wdiff draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08.txt draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-09.txt

Network Working Group P. Jones
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational P. Ellenbogen
Expires: 21 November 15 December 2021 Princeton University
N. Ohlmeier
Mozilla
20 May
8x8, Inc.
13 June 2021

DTLS Tunnel between a Media Distributor and Key Distributor to
Facilitate Key Exchange
draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08
draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-09

Abstract

This document defines a DTLS tunneling protocol for use in multimedia
conferences that enables a Media Distributor to facilitate key
exchange between an endpoint in a conference and the Key Distributor.
The protocol is designed to ensure that the keying material used for
hop-by-hop encryption and authentication is accessible to the media
distributor, Media
Distributor, while the keying material used for end-to-end encryption
and authentication is inaccessible to the media distributor. Media Distributor.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 November 15 December 2021.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.

Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Tunneling Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
4. Example Message Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Tunneling Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Endpoint Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Tunnel Establishment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Media Distributor Tunneling Procedures . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. Key Distributor Tunneling Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.5. Versioning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Tunneling Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Tunnel Message Format TunnelMessage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. SupportedProfiles Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. UnsupportedVersion Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.4. MediaKeys Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.5. TunneledDtls Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.6. EndpointDisconnect Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Example Binary Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 16
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 16
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17

1. Introduction

An objective of Privacy-Enhanced RTP Conferencing (PERC) [RFC8871] is
to ensure that endpoints in a multimedia conference have access to
the end-to-end (E2E) and hop-by-hop (HBH) keying material used to
encrypt and authenticate Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550]
packets, while the Media Distributor has access only to the HBH
keying material for encryption and authentication.

This specification defines a tunneling protocol that enables the
media distributor
Media Distributor to tunnel DTLS [RFC6347] messages between an
endpoint and the key distributor, Key Distributor, thus allowing an endpoint to use
DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] for establishing encryption and authentication
keys with the key distributor. Key Distributor.

The tunnel established between the media distributor Media Distributor and key
distributor Key
Distributor is a TLS [RFC5246] connection that is established before
any messages are forwarded by the media distributor Media Distributor on behalf of the
endpoint. DTLS packets received from the endpoint are encapsulated
by the media distributor Media Distributor inside this tunnel as data to be sent to the
key distributor.
Key Distributor. Likewise, when the media distributor Media Distributor receives data
from the key distributor Key Distributor over the tunnel, it extracts the DTLS
message inside and forwards the DTLS message to the endpoint. In
this way, the DTLS association for the DTLS-SRTP procedures is
established between the endpoint and the key distributor, Key Distributor, with the
media distributor
Media Distributor simply forwarding packets between the two entities
and having no visibility into the confidential information exchanged.

Following the existing DTLS-SRTP procedures, the endpoint and key
distributor Key
Distributor will arrive at a selected cipher and keying material,
which are used for HBH encryption and authentication by both the
endpoint and the media distributor. Media Distributor. However, since the media
distributor Media
Distributor would not have direct access to this information, the key
distributor Key
Distributor explicitly shares the HBH key information with the media
distributor Media
Distributor via the tunneling protocol defined in this document.
Additionally, the endpoint and key distributor Key Distributor will agree on a cipher
for E2E encryption and authentication. The key distributor Key Distributor will
transmit keying material to the endpoint for E2E operations, but will
not share that information with the media distributor. Media Distributor.

By establishing this TLS tunnel between the media distributor Media Distributor and key
distributor Key
Distributor and implementing the protocol defined in this document,
it is possible for the media distributor Media Distributor to facilitate the
establishment of a secure DTLS association between an endpoint and
the key distributor Key Distributor in order for the endpoint to receive E2E and HBH
keying material. At the same time, the key distributor Key Distributor can securely
provide the HBH keying material to the media distributor. Media Distributor.

2. Conventions Used In This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

This document uses the terms "endpoint", "Media Distributor", and
"Key Distributor" defined in [RFC8871].

