Network Working Group                                            E. Lear
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                                R. Droms
Expires: April 2, June 3, 2017
                                                            D. Romascanu
                                                      September 29,
                                                       November 30, 2016

              Manufacturer Usage Description Specification


   This memo specifies the necessary components to implement
   manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD).  This includes two YANG
   modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, an LLDP TLV, a URL suffix
   specification, an X.509 certificate extension and a means to sign and
   verify the descriptions.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, June 3, 2017.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  A Simple Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Determining Intended Use  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Finding A Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.5.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.6.  The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . .   7
   2.  The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Element Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  previous-mud-file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  cache-validity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  masa-server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  is-supported  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.6.  systeminfo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.7.  packet-direction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.8.  manufacturer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.9.  same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.10. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.11. local-networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.12. controller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.13. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Processing of the MUD file  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  What does a MUD URL look like?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  The MUD YANG Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model  . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  source-dnsname  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.2.  destination-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  MUD File Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.1.  Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.3.  Relay Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension   20
   11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension . . . . . .  21  22
   12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . . .  22  23
     12.1.  Creating a MUD file signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22  23
     12.2.  Verifying a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   13. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  24
   14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  26
     15.1.  DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  26
     15.2.  PKIX Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  26
     15.3.  Well Known URI Suffix  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  26
     15.4.  MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files . . . . . . .  25  26
     15.5.  LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26  27
     15.6.  The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)  . . .  27  28
   16. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  28
   17. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  28
     17.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  28
     17.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29  30
   Appendix A.  Changes from Earlier Versions  . . . . . . . . . . .  30  31
   Appendix B.  Default MUD elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30  32
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  37

1.  Introduction

   The Internet has largely been constructed on general purpose
   computers; those devices that may be used for a purpose that is
   specified by those who buy the device.  [RFC1984] presumed that an
   end device would be most capable of protecting itself.  This made
   sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe, and
   it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices
   today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets.

   [RFC7452] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about,
   smart objects.  Let us then posit a group of objects that are
   specifically not general purpose computers.  These devices therefore
   have a purpose to their use.  By definition, therefore, all other
   purposes are NOT intended.  The combination of these two statements
   can be restated as a manufacturer usage description (MUD) that can be
   applied at various points within a network.  Although this memo may
   seem to stress access requirements, usage intent also consists of
   quality of service needs a device may have.

   We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context, to
   simply mean the entity or organization that will state how a device
   is intended to be used.  In the context of a lightbulb, this might
   indeed be the lightbulb manufacturer.  In the context of a smarter
   device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be integrator of
   that device.  The key points are that the device itself is expected
   to serve a limited purpose, and that there may exist an organization
   in the supply chain of that device that will take responsibility for
   informing the network about that purpose.

   The converse statement holds that general computing systems will
   benefit very little from MUD, as their manufacturers cannot envision
   a specific communication pattern to describe.

   The intent of MUD is to therefore solve for the following problems:

   o  Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device entering a
      network to those communications intended by the manufacturer.

   o  Provide for a means to scale network policies to the ever-
      increasing number types of devices in the network.

   o  Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way
      that is faster than it might take to update systems.  This will be
      particularly true for systems that are no longer supported by
      their manufacturer.

   o  Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare

   No matter how good a MUD-enabled network is, it will never replace
   the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities.  It may,
   however, provide network administrators with some additional
   protection when those vulnerabilities exist.

1.1.  A Simple Example

   A light bulb is intended to light a room.  It may be remotely
   controlled through the network; and it may make use of a rendezvous
   service of some form that an app on smart phone accesses.  What we
   can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other network access
   is unwanted.  It will not contact a news service, nor speak to the
   refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other devices.  It
   has no Facebook friends.  Therefore, an access list applied to it
   that states that it will only connect to the single rendezvous
   service will not impede the light bulb in performing its function,
   while at the same time allowing the network to provide both it and
   other devices an additional layer of protection.

1.2.  Determining Intended Use

   The notion of intended use is in itself not new.  Network
   administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such
   use.  This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and
   Zwicky in [FW95].  Programmatically profiling systems have existed
   for years as well.  These systems make use of heuristics that take at
   least some time to assert what a system is.

   A system could just as easily tell the network what sort of
   protection it requires without going into what sort of system it is.
   This would, in effect, be the converse of [RFC7488].  In seeking a
   general purpose solution, however, we assume that a device has so few
   capabilities that it will implement the least necessary capabilities
   to function properly.  This is a basic economic constraint.  Unless
   the network would refuse access to such a device, its developers
   would have no reason to implement such an approach.  To date, such an
   assertion has held true.

