draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-05.txt   draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-06.txt 
Network Working Group E. Lear Network Working Group E. Lear
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track R. Droms Intended status: Standards Track R. Droms
Expires: September 9, 2017 Expires: November 16, 2017
D. Romascanu D. Romascanu
March 08, 2017 May 15, 2017
Manufacturer Usage Description Specification Manufacturer Usage Description Specification
draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-05 draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-06
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies the necessary components to implement This memo specifies a component-based architecture for manufacturer
manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD). This includes two YANG usage descriptions (MUD). This includes two YANG modules, IPv4 and
modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, an LLDP TLV, a URL suffix IPv6 DHCP options, an LLDP TLV, a URL suffix specification, an X.509
specification, an X.509 certificate extension and a means to sign and certificate extension and a means to sign and verify the
verify the descriptions. descriptions.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. A Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. What MUD doesn't do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Determining Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. A Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Determining Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5. Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . . 7 1.6. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.7. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . . 8
3. Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.8. Order of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. previous-mud-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. cache-validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1. last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. masa-server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2. cache-validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. is-supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. masa-server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6. systeminfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. is-supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7. packet-direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. systeminfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.8. manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.6. extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9. same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.7. packet-direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.10. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.8. manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.11. local-networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9. same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.12. controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.10. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.13. my-controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.11. local-networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.14. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.12. controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Processing of the MUD file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.13. my-controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. What does a MUD URL look like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.14. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. The MUD YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Processing of the MUD file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . 16 5. What does a MUD URL look like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. source-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. The MUD YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. destination-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. source-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. destination-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.3. The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.3. Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 22 9.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension . . . . . . 23 9.3. Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . . . 25 10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 23
12.1. Creating a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension . . . . . . 24
12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . . . 26
13. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 12.1. Creating a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 13. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
15.1. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 14. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
15.2. PKIX Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
15.3. Well Known URI Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
15.4. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files . . . . . . . 28 16.1. YANG Module Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
15.5. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 16.2. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15.6. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs) . . . 30 16.3. PKIX Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
16. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 16.4. Well Known URI Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 16.5. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files . . . . . . . 30
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 16.6. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 16.7. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs) . . . 32
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 34 17. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix B. Default MUD elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix B. Default MUD elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Internet has largely been constructed on general purpose The Internet has largely been constructed on general purpose
computers; those devices that may be used for a purpose that is computers; those devices that may be used for a purpose that is
specified by those who buy the device. [RFC1984] presumed that an specified by those who buy the device. [RFC1984] presumed that an
end device would be most capable of protecting itself. This made end device would be most capable of protecting itself. This made
sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe, and sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe, and
it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices
today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets. today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets.
[RFC7452] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about, [RFC7452] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about,
smart objects. Let us then posit a group of objects that are smart objects. Let us then posit a group of objects that are
specifically not general purpose computers. These devices therefore specifically NOT general purpose computers. These devices therefore
have a purpose to their use. By definition, therefore, all other have a purpose to their use. By definition, therefore, all other
purposes are NOT intended. The combination of these two statements purposes are NOT intended. The combination of these two statements
can be restated as a manufacturer usage description (MUD) that can be can be restated as a manufacturer usage description (MUD) that can be
applied at various points within a network. Although this memo may applied at various points within a network. Although this memo may
seem to stress access requirements, usage intent also consists of seem to stress access requirements, usage intent also consists of
quality of service needs a device may have. quality of service needs a device may have.
We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context, to We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context, to
simply mean the entity or organization that will state how a device simply mean the entity or organization that will state how a device
is intended to be used. In the context of a lightbulb, this might is intended to be used. In the context of a lightbulb, this might
indeed be the lightbulb manufacturer. In the context of a smarter indeed be the lightbulb manufacturer. In the context of a smarter
device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be integrator of device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be integrator of
that device. The key points are that the device itself is expected that device. The key points are that the device itself is expected
to serve a limited purpose, and that there may exist an organization to serve a limited purpose, and that there may exist an organization
in the supply chain of that device that will take responsibility for in the supply chain of that device that will take responsibility for
informing the network about that purpose. informing the network about that purpose.
The converse statement holds that general computing systems will
benefit very little from MUD, as their manufacturers cannot envision
a specific communication pattern to describe.
The intent of MUD is to therefore solve for the following problems: The intent of MUD is to therefore solve for the following problems:
o Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device entering a o Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device entering a
network to those communications intended by the manufacturer. network to those communications intended by the manufacturer.
o Provide for a means to scale network policies to the ever- o Provide for a means to scale network policies to the ever-
increasing number types of devices in the network. increasing number types of devices in the network.
o Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way o Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way
that is faster than it might take to update systems. This will be that is faster than it might take to update systems. This will be
particularly true for systems that are no longer supported by particularly true for systems that are no longer supported by
their manufacturer. their manufacturer.
o Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare o Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare
minimum. minimum.
MUD therefore consists of three architectural building blocks: - A
classifier that a device emits that can be used to locate a
description; - The description itself, including how it is
interpreted, and; - A means to retrieve the description.
In this specification we specify each of these building blocks and
how they are intended to be used together. However, they may also be
used separately, independent of this specification by enterprise
networks for their own purposes.
1.1. What MUD doesn't do
General computing systems will benefit very little from MUD, as their
manufacturers cannot envision a specific communication pattern to
describe. In addition, even those devices that have a single or
small number of uses might have very broad communication patterns.
MUD is not for them either.
No matter how good a MUD-enabled network is, it will never replace No matter how good a MUD-enabled network is, it will never replace
the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities. It may, the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities. It may,
however, provide network administrators with some additional however, provide network administrators with some additional
protection when those vulnerabilities exist. protection when those vulnerabilities exist.
1.1. A Simple Example 1.2. A Simple Example
A light bulb is intended to light a room. It may be remotely A light bulb is intended to light a room. It may be remotely
controlled through the network; and it may make use of a rendezvous controlled through the network; and it may make use of a rendezvous
service of some form that an app on smart phone accesses. What we service of some form that an app on smart phone accesses. What we
can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other network access can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other network access
is unwanted. It will not contact a news service, nor speak to the is unwanted. It will not contact a news service, nor speak to the
refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other devices. It refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other devices. It
has no Facebook friends. Therefore, an access list applied to it has no Facebook friends. Therefore, an access list applied to it
that states that it will only connect to the single rendezvous that states that it will only connect to the single rendezvous
service will not impede the light bulb in performing its function, service will not impede the light bulb in performing its function,
while at the same time allowing the network to provide both it and while at the same time allowing the network to provide both it and
other devices an additional layer of protection. other devices an additional layer of protection.
