OPSEC P. Cain Internet-Draft The Cooper-Cain Group, Inc. Intended status:
Standards TrackInformational G. Jones Expires: May 19,September 2, 2007 March 1, 2007 The MITRE Corporation November 15, 2006Logging Capabilities for IP Network Infrastructure draft-ietf-opsec-logging-caps-01draft-ietf-opsec-logging-caps-02 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19,September 2, 2007. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).IETF Trust (2007). Abstract This document lists logging capabilities originally defined in RFC3871 [RFC3871] and needed to support current operational practices, including those described in the Operational Security Current Practices document[CURPRAC]document[RFC4778] Logging is defined as the delivery of messages about the device, the data passing through the device, or the device's interaction with another device. This document may be used in conjunction with the other capabilities documents to operate a secure networking environment. Capabilities are defined without reference to specific technologies. This is done to leave room for deployment of new technologies that implement the capability. Each capability cites the practices it supports. Current implementations that support the capability are cited. Special considerations are discussed as appropriate listing operational and resource constraints, limitations of current implementations, trade-offs, etc. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Security Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Capabilities vs. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Functional Capabilities of Log Generating Systems . . . . . . 6 2.1. Logging Facility Uses Protocols Subject To Open Review . . 6 2.2. Logs Sent To Remote Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Ability to Select Reliable Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. Ability to Remotely Log Securely . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 2.5. Ability to Log Locally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910 2.6. Ability to Log Different Severities to Different Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.7. Ability to Log to Multiple Destinations . . . . . . . . . 11 2.8. Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time . . . . . . . . . 12 2.9. Display Timezone and UTC Offset . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.10. Default Timezone Should Be UTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.11. Log Entries Must Be Timestamped . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.12. Log on Exception or Identified Event . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.13. Logs Contain Untranslated IP Addresses . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.14. Logs Contain Records Of Critical Security Events . . . . . 17 2.15. Logs Contain Records of General Security Events . . . . . 18 2.16. Logs Do Not Contain Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.17. Devices Should Log Every Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.18. Syslog-specific Capabilties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.18.1. Configurable Facility Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.18.2. Configurable Destination UDP Port . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.19. SNMP-specific capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.19.1. Read-only Operations Supported . . . . . . . . . . . 2223 2.19.2. Restrict Returning Data to specific Hosts . . . . . . 23 2.19.3. Only Return Specific Data to Requestor . . . . . . . 24 3. Additional Operational Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 31 1. Introduction This document defines a set of capabilities for network equipment that generates event logs or performs event logging in the environments defined by [CURPRAC].[RFC4778]. Its goal is to identify capabilities required of the network equipment to generate and forward messages from the network equipment to an event logging system. Although most people equate logging with using the syslog protocol, other protocols such as SNMP [RFC3411] are quite capable of generating a log entry for transmission to a remote log entry collector. [CURPRAC]RFC4778 defines the goals, motivation, scope, definitions, intended audience, threat model, and potential attacks for each of the practices currently in use by network operators. Those current practices have been identified and refined to generate the capabilities listed in this document. 1.1. Security Overview The logging capabilities defined in this document are derived from observations and experiences in real world networks where unexpected activities in a network infrastructure caused concern to the network operator. Examples of such activities are: An adversary or unauthorized user login into an infrastructure device. The risk is that the configuration or other operating parameter could be modified. A device becomes overwhelmed, throttles, or crashes. Without logging or some other mechanism to notify the operator of the condition, the operator will not know that an action is required to return the device to optimal operating condition. Network problems cannot be properly diagnosed without sufficient information, which if not captured, will not be available for diagnoses activities. The main threat in a logging infrastructure is that a bad event may happen and the operator of the infrastructure may not be made aware of that event and cannot correct or