1.3.  Finding A Policy: The MUD URL

   Our work begins, therefore, with the device emitting a Universal
   Resource Locator (URL) [RFC3986].  This URL may serves both to
   classify the device type and to provide a means to locate a policy

   In this memo three means are defined to emit the MUD URL.  One is a
   DHCP option[RFC2131],[RFC3315] that the DHCP client uses to inform
   the DHCP server.  The DHCP server may take further actions, such as
   retrieve the URL or otherwise pass it along to network management
   system or controller.  The other method defined is an X.509
   constraint.  The IEEE has developed [IEEE8021AR] that provides a
   certificate-based approach to communicate device characteristics,
   which itself relies on [RFC5280].  The MUD URL extension is non-
   critical, as required by IEEE 802.1AR.  Finally, an LLDP frame is

1.4.  Types of Policies

   When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD controller retrieves a file
   that describes what sort of communications a device is designed to
   have.  The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud
   based services or certain classes for access within an operational
   network.  An example of a class might be "devices of a specified
   manufacturer type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated
   simply by the authority of the MUD URL.  Another example might to
   allow or disallow local access.  Just like other policies, these may
   be combined.  For example:

      Allow access to host with QoS AF11
      Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer
      Allow access to and from controllers who need to speak COAP
      Allow access to local DNS/DHCP
      Deny all other access

   To add a bit more depth that should not be a stretch of anyone's
   imagination, one could also make use of port-based access lists.
   Thus a printer might have a description that states:

      Allow access for port IPP or port LPD
      Allow local access for port HTTP
      Deny all other access

   In this way anyone can print to the printer, but local access would
   be required for the management interface.

   The files that are retrieved are intended to be closely aligned to
   existing network architectures so that they are easy to deploy.  We
   make use of YANG [RFC6020] because of the time and effort spent to
   develop accurate and adequate models for use by network devices.
   JSON is used as a serialization for compactness and readability,
   relative to XML.

   The YANG modules specified here are extensions of
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].  The extensions to this model allow for
   a manufacturer to express classes of systems that a manufacturer
   would find necessary for the proper function of the device.  Two
   modules are specified.  The first module specifies a means for domain
   names to be used in ACLs so that devices that have their controllers
   in the cloud may be appropriately authorized with domain names, where
   the mapping of those names to addresses may rapidly change.

   The second module abstracts away IP addresses into certain classes
   that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
   processing.  Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the
   device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be
   configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge.
   That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer

   Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
   is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
   relatively ubiquitous, and therefore, mature.  Therefore, only a a
   limited subset YANG-based configuration of is permitted in a MUD

1.5.  Terminology

   MUD:  manufacturer usage description.

   MUD file:  a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a
      recommended behavior.

   MUD file server:  a web server that hosts a MUD file.

   MUD controller:  the system that requests and receives the MUD file
      from the MUD server.  After it has processed a MUD file it may
      direct changes to relevant network elements.

   MUD URL:  a URL that can be used by the MUD controller to receive the
      MUD file.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.6.  The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture

   With these components laid out we now have the basis for an
   archicture.  This leads us to ASCII art.

    .                      ____________     .           _____________
    .                     |            |    .          |             |
    .                     |    MUD     |----->get URL->|   MUD       |
    .                     | Controller |    .(https)   | File Server |
    .  End system network |____________|<--MUD file<--<|_____________|
    .                             .         .
    .                             .         .
    . _______                 _________     .
    .|       |  (dhcp et al) | router  |    .
    .| Thing |---->MUD URL-->|   or    |    .
    .|_______|               | switch  |    .
    .                        |_________|    .

                        Figure 1: MUD Architecture

   In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and
   forwards them to the network management system for processing.  This
   happens in different ways, depending on how the URI is communicated.
   For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server might receive the
   URI and then process it.  In the case of IEEE 802.1X, the switch
   would tunnel the URI to the authentication server, who would then
   process it.

   The information returned by the web site is valid for the duration of
   the device's connection, or as specified in the description.  Thus if
   the device is mobile, when it moves on, any configuration in the
   switch is removed.  Similarly, from time to time the description may
   be refreshed, based on new capabilities or communication patterns or

   The web site is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer.
   Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL.  For
   legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to
   determine the appropriate URI, it may proxy it, the trivial cases
   being a map between some registered device or port and a URL.

2.  The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning

   A MUD file consists of JSON based on a YANG model.  For purposes of
   MUD, the elements that can be modified are access lists as augmented
   by this model.  The MUD file is limited to the serialization of a
   small number of YANG schema, including the models specified in the
   following documents:

   o  [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]

   o  [RFC6991]

   Publishers of MUD files MUST NOT include other elements except as
   described in Section 13, and MUST only contain information relevant
   to the device being described.  Devices parsing MUD files MUST cease
   processing if they find other elements.