1.2. Determining Intended Use 1.3. Determining Intended Use
The notion of intended use is in itself not new. Network The notion of intended use is in itself not new. Network
administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such
use. This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and use. This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and
Zwicky in [FW95]. Programmatically profiling systems have existed Zwicky in [FW95]. Programmatically profiling systems have existed
for years as well. These systems make use of heuristics that take at for years as well. These systems make use of heuristics that take at
least some time to assert what a system is. least some time to assert what a system is.
A system could just as easily tell the network what sort of A system could just as easily tell the network what sort of
protection it requires without going into what sort of system it is. protection it requires without going into what sort of system it is.
This would, in effect, be the converse of [RFC7488]. In seeking a This would, in effect, be the converse of [RFC7488]. In seeking a
general purpose solution, however, we assume that a device has so few general purpose solution, however, we assume that a device has so few
capabilities that it will implement the least necessary capabilities capabilities that it will implement the least necessary capabilities
to function properly. This is a basic economic constraint. Unless to function properly. This is a basic economic constraint. Unless
the network would refuse access to such a device, its developers the network would refuse access to such a device, its developers
would have no reason to implement such an approach. To date, such an would have no reason to implement such an approach. To date, such an
assertion has held true. assertion has held true.
1.3. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL 1.4. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL
Our work begins, therefore, with the device emitting a Universal Our work begins, therefore, with the device emitting a Universal
Resource Locator (URL) [RFC3986]. This URL may serves both to Resource Locator (URL) [RFC3986]. This URL may serves both to
classify the device type and to provide a means to locate a policy classify the device type and to provide a means to locate a policy
file. file.
In this memo three means are defined to emit the MUD URL. One is a In this memo three means are defined to emit the MUD URL. One is a
DHCP option[RFC2131],[RFC3315] that the DHCP client uses to inform DHCP option[RFC2131],[RFC3315] that the DHCP client uses to inform
the DHCP server. The DHCP server may take further actions, such as the DHCP server. The DHCP server may take further actions, such as
retrieve the URL or otherwise pass it along to network management retrieve the URL or otherwise pass it along to network management
system or controller. The other method defined is an X.509 system or controller. The other method defined is an X.509
constraint. The IEEE has developed [IEEE8021AR] that provides a constraint. The IEEE has developed [IEEE8021AR] that provides a
certificate-based approach to communicate device characteristics, certificate-based approach to communicate device characteristics,
which itself relies on [RFC5280]. The MUD URL extension is non- which itself relies on [RFC5280]. The MUD URL extension is non-
critical, as required by IEEE 802.1AR. Various means may be used to critical, as required by IEEE 802.1AR. Various means may be used to
communicate that certificate, including Tunnel Extensible communicate that certificate, including Tunnel Extensible
Authentication Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170]. Finally, an LLDP frame is Authentication Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170]. Finally, a Link Layer
defined. Discovery Protocol (LLDP) frame is defined [IEEE8021AB].
1.4. Types of Policies It is possible that there may be other means for a MUD URL to be
learned by a network. For instance, if a device has a serial number,
it may be possible for the MUD controller to perform a lookup of the
device, if it has some knowledge as to who the device manufacturer
is, and what its MUD file server is. Such mechanisms are not
described in this memo, but are possible.
1.5. Types of Policies
When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD controller retrieves a file When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD controller retrieves a file
that describes what sort of communications a device is designed to that describes what sort of communications a device is designed to
have. The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud have. The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud
based services or certain classes for access within an operational based services or certain classes for access within an operational
network. An example of a class might be "devices of a specified network. An example of a class might be "devices of a specified
manufacturer type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated manufacturer type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated
simply by the authority of the MUD URL. Another example might to simply by the authority component (e.g, the domain name) of the MUD
allow or disallow local access. Just like other policies, these may URL. Another example might to allow or disallow local access. Just
be combined. For example: like other policies, these may be combined. For example:
Allow access to host controller.example.com with QoS AF11
Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer
Allow access to and from controllers who need to speak COAP Allow access to and from controllers who need to speak COAP
Allow access to local DNS/DHCP Allow access to local DNS/DHCP
Deny all other access Deny all other access
To add a bit more depth that should not be a stretch of anyone's To add a bit more depth that should not be a stretch of anyone's
imagination, one could also make use of port-based access lists. imagination, one could also make use of port-based access lists.
Thus a printer might have a description that states: Thus a printer might have a description that states:
Allow access for port IPP or port LPD Allow access for port IPP or port LPD
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that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
processing. Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the processing. Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the
device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be
configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge. configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge.
That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer
specifies. The abstractions are as follows: specifies. The abstractions are as follows:
Manufacturer: A device made by a particular manufacturer, as Manufacturer: A device made by a particular manufacturer, as
identified by the authority component of its MUD-URL identified by the authority component of its MUD-URL
my-manufacturer: Devices that have the same authority section of same-manufacturer: Devices that have the same authority component of
their MUD-URL. their MUD-URL.
Controller: A device that the local network administrator admits to Controller: A device that the local network administrator admits to
the particular class. the particular class.
my-controller: A class associated with the MUD-URL of a device that my-controller: A class associated with the MUD-URL of a device that
the administrator admits. the administrator admits.
The "manufacturer" classes can be easily specified by the The "manufacturer" classes can be easily specified by the
manufacturer, whereas controller classes are initially envisioned to manufacturer, whereas controller classes are initially envisioned to
be specified by the administrator. be specified by the administrator.
Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
relatively ubiquitous, and therefore, mature. Therefore, only a a relatively ubiquitous, and therefore, mature. Therefore, only a a
limited subset YANG-based configuration of is permitted in a MUD limited subset YANG-based configuration of is permitted in a MUD
file. file.
1.5. Terminology 1.6. Terminology
MUD: manufacturer usage description. MUD: manufacturer usage description.
MUD file: a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a MUD file: a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a
recommended behavior. recommended behavior.
MUD file server: a web server that hosts a MUD file. MUD file server: a web server that hosts a MUD file.
MUD controller: the system that requests and receives the MUD file MUD controller: the system that requests and receives the MUD file
from the MUD server. After it has processed a MUD file it may from the MUD server. After it has processed a MUD file it may
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Manufacturer: the entity that configures the Thing to emit the MUD Manufacturer: the entity that configures the Thing to emit the MUD
URL and the one who asserts a recommendation in a MUD file. The URL and the one who asserts a recommendation in a MUD file. The
manufacturer might not always be the entity that constructs a manufacturer might not always be the entity that constructs a
device. It could, for instance, be a systems integrator, or even device. It could, for instance, be a systems integrator, or even
a component provider. a component provider.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.6. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture 1.7. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture
With these components laid out we now have the basis for an With these components laid out we now have the basis for an
archicture. This leads us to ASCII art. archicture. This leads us to ASCII art.