3. Tunneling Concept

A TLS connection (tunnel) is established between the media
distributor Media
Distributor and the key distributor. Key Distributor. This tunnel is used to relay
DTLS messages between the endpoint and key distributor, Key Distributor, as depicted
in Figure 1:

+-------------+
| Key |
| Distributor |
+-------------+
# ^ ^ #
# | | # <-- TLS Tunnel
# | | #
+----------+ +-------------+ +----------+
| | DTLS | | DTLS | |
| Endpoint |<------------| Media |------------>| Endpoint |
| | to Key | Distributor | to Key | |
| | Distributor | | Distributor | |
+----------+ +-------------+ +----------+

Figure 1: TLS Tunnel to Key Distributor

The three entities involved in this communication flow are the
endpoint, the media distributor, Media Distributor, and the key distributor. Key Distributor. The
behavior of each entity is described in Section 5.

The key distributor Key Distributor is a logical function that might might be co-
resident co-resident
with a key management server operated by an enterprise, reside in one
of the endpoints participating in the conference, or elsewhere that
is trusted with E2E keying material.

4. Example Message Flows

This section provides an example message flow to help clarify the
procedures described later in this document. It is necessary that
the key distributor Key Distributor and media distributor Media Distributor establish a mutually
authenticated TLS connection for the purpose of sending tunneled
messages, though the complete TLS handshake for the tunnel is not
shown in Figure 2 since there is nothing new this document introduces
with regard to those procedures.

Once the tunnel is established, it is possible for the media
distributor Media
Distributor to relay the DTLS messages between the endpoint and the
key distributor.
Key Distributor. Figure 2 shows a message flow wherein the endpoint
uses DTLS-SRTP to establish an association with the key distributor. Key Distributor.
In the process, the media distributor Media Distributor shares its supported SRTP
protection profile information (see [RFC5764]) and the key
distributor Key
Distributor shares HBH keying material and selected cipher with the
media distributor.
Media Distributor.

Endpoint media distributor key distributor Media Distributor Key Distributor
| | |
| |<=======================>|
| | TLS Connection Made |
| | |
| |========================>|
| | SupportedProfiles |
| | |
|------------------------>|========================>|
| DTLS handshake message | TunneledDtls |
| | |
| |<========================|
| | MediaKeys |
| | |
.... may be multiple handshake messages ...
| | |
|<------------------------|<========================|
| DTLS handshake message | TunneledDtls |
| | |

Figure 2: Sample DTLS-SRTP Exchange via the Tunnel

After the initial TLS connection has been established each of the
messages on the right-hand side of Figure 2 is a tunneling protocol
message as defined in Section 6.

SRTP protection profiles supported by the media distributor Media Distributor will be
sent in a "SupportedProfiles" message when the TLS tunnel is
initially established. The key distributor Key Distributor will use that information
to select a common profile supported by both the endpoint and the
media distributor
Media Distributor to ensure that HBH operations can be successfully
performed.

As DTLS messages are received from the endpoint by the media
distributor, Media
Distributor, they are forwarded to the key distributor Key Distributor encapsulated
inside a "TunneledDtls" message. Likewise, as "TunneledDtls"
messages are received by the media distributor Media Distributor from the key
distributor, Mey
Distributor, the encapsulated DTLS packet is forwarded to the
endpoint.

The key distributor Key Distributor will provide the SRTP [RFC3711] keying material
to the media distributor Media Distributor for HBH operations via the "MediaKeys"
message. The media distributor Media Distributor will extract this keying material
from the "MediaKeys" message when received and use it for HBH
encryption and authentication.

5. Tunneling Procedures

The following sub-sections explain in detail the expected behavior of
the endpoint, the media distributor, Media Distributor, and the key distributor. Key Distributor.

It is important to note that the tunneling protocol described in this
document is not an extension to TLS [RFC5246] or DTLS [RFC6347].
Rather, it is a protocol that transports DTLS messages generated by
an endpoint or key distributor Key Distributor as data inside of the TLS connection
established between the media distributor Media Distributor and key distributor. Key Distributor.