   This module is structured into three parts.  The first container
   holds information that is relevant to retrieval and validity of the
   MUD file itself.  The second container augments the access list to
   indicate direction the ACL is to be applied.  The final container
   augments the matching container of the ACL model to add several
   elements that are relevant to the MUD URL, or other otherwise
   abstracted for use within a local environment.

     module: ietf-mud
       +--rw meta-info
           +--rw last-update?         yang:date-and-time
           +--rw previous-mud-file?   yang:uri
           +--rw cache-validity?      uint32
           +--rw masa-server?         inet:uri
           +--rw is-supported?        boolean
     augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl:
        +--rw packet-direction?   direction
     augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl
        +--rw manufacturer?          inet:host
        +--rw same-manufacturer?     empty
        +--rw model?                 string
        +--rw local-networks?        empty
        +--rw controller?            inet:uri
        +--rw direction-initiated?   direction

3.  Element Definitions

   The following elements are defined.

3.1.  last-update

   This is a date-and-time value of the last time the MUD file was
   updated.  This is akin to a version number.  Its form is taken from
   [RFC6991] which, for those keeping score, turn was taken from
   Section 5.6 of [RFC3339], which was taken from [ISO.8601.1988].

3.2.  previous-mud-file

   This is a URL that should point to the previous MUD URL for auditing
   purposes.  Because it should not be necessary to resign a MUD file
   when a new one is released, the archival location of a current MUD
   file should be identified prior to its release.  Note the signature
   file MUST also be available.  For example, if previous-mud-file is
   set to "", the corresponding signature
   would be found at "".

3.3.  cache-validity

   This uint32 is the period of time in hours that a network management
   station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
   update.  It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and no
   more than 1440 for any device that is supported.

3.4.  masa-server

   This optional element refers to the URL that should be used to
   resolve the location any MASA service, as specified in

3.5.  is-supported

   This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
   administrator as to whether or not the device is supported.  In this
   context a device is said to be supported if the manufacturer might
   issue an update to the device or if the manufacturer might update the
   MUD file.

3.6.  systeminfo

   This string contains a description of the device that this MUD file
   supports.  Note that this is a hint, and not intended for consumption
   by a computer.

3.7.  packet-direction

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes access-lists but does not
   attempt to indicate where they are applied as that is handled
   elsewhere in a configuration.  However, in this case, a MUD file must
   be explicit in describing the communcation pattern of a device, and
   that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in either
   direction of communication.  This element takes a single value of
   either "to-device" or "from-device", based on a typedef "direction".

3.8.  manufacturer

   This element consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
   authority section of another device's MUD URL.

3.9.  same-manufacturer

   This is an equivalent for when the manufacturer element is used to
   indicate the authority that is found in another device's MUD URL
   matches that of the authority found in this device's MUD URL.

3.10.  model

   This string matches the one and only segment following the authority
   section of the MUD URL.  It refers to a model that is unique within
   the context of the authority.  It may also include product version
   information.  Thus how this field is constructed is entirely a local
   matter for the manufacturer.

3.11.  local-networks

   This null-valued element expands to include local networks.  Its
   default expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default
   route that is received from the router.

3.12.  controller

   This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
   network management station.  The element then is expanded to the set
   of hosts that are so registered.  This element may also be a URN.  In
   this case, the URN describes a well known service, such as DNS or

   In addition, some meta information is defined in order to determine
   when a usage description should be refreshed.

3.13.  direction-initiated

   When applied this matches packets when the flow was initiated in the
   corresponding direction.  [RFC6092] provides guidance for IPv6
   guidance best practices.  While that document is scoped specifically
   to IPv6, its contents are applicable for IPv4 as well.  When this
   flag is set, and the system has no reason to believe a flow has been
   initiated it MUST drop the packet.  This match SHOULD be applied with
   specific transport parameters, such as protocol.

4.  Processing of the MUD file

   To keep things relatively simple in addition to whatever definitions
   exist, we also apply two additional default behaviors:

   o  Anything not explicitly permitted is denied.

   o  Local DNS and NTP are, by default, permitted to and from the

   An explicit description of the defaults can be found in Appendix B.

5.  What does a MUD URL look like?

   To begin with, MUD takes full advantage of both the https: scheme and
   the use of .well-known.  HTTPS is important in this case because a
   man in the middle attack could otherwise harm the operation of a
   class of devices.  .well-known is used because we wish to add
   additional structure to the URL.  And so the URL appears as follows:

      mud-url   = "https://" authority  "/.well-known/mud/" mud-rev
                  "/" model ( "?" extras )
                  ; authority is from RFC3986
      mud-rev   = "v1"
      model     = segment  ; from RFC3986
      extras    = query    ; from RFC3986

   mud-rev signifies the version of the manufacturer usage description
   file.  This memo specifies "v1" of that file.  Later versions may
   permit additional schemas or modify the format.  In order to provide
   for the broadest compatibility for the various transmission
   mechanisms, the length of the URL for v1 MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.

   "model" represents a device model as the manufacturer wishes to
   represent it.  It could be a brand name or something more specific.
   It also may provide a means to indicate what version the product is.
   Specifically if it has been updated in the field, this is the place
   where evidence of that update would appear.  The field should be
   changed when the intended communication patterns of a device change.
   While from a controller standpoint, only comparison and matching
   operations are safe, it is envisioned that updates will require some
   administrative review.  Processing of this URL occurs as specified in
   [RFC2818] and [RFC3986].