......................................... .........................................
. ____________ . _____________ . ____________ . _____________
. | | . | | . | | . | |
. | MUD |----->get URL->| MUD | . | MUD |----->get URL->| MUD |
. | Controller | .(https) | File Server | . | Controller | .(https) | File Server |
. End system network |____________|<--MUD file<--<|_____________| . End system network |____________|<--MUD file<--<|_____________|
skipping to change at page 8, line 27 skipping to change at page 8, line 42
. |_________| . . |_________| .
......................................... .........................................
Figure 1: MUD Architecture Figure 1: MUD Architecture
In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and
forwards them to the network management system for processing. This forwards them to the network management system for processing. This
happens in different ways, depending on how the URI is communicated. happens in different ways, depending on how the URI is communicated.
For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server might receive the For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server might receive the
URI and then process it. In the case of IEEE 802.1X, the switch URI and then process it. In the case of IEEE 802.1X, the switch
would tunnel the URI via a certificate to the authentication server, would carry the URI via a certificate to the authentication server
who would then process it. One method to do this is TEAP, described via EAP over Radius[RFC3748], which would then process it. One
in [RFC7170]. The certificate extension is described below. method to do this is TEAP, described in [RFC7170]. The certificate
extension is described below.
The information returned by the web site is valid for the duration of The information returned by the web site is valid for the duration of
the device's connection, or as specified in the description. Thus if the device's connection, or as specified in the description. Thus if
the device is mobile, when it moves on, any configuration in the the device is mobile, when it moves on, any configuration in the
switch is removed. Similarly, from time to time the description may switch is removed. Similarly, from time to time the description may
be refreshed, based on new capabilities or communication patterns or be refreshed, based on new capabilities or communication patterns or
vulnerabilities. vulnerabilities.
The web site is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer. The web site is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer.
Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL. For Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL. For
legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to
determine the appropriate URI, it may proxy it, the trivial cases determine the appropriate URI, it may proxy it, the trivial cases
being a map between some registered device or port and a URL. being a map between some registered device or port and a URL.
1.8. Order of operations
As mentioned above, MUD contains architectural building blocks, and
so order of operation may vary. However, here is one clear intended
example:
1. Device emits URL.
2. That URL is forwarded to a MUD controller by the nearest switch
(how this happens depends on the way in which the MUD URL is
emitted).
3. The MUD controller retrieves the MUD file from the MUD file
server, assuming it doesn't already have a copy. It may test the
URL against a reputation service, and it may test any hosts
within the file against reputation services, as it deems fit.
4. The MUD controller may query the administrator for permission to
add the device and associated policy. If the device is known or
the device type is known, it may skip this step.
5. The MUD controller instantiates local configuration based on the
abstractions defined in this document.
6. The MUD controller configures the switch nearest the device.
Other systems may be configured as well.
7. When the device disconnects, policy is removed.
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning 2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning
A MUD file consists of JSON based on a YANG model. For purposes of A MUD file consists of JSON based on a YANG model. For purposes of
MUD, the elements that can be modified are access lists as augmented MUD, the elements that can be modified are access lists as augmented
by this model. The MUD file is limited to the serialization of a by this model. The MUD file is limited to the serialization of a
small number of YANG schema, including the models specified in the small number of YANG schema, including the models specified in the
following documents: following documents:
o [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] o [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
o [RFC6991]
o [RFC6991]
Publishers of MUD files MUST NOT include other elements except as Publishers of MUD files MUST NOT include other elements except as
described in Section 13, and MUST only contain information relevant described in Section 3.6, and MUST only contain information relevant
to the device being described. Devices parsing MUD files MUST cease to the device being described. Devices parsing MUD files MUST cease
processing if they find other elements. processing if they find other elements.
This module is structured into three parts. The first container This module is structured into three parts. The first container
holds information that is relevant to retrieval and validity of the holds information that is relevant to retrieval and validity of the
MUD file itself. The second container augments the access list to MUD file itself. The second container augments the access list to
indicate direction the ACL is to be applied. The final container indicate direction the ACL is to be applied. The final container
augments the matching container of the ACL model to add several augments the matching container of the ACL model to add several
elements that are relevant to the MUD URL, or other otherwise elements that are relevant to the MUD URL, or other otherwise
abstracted for use within a local environment. abstracted for use within a local environment.
module: ietf-mud Simplified graphical representation of the data models are used in
+--rw meta-info this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is
+--rw last-update? yang:date-and-time defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis].
+--rw previous-mud-file? yang:uri
+--rw cache-validity? uint32 +--rw metainfo
+--rw masa-server? inet:uri +--rw last-update? yang:date-and-time
+--rw is-supported? boolean +--rw cache-validity? uint8
+--rw masa-server? inet:uri
+--rw is-supported? boolean
+--rw systeminfo? inet:uri
+--rw extensions* string
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl: augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl:
+--rw packet-direction? direction +--rw packet-direction? direction
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:access-list-entries/
/acl:access-list-entries/acl:ace/acl:matches: acl:ace/acl:matches:
+--rw manufacturer? inet:host +--rw manufacturer? inet:host
+--rw same-manufacturer? empty +--rw same-manufacturer? empty
+--rw model? string +--rw model? string
+--rw local-networks? empty +--rw local-networks? empty
+--rw controller? inet:uri +--rw controller? inet:uri
+--rw my-controller? empty +--rw my-controller? empty
+--rw direction-initiated? direction +--rw direction-initiated? direction
3. Element Definitions 3. Element Definitions
The following elements are defined. The following elements are defined.
3.1. last-update 3.1. last-update
This is a date-and-time value of the last time the MUD file was This is a date-and-time value of when the MUD file was generated.
updated. This is akin to a version number. Its form is taken from This is akin to a version number. Its form is taken from [RFC6991]
[RFC6991] which, for those keeping score, turn was taken from which, for those keeping score, turn was taken from Section 5.6 of
Section 5.6 of [RFC3339], which was taken from [ISO.8601.1988]. [RFC3339], which was taken from [ISO.8601.1988].
3.2. previous-mud-file
This is a URL that should point to the previous MUD URL for auditing
purposes. Because it should not be necessary to resign a MUD file
when a new one is released, the archival location of a current MUD
file should be identified prior to its release. Note the signature
file MUST also be available. For example, if previous-mud-file is
set to "https://example.com/.mud/v1/xxx", the corresponding signature
would be found at "https://example.com/.mud/v1/xxx.p7s".