respond to it. This document is concerned solely with the ability of the network device to generate appropriate messages. For guidance on transport and secure delivery see [RFC3164]. For a logging infrastructure introduction and guidance on building a secure infrastructure see NIST Publication 800-62. [SP800-92] One threat to the logging infrastructure is a self-inflicted denial of service attack due to an overwhelming amount of log messages generated on the local machine, such that the local system is using all its available effort to generate log messages, or congestion through the network between the log generator and the log collector, such that the remote system is inaccessible to management operations. Although not specifically a capability, care should be taken when configuring the logging infrastructure to account for this threat. 1.2. Capabilities vs. Requirements Capabilities may or may not be requirements. That is a local determination that must be made by each operator with reference to the policies that they must support. This document, together with [CURPRAC],[RFC4778], will assist network operators in identifying their security capability requirements and communicating them clearly to vendors. Capabilities are defined without reference to specific technologies. This is done to leave room for deployment of new technologies that implement the capability. Each capability cites the practices it supports. Current implementations that support the capability are cited. 1.3. Format Each capability has the following subsections: o Capability (what) o Discussion o Supported Practices (why) o Current Implementations (how) o Considerations (caveats, resource issues, protocol issues, etc.) The Capability section describes a feature to be supported by the device. The Supported Practice section cites practices described in [CURPRAC][RFC4778] that are supported by this capability. The Current Implementation section is intended to give examples of implementations of the capability, citing technology and standards current at the time of writing. It is expected that the choice of features to implement the capabilities will change over time. The Considerations section lists operational and resource constraints, limitations of current implementations, trade offs, etc. 2. Functional Capabilities of Log Generating Systems The capabilities in this section are intended to list testable, functional capabilities that are needed to operate devices securely and meet the obligations of Section 1.1Security Overview. 2.1. Logging Facility Uses Protocols Subject To Open Review Capability The device is capable of providing a logging facility that is based on protocols subject to open review. Custom or proprietary logging protocols MAY be implemented provided the same information is made available. Discussion The use of logging based on protocols subject to open review permits the operator to perform archiving and analysis of logs without relying on vendor-supplied software and servers. Supported Practices * Use IETF-defined protocols such as syslog, syslog with reliable delivery, syslog-ng, or SNMP. Current Implementations This capability can be satisfied by the use of one or more of syslog [RFC3164], syslog with reliable delivery [RFC3195], TACACS+ [RFC1492], RADIUS [RFC2865], or SNMP [RFC3415]. The current best solution seems to be the following: * Implement syslog [RFC3164]. * Consider implementing syslog with reliable delivery [RFC3195]. * Using SNMP with applicable security controls. Considerations None. 2.2. Logs Sent To Remote Servers Capability The device is capable of supporting transmission of records of security-related events to one or more remote collection devices. There should be configuration settings on the device that allow selection of destination servers. Discussion None. Supported Practices * Use multiple collection devices to enhance reliability. * Use different collection devices to segregate different event sensitivity levels. Current Implementations This capability may be satisfied by the use of one or more of: syslog [RFC3164], syslog with reliable delivery [RFC3195], TACACS+ [RFC1492], or RADIUS [RFC2865]. Considerations This capability is important because it supports individual accountability. It is important to store them on a separate server to preserve them in case of failure or compromise of the managed device. Note that there may be privacy or legal considerations when logging/monitoring user activity. High volumes of logging may generate excessive network traffic and/or compete for scarce memory and CPU resources on the device. 2.3. Ability to Select Reliable Delivery Capability The device is able to select reliable delivery of log messages. Discussion Reliable delivery is important to the extent that log data is depended upon to make operational decisions and perform forensic analysis. Without reliable delivery, log data becomes a collection of hints instead of a true record of events. Supported Practices * Use syslog-ng. * Tunnel the logging stream over a TCP-based connection. * Use an out-of-band network to connect critical logging devices to the collection device. Current Implementations One example of reliable syslog delivery is defined in[RFC3195]. Syslog-ng provides another example, although the protocol has not been standardized Considerations Reliable delivery should be used if the path from log event generator to the collection device transits administrative domains or uses unreliable