draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-04.txt   draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-05.txt 
opsec F. Gont opsec F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Best Current Practice W. Liu Intended status: Best Current Practice W. Liu
Expires: January 2, 2015 Huawei Technologies Expires: July 23, 2015 Huawei Technologies
G. Van de Velde G. Van de Velde
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
July 1, 2014 January 19, 2015
DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-04 draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-05
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to
a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers. The aforementioned a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers. It is based on
mechanism is based on DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device at which the packets
at which the packets are received. The aforementioned mechanism has are received. A similar mechanism has been widely deployed in IPv4
been widely deployed in IPv4 networks ('DHCP snooping'), and hence it networks ('DHCP snooping'), and hence it is desirable that similar
is desirable that similar functionality be provided for IPv6 functionality be provided for IPv6 networks. This document specifies
networks. a Best Current Practice for the implementation of DHCPv6 Shield.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 23, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. DHCPv6-Shield Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. DHCPv6-Shield Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to This document specifies DHCPv6-Shield: a mechanism for protecting
a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers [RFC3315]. This hosts connected to a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers
mechanism is analogous to the RA-Guard mechanism [RFC6104] [RFC6105] [RFC3315]. The basic concept behind DHCPv6-Shield is that a layer-2
[RFC7113] intended for protection against rogue Router Advertisement device filters DHCPv6 messages meant to DHCPv6 clients (henceforth
[RFC4861] messages.
The basic concept behind DHCPv6-Shield is that a layer-2 device
filters DHCPv6 messages meant to DHCPv6 clients (henceforth
"DHCPv6-server messages"), according to a number of different "DHCPv6-server messages"), according to a number of different
criteria. The most basic filtering criterion is that DHCPv6-server criteria. The most basic filtering criterion is that DHCPv6-server
messages are discarded by the layer-2 device unless they are received messages are discarded by the layer-2 device unless they are received
on a specific ports of the layer-2 device. on a specific ports of the layer-2 device.
Before the DCHPv6-Shield device is deployed, the administrator Before the DCHPv6-Shield device is deployed, the administrator
specifies the layer-2 port(s) on which DHCPv6-server messages are to specifies the layer-2 port(s) on which DHCPv6-server messages are to
be allowed. Only those ports to which a DHCPv6 server or relay is to be allowed. Only those ports to which a DHCPv6 server or relay is to
be connected should be specified as such. Once deployed, the be connected should be specified as such. Once deployed, the
DHCPv6-Shield device inspects received packets, and allows (i.e. DHCPv6-Shield device inspects received packets, and allows (i.e.
passes) DHCPv6-server messages only if they are received on layer-2 passes) DHCPv6-server messages only if they are received on layer-2
ports that have been explicitly configured for such purpose. ports that have been explicitly configured for such purpose.
DHCPv6-Shield is analogous to the RA-Guard mechanism [RFC6104]
[RFC6105] [RFC7113], intended for protection against rogue Router
Advertisement [RFC4861] messages.
We note that DHCPv6-Shield only mitigates only DHCPv6-based attacks
against hosts. Attack vectors based on other messages meant for
network configuration (such as ICMPv6 Router Advertisements) are not
addressed by DHCPv6-Shield itself. In a similar vein,
DHCPv6-Shielddoes not mitigate attacks against DHCPv6 servers (e.g.,
Denial of Service).
2. Requirements Language 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
DHCPv6 Shield device: DHCPv6-Shield:
the set of filtering rules specified in this document, meant to
mitigate attacks that employ DHCPv6-server packets.
DHCPv6-Shield device:
A layer-2 device (typically a layer-2 switch) that enforces the A layer-2 device (typically a layer-2 switch) that enforces the
filtering policy specified in this document. filtering policy specified in this document.
For the purposes of this document, the terms Extension Header, Header For the purposes of this document, the terms Extension Header, Header
Chain, First Fragment, and Upper-layer Header are used as follows Chain, First Fragment, and Upper-layer Header are used as specified
[RFC7112]: in [RFC7112]:
Extension Header: IPv6 Extension Header:
Extension Headers are defined in Section 4 of [RFC2460]. As a Extension Headers are defined in Section 4 of [RFC2460]. As a
result of [RFC7045], [IANA-PROTO] provides a list of assigned result of [RFC7045], [IANA-PROTO] provides a list of assigned
Internet Protocol Numbers and designates which of those protocol Internet Protocol Numbers and designates which of those protocol
numbers also represent extension headers. numbers also represent extension headers.