3.3. cache-validity 3.2. cache-validity
This uint32 is the period of time in hours that a network management This uint8 is the period of time in hours that a network management
station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
update. It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and no update. It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and
more than 1440 for any device that is supported. MUST NOT be more than 168 for any device that is supported.
3.4. masa-server 3.3. masa-server
This optional element refers to the URL that should be used to This optional element refers to the URL that should be used to
resolve the location any MASA service, as specified in resolve the location any MASA service, as specified in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].
3.5. is-supported 3.4. is-supported
This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
administrator as to whether or not the device is supported. In this administrator as to whether or not the device is supported. In this
context a device is said to be supported if the manufacturer might context a device is said to be supported if the manufacturer might
issue an update to the device or if the manufacturer might update the issue an update to the device or if the manufacturer might update the
MUD file. MUD file.
3.6. systeminfo 3.5. systeminfo
This string contains a description of the device that this MUD file This is a URL that points to a description of the device to be
supports. Note that this is a hint, and not intended for consumption connected. The intent is for administrators to be able to read about
by a computer. what the device is the first time the MUD-URL is used.
3.6. extensions
This optional leaf-list names MUD extensions that are used in the MUD
file. Note that NO MUD extensions may be used in a MUD file prior to
the extensions being declared. Implementations MUST ignore any
elements in this file that they do not understand.
3.7. packet-direction 3.7. packet-direction
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes access-lists but does not [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes access-lists but does not
attempt to indicate where they are applied as that is handled attempt to indicate where they are applied as that is handled
elsewhere in a configuration. However, in this case, a MUD file must elsewhere in a configuration. However, in this case, a MUD file must
be explicit in describing the communcation pattern of a device, and be explicit in describing the communication pattern of a device, and
that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in either that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in either
direction of communication. This element takes a single value of direction of communication. This element takes a single value of
either "to-device" or "from-device", based on a typedef "direction". either "to-device" or "from-device", based on a typedef "direction".
3.8. manufacturer 3.8. manufacturer
This element consists of a hostname that would be matched against the This element consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
authority section of another device's MUD URL. authority component of another device's MUD URL.
3.9. same-manufacturer 3.9. same-manufacturer
This is an equivalent for when the manufacturer element is used to This is an equivalent for when the manufacturer element is used to
indicate the authority that is found in another device's MUD URL indicate the authority that is found in another device's MUD URL
matches that of the authority found in this device's MUD URL. matches that of the authority found in this device's MUD URL.
3.10. model 3.10. model
This string matches the one and only segment following the authority This string matches the one and only segment following the authority
section of the MUD URL. It refers to a model that is unique within component of the MUD URL. It refers to a model that is unique within
the context of the authority. It may also include product version the context of the authority. It may also include product version
information. Thus how this field is constructed is entirely a local information. Thus how this field is constructed is entirely a local
matter for the manufacturer. matter for the manufacturer.
3.11. local-networks 3.11. local-networks
This null-valued element expands to include local networks. Its This null-valued element expands to include local networks. Its
default expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default default expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default
route that is received from the router. route that is received from the router. However, administrators may
expand the expression as is appropriate in their deployments.
3.12. controller 3.12. controller
This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
network management station. The element then is expanded to the set mud controller. The element then is expanded to the set of hosts
of hosts that are so registered. This element may also be a URN. In that are so registered. This element may also be a URN. In this
this case, the URN describes a well known service, such as DNS or case, the URN describes a well known service, such as DNS or NTP.
NTP.
Great care should be used when invoking the controller class. For Great care should be used when invoking the controller class. For
one thing, it requires some understanding by the administrator as to one thing, it requires some understanding by the administrator as to
when it is appropriate. For standard classes, it may be possible to when it is appropriate. Classes that are standardized may make it
code in certain intelligence. Nonstandard classes may require possible to code in certain intelligence. Nonstandard classes may
substantially more care. Pre-registration in such classes by require substantially more care. Pre-registration in such classes by
controllers with the MUD server is encouraged. The mechanism to do controllers with the MUD server is encouraged. The mechanism to do
that is beyond the scope of this work. that is beyond the scope of this work.
3.13. my-controller 3.13. my-controller
This null-valued element establishes a class of controllers that are This null-valued element establishes a class of controllers that are
intended to control the device associated with the MUD file being intended to control the device associated with the MUD file being
referenced. referenced.
3.14. direction-initiated 3.14. direction-initiated
skipping to change at page 13, line 13 skipping to change at page 14, line 13
Specifically if it has been updated in the field, this is the place Specifically if it has been updated in the field, this is the place
where evidence of that update would appear. The field should be where evidence of that update would appear. The field should be
changed when the intended communication patterns of a device change. changed when the intended communication patterns of a device change.
While from a controller standpoint, only comparison and matching While from a controller standpoint, only comparison and matching
operations are safe, it is envisioned that updates will require some operations are safe, it is envisioned that updates will require some
administrative review. Processing of this URL occurs as specified in administrative review. Processing of this URL occurs as specified in
[RFC2818] and [RFC3986]. [RFC2818] and [RFC3986].
6. The MUD YANG Model 6. The MUD YANG Model
<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud@2016-07-20.yang" <CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud@2017-04-18.yang"
module ietf-mud { module ietf-mud {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
prefix "ietf-mud"; prefix "ietf-mud";
import ietf-access-control-list { import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix "acl"; prefix "acl";
} }
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
skipping to change at page 13, line 38 skipping to change at page 14, line 37
import ietf-inet-types { import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet"; prefix "inet";
} }
organization organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group"; "IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/ "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/
WG List: opsawg@ietf.org WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
WG Chair: Warren Kumari Author: Eliot Lear
warren@kumari.net
WG Chair: Zhou Tianran
zhoutianran@huawei.com
Editor: Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com lear@cisco.com
Editor: Ralph Droms Author: Ralph Droms
rdroms@cisco.com rdroms@gmail.com
Author: Dan Romascanu
dromasca@gmail.com
"; ";
description description
"This YANG module defines a component that augments the "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
IETF description of an access list. This specific module IETF description of an access list. This specific module
focuses on additional filters that include local, model, focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
and same-manufacturer. and same-manufacturer.
