negotiation to use EKT is done at | |||
the DTLS handshake level and does not change the [RFC3264] Offer / | the DTLS handshake level and does not change the [RFC3264] Offer / | |||
Answer messaging. | Answer messaging. | |||
5.4. Sending the DTLS EKT_Key Reliably | 5.4. Sending the DTLS EKT_Key Reliably | |||
The DTLS ekt_key is sent using the retransmissions specified in | The DTLS ekt_key is sent using the retransmissions specified in | |||
Section 4.2.4. of DTLS [RFC6347]. | Section 4.2.4. of DTLS [RFC6347]. | |||
End of changes. 8 change blocks. | ||||
7 lines changed or deleted | 13 lines changed or added | |||
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