channels, as it is important that the entire stream of log events is captured. CAUTION: The use of reliable delivery is heavily debated within the logging and security communities as errors encountered when reliably logging can cause the log generator to repeatedly attempt to deliver the log message causing a denial of service or deadlock condition. It may be desirable to use a rate-limiting features in syslog senders or for the logger of a message to have the option of either not log more messages or cease its own operation. This document does not specify which options to use. 2.4. Ability to Remotely Log Securely Capability The device is capable of delivering log data stream to the collection device in a confidential manner. Discussion While syslog *could* provide this capability, it has many security issues and by itself does not address issues from the threat model. See the security considerations section of [RFC3164] for a list of issues. Syslog with reliable delivery provides solutions to most/all of these issues, however at the time of this writing there are few implementations. Other possible solutions might be to tunnel syslog over a secure transport, but this often raises difficult key management and scalability issues. Supported Practices * Log data tunnelled within IPSec or SSH. * Use syslog-ng. * Use security services supplied by SNMP [RFC3414] Current Implementations There is no common implementation of this capability. Considerations Delivering log data across untrusted streams or including sensitive data in a event data may require additional countermeasures to protect the data. This concern should not be addressed lightly. ISPs are fully aware that there is no security with syslog but IPSec is considered too operationally expensive and cumbersome to deploy. Syslog-ng and stunnel could be used for better authentication and integrity protected solutions. Mechanisms to prevent unauthorized personnel from tampering with logs is constrained by auditing who has access to the logging servers and files. 2.5. Ability to Log Locally Capability The device is capable of logging data locally on the device itself into non-volatile storage. Discussion Logging of failed authentication attempts to local non-volatile storage is critical as it provides a record of events if the device gets isolated from its authentication interfaces or an attack overwhelms the console interface. Local logging is also important for viewing information when connected to the device and it provides some backup of log data in case remote logging fails. Local logging also provides a way to quickly view logs relevant to one device without having to sort through a possibly large set of logs from other devices at the collection device. Supported Practices * To conserve space, only failed device logins and network connectivity issues are logged locally. Current Implementations One example of local logging would be a memory buffer that receives copies of messages sent to the remote log server. Another example might be a local syslog server (assuming the device is capable of running syslog and has some local storage). Considerations Storage on the device may be limited. High volumes of log messages may quickly fill the available storage, in which case there are two options: new logs overwrite old logs (possibly via the use of a circular memory buffer or log file rotation) or logging stops. 2.6. Ability to Log Different Severities to Different Destinations Capability The device is capable of specifying different severity levels of log message to be delivered to different collection destinations. Discussion A network of multiple devices may generate a significant amount of log data. The ability to send critical log messages, for example a root login, to a specific destination device will enhance the ability of the network operator to notice the critical event. Supported Practices * Email critical event notices to a continuously monitored mailbox. * Send critical event notices to a separate log collector that scrolls received messages upon a large display in the NOC. Current Implementations There are no common implementations of this capability. Considerations The use of multiple collectors will incur maintenance and reliability issues. In some cases, multiple filters watching a single collection point may be more efficient than using multiple collectors. 2.7. Ability to Log to Multiple Destinations Capability The device is capable of allowing log message to be delivered to multiple collection destinations. Discussion All ISPs have multiple syslog servers - some ISPs choose to use separate syslog servers for varying infrastructure devices (i.e., one syslog server for backbone routers, one syslog server for customer edge routers, etc.). This provides a backup mechanism to see what is going on in the network in the event that a device may 'forget' to do syslog if the CPU is busy. Supported Practices * Use multiple log servers to enhance reliability. Current Implementations Most ISPs use multiple, sometimes geographically diverse, log collectors. Considerations None. 2.8. Ability to Maintain Accurate System Time Capability The device is capable of maintaining accurate, "high resolution" system time. Discussion Accurate time is important to the generation of reliable log data. Accurate time is also important to the correct operation of some authentication mechanisms. The ability to correlate network events from different devices is directly related to the