5.1. Endpoint Procedures

The endpoint follows the procedures outlined for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764]
in order to establish the cipher and keys used for encryption and
authentication, with the endpoint acting as the client and the key
distributor Key
Distributor acting as the server. The endpoint does not need to be
aware of the fact that DTLS messages it transmits toward the media
distributor Media
Distributor are being tunneled to the key distributor. Key Distributor.

The endpoint MUST include a unique identifier in the "tls-id" SDP
[!@RFC4566]
[RFC4566] attribute sent by the endpoint in both offer and answer
[RFC3264] messages as per [RFC8842]. Further, the endpoint MUST
include this same unique identifier in the "external_session_id"
extension [RFC8844] in the "ClientHello" message when establishing a
DTLS association.

When receiving a "external_session_id" value from the key
distributor, Key
Distributor, the client MUST check to ensure that value matches the
"tls-id" value received in SDP. If the values do not match, the
endpoint MUST consider any received keying material to be invalid and
terminate the DTLS association.

5.2. Tunnel Establishment Procedures

Either the media distributor Media Distributor or key distributor Key Distributor initiates the
establishment of a TLS tunnel. Which entity acts as the TLS client
when establishing the tunnel and what event triggers the
establishment of the tunnel are outside the scope of this document.
Further, how the trust relationships are established between the key
distributor Key
Distributor and media distributor Media Distributor are also outside the scope of this
document.

A tunnel MUST be a mutually authenticated TLS connection.

The media distributor Media Distributor or key distributor Key Distributor MUST establish a tunnel
prior to forwarding tunneled DTLS messages. Given the time-sensitive
nature of DTLS-SRTP procedures, a tunnel SHOULD be established prior
to the media distributor Media Distributor receiving a DTLS message from an endpoint.

A single tunnel MAY be used to relay DTLS messages between any number
of endpoints and the key distributor. Key Distributor.

A media distributor Media Distributor MAY have more than one tunnel established between
itself and one or more key distributors. Key Distributors. When multiple tunnels are
established, which tunnel or tunnels to use to send messages for a
given conference is outside the scope of this document.

5.3. Media Distributor Tunneling Procedures

The first message transmitted over the tunnel is the
"SupportedProfiles" (see Section 6). This message informs the key
distributor Key
Distributor about which DTLS-SRTP profiles the media distributor Media Distributor
supports. This message MUST be sent each time a new tunnel
connection is established or, in the case of connection loss, when a
connection is re-established. The media distributor Media Distributor MUST support the
same list of protection profiles for the duration of any endpoint-
initiated DTLS association and tunnel connection.

The media distributor Media Distributor MUST assign a unique association identifier for
each endpoint-initiated DTLS association and include it in all
messages forwarded to the key distributor. Key Distributor. The key distributor Key Distributor will
subsequently include this identifier in all messages it sends so that
the media distributor Media Distributor can map messages received via a tunnel and
forward those messages to the correct endpoint. The association
identifier MUST be randomly assigned UUID value as described
Section 4.4 of [RFC4122].

When a DTLS message is received by the media distributor Media Distributor from an
endpoint, it forwards the UDP payload portion of that message to the
key distributor
Key Distributor encapsulated in a "TuneledDtls" message. The media
distributor Media
Distributor is not required to forward all messages received from an
endpoint for a given DTLS association through the same tunnel if more
than one tunnel has been established between it and a key
distributor. Key
Distributor.

When a "MediaKeys" message is received, the media distributor Media Distributor MUST
extract the cipher and keying material conveyed in order to
subsequently perform HBH encryption and authentication operations for
RTP and RTCP packets sent between it and an endpoint. Since the HBH
keying material will be different for each endpoint, the media
distributor Media
Distributor uses the association identifier included by the key
distributor Key
Distributor to ensure that the HBH keying material is used with the
correct endpoint.