6.  The MUD YANG Model

<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud@2016-07-20.yang";

module ietf-mud {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
  prefix "ietf-mud";

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix "acl";

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix "yang";

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix "inet";

    "IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";

       "WG Web:
       WG List:
       WG Chair: Warren Kumari
       WG Chair: Zhou Tianran
       Editor: Eliot Lear
       Editor: Ralph Droms

    "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
     IETF description of an access list.  This specific module
     focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
     and same-manufacturer.

    Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
    the document authors.  All rights reserved.
    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
    without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
    to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
    License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision "2016-07-20"  {
    description "Base version of MUD extensions to ACL model";
    reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description Specification";

  typedef direction {
     type enumeration {
         enum to-device {
           description "packets or flows destined to the target device";
         enum from-device {
           description "packets or flows destined from
                        the target device";
     description "Which way are we talking about?";

  container metainfo  {

    description "Information about when support end(ed), and
                 when to refresh";

    leaf last-update {
      type yang:date-and-time;
      description "This is intended to be the time and date that
                   the MUD file was generated.";

    leaf previous-mud-file {
       type inet:uri;
       description "Use to find the previous MUD file location
                    for auditing purposes.";
    leaf cache-validity {
      type uint32;
      description "The information retrieved from the MUD server is
                 valid for these many hours, after which it should
                 be refreshed.";

    leaf masa-server {
      type inet:uri;
      description "The URI of the MASA server that network
      elements should forward requests to for this device.";

    leaf is-supported {
      type boolean;
      description "The element is currently supported
                   by the manufacturer.";
    leaf systeminfo {
      type string;
      description "A non-normative name and description of the device
                   this file is used for.";

  augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl"   {
    description "add inbound or outbound.  Normally access lists
                 are applied in an inbound or outbound direction
                 separately from their definition.  This is not
                 possible with MUD.";
    leaf packet-direction
      type direction;
      description "inbound or outbound ACL.";

  augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/" +
     "acl:access-list-entries/acl:ace/" +
     "acl:matches" {
    description "adding abstractions to avoid need of IP addresses";

    leaf manufacturer {
      type inet:host;
      description "authority component of the manufacturer URI";
    leaf same-manufacturer {
      type empty;
      description "expand to ACEs for each device
                   with the same origin";

    leaf model {
        type string;
        description "specific model (including version) for a
                     given manufacturer";

    leaf local-networks {
      type empty;
      description "this string is used to indicate networks
                   considered local in a given environment.";
    leaf controller {
      type inet:uri;
      description "expands to one or more controllers for a
                   given service that is codified by inet:uri.";
    leaf direction-initiated {
      type direction;
      description "which direction a flow was initiated";


7.  The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model

   This module specifies an extension to IETF-ACL model such that domain
   names may be referenced by augmenting the "matches" element.
   Different implementations may deploy differing methods to maintain
   the mapping between IP address and domain name, if indeed any are
   needed.  However, the intent is that resources that are referred to
   using a name should be authorized (or not) within an access list.

   The structure of the change is as follows:

         +--rw src-dnsname?        inet:host
         +--rw dst-dnsname?        inet:host

   The choice of this particular point in the access-list model is based
   on the assumption that we are in some way referring to IP-related
   resources, as that is what the DNS returns.  A domain name in our
   context is defined in [RFC6991].

   The following elements are defined.

7.1.  source-dnsname

   The argument corresponds to a domain name of a source as specified by
   inet:host.  Depending on how the model is used, it may or may not be
   resolved, as required by the implementation and circumstances.

7.2.  destination-dnsname

   The argument corresponds to a domain name of a destination as
   specified by inet:host.  Depending on how the model is used, it may
   or may not be resolved, as required by the implementation and

7.3.  The ietf-acldns Model

 <CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-acldns@2007-07020.yang";

 module ietf-acldns {
   yang-version 1.1;
   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns";
   prefix "ietf-acldns";

   import ietf-access-control-list {
     prefix "acl";

   import ietf-inet-types {
     prefix "inet";

     "IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";

        "WG Web:
        WG List:
        WG Chair: Warren Kumari
        WG Chair: Zhou Tianran
        Editor: Eliot Lear
        Editor: Ralph Droms

     "This YANG module defines a component that augments the
      IETF description of an access list to allow dns names
      as matching criteria.";

   revision "2016-07-20" {
     description "Base version of dnsname extension of ACL model";
     reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description Specification";

   augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/" +
      "acl:access-list-entries/acl:ace/" +
      "acl:matches/acl:ace-type/acl:ace-ip" {
     description "adding domain names to matching";

     leaf src-dnsname {
       type inet:host;
       description "domain name to be matched against";
     leaf dst-dnsname {
       type inet:host;
       description "domain name to be matched against";


8.  MUD File Example

   This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
   outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.