accuracy of the log timestamps. If a time line cannot be constructed, the event logs and forensic data are useless. Supported Practices * The time is derived from NTP which is generally configured as a flat hierarchy at stratum-1 and stratum-2 servers to have less configuration and fewer maintenance issues. * Each router is configured with one stratum-1 peer both locally and remotely. Current Implementations This capability may be satisfied by supporting Network Time Protocol (NTP), Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP), or via direct connection to an accurate time source. Considerations System clock chips are inaccurate to varying degrees. System time should not be relied upon unless it is regularly checked and synchronized with a known, accurate external time source (such as an NTP stratum-1 server). Also note that if network time synchronization is used, an attacker may be able to manipulate the clock unless cryptographic authentication is used. 2.9. Display Timezone and UTC Offset Capability The device is capable of displaying and logging system time in a timezone or offset from UTC. Discussion None. Supported Practices * The log timestamps include a timezone indicator like "-05:00". Current Implementations Many devices support this capability. Considerations Knowing the timezone or UTC offset makes correlation of data and coordination with data in other timezones possible. Bob is in Newfoundland, Canada which is UTC -3:30. Alice is somewhere in Indiana, USA. Some parts of Indiana switch to daylight savings time while others do not. A user on Bob's network attacks a user on Alice's network. Both are using logs with local timezones and no indication of UTC offset. Correlating these logs will be difficult and error prone. Including timezone, or better, UTC offset, eliminates these difficulties. Notice that a physical location may have different offsets from UTC during a year as summer time, daylight savings time, or other local customs are applied. 2.10. Default Timezone Should Be UTC Capability The device is capable of using UTC for its default timezone for display and logging. The device may be capable of supporting a mechanism to allow the operator to specify the display and logging of times in a timezone other than UTC. Discussion Knowing the timezone or UTC offset makes correlation and coordination in other timezones possible. Supported Practices * The timezone offset can be entered as part of configuration of a device. Current Implementations Bob in Newfoundland (UTC -3:30) and Alice in Indiana (UTC -5 or UTC -6 depending on the time of year and exact county in Indiana) are working an incident together using their logs. Both left the default settings, which was UTC, so there was no translation of time necessary to correlate the logs. Considerations None. 2.11. Log Entries Must Be Timestamped Capability By default, the device should be capable of generating timestamps on all log messages, accurate to within a second or less, and including a timezone. The device should be capable of disabling the generation of timestamps. Discussion Accurate timestamps are necessary for correlating events, particularly across multiple devices or with other organizations. This applies when it is necessary to analyze logs. Supported Practices * Each entry into the log contains a time value. Current Implementations This capability may be satisfied by writing timestamps into syslog messages. Considerations It is difficult to correlate logs from different time zones. Security events on the Internet often involve machines and logs from a variety of physical locations. For that reason, UTC is preferred, all other things being equal. 2.12. Log on Exception or Identified Event Capability The device is capable of generating log entries on exceptions (e.g., failures) or event matching (e.g., generate a log entry if an event happens) via a configurable value. Discussion Traditionally, log events are generated on exceptions, such as failures or errors. Often this is not sufficient as a network operator cannot tell if an attacker failed to log into a device once, or failed once and then succeeded on the second try. Devices should be configurable to allow for log messages on failures, successes, or everything. Supported Practices * Log all login events to a device but have only the collection device alert on failures. * Log successful device configuration changes since one must be aware of all modifications on some types of devices. Current Implementations Some ISPs put in passive devices to see routing updates and withdrawals, so that they do not rely solely on the device for log files. Considerations None. 2.13. Logs Contain Untranslated IP Addresses Capability The device is capable of NOT using the DNS name of the log message generating device in event messages and logs. The device will use the IP Address of the log message generator in its logs. Discussion Although sometimes less obtuse than DNS names, IP address assignments tend to be more stable than DNS entries. If an operator is trying to correlate a historical event, the DNS name may have been changed from that used at the event. To ease this confusion, the IP address of the source of the action that caused the log event should be retained in the log entry. Supported Practices * Include the source IP address in all log messages. * Although a corresponding DNS name is useful, DNS lookups can be slow and consume resources. Current Implementations Most devices include the source IP in event logs Considerations A failed network login should generate a record with the source address of the login attempt, but the Source addresses may be spoofed. Network-based attacks often use spoofed source addresses so they should not be completely trusted unless verified by other means. Having accurate timestamps in the logs increases the chances that the use of an address can be correlated to an individual. 