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as Copyright (c) 2016,2017 IETF Trust and the persons
the document authors. All rights reserved. identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-07-20" { revision "2017-04-18" {
description "Base version of MUD extensions to ACL model"; description "Base version of MUD extensions to ACL model";
reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
Specification"; Specification";
} }
typedef direction { typedef direction {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum to-device { enum to-device {
description "packets or flows destined to the target description "packets or flows destined to the target
device"; device";
skipping to change at page 14, line 44 skipping to change at page 15, line 43
description "Which way are we talking about?"; description "Which way are we talking about?";
} }
container metainfo { container metainfo {
description "Information about when support end(ed), and description "Information about when support end(ed), and
when to refresh"; when to refresh";
leaf last-update { leaf last-update {
type yang:date-and-time; type yang:date-and-time;
description "This is intended to be the time and date that description "This is intended to be when
the MUD file was generated."; the MUD file was generated.";
} }
leaf previous-mud-file {
type inet:uri;
description "Use to find the previous MUD file location
for auditing purposes.";
}
leaf cache-validity { leaf cache-validity {
type uint32; type uint8 {
range "1..168";
}
description "The information retrieved from the MUD server is description "The information retrieved from the MUD server is
valid for these many hours, after which it should valid for these many hours, after which it should
be refreshed."; be refreshed.";
} }
leaf masa-server { leaf masa-server {
type inet:uri; type inet:uri;
description "The URI of the MASA server that network description "The URI of the MASA server that network
elements should forward requests to for this device."; elements should forward requests to for this device.";
} }
leaf is-supported { leaf is-supported {
type boolean; type boolean;
description "The element is currently supported description "The element is currently supported
by the manufacturer."; by the manufacturer.";
} }
leaf systeminfo { leaf systeminfo {
type string; type inet:uri;
description "A non-normative name and description of the device description "A reference to a description of this device";
this file is used for.";
} }
leaf-list extensions {
type string;
description "A list of extension names that are used in this MUD
file. Each name is registered with the IANA and
described in an RFC.";
}
} }
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl" { augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl" {
description "add inbound or outbound. Normally access lists description "add inbound or outbound. Normally access lists
are applied in an inbound or outbound direction are applied in an inbound or outbound direction
separately from their definition. This is not separately from their definition. This is not
possible with MUD."; possible with MUD.";
leaf packet-direction leaf packet-direction
{ {
type direction; type direction;
skipping to change at page 18, line 10 skipping to change at page 19, line 10
import ietf-inet-types { import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet"; prefix "inet";
} }
organization organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group"; "IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/ "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/
WG List: opsawg@ietf.org WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
WG Chair: Warren Kumari Author: Eliot Lear
warren@kumari.net
WG Chair: Zhou Tianran
zhoutianran@huawei.com
Editor: Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com lear@cisco.com
Editor: Ralph Droms Author: Ralph Droms
rdroms@cisco.com rdroms@gmail.com
Author: Dan Romascanu
dromasca@gmail.com
"; ";
description description
"This YANG module defines a component that augments the "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
IETF description of an access list to allow dns names IETF description of an access list to allow dns names
as matching criteria."; as matching criteria.";
revision "2016-07-20" { revision "2016-07-20" {
description "Base version of dnsname extension of ACL model"; description "Base version of dnsname extension of ACL model";
reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
skipping to change at page 19, line 13 skipping to change at page 20, line 13
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
8. MUD File Example 8. MUD File Example
This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443. outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.
{ {
"ietf-mud:metainfo": { "ietf-mud:metainfo": {
"last-update": "2016-05-18T20:00:50Z", "last-update": "2016-05-18T20:00:50Z",
"cache-validity": 1440 "cache-validity": 168
}, },
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": { "ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [ { "acl": [ {
"acl-name": "inbound-stuff", "acl-name": "inbound-stuff",
"acl-type" : "ipv4-acl", "acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
"ietf-mud:direction" : "to-device", "ietf-mud:packet-direction" : "to-device",
"access-list-entries": { "access-list-entries": {
"ace": [ "ace": [
{ {
"rule-name": "access-cloud", "rule-name": "access-cloud",
"matches": { "matches": {
"ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname":
"lighting-system.example.com", "lighting-system.example.com",
"protocol" : 6, "protocol" : 6,
"source-port-range" : { "source-port-range" : {
"lower-port" : 443, "lower-port" : 443,
skipping to change at page 19, line 43 skipping to change at page 20, line 43
"actions" : { "actions" : {
"permit" : [null] "permit" : [null]
} }
} }
] ]
} }
}, },
{ {
"acl-name": "outbound-stuff", "acl-name": "outbound-stuff",
"acl-type" : "ipv4-acl", "acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
"ietf-mud:direction" : "from-device", "ietf-mud:packet-direction" : "from-device",
"access-list-entries": { "access-list-entries": {
"ace": [ "ace": [
{ {
"rule-name": "access-cloud", "rule-name": "access-cloud",
"matches": { "matches": {
"ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname":
"lighting-system.example.com", "lighting-system.example.com",
"protocol" : 6, "protocol" : 6,
"destination-port-range" : { "destination-port-range" : {
"lower-port" : 443, "lower-port" : 443,
skipping to change at page 21, line 43 skipping to change at page 22, line 43
and the URL, it MUST return the option with length field set to zero and the URL, it MUST return the option with length field set to zero
and a corresponding null URL field as an acknowledgment. Even in and a corresponding null URL field as an acknowledgment. Even in
this circumstance, no specific network behavior is guaranteed. When this circumstance, no specific network behavior is guaranteed. When
a server consumes this option, it will either forward the URL and a server consumes this option, it will either forward the URL and
relevant client information to a network management system (such as relevant client information to a network management system (such as
the giaddr), or it will retrieve the usage description by resolving the giaddr), or it will retrieve the usage description by resolving
the URL. the URL.
DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
pass along appropriate information to a network management system or pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
controller. A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST adhere MUD controller. A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST
to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to validate the adhere to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to
TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file. Those validate the TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file.
servers will retrieve the file, process it, create and install the Those servers will retrieve the file, process it, create and install
necessary configuration on the relevant network element. Servers the necessary configuration on the relevant network element. Servers
SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface. A SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface. A
DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
a MUD URL to a network management system MUST notify the network a MUD URL to a MUD controller MUST notify the MUD controller of any
management of any corresponding change to the DHCP state of the corresponding change to the DHCP state of the client (such as
client (such as expiration or explicit release of a network address expiration or explicit release of a network address lease).
lease).
9.3. Relay Requirements 9.3. Relay Requirements
There are no additional requirements for relays. There are no additional requirements for relays.
10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension
This section defines an X.509 non-critical certificate extension that This section defines an X.509 non-critical certificate extension that
contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an
on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate
skipping to change at page 23, line 39 skipping to change at page 24, line 39
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url } IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url }
id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 } id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }
MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String
END END
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
While this extension can appear in either an 802.AR manufacturer
certificate (IDevID) or deployment certificate (LDevID), of course it
is not guaranteed in either, nor is it guaranteed to be carried over.