The media distributor Media Distributor MUST forward all DTLS messages received from
either the endpoint or the key distributor Key Distributor (via the "TunneledDtls"
message) to ensure proper communication between those two entities.

When the media distributor Media Distributor detects an endpoint has disconnected or
when it receives conference control messages indicating the endpoint
is to be disconnected, the media distributors Media Distributors MUST send an
"EndpointDisconnect" message with the association identifier assigned
to the endpoint to the key distributor. Key Distributor. The media distributor Media Distributor SHOULD
take a loss of all RTP and RTCP packets as an indicator that the
endpoint has disconnected. The particulars of how RTP and RTCP are
to be used to detect an endpoint disconnect, such as timeout period,
is not specified. The media distributor Media Distributor MAY use additional
indicators to determine when an endpoint has disconnected.

5.4. Key Distributor Tunneling Procedures

Each TLS tunnel established between the media distributor Media Distributor and the key
distributor Key
Distributor MUST be mutually authenticated.

When the media distributor Media Distributor relays a DTLS message from an endpoint,
the media distributor Media Distributor will include an association identifier that is
unique per endpoint-originated DTLS association. The association
identifier remains constant for the life of the DTLS association.
The key distributor Key Distributor identifies each distinct endpoint-originated DTLS
association by the association identifier.

When processing an incoming endpoint association, the key distributor Key Distributor
MUST extract the "external_session_id" value transmitted in the
"ClientHello" message and match that against "tls-id" value the
endpoint transmitted via SDP. If the values in SDP and the
"ClientHello" do not match, the DTLS association MUST be rejected.

The process through which the "tls-id" in SDP is conveyed to the key
distributor Key
Distributor is outside the scope of this document.

The key distributor Key Distributor MUST match the certificate fingerprint and
"external_session_id" received from endpoint's "ClientHello" message
with the values received from the SDP transmitted by the endpoint.
It is through this process that the key distributor Key Distributor can be sure to
deliver the correct conference key to the endpoint.

When sending the "ServerHello" message, the key distributor Key Distributor MUST
insert its own unique identifier in the "external_session_id"
extension. This value MUST also be conveyed back to the client via
SDP as a "tls-id" attribute.

The key distributor Key Distributor MUST encapsulate any DTLS message it sends to an
endpoint inside a "TunneledDtls" message (see Section 6). The key
distributor Key
Distributor is not required to transmit all messages a given DTLS
association through the same tunnel if more than one tunnel has been
established between it and a media distributor. Media Distributor.

The key distributor Key Distributor MUST use the same association identifier in
messages sent to an endpoint as was received in messages from that
endpoint. This ensures the media distributor Media Distributor can forward the
messages to the correct endpoint.

The key distributor Key Distributor extracts tunneled DTLS messages from an endpoint
and acts on those messages as if that endpoint had established the
DTLS association directly with the key distributor. Key Distributor. The key
distributor Key
Distributor is acting as the DTLS server and the endpoint is acting
as the DTLS client. The handling of the messages and certificates is
exactly the same as normal DTLS-SRTP procedures between endpoints.

The key distributor Key Distributor MUST send a "MediaKeys" message to the media
distributor Media
Distributor as soon as the HBH encryption key is computed and before
it sends a DTLS "Finished" message to the endpoint. The "MediaKeys"
message includes the selected cipher (i.e. protection profile), MKI
[RFC3711] value (if any), SRTP master keys, and SRTP master salt
values. The key distributor Key Distributor MUST use the same association identifier
in the "MediaKeys" message as is used in the "TunneledDtls" messages
for the given endpoint.

The key distributor Key Distributor uses the certificate fingerprint of the endpoint
along with the unique identifier received in the
"external_session_id" extension to determine which conference a given
DTLS association is associated.

The key distributor Key Distributor MUST select a cipher that is supported by both
the endpoint and the media distributor Media Distributor to ensure proper HBH
operations.