2.14. Logs Contain Records Of Critical Security Events Capability The device is capable of generating a log event for at least the following events: * authentication successes * authentication failures * session Termination * authorization changes * configuration changes * device status changes Discussion The main function of any of these log messages is to see what the device is doing, as well as to try and ascertain what certain malicious attackers are trying to do. Typically the data logged will contain the source and destination IP addresses and layer 4 port numbers as well as a timestamp. Supported Practices * Examples of events recorded include: user logins, bad login attempts, logouts, user privilege level changes, configuration commands issued by privileged users, and system startup/ shutdown events. Current Implementations Most devices crudely support this capability. Considerations This list is far from complete. Note that there may be privacy or legal considerations when logging/monitoring user activity or personal information. This is an important capability because it supports individual accountability and auditing as well as forensics. See section 188.8.131.52 of The Site Security Handbook.. 2.15. Logs Contain Records of General Security Events Capability The device is capable of generating a log record for all other critical security related events including filtering (or ACL) exceptions, routing protocol state changes, all device access (regardless of authentication success or failure), all commands issued to a device, and all routing events (boot-up/flaps). Discussion The main function of any of these log messages is to see what the device is doing as well as to try and ascertain what certain malicious attackers are trying to do. Typically the data logged will contain the source and destination IP addresses and layer 4 port numbers as well as a timestamp. Supported Practices * Examples of events recorded include: ACL matches, filtering exceptions, and individual configuration commands issued by users. Current Implementations Most devices crudely support this capability. Considerations This list is far from complete. Note that there may be privacy or legal considerations when logging/monitoring user activity or personal information. This is an important capability because it supports individual accountability and auditing as well as forensics. See section 184.108.40.206 of the Site Security Handbook [RFC2196]. 2.16. Logs Do Not Contain Passwords Capability The device is capable of excluding passwords, by default configuration, from all audit records, including records of successful or failed authentication attempts. Discussion A user may make small mistakes in entering a password such as using incorrect capitalization ("my password" vs. "My Password"). Event logs are traditionally dispersed widely so unexpected events will be noticed. Unauthorized access to event logs that contain these mistakes may compromise more than just the network devices as most users do not have independent passwords for every system. Supported Practices * Login failure log messages include the failed username, timestamp, and source IP address, but not the password used. Current Implementations Access control and authorization requirements differ for accounting records (logs) and authorization databases (passwords). Logging passwords may grant unauthorized access to individuals with access to the logs. Logging failed passwords may also give hints about actual passwords. See section 220.127.116.11 of Site Security Handbook [RFC2196]. Considerations There may be situations where it is appropriate/required to log passwords, such as when performing real-time attack analysis. Caution is advised in these rare circumstances. Even with that caution, there's a remaining risk with logging user names, since many users accidentally type in their password for the username. One way to mitigate this risk is to log only usernames that actually do exist but this adds considerate complexity to a logging system and might allow a different attack vector. 2.17. Devices Should Log Every Message Capability Devices should be capable of being configured to either log every event or to drop events due to congestion. Discussion Many devices implement logging as an afterthought with the device dropping log messages or failing to log critical events when the device is "busy". This behaviour makes forensic analysis difficult, if not impossible. Devices should be configurable to not drop log events at those operator-defined times when this behaviour is expected. Supported Practices * Use multiple logging devices and collectors to capture enough extra messages to be able to recreate a full log. Current Implementations Use multiple logging devices. Considerations Improper configuration or implementation of this capability may open a device, network, or logging infrastructure to a self- inflicted denial of service attack.attack.. 