It is RECOMMENDED that MUD controller implementations maintain a
table that maps a device to its MUD-URL.
11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension 11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension
The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [IEEE8021AB] is The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) is a one hop
a one hop vendor-neutral link layer protocols used by end hosts vendor-neutral link layer protocols used by end hosts network devices
network devices for advertising their identity, capabilities, and for advertising their identity, capabilities, and neighbors on an
neighbors on an IEEE 802 local area network. Its Type-Length-Value IEEE 802 local area network. Its Type-Length-Value (TLV) design
(TLV) design allows for 'vendor-specific' extensions to be defined. allows for 'vendor-specific' extensions to be defined. IANA has a
IANA has a registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier (OUI) defined
(OUI) defined as documented in [RFC7042]. The MUD LLDP extension as documented in [RFC7042]. The MUD LLDP extension uses a subtype
uses a subtype defined in this document to carry the MUD URL. defined in this document to carry the MUD URL.
The LLDP vendor specific frame has the following format: The LLDP vendor specific frame has the following format:
+--------+--------+----------+---------+-------------- +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
|TLV Type| len | OUI |subtype | MUD URL |TLV Type| len | OUI |subtype | MUD URL
| =127 | |= 00 00 5E| = 1 | | =127 | |= 00 00 5E| = 1 |
|(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-255 octets) |(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-255 octets)
+--------+--------+----------+---------+-------------- +--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
where: where:
skipping to change at page 24, line 45 skipping to change at page 25, line 49
Hosts, routers, or other network devices that implement this option Hosts, routers, or other network devices that implement this option
may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these
options. For example they may fill in information in the respective options. For example they may fill in information in the respective
extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (LLDP MIB). LLDP extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (LLDP MIB). LLDP
operates in a one-way direction. LLDPDUs are not exchanged as operates in a one-way direction. LLDPDUs are not exchanged as
information requests by one device and response sent by another information requests by one device and response sent by another
device. The other devices do not acknowledge LLDP information device. The other devices do not acknowledge LLDP information
received from a device. No specific network behavior is guaranteed. received from a device. No specific network behavior is guaranteed.
When a device consumes this extension, it may either forward the URL When a device consumes this extension, it may either forward the URL
and relevant remote device information to a network management and relevant remote device information to a MUD controller, or it
system, or it will retrieve the usage description by resolving the will retrieve the usage description by resolving the URL.
URL.
12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files 12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files
Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
network access lists, they are sensitive. To insure that they have network access lists, they are sensitive. To insure that they have
not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed. We make not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed. We make
use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for
this purpose. this purpose.
12.1. Creating a MUD file signature 12.1. Creating a MUD file signature
skipping to change at page 25, line 27 skipping to change at page 26, line 27
certificates SHOULD be included. The signature is stored at the same certificates SHOULD be included. The signature is stored at the same
location as the MUD URL but with the suffix of ".p7s". Signatures location as the MUD URL but with the suffix of ".p7s". Signatures
are transferred using content-type "Application/pkcs7-signature". are transferred using content-type "Application/pkcs7-signature".
For example: For example:
% openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \ % openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
-in mudfile -binary -outform DER - \ -in mudfile -binary -outform DER - \
-certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s -certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s
Note: A MUD file may need to be resigned if the signature expires. Note: A MUD file may need to be re-signed if the signature expires.
12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature 12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature
Prior to retrieving a MUD file the MUD controller SHOULD retrieve the Prior to retrieving a MUD file the MUD controller SHOULD retrieve the
MUD signature file using the MUD URL with a suffix of ".p7s". For MUD signature file using the MUD URL with a suffix of ".p7s". For
example, if the MUD URL is "https://example.com/.well-known/v1/ example, if the MUD URL is "https://example.com/.well-known/v1/
modela", the MUD signature URL will be "https://example.com/.well- modela", the MUD signature URL will be "https://example.com/.well-
known/v1/modela.p7s". known/v1/modela.p7s".
Upon retrieving a MUD file, a MUD controller MUST validate the Upon retrieving a MUD file, a MUD controller MUST validate the
skipping to change at page 26, line 32 skipping to change at page 27, line 32
the metainfo container is permitted with the understanding that the metainfo container is permitted with the understanding that
such additions may be ignored. In addition, augmentation of the such additions may be ignored. In addition, augmentation of the
ACL model is permitted so long as it remains safe for a given ACE ACL model is permitted so long as it remains safe for a given ACE
to be ignored by the MUD Controller or the network elements it to be ignored by the MUD Controller or the network elements it
configures. Most specifically, is is not permitted to include as configures. Most specifically, is is not permitted to include as
an augmentation that modifies "deny" behavior without bumping the an augmentation that modifies "deny" behavior without bumping the
version. Furthermore, implementations that are not able to parse version. Furthermore, implementations that are not able to parse
a component of the ACE array MUST ignore the entire array entry a component of the ACE array MUST ignore the entire array entry
(e.g., not the entire array) and MAY ignore the entire MUD file. (e.g., not the entire array) and MAY ignore the entire MUD file.
14. Security Considerations 14. Deployment Considerations
Based on the means a URL is procured, a device may be able to lie Because MUD consists of a number of architectural building blocks, it
about what it is, thus gaining additional network access. There are is possible to assemble different deployment scenarios. One key
aspect is where to place policy enforcement. In order to protect the
device from other devices within a local deployment, policy can be
enforced on the nearest switch or access point. In order to limit
unwanted traffic within a network, it may also be advisable to
enforce policy as close to the Internet as possible. In some
circumstances, policy enforcement may not be available at the closest
hop. At that point, the risk of so-called east-west infection is
increased to the number of devices that are able to communicate
without protection.
A caution about some of the classes: admission of a device into the
"manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" class may have impact on
access of other devices. Put another way, the admission may grow the
access-list on switches connected to other devices, depending on how
access is managed. Therefore, care should be given on managing that
access-list growth. Alternative methods such as additional
segmentation can be used to keep that growth within reason.