When the DTLS association between the endpoint and the key
distributor Key
Distributor is terminated, regardless of which entity initiated the
termination, the key distributor Key Distributor MUST send an "EndpointDisconnect"
message with the association identifier assigned to the endpoint to
the media distributor. Media Distributor.

5.5. Versioning Considerations

All messages for an established tunnel MUST utilize the same version
value.

Since the media distributor Media Distributor sends the first message over the tunnel,
it effectively establishes the version of the protocol to be used.
If that version is not supported by the key distributor, it MUST
discard Key Distributor, the message, Key
Distributor MUST transmit an "UnsupportedVersion" message, message containing
the highest version number supported, and close the TLS connection.

The media distributor Media Distributor MUST take note of the version received in an
"UnsupportedVersion" message and use that version when attempting to
re-establish a failed tunnel connection. Note that it is not
necessary for the media distributor Media Distributor to understand the newer version
of the protocol to understand that the first message received is
"UnsupportedVersion". The media distributor Media Distributor can determine from the
first two octets received what the version number is and that the
message is "UnsupportedVersion". The rest of the data received, if
any, would be discarded and the connection closed (if not already
closed).

6. Tunneling Protocol

Tunneled messages are transported via the TLS tunnel as application
data between the media distributor and Media Distributor and the key distributor. Key Distributor. Tunnel
messages are specified using the format described in [RFC5246]
section 4. As in [RFC5246], all values are stored in network byte
(big endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex bytes 01 02 03
04 is equivalent to the decimal value 16909060.

The

This protocol defines several different messages, each of which
containing the
contains the following information:

* Protocol version

* Message type identifier

* Message body length

* The message body

Each of these the tunnel messages is a "TunnelMessage" in the syntax, structure with a the
message type indicating the actual content of the message body.

6.1. Tunnel Message Format TunnelMessage Structure

The syntax of the protocol is defined below. "TunnelMessage" defines the structure of all messages sent via
the tunnel protocol. That structure includes a field called
"msg_type" that identifies the specific type of message contained
within "TunnelMessage".

enum {
supported_profiles(1),
unsupported_version(2),
media_keys(3),
tunneled_dtls(4),
endpoint_disconnect(5),
(255)
} MsgType;

opaque uuid[16];

struct {
MsgType msg_type;
uint16 length;
select (MsgType) {
case supported_profiles: SupportedProfiles;
case unsupported_version: UnsupportedVersion;
case media_keys: MediaKeys;
case tunneled_dtls: TunneledDtls;
case endpoint_disconnect: EndpointDisconnect;
} body;
} TunnelMessage;

The elements of "TunnelMessage" include:

* msg_type: "msg_type": the type of message contained within the structure
"body".

* length: "length": the length in octets of the following "body" of the
message.

* "body": the actual message being conveyed within this
"TunnelMessage" structure.

6.2. SupportedProfiles Message

The "SupportedProfiles" message is defined as:

uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; /* from RFC5764 */

struct {
uint8 version;
SRTPProtectionProfile protection_profiles<0..2^16-1>;
} SupportedProfiles;

This message contains this single element:

* version: "version": indicates the version of this the protocol to use (0x00).

* protection_profiles: "protection_profiles": The list of two-octet SRTP protection
profile values as per [RFC5764] supported by the media distributor. Media
Distributor.

6.3. UnsupportedVersion Message

The "UnsupportedVersion" message is defined as follows:

struct {
uint8 highest_version;
} UnsupportedVersion;

The elements of "UnsupportedVersion" include:

* highest_version: "highest_version": indicates the highest supported version of the protocol version.
supported by the Key Distributor.