      "ietf-mud:metainfo": {
         "last-update": "2016-05-18T20:00:50Z",
         "cache-validity": 1440
      "ietf-access-control-list:access-lists":  {
        "acl": [ {
         "acl-name": "inbound-stuff",
         "acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
         "ietf-mud:direction" : "to-device",
         "access-list-entries": {
            "ace": [
                  "rule-name": "access-cloud",
                  "matches": {
                     "protocol" : 6,
                     "source-port-range" : {
                        "lower-port" : 443,
                        "upper-port" : 443
                  "actions" : {
                    "permit" : [null]
         "acl-name": "outbound-stuff",
         "acl-type" : "ipv4-acl",
         "ietf-mud:direction" : "from-device",
         "access-list-entries": {
            "ace": [
                  "rule-name": "access-cloud",
                  "matches": {
                      "protocol" : 6,
                      "destination-port-range" : {
                        "lower-port" : 443,
                        "upper-port" : 443
                  "actions" : {
                      "permit" : [null]

9.  The MUD URL DHCP Option

   The IPv4 MUD URL client option has the following format:

     | code | len |  MUD URL

   Code OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (TBD) (161) is assigned by IANA.  len is a single
   octet that indicates the length of the URL in octets.  MUD URL is a
   URL.  The length of a  MUD URL does not URLs MUST NOT exceed 255 bytes. octets.

   The IPv6 MUD URL client option has the following format:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     |         OPTION_MUD_URL_V6     |        option-length          |
     |                            MUD URL                            |
     |                              ...                              |

   OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (TBD; assigned by IANA).

   option-length contains the length of the URL in octets.

   The length
   MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.

   The intent of this option is to provide both a new device classifier
   to the network as well as some recommended configuration to the
   routers that implement policy.  However, it is entirely the purview
   of the network system as managed by the network administrator to
   decide what to do with this information.  The key function of this
   option is simply to identify the type of device to the network in a
   structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing

9.1.  Client Behavior

   A DHCP DHCPv4 client MAY emit either a DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 option or both. and a DHCPv6 client MAY emit
   DHCPv6 option.  These options are singletons, as specified in
   [RFC7227].  Because clients are intended to have at most one MUD URL
   associated with them, they may emit at most one MUD URL option via
   DHCPv4 and one MUD URL option via DHCPv6.  In the case where both v4
   and v6 DHCP options are emitted, the same URL MUST be used.

   Clients SHOULD log or otherwise report improper acknowledgments from
   servers, but they MUST NOT modify their MUD URL configuration based
   on a server's response.  The server's response is only an
   acknowledgment that the server has processed the option, and promises
   no specific network behavior to the client.  In particular, it may
   not be possible for the server to retrieve the file associated with
   the MUD URL, or the local network administration may not wish to use
   the usage description.  Neither of these situations should be
   considered in any way exceptional.

9.2.  Server Behavior

   A DHCP server may ignore these options or take action based on
   receipt of these options.  For purposes of debugging, if  If a server successfully parses the option
   and the URL, it MUST return the option with the same length field set to zero
   and a corresponding null URL field as an acknowledgment.  Even in
   this circumstance, no specific network behavior is guaranteed.  When
   a server consumes this option, it will either forward the URL and
   relevant client information to a network management system (such as
   the giaddr), or it will retrieve the usage description by resolving
   the URL.

   DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
   pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
   controller.  A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST adhere
   to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to validate the
   TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file.  Those
   servers will retrieve the file, process it, create and install the
   necessary configuration on the relevant network element.  Servers
   SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface.  A
   DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
   a MUD URL to a network management system MUST notify the network
   management of any corresponding change to the DHCP state of the
   client (such as expiration or explicit release of a network address

9.3.  Relay Requirements

   There are no additional requirements for relays.

10.  The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension

   [RFC7299] provides a procedure and means to specify extensions to

   This section defines an X.509 certificates.  The MUD URL is a non-critical Certificate certificate extension that
   contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an
   on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate
   subject.  This extension contains a single
   Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).  URI must be represented as described in Section 7.4 of

   Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers must (IRIs) MUST be represented mapped to
   URIs as URI's specified in the way described Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
   in RFC
   5280, section 7.4. the certificate extension.

   The semantics of the URI are defined Section 5 of this document.

   The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of

         These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line
         information about the issuer or the subject.

   The MUD URL is precisely that: online information about the
   particular subject.

   The new extension is identified as follows:

   - The MUD URL extension

    MUDURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                 id-mod-mudURLExtn2016(TBD1) }


    -- EXPORTS ALL --

      FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
              { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

      FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
              { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
                id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;
      MUDCertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-MUDURL, ... }
      IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url }

      id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFER IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe
   TBD TBD2 }

   The extension returns a single value:


      MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String - for use with MUD architecture.

   The semantics of the URI are defined Section 5.