First Fragment: First Fragment:
An IPv6 fragment with fragment offset equal to 0. An IPv6 fragment with fragment offset equal to 0.
skipping to change at page 4, line 23 skipping to change at page 4, line 31
chain. In a simple example, if the upper-layer header is a TCP chain. In a simple example, if the upper-layer header is a TCP
header, the TCP payload is not part of the header chain. In a header, the TCP payload is not part of the header chain. In a
more complex example, if the upper-layer header is an ESP header, more complex example, if the upper-layer header is an ESP header,
neither the payload data, nor any of the fields that follow the neither the payload data, nor any of the fields that follow the
payload data in the ESP header are part of the header chain. payload data in the ESP header are part of the header chain.
4. DHCPv6-Shield Configuration 4. DHCPv6-Shield Configuration
Before being deployed for production, the DHCPv6-Shield device MUST Before being deployed for production, the DHCPv6-Shield device MUST
be explicitly configured with respect to which layer-2 ports are be explicitly configured with respect to which layer-2 ports are
allowed to send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients (i.e. DHCPv6-server allowed to receive DHCPv6 packets destined to DHCPv6 clients (i.e.
messages). Only those layer-2 ports explicitly configured for such DHCPv6-server messages). Only those layer-2 ports explicitly
purpose will be allowed to send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients. configured for such purpose will be allowed to receive DHCPv6 packets
to DHCPv6 clients.
5. DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice 5. DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice
The following filtering rules MUST be enforced as part of a The following filtering rules MUST be enforced as part of a
DHCPv6-Shield implementation on those ports that are not allowed to DHCPv6-Shield implementation on those ports that are not allowed to
send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients: receive DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients:
1. DHCPv6-Shield MUST parse the IPv6 entire header chain present in 1. DHCPv6-Shield MUST parse the entire IPv6 header chain present in
the packet, to identify whether it is a DHCPv6 packet meant for a the packet, to identify whether it is a DHCPv6 packet meant for a
DHCPv6 client (i.e., a DHCPv6-server message). DHCPv6 client (i.e., a DHCPv6-server message).
RATIONALE: DHCPv6-Shield implementations MUST NOT enforce a RATIONALE: DHCPv6-Shield implementations MUST NOT enforce a
limit on the number of bytes they can inspect (starting from limit on the number of bytes they can inspect (starting from
the beginning of the IPv6 packet), since this could introduce the beginning of the IPv6 packet), since this could introduce
false-positives: legitimate packets could be dropped simply false-negatives: DHCP6-server packets received on ports not
allowed to receive such packets could be allowed simply
because the DHCPv6-Shield device does not parse the entire because the DHCPv6-Shield device does not parse the entire
IPv6 header chain present in the packet. An implementation IPv6 header chain present in the packet.
that has such an implementation-specific limit MUST NOT claim
compliance with this specification.
2. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is a first- 2. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is a first-
fragment (i.e., a packet containing a Fragment Header with the fragment (i.e., a packet containing a Fragment Header with the
Fragment Offset set to 0) and it fails to contain the entire IPv6 Fragment Offset set to 0) and it fails to contain the entire IPv6
header chain (i.e., all the headers starting from the IPv6 header header chain (i.e., all the headers starting from the IPv6 header
up to, and including, the upper-layer header), DHCPv6-Shield MUST up to, and including, the upper-layer header), DHCPv6-Shield MUST
drop the packet, and SHOULD log the packet drop event in an drop the packet, and SHOULD log the packet drop event in an
implementation-specific manner as a security fault. implementation-specific manner as a security fault.
RATIONALE: [RFC7112] specifies that the first-fragment (i.e., RATIONALE: Packets that fail to contain the IPv6 header chain
the fragment with the Fragment Offset set to 0) MUST contain could otherwise be leveraged for circumventing DHCPv6-Shield.
the entire IPv6 header chain, and allows intermediate systems [RFC7112] specifies that the first-fragment (i.e., the
such as routers to drop those packets that fail to comply with fragment with the Fragment Offset set to 0) MUST contain the
this requirement. entire IPv6 header chain, and allows intermediate systems such
as routers to drop those packets that fail to comply with this
requirement.