6.4. MediaKeys Message

The "MediaKeys" message is defined as:

struct {
uuid association_id;
SRTPProtectionProfile protection_profile;
opaque mki<0..255>;
opaque client_write_SRTP_master_key<1..255>;
opaque server_write_SRTP_master_key<1..255>;
opaque client_write_SRTP_master_salt<1..255>;
opaque server_write_SRTP_master_salt<1..255>;
} MediaKeys;

The fields are described as follows:

* association_id: "association_id": A value that identifies a distinct DTLS
association between an endpoint and the key distributor. Key Distributor.

* protection_profiles: "protection_profiles": The value of the two-octet SRTP protection
profile value as per [RFC5764] used for this DTLS association.

* mki: "mki": Master key identifier [RFC3711]. A zero-length field
indicates that no MKI value is present.

* client_write_SRTP_master_key: "client_write_SRTP_master_key": The value of the SRTP master key
used by the client (endpoint).

* server_write_SRTP_master_key: "server_write_SRTP_master_key": The value of the SRTP master key
used by the server (media distributor). (Media Distributor).

* client_write_SRTP_master_salt: "client_write_SRTP_master_salt": The value of the SRTP master salt
used by the client (endpoint).

* server_write_SRTP_master_salt: "server_write_SRTP_master_salt": The value of the SRTP master salt
used by the server (media distributor). (Media Distributor).

6.5. TunneledDtls Message

The "TunneledDtls" message is defined as:

struct {
uuid association_id;
opaque dtls_message<0..2^16-1>;
} TunneledDtls;

The fields are described as follows:

* association_id: An "association_id": A value that identifies a distinct DTLS
association between an endpoint and the key distributor. Key Distributor.

* dtls_message: "dtls_message": the content of the DTLS message received by the
endpoint or to be sent to the endpoint.

6.6. EndpointDisconnect Message

The "EndpointDisconect" "EndpointDisconnect" message is defined as:

struct {
uuid association_id;
} EndpointDisconnect;

The fields are described as follows:

* association_id: "association_id": An value that identifies a distinct DTLS
association between an endpoint and the key distributor. Key Distributor.

7. Example Binary Encoding

The "TunnelMessage" is encoded in binary following the procedures
specified in [RFC5246]. This section provides an example of what the
bits on the wire would look like for the "SupportedProfiles" message
that advertises support for both
DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_128_GCM_AEAD_AES_128_GCM
"DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_128_GCM_AEAD_AES_128_GCM" and
DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_256_GCM_AEAD_AES_256_GCM
"DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_256_GCM_AEAD_AES_256_GCM" [RFC8723].

TunnelMessage:
message_type: 0x01
length: 0x0007
SupportedProfiles:
version: 0x00
protection_profiles: 0x0004 (length)
0x0009000A (value)

Thus, the encoding on the wire presented here in network bytes order
would be this stream of octets:

0x0100070000040009000A

8. IANA Considerations

This document establishes a new registry to contain message type
values used in the DTLS Tunnel protocol. These data message type values
are a single octet in length. This document defines the values shown
in Table 1 below, leaving the balance of possible values reserved for
future specifications:

+=========+====================================+
| MsgType | Description |
+=========+====================================+
| 0x01 | Supported SRTP Protection Profiles |
+---------+------------------------------------+
| 0x02 | Unsupported Version |
+---------+------------------------------------+
| 0x03 | Media Keys |
+---------+------------------------------------+
| 0x04 | Tunneled DTLS |
+---------+------------------------------------+
| 0x05 | Endpoint Disconnect |
+---------+------------------------------------+

Table 1: Data Message Type Values for the DTLS
Tunnel Protocol

The value 0x00 is reserved and all values in the range 0x06 to 0xFF
are reserved. available for allocation. The procedures for updating this table
are those defined as "IETF Review" in section 4.8 of [RFC8126].

The name for this registry is "Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Tunnel Protocol Data Message Types for Privacy Enhanced
Conferencing".

The procedures for updating this table are those defined as "IETF
Review" in section 4.8 if [!@RFC8126].