11.  The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension

   The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [IEEE8021AB] is
   a one hop vendor-neutral link layer protocols used by end hosts
   network devices for advertising their identity, capabilities, and
   neighbors on an IEEE 802 local area network.  Its Type-Length-Value
   (TLV) design allows for 'vendor-specific' extensions to be defined.
   IANA has a registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier
   (OUI) defined as documented in [RFC7042].  The MUD LLDP extension
   uses a subtype defined in this document to carry the MUD URL.

   The LLDP vendor specific frame has the following format:

   |TLV Type|  len   |   OUI    |subtype  | MUD URL
   |  =127  |        |= 00 00 5E|  = 1    |
   |(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-256 octet)|(1-255 octets)


   o  TLV Type = 127 indicates a vendor-specific TLV

   o  len - indicates the TLV string length

   o  OUI = 00 00 5E is the organizationally unique identifier of IANA

   o  subtype = 1 (to be assigned by IANA for the MUD URL)

   o  MUD URL - the length MUST NOT exceed 256 255 octets (consistent with
      the DHCP option defined in Section 9)

   The intent of this extension is to provide both a new device
   classifier to the network as well as some recommended configuration
   to the routers that implement policy.  However, it is entirely the
   purview of the network system as managed by the network administrator
   to decide what to do with this information.  The key function of this
   extension is simply to identify the type of device to the network in
   a structured way such that the policy can be easily found with
   existing toolsets.

   Hosts, routers, or other network devices that implement this option
   are intended to have at most one MUD URL associated with them, so
   they may transmit at most one MUD URL value.

   Hosts, routers, or other network devices that implement this option
   may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these
   options.  For example they may fill in information in the respective
   extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (LLDP MIB).  LLDP
   operates in a one-way direction.  LLDPDUs are not exchanged as
   information requests by one device and response sent by another
   device.  The other devices do not acknowledge LLDP information
   received from a device. No specific network behavior is guaranteed.
   When a device consumes this extension, it may either forward the URL
   and relevant remote device information to a network management
   system, or it will retrieve the usage description by resolving the

12.  Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files

   Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
   network access lists, they are sensitive.  To insure that they have
   not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed.  We make
   use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for
   this purpose.

12.1.  Creating a MUD file signature

   A MUD file MUST be signed using CMS as an opaque binary object.  In
   order to make successful verification more likely, intermediate
   certificates SHOULD be included.  The signature is stored at the same
   location as the MUD URL but with the suffix of ".p7s".  Signatures
   are transferred using content-type "Application/pkcs7-signature".

   For example:

   % openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
                 -in mudfile -binary -outform DER - \
                 -certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s

   Note: A MUD file may need to be resigned if the signature expires.

12.2.  Verifying a MUD file signature

   Prior to retrieving a MUD file the MUD controller SHOULD retrieve the
   MUD signature file using the MUD URL with a suffix of ".p7s".  For
   example, if the MUD URL is "
   modela", the MUD signature URL will be "

   Upon retrieving a MUD file, a MUD controller MUST validate the
   signature of the file before continuing with further processing.  A
   MUD controller SHOULD produce an error and it MUST cease all
   processing of that file if the signature cannot be validated.  It is
   important that MUD controllers have some reason to trust the
   certificates they are seeing.  Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that new
   signers be validated either directly by an administrator or by a
   service that has some reason to believe that the signer is a good

   For Example:

   % openssl cms -verify -in mudfile.p7s -inform DER -content mudfile

   Note the additional step of verifying the common trust root.

13.  Extensibility

   One of our design goals is to see that MUD files are able to be
   understood by as broad a cross-section of systems as is possible.
   Coupled with the fact that we have also chosen to leverage existing
   mechanisms, we are left with no ability to negotiate extensions and a
   limited desire for those extensions in any event.  A such, a two-tier
   extensibility framework is employed, as follows:

   1.  At a coarse grain, a protocol version is included in a MUD URL.
       This memo specifies MUD version 1.  Any and all changes are
       entertained when this version is bumped.  Transition approaches
       between versions would be a matter for discussion in future

   2.  At a finer grain, only extensions that would not incur additional
       risk to the device are permitted.  Specifically, augmenting of
       the meta-info metainfo container is permitted with the understanding that
       such additions may be ignored.  In addition, augmentation of the
       ACL model is permitted so long as it remains safe for a given ACE
       to be ignored by the MUD Controller or the network elements it
       configures.  Most specifically, is is not permitted to include as
       an augmentation that modifies "deny" behavior without bumping the
       version.  Furthermore, implementations that are not able to parse
       a component of the ACE array MUST ignore the entire array entry
       (e.g., not the entire array) and MAY ignore the entire MUD file.