2.18. Syslog-specific Capabilties The predominant logging mechanism within network infrastructures is BSD-syslog and its variants. With such widespread use, this section identifies capabilities specific to syslog. 2.18.1. Configurable Facility Values Capability The device is capable of allowing for the selection of the syslog facility number via configuration. Discussion A network operator may have many similar devices in their network. The ability to segregate different severity events by the strategic use of the syslog facility number is extremely useful. Supported Practices * Authentication log entries are marked at a different facility code to allow for easier segregation at the event collector. Current Implementations Some devices support this capability via a configuration variable. Considerations None. 2.18.2. Configurable Destination UDP Port Capability Devices are capable of allowing for the configuration of the destination syslog EDP port number. Discussion In large logging environments, spreading the load amongst multiple receiving daemons is a useful optimization. This capability also allows operators to differentiate between different device functions very easily, for example all backbone router log to port 512 and all access router log to port 513. Supported Practices * Send all backbone routers log to port 512 and all access router log to port 513. Current Implementations Some devices support this capability via a configuration variable. Considerations None. 2.19. SNMP-specific capabilities Another common logging mechanism uses the notification messages of the Simple Network Management Protocol [RFC3411]. 2.19.1. Read-only Operations Supported Capability The device is capable of disabling SNMP write operations to the device. Discussion Since SNMP is used as a management protocol in addition to its logging functionality, the ability to disable operations that would change the device operations should be supported for those devices which aren't using the management functions. Supported Practices * Disable SNMP write operations. Current Implementations Some devices support this capability via a configuration variable. Considerations None. 2.19.2. Restrict Returning Data to specific Hosts Capability The device is capable of restricting the IP addresses that can query the SNMP interface for event data. Discussion Since event data can educate an adversary, devices should be able to only send event data ("responses") to certain, configured IP addresses, not any system that interrogates them. See [RFC3413]. Supported Practices * Configure devices to only accept SNMP requests from authorized addresses. Current Implementations Some devices support this capability via a configuration variable. Considerations None. 2.19.3. Only Return Specific Data to Requestor Capability The device is capable of delivering specific managed object data (e.g., values linked to a specific OID) instead of returning all event data for the device (e.g., an entire OID subtree). Discussion Since event data can educate an adversary, devices should be able to only send specific event data instead of returning all the data in every query. See [RFC3415]. Supported Practices * Queries request specific OID values instead of dumping the entire MIB. This practice reduces event data volume in addition to attaining security. Current Implementations Most devices support this capability. Considerations None. 3. Additional Operational Practices This section describes practices not covered in [CURPRAC].[RFC4778]. They are included here to provide justification for capabilities that reference them. This section will be populated from comments received on this internet-draft. 4. Security Considerations Security capabilities of network devices is the subject matter of this entire memo. The capabilities listed cite practices in [CURPRAC][RFC4778] that they are intended to support. [CURPRAC][RFC4778] also defines the general threat model, practices, and lists justifications for each practice. 5. IANA Considerations There are no IANA actions required by this document. 6. Acknowledgments 7. Normative References [CURPRAC] Kaeo, M., "Operational Security Current Practices", May 2006.[RFC1492] Finseth, C., "An Access Control Protocol, Sometimes Called TACACS", RFC 1492, July 1993. [RFC2196] Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", RFC 2196, September 1997. [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000. [RFC3164] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", RFC 3164, August 2001. [RFC3195] New, D. and M. Rose, "Reliable Delivery for syslog", RFC 3195, November 2001. [RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411, December 2002. [RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62, RFC 3413, December 2002. [RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002. [RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December 2002. [RFC3871] Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure", RFC 3871, September 2004. [RFC4778] Kaeo, M., "Operational Security Current Practices In Internet Service Provider Environments", January 2007. [SP800-92] Souppaya, M. and K. Kent, "Guide to Security Log Management", FIPS 800-92, April 2006. Authors' Addresses Patrick Cain The Cooper-Cain Group, Inc. P.O. Box 400992 Cambridge, MA 02140 U.S.A. Phone: +1 617-848-1950 Email: email@example.com George Jones The MITRE Corporation 7515 Colshire Drive, M/S WEST McLean, Virginia 22102-7508 USA Phone: +1 703 488 9740Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. 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