15. Security Considerations
Based on how a MUD-URL is emitted, a device may be able to lie about
what it is, thus gaining additional network access. There are
several means to limit risk in this case. The most obvious is to several means to limit risk in this case. The most obvious is to
only believe devices that make use of certificate-based only believe devices that make use of certificate-based
authentication such as IEEE 802.1AR certificates. When those authentication such as IEEE 802.1AR certificates. When those
certificates are not present, devices claiming to be of a certain certificates are not present, devices claiming to be of a certain
manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping
without additional validation of some form. This will occur when it without additional validation of some form. This will occur when it
makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer" for the purpose of makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer" for the purpose of
accessing devices of a particular type. accessing devices of a particular type. Similarly, network
management systems may be able to fingerprint the device. In such
cases, the MUD-URL can act as a classifier that can be proven or
disproven. Fingerprinting may have other advantages as well: when
802.1AR certificates are used, because they themselves cannot change,
fingerprinting offers the opportunity to add artificats to the MUD-
URL. The meaning of such artifacts is left as future work.
Network management systems SHOULD NOT accept a usage description for Network management systems SHOULD NOT accept a usage description for
a device with the same MAC address that has indicated a change of a device with the same MAC address that has indicated a change of
authority without some additional validation (such as review of the authority without some additional validation (such as review of the
class). New devices that present some form of unauthenticated MUD class). New devices that present some form of unauthenticated MUD
URL SHOULD be validated by some external means when they would be URL SHOULD be validated by some external means when they would be
otherwise be given increased network access. otherwise be given increased network access.
It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability. exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
There are three recommended approaches to address this threat. The There are three recommended approaches to address this threat. The
first is to validate the signature of the MUD file. The second is to first is to validate the signature of the MUD file. The second is to
have a system do a primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both have a system do a primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both
parseable and believable at some level. MUD files will likely be parseable and believable at some level. MUD files will likely be
relatively small, to start with. The number of ACEs used by any relatively small, to start with. The number of ACEs used by any
given device should be relatively small as well. Second, it may be given device should be relatively small as well. It may also be
useful to limit retrieval of MUD URLs to only those sites that are useful to limit retrieval of MUD URLs to only those sites that are
known to have decent web reputations. known to have decent web reputations.
Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names. If a domain name Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names. If a domain name
changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
provide MUD files that MUD controllers would consider valid. There provide MUD files that MUD controllers would consider valid. There
are a few approaches that can mitigate this attack. First, MUD file are a few approaches that can mitigate this attack. First, MUD
servers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server. When controllers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server.
a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD When a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD
controller should check to see if ownership of the domain has controller should check to see if ownership of the domain has
changed. A fair programmatic approximation of this is when the name changed. A fair programmatic approximation of this is when the name
servers for the domain have changed. If the actual MUD file has servers for the domain have changed. If the actual MUD file has
changed, the controller MAY check the WHOIS database to see if changed, the controller MAY check the WHOIS database to see if
registration ownership of a domain has changed. If a change has registration ownership of a domain has changed. If a change has
occured, or if for some reason it is not possible to determine occured, or if for some reason it is not possible to determine
whether ownership has changed, further review may be warranted. whether ownership has changed, further review may be warranted.
Note, this remediation does not take into account the case of a Note, this remediation does not take into account the case of a
device that was produced long ago and only recently fielded, or the device that was produced long ago and only recently fielded, or the
case where a new MUD controller has been installed. case where a new MUD controller has been installed.
skipping to change at page 28, line 5 skipping to change at page 29, line 31
mechanisms such as mDNS[RFC6872], how a device might otherwise be mechanisms such as mDNS[RFC6872], how a device might otherwise be
identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is connected to identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is connected to
the network, whether a device is intended to be used by individuals the network, whether a device is intended to be used by individuals
or carry personal identifying information, and then apply appropriate or carry personal identifying information, and then apply appropriate
data minimization techniques. One approach is to make use of TEAP data minimization techniques. One approach is to make use of TEAP
[RFC7170] as the means to share information with authorized [RFC7170] as the means to share information with authorized
components in the network. Network devices may also assist in components in the network. Network devices may also assist in
limiting access to the MUD-URL through the use of mechanisms such as limiting access to the MUD-URL through the use of mechanisms such as
DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610]. DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610].
15. IANA Considerations Please note that the security considerations mentioned in Section 4.7
of [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis] are not applicable in this case
because the YANG serialization is not intended to be accessed via
NETCONF. However, for those who try to instantiate this model in a
device via NETCONF, all objects in each model in this draft exhibit
similar security characteristics as [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. The
basic purpose of MUD is to configure access, and so by its very
nature can be disruptive if used by unauthorized parties.
15.1. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options 16. IANA Considerations
16.1. YANG Module Registrations
The following YANG modules are requested to be registred in the "IANA
Module Names" registry:
The ietf-mud module:
o Name: ietf-mud
o XML Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
o Prefix: ief-mud
o Reference: This memo
The ietf-acldns module:
o Name: ietf-acldns
o XML Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
o Prefix: ietf-acldns
o Reference: This memo
16.2. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options
The IANA has allocated option 161 in the Dynamic Host Configuration The IANA has allocated option 161 in the Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry
for the MUD DHCPv4 option. for the MUD DHCPv4 option.
IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified
in Section 9. in Section 9.
15.2. PKIX Extensions 16.3. PKIX Extensions
IANA is kindly requested to make the following assignments for: IANA is kindly requested to make the following assignments for:
o The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for o The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).
o id-pe-mud-url object identifier from the "SMI Security for PKIX o id-pe-mud-url object identifier from the "SMI Security for PKIX
Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1). Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).
The use fo these values is specified in Section 10. The use fo these values is specified in Section 10.
15.3. Well Known URI Suffix 16.4. Well Known URI Suffix
The IANA has allocated the URL suffix of "mud" as follows: The IANA has allocated the URL suffix of "mud" as follows:
o URI Suffix: "mud" o Specification documents: this document o o URI Suffix: "mud" o Specification documents: this document o
Related information: n/a Related information: n/a
15.4. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files 16.5. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files
The following media-type is defined for transfer of MUD file: The following media-type is defined for transfer of MUD file:
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: mud+json o Subtype name: mud+json
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/mud+json values o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/mud+json values
are represented as a JSON object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be are represented as a JSON object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be
employed. employed.
skipping to change at page 29, line 34 skipping to change at page 31, line 34
o Person & email address to contact for further information: o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com> Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: o Author:
Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com> Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Change controller: IESG o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No. o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.
15.5. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry 16.6. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry for IANA Link Layer IANA is requested to create a new registry for IANA Link Layer
Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV subtype values. The recommended policy Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV subtype values. The recommended policy
for this registry is Expert Review. The maximum number of entries in for this registry is Expert Review. The maximum number of entries in
the registry is 256. the registry is 256.
IANA is required to populate the initial registry with the value: IANA is required to populate the initial registry with the value:
LLDP subtype value = 1 (All the other 255 values should be initially LLDP subtype value = 1 (All the other 255 values should be initially
marked as 'Unassigned'.) marked as 'Unassigned'.)