14.  Security Considerations

   Based on the means a URL is procured, a device may be able to lie
   about what it is, thus gaining additional network access.  There are
   several means to limit risk in this case.  The most obvious is to
   only believe devices that make use of certificate-based
   authentication such as IEEE 802.1AR certificates.  When those
   certificates are not present, devices claiming to be of a certain
   manufacturer SHOULD NOT be included in that manufacturer grouping
   without additional validation of some form.  This will occur when it
   makes use of primitives such as "manufacturer" for the purpose of
   accessing devices of a particular type.

   Network management systems SHOULD NOT deploy accept a usage description for
   a device with the same MAC address that has indicated a change of
   authority without some additional validation (such as review of the
   class).  New devices that present some form of unauthenticated MUD
   URL SHOULD be validated by some external means when they would be
   otherwise be given increased network access.

   It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
   exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
   There are three recommended approaches to address this threat.  The
   first is to validate the signature of the MUD file.  The second is to
   have a system do a primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both
   parseable and believable at some level.  MUD files will likely be
   relatively small, to start with.  The number of ACEs used by any
   given device should be relatively small as well.  Second, it may be
   useful to limit retrieval of MUD URLs to only those sites that are
   known to have decent web reputations.

   Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names.  If a domain name
   changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
   provide MUD files that MUD controllers would consider valid.  There
   are a few approaches that can mitigate this attack.  First, MUD file
   servers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server.  When
   a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD
   controller should check to see if ownership of the domain has
   changed.  A fair programmatic approximation of this is when the name
   servers for the domain have changed.  If the actual MUD file has
   changed, the controller MAY check the WHOIS database to see if
   registration ownership of a domain has changed.  If a change has
   occured, or if for some reason it is not possible to determine
   whether ownership has changed, further review may be warranted.
   Note, this remediation does not take into account the case of a
   device that was produced long ago and only recently fielded, or the
   case where a new MUD controller has been installed.

15.  IANA Considerations

15.1.  DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options

   IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified
   in Section 9.

15.2.  PKIX Extensions

   The IANA is requested to assign release of a value for id-pe-mud-uri in MUD URL by a device reveals what the device is, and
   provides an attacker with guidance on what vulnerabilities may be
   present.  This is a security consideration.

   While the MUD URL itself is not intended to be unique to a specific
   device, the release of the URL may aid an observer in identifying
   individuals when combined with other information.  This is a privacy

   In addressing both of these concerns, implementors should take into
   account what other information they are advertising through
   mechanisms such as mDNS[RFC6872], how a device might otherwise be
   identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is connected to
   the network, whether a device is intended to be used by individuals
   or carry personal identifying information, and then apply appropriate
   data minimization techniques.  One approach is to make use of EAP-TLS
   (cited above) as the means to share information with the network.
   Network devices may also assist in limiting access to the MUD-URL
   through the use of mechanisms such as DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610].

15.  IANA Considerations

15.1.  DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options

   The IANA has allocated option 161 in the Dynamic Host Configuration
   Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry
   for the MUD DHCPv4 option.

   IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified
   in Section 9.

15.2.  PKIX Extensions

   IANA is kindly requested to make the following assignments for:

   o The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for
   PKIX Module Identifier" registry (

   o id-pe-mud-url object identifier from the "SMI Security for PKIX
   Certificate Extension" Registry.  Its registry (

   The use fo these values is specified in Section 10.

15.3.  Well Known URI Suffix

   The IANA is requested to register has allocated the URL suffix of "mud" as follows:

   o URI Suffix: "mud" o Specification documents: this document o
   Related information: n/a

15.4.  MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files

   The following media-type is defined for transfer of MUD file:

   o Type name: application
   o Subtype name: mud+json
   o Required parameters: n/a
   o Optional parameters: n/a
   o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/mud+json values
     are represented as a JSON object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be
   o Security considerations: See {{secon}} of this document.
   o Interoperability considerations: n/a
   o Published specification: this document
   o Applications that use this media type: MUD controllers as
     specified by this document.
   o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
   o Additional information:

       Magic number(s): n/a
       File extension(s): n/a
       Macintosh file type code(s): n/a

   o Person & email address to contact for further information:
     Eliot Lear <>, Ralph Droms <>
   o Intended usage: COMMON
   o Restrictions on usage: none

   o Author: Eliot Lear <>, Ralph Droms <>
   o Change controller: IESG
   o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.

15.5.  LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry

   IANA is requested to create a new registry for IANA Link Layer
   Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV subtype values.  The recommended policy
   for this registry is Expert Review.  The maximum number of entries in
   the registry is 256.

   IANA is required to populate the initial registry with the value:

   LLDP subtype value = 1 (All the other 255 values should be initially
   marked as 'Unassigned'.)