NOTE: This rule should only be applied to IPv6 fragments with NOTE: This rule should only be applied to IPv6 fragments with
a Fragment Offset of 0 (non-first fragments can be safely a Fragment Offset of 0 (non-first fragments can be safely
passed, since they will never reassemble into a complete passed, since they will never reassemble into a complete
datagram if they are part of a DHCPv6 packet meant for a datagram if they are part of a DHCPv6 packet meant for a
DHCPv6 client received on a port where such packets are not DHCPv6 client received on a port where such packets are not
allowed). allowed).
3. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is identified 3. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is identified
to be a DHCPv6 packet meant for a DHCPv6 client or the packet to be a DHCPv6 packet meant for a DHCPv6 client or the packet
contains an unrecognized Next Header value, DHCPv6-Shield MUST contains an unrecognized Next Header value, DHCPv6-Shield MUST
drop the packet, and SHOULD log the packet drop event in an drop the packet, and SHOULD log the packet drop event in an
implementation-specific manner as a security alert. implementation-specific manner as a security alert.
DHCPv6-Shield MUST provide a configuration knob that controls DHCPv6-Shield MUST provide a configuration knob that controls
whether packets with unrecognized Next Header values are dropped; whether packets with unrecognized Next Header values are dropped;
this configuration knob MUST default to "drop". this configuration knob MUST default to "drop".
RATIONALE: [RFC7045] requires that nodes be configurable with RATIONALE: An unrecognized Next Header value could possibly
respect to whether packets with unrecognized headers are identify an IPv6 Extension Header, and thus be leveraged to
forwarded, and allows the default behavior to be that such conceal a DHCPv6-server packet (since there is no way for
packets be dropped. DHCPv6-Shield to parse past unrecognized Next Header values
[I-D.gont-6man-rfc6564bis]). [RFC7045] requires that nodes be
configurable with respect to whether packets with unrecognized
headers are forwarded, and allows the default behavior to be
that such packets be dropped.
4. In all other cases, DHCPv6-Shield MUST pass the packet as usual. 4. In all other cases, DHCPv6-Shield MUST pass the packet as usual.
NOTE: For the purpose of enforcing the DHCPv6-Shield filtering NOTE: For the purpose of enforcing the DHCPv6-Shield filtering
policy, an ESP header [RFC4303] should be considered to be an policy, an ESP header [RFC4303] should be considered to be an
"upper-layer protocol" (that is, it should be considered the last "upper-layer protocol" (that is, it should be considered the last
header in the IPv6 header chain). This means that packets header in the IPv6 header chain). This means that packets
employing ESP would be passed by the DHCPv6-Shield device to the employing ESP would be passed by the DHCPv6-Shield device to the
intended destination. If the destination host does not have a intended destination. If the destination host does not have a
security association with the sender of the aforementioned IPv6 security association with the sender of the aforementioned IPv6
packet, the packet would be dropped. Otherwise, if the packet is packet, the packet would be dropped. Otherwise, if the packet is
considered valid by the IPsec implementation at the receiving host considered valid by the IPsec implementation at the receiving host
and encapsulates a DHCPv6 message, it is up to the receiving host and encapsulates a DHCPv6 message, it is up to the receiving host
what to do with such packet. what to do with such packet.
If a packet is dropped due to this filtering policy, then the packet The above rules require that if a packet is dropped due to this
drop event SHOULD be logged in an implementation-specific manner as a filtering policy, the packet drop event be logged in an
security fault. The logging mechanism SHOULD include a drop counter implementation-specific manner as a security fault. The logging
dedicated to DHCPv6-Shield packet drops. mechanism SHOULD include a per -port drop counter dedicated to
DHCPv6-Shield packet drops.