Description = the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform Description = the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) Resource Locator (URL)
Reference = < this document > Reference = < this document >
15.6. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs) 16.7. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)
The following parameter registry is requested to be added in The following parameter registry is requested to be added in
accordance with [RFC3553] accordance with [RFC3553]
Registry name: "urn:ietf:params:mud" is requested. Registry name: "urn:ietf:params:mud" is requested.
Specification: this document Specification: this document
Repository: this document Repository: this document
Index value: Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service Index value: Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service
name, as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC6335] name, as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC6335]
The following entries should be added to the "urn:ietf:params:mud" The following entries should be added to the "urn:ietf:params:mud"
name space: name space:
"urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by
[RFC1123]. "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified [RFC1123]. "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified
by [RFC5905]. by [RFC5905].
16. Acknowledgments 17. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, Bernie Volz, The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, Bernie Volz,
Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm, John Bashinski, Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm, John Bashinski,
Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, and Dan Wing for their valuable advice and Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, and Dan Wing for their valuable advice and
reviews. Russ Housley entirely rewrote Section 10 to be a complete reviews. Russ Housley entirely rewrote Section 10 to be a complete
module. Adrian Farrel provided the basis for privacy considerations module. Adrian Farrel provided the basis for privacy considerations
text. The remaining errors in this work are entirely the text. Kent Watson provided a thorough review of the archictecture
responsibility of the author. and the YANG model. The remaining errors in this work are entirely
the responsibility of the author.
17. References 18. References
17.1. Normative References 18.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason, Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping- Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-04 (work in progress), October 2016. keyinfra-05 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair, Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model", "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-09 (work in progress), October draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-10 (work in progress), March
2016. 2017.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis]
Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of YANG
Data Model Documents", draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-12
(work in progress), March 2017.
[IEEE8021AB] [IEEE8021AB]
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks-- Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks--
Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery", Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery",
n.d.. n.d..
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - [RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989, DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
skipping to change at page 31, line 34 skipping to change at page 33, line 39
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, [RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>. 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource [RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987, Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
January 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>. January 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
skipping to change at page 32, line 42 skipping to change at page 35, line 5
[RFC7227] Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and [RFC7227] Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options", S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014, BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
[RFC7610] Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield: [RFC7610] Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199, Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015, RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.
17.2. Informative References 18.2. Informative References
[FW95] Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls", [FW95] Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls",
January 1995. January 1995.
[IEEE8021AR] [IEEE8021AR]
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Secure Device Identity", 1998. "Secure Device Identity", 1998.
[ISO.8601.1988] [ISO.8601.1988]
International Organization for Standardization, "Data International Organization for Standardization, "Data
skipping to change at page 34, line 9 skipping to change at page 36, line 19
[RFC7488] Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T. [RFC7488] Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T.
Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection", Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection",
RFC 7488, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015, RFC 7488, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488>.
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions
RFC Editor to remove this section prior to publication. RFC Editor to remove this section prior to publication.
Draft -05 to -06:
o Make clear that this is a component architecture (Polk and Watson)
o Add order of operations (Watson)
o Add extensions leaf-list (Pritikin)
o Remove previous-mud-file (Watson)
o Modify text in last-update (Watson)
o Clarify local networks (Weis, Watson)
o Fix contact info (Watson)
o Terminology clarification (Weis)
o Advice on how to handle LDevIDs (Watson)
o Add deployment considerations (Watson)
o Add some additional text about fingerprinting (Watson)
o Appropriate references to 6087bis (Watson)
o Change systeminfo to a URL to be referenced (Lear)
Draft -04 to -05: * syntax error correction Draft -04 to -05: * syntax error correction
Draft -03 to -04: * Re-add my-controller Draft -03 to -04: * Re-add my-controller
Draft -02 to -03: * Additional IANA updates * Format correction in Draft -02 to -03: * Additional IANA updates * Format correction in
YANG. * Add reference to TEAP. YANG. * Add reference to TEAP.
Draft -01 to -02: * Update IANA considerations * Accept Russ Housley Draft -01 to -02: * Update IANA considerations * Accept Russ Housley
rewrite of X.509 text * Include privacy considerations text * Redo rewrite of X.509 text * Include privacy considerations text * Redo
the URL limit. Still 255 bytes, but now stated in the URL the URL limit. Still 255 bytes, but now stated in the URL
skipping to change at page 34, line 40 skipping to change at page 37, line 29
This is considered the default behavior and the ACEs are in effect This is considered the default behavior and the ACEs are in effect
appended to whatever other ACEs. To block DNS or NTP one repeats the appended to whatever other ACEs. To block DNS or NTP one repeats the
matching statement but replace "permit" with deny. Because ACEs are matching statement but replace "permit" with deny. Because ACEs are
processed in the order they are received, the defaults would not be processed in the order they are received, the defaults would not be
reached. A MUD controller might further decide to optimize to simply reached. A MUD controller might further decide to optimize to simply
not include the defaults when they are overriden. not include the defaults when they are overriden.
A complete MUD entry is included below. A complete MUD entry is included below.
{ {
"ietf-mud:meta-info": { "ietf-mud:metainfo": {
"lastUpdate": "2016-09-27T15:10:24+02:00", "last-update": "2016-09-27T15:10:24+02:00",
"cacheValidity": 1440 "cache-validity": 168
}, },
"ietf-acl:access-lists": { "acl:access-lists": {
"ietf-acl:access-list": [ "access-list": [
{ {
"acl-name": "mud-53134-v4in", "acl-name": "mud-53134-v4in",
"acl-type": "ipv4-acl", "acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
"ietf-mud:packet-direction": "to-device", "ietf-mud:packet-direction": "to-device",
"access-list-entries": { "access-list-entries": {
"ace": [ "ace": [
{ {
"rule-name": "entout0-in", "rule-name": "entout0-in",
"matches": { "matches": {
"ietf-mud:controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns", "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
skipping to change at page 40, line 4 skipping to change at page 42, line 36
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Eliot Lear Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7 Richtistrasse 7
Wallisellen CH-8304 Wallisellen CH-8304
Switzerland Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200 Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com Email: lear@cisco.com
Ralph Droms Ralph Droms
Phone: +1 978 376 3731 Phone: +1 978 376 3731
Email: rdroms@gmail.com Email: rdroms@gmail.com
Dan Romascanu Dan Romascanu
Phone: +972 54 5555347
Email: dromasca@gmail.com Email: dromasca@gmail.com
 End of changes. 86 change blocks. 
223 lines changed or deleted 381 lines changed or added

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