   Description = the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform
   Resource Locator (URL)

   Reference = < this document >

15.6.  The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)

   Namespace ID: "urn:mud"

   The following parameter registry is requested to be added in
   accordance with [RFC3553]

    Registry name: "urn:ietf:params:mud" is requested.  Registration Information:
   registration version number: 1 registration date: 2016-09-27

   Declared registrant of the namespace: The Internet Engineering Task
   Force Ops Area WG Designated contact person:
   Declaration of syntactic structure: Entries should follow the syntax
    Specification: this document
    Repository: this document
    Index value:  Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service name name, as found
                  specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC6335].
   Relevant ancillary documentation: this document.  Identifier
   uniqueness considerations: see below Identifier persistence
   considerations: no resolution mechanism is anticipated.  Process of
   identifier assignment: IANA is requested to maintain a table of
   entries that are updated with the policy of "standards action".
   Process for identifier resolution: n/a Rules for Lexical Equivalence:
   exact ASCII match Conformance with URN Syntax: no special
   considerations.  Validation mechanism: a syntax grammar Scope: These
   identifiers are intended solely for use as a means to indicate
   standard MUD controllers. [RFC6335]

   The following entries should be added to the "ietf:mud" "urn:ietf:params:mud"
   name space:


   "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by
   "ietf:mud:ntp"  "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified
   by [RFC5905].

16.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, Bernie Volz,
   Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm, John Bashinski,
   Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, and Dan Wing for their valuable advice and
   reviews.  Russ Housley entirely rewrote Section 10 to be a complete
   module.  Adrian Farrel provided the basis for privacy considerations
   text.  The remaining errors in this work are entirely the
   responsibility of the author.

17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-04 (work in progress), June October 2016.

              Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
              "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
              draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-09 (work in progress), July October

              Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
              Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks--
              Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery",

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
              2003, <>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,

   [RFC3987]  Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
              Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
              January 2005, <>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,

   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
              Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
              Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,

   [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
              Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
              Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
              RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,

   [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
              S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
              BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,

   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group",

   [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
              Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
              RFC 7299, 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <>. 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,

17.2.  Informative References

   [FW95]     Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls",
              January 1995.

              Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
              "Secure Device Identity", 1998.

              International Organization for Standardization, "Data
              elements and interchange formats - Information interchange
              - Representation of dates and times", ISO Standard 8601,
              June 1988.

   [RFC1984]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
              Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,

   [RFC3553]  Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
              IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
              Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
              2003, <>.

   [RFC6872]  Gurbani, V., Ed., Burger, E., Ed., Anjali, T., Abdelnur,
              H., and O. Festor, "The Common Log Format (CLF) for the
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Framework and
              Information Model", RFC 6872, DOI 10.17487/RFC6872,
              February 2013, <>.

   [RFC7042]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and J. Abley, "IANA Considerations and
              IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802
              Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 7042, DOI 10.17487/RFC7042,
              October 2013, <>.

   [RFC7452]  Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
              "Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
              RFC 7452, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,

   [RFC7488]  Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T.
              Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection",
              RFC 7488, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015,

Appendix A.  Changes from Earlier Versions

   RFC Editor to remove this section prior to publication.

   Draft -01 to -02: * Update IANA considerations * Accept Russ Housley
   rewrite of X.509 text * Include privacy considerations text * Redo
   the URL limit.  Still 255 bytes, but now stated in the URL
   definition.  * Change URI registration to be under urn:ietf:params

   Draft -00 to -01: * Fix cert trust text.  * change supportInformation
   to meta-info * Add an informaitonal element in.  * add urn registry
   and create first entry * add default elements

Appendix B.  Default MUD elements

   What follows is a MUD file that permits DNS traffic to a controller
   that is registered with the URN "urn:mud:dns" "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" and traffic
   NTP to a controller that is registered "urn:mud:ntp". "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp".
   This is considered the default behavior and the ACEs are in effect
   appended to whatever other ACEs.  To block DNS or NTP one repeats the
   matching statement but replace "permit" with deny.  Because ACEs are
   processed in the order they are received, the defaults would not be
   reached.  A MUD controller might further decide to optimize to simply
   not include the defaults when they are overriden.

   A complete MUD entry is included below.

     "ietf-mud:meta-info": {
       "lastUpdate": "2016-09-27T15:10:24+02:00",
       "cacheValidity": 1440
     "ietf-acl:access-lists": {
       "ietf-acl:access-list": [
           "acl-name": "mud-53134-v4in",
           "acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
           "ietf-mud:packet-direction": "to-device",
           "access-list-entries": {
             "ace": [
                 "rule-name": "entout0-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [

                 "rule-name": "entout1-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 6,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout2-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:ntp", "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 123,
                     "upper-port": 123
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
           "acl-name": "mud-53134-v4out",
           "acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
           "ietf-mud:packet-direction": "from-device",
           "access-list-entries": {
             "ace": [
                 "rule-name": "entout0-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout1-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 6,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout2-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:ntp", "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 123,
                     "upper-port": 123
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
           "acl-name": "mud-53134-v6in",
           "acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
           "ietf-mud:packet-direction": "to-device",
           "access-list-entries": {
             "ace": [
                 "rule-name": "entout0-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout1-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 6,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout2-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:ntp", "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 123,
                     "upper-port": 123
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
           "acl-name": "mud-53