9. Security Considerations

The encapsulated data is protected by

Since the procedures in this document relies on TLS connection from [RFC5246] for
transport security, the
endpoint to key distributor, and security considerations for TLS should be
reviewed when implementing the media distributor is merely an
on path entity. The media distributor does not have access to protocol defined in this document.

While the
end-to-end keying material This tunneling protocol defined in this document does not introduce any additional use
DTLS-SRTP [[RFC5764] directly, it does convey and negotiate some of
the same information (e.g., protection profile data). As such, a
review of the security concerns beyond considerations found in that document may be
useful.

This document describes a normal DTLS-SRTP association.

The HBH means of securely exchanging keying
material is protected by the mutual authenticated TLS
connection between the media distributor and key distributor. The
key distributor MUST ensure that it only forms associations with
authorized cryptographic transforms for both E2E and HBH encryption
and authentication of media distributors or it could hand between an endpoint and a Key Distributor
via a Media Distributor. Additionally, the procedures result in
delivering HBH keying material information to
untrusted parties. the intermediary Media Distributor.
The supported profiles information sent from Key Distributor and endpoint are the media distributor only two entities with
access to both the key distributor E2E and HBH keys, while the Media Distributor has
access to only HBH information. Section 8.2 of [RFC8871] enumerates
various attacks against which one must guard when implementing a
Media Distributor and are important to note.

A requirement in this document is not particularly sensitive as it that a TLS connection between the
Media Distributor and the Key Distributor be mutually authenticated.
The reason for this requirement is to ensure that only provides an authorized
Media Distributor receives the cryptographic algorithms supported HBH keying material. If an
unauthorized Media Distributor gains access to the HBH keying
material, it can easily cause service degradation or denial by
transmitting HBH-valid packets that ultimately fail E2E
authentication or replay protection checks (see Section 3.3.2 of
[RFC3711]). Even if service does not appear degraded in any way,
transmitting and processing bogus packets are a waste of both
computational and network resources.

While E2E keying material passes through the Media Distributor via
the protocol defined in this document, the Media Distributor has no
means of gaining access to that information and therefore cannot
affect the E2E media distributor.
Further, processing function in the endpoint except to
present it is still protected by with invalid or replayed data. That said, any entity
along the TLS connection path that interferes with the DTLS exchange between the
media distributor
endpoint and the key distributor. Key Distributor, including a malicious Media
Distributor that is not properly authorized, could prevent an
endpoint from properly communicating with the Key Distributor and,
therefore, prevent successful conference participation.

10. Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank David Benham and Cullen Jennings for
reviewing this document and providing constructive comments.

11. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.

[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.

[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
July 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>.

[RFC6347] Rescorla, E.

[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 6347, 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[RFC8842] Holmberg, C. and R. Shpount, "Session Description Protocol
(SDP) Offer/Answer Considerations for Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 8842, DOI 10.17487/RFC8842, January 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8842>.

[RFC8844] Thomson, M. and E. Rescorla, "Unknown Key-Share Attacks on
Uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)",
RFC 8844, DOI 10.17487/RFC8844, January 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844>.

[RFC8871] Jones, P., Benham, D., and C. Groves, "A Solution
Framework for Private Media in Privacy-Enhanced RTP
Conferencing (PERC)", RFC 8871, DOI 10.17487/RFC8871,
January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8871>.

12. Informative References

[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

[RFC8723] Jennings, C., Jones, P., Barnes, R., and A.B. Roach,
"Double Encryption Procedures for the Secure Real-Time
Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 8723,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8723, April 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8723>.

Authors' Addresses

Paul E. Jones
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7025 Kit Creek Rd.
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709
United States of America

Phone: +1 919 476 2048
Email: paulej@packetizer.com
Paul M. Ellenbogen
Princeton University

Phone: +1 206 851 2069
Email: pe5@cs.princeton.edu

Nils H. Ohlmeier
Mozilla
8x8, Inc.

Phone: +1 408 659 6457
Email: nils@ohlmeier.org