In order to protect current end-node IPv6 implementations, Rule #2 In order to protect current end-node IPv6 implementations, Rule #2
has been defined as a default rule to drop packets that cannot be has been defined as a default rule to drop packets that cannot be
positively identified as not being DHCPv6-server packets (because the positively identified as not being DHCPv6-server packets (because the
packet is a fragment that fails to include the entire IPv6 header packet is a fragment that fails to include the entire IPv6 header
chain). This means that, at least in theory, DHCPv6-Shield could chain). This means that, at least in theory, DHCPv6-Shield could
result in false-positive blocking of some legitimate (non result in false-positive blocking of some legitimate (non
DHCPv6-server) packets. However, as noted in [RFC7112], IPv6 packets DHCPv6-server) packets. However, as noted in [RFC7112], IPv6 packets
that fail to include the entire IPv6 header chain are virtually that fail to include the entire IPv6 header chain are virtually
impossible to police with state-less filters and firewalls, and hence impossible to police with state-less filters and firewalls, and hence
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This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The mechanism specified in this document can be used to mitigate The mechanism specified in this document can be used to mitigate
DHCPv6-based attacks against hosts. Attack vectors based on other DHCPv6-based attacks against hosts. Attack vectors based on other
messages meant for network configuration (such as ICMPv6 Router messages meant for network configuration (such as ICMPv6 Router
Advertisements) are out of the scope of this document. Additionally, Advertisements) are out of the scope of this document. Additionally,
the mechanism specified in this document does not mitigate attacks the mechanism specified in this document does not mitigate attacks
against DHCPv6 servers (e.g., DoS). against DHCPv6 servers (e.g., Denial of Service).
If deployed in layer-2 domain with several cascading switches, there If deployed in layer-2 domain with several cascading switches, there
will be an ingress port on the host's local switch which will need to will be an ingress port on the host's local switch which will need to
be enabled for receiving DHCPv6-server messages. However, this local be enabled for receiving DHCPv6-server messages. However, this local
switch will be reliant on the upstream devices to have filtered out switch will be reliant on the upstream devices to have filtered out
rogue DHCPv6-server messages, as the local switch has no way of rogue DHCPv6-server messages, as the local switch has no way of
determining which upstream DHCP-server messages are valid. determining which upstream DHCP-server messages are valid.
Therefore, in order to be effective DHCPv6 Shield should be deployed Therefore, in order to be effective DHCPv6 Shield should be deployed
and enabled on all layer-2 switches of a given layer-2 domain. and enabled on all layer-2 switches of a given layer-2 domain.
As noted in Section 5, IPv6 implementations that allow overlapping As noted in Section 5, IPv6 implementations that allow overlapping
fragments (i.e. that do not comply with [RFC5722]) might still be fragments (i.e. that do not comply with [RFC5722]) might still be
subject of DHCPv6-based attacks. However, most current subject of DHCPv6-based attacks. However, most current
implementations seem to comply with [RFC5722], and hence forbid IPv6 implementations seem to comply with [RFC5722], and hence forbid IPv6
overlapping fragments. overlapping fragments.
We note that if an attacker sends a fragmented DHCPv6 packet on a We note that if an attacker sends a fragmented DHCPv6 packet on a
port not allowed to send such packets, the first-fragment would be port not allowed to receive such packets, the first-fragment would be
dropped, and the rest of the fragments would be passed. This means dropped, and the rest of the fragments would be passed. This means
that the victim node would tie memory buffers for the aforementioned that the victim node would tie memory buffers for the aforementioned
fragments, which would never reassemble into a complete datagram. If fragments, which would never reassemble into a complete datagram. If
a large number of such packets were sent by an attacker, and the a large number of such packets were sent by an attacker, and the
victim node failed to implement proper resource management for the victim node failed to implement proper resource management for the
fragment reassembly buffer, this could lead to a Denial of Service fragment reassembly buffer, this could lead to a Denial of Service
(DoS). However, this does not really introduce a new attack vector, (DoS). However, this does not really introduce a new attack vector,
since an attacker could always perform the same attack by sending since an attacker could always perform the same attack by sending
forged fragmented datagram in which at least one of the fragments is forged fragmented datagram in which at least one of the fragments is
missing. [CPNI-IPv6] discusses some resource management strategies missing. [CPNI-IPv6] discusses some resource management strategies
that could be implemented for the fragment reassembly buffer. that could be implemented for the fragment reassembly buffer.
Finally, we note that the security of a site employing DHCPv6 Shield Additionally, we note that the security of a site employing DHCPv6
could be further improved by deploying [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp], to Shield could be further improved by deploying [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp],
mitigate IPv6 address. spoofing attacks. to mitigate IPv6 address spoofing attacks.
Finally, we note that other mechanisms for mitigating attacks based
on DHCPv6-server messages are available that have different
deployment considerations. For example, [I-D.ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6]
allows for authentication of DHCPv6-server packets if the IPv6
addresses of the DHCPv6 servers can be pre-configured at the client
nodes.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Jean-Michel The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Ben Campbell,
Combes, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Crsten Schmoll, Robert Sleigh, Mark Jean-Michel Combes, Sheng Jiang, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Carsten
Smith, and Eric Vyncke, for providing valuable comments on earlier Schmoll, Robert Sleigh, Donald Smith, Mark Smith, Hannes Tschofenig,
Eric Vyncke, and Qin Wu, for providing valuable comments on earlier
versions of this document. versions of this document.
Part of Section 3 of this document was borrowed from [RFC7112], Part of Section 3 of this document was borrowed from [RFC7112],
authored by Fernando Gont, Vishwas Manral, and Ron Bonica. authored by Fernando Gont, Vishwas Manral, and Ron Bonica.
This document is heavily based on the document [RFC7113] authored by This document is heavily based on the document [RFC7113] authored by
Fernando Gont. Thus, the authors would like to thank Ran Atkinson, Fernando Gont. Thus, the authors would like to thank Ran Atkinson,
Karl Auer, Robert Downie, Washam Fan, David Farmer, Mike Heard, Marc Karl Auer, Robert Downie, Washam Fan, David Farmer, Mike Heard, Marc
Heuse, Nick Hilliard, Ray Hunter, Joel Jaeggli, Simon Perreault, Heuse, Nick Hilliard, Ray Hunter, Joel Jaeggli, Simon Perreault,
Arturo Servin, Gunter van de Velde, James Woodyatt, and Bjoern A. Arturo Servin, Gunter van de Velde, James Woodyatt, and Bjoern A.
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 9, line 7
RFC 5722, December 2009. RFC 5722, December 2009.
[RFC7112] Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of [RFC7112] Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of
Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", RFC 7112, January 2014. Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", RFC 7112, January 2014.
[RFC7045] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing [RFC7045] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing
of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045, December 2013. of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045, December 2013.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6]
Jiang, S. and S. Shen, "Secure DHCPv6 Using CGAs", draft-
ietf-dhc-secure-dhcpv6-07 (work in progress), September
2012.
[I-D.gont-6man-rfc6564bis]
Gont, F., Will, W., Krishnan, S., and H. Pfeifer, "IPv6
Universal Extension Header", draft-gont-6man-rfc6564bis-00
(work in progress), April 2014.
[RFC6104] Chown, T. and S. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement [RFC6104] Chown, T. and S. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement
Problem Statement", RFC 6104, February 2011. Problem Statement", RFC 6104, February 2011.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J. [RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105, Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
February 2011. February 2011.
[RFC7113] Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router [RFC7113] Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113, February 2014. Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113, February 2014.
skipping to change at page 9, line 7 skipping to change at page 9, line 40
numbers/protocol-numbers.txt>. numbers/protocol-numbers.txt>.
[SI6-FRAG] [SI6-FRAG]
SI6 Networks, "IPv6 NIDS evasion and improvements in IPv6 SI6 Networks, "IPv6 NIDS evasion and improvements in IPv6
fragmentation/reassembly", 2012, fragmentation/reassembly", 2012,
<http://blog.si6networks.com/2012/02/ <http://blog.si6networks.com/2012/02/
ipv6-nids-evasion-and-improvements-in.html>. ipv6-nids-evasion-and-improvements-in.html>.
[I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp]
Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for
DHCP", draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-27 (work in progress), June DHCP", draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-31 (work in progress), January
2014. 2015.
[CPNI-IPv6] [CPNI-IPv6]
Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6)", UK Centre for the Protection of version 6 (IPv6)", UK Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure, (available on request). National Infrastructure, (available on request).
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Fernando Gont Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Evaristo Carriego 2644 Evaristo Carriego 2644
Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706 Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706
Argentina Argentina
Phone: +54 11 4650 8472 Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
Email: fgont@si6networks.com Email: fgont@si6networks.com
URI: http://www.si6networks.com URI: http://www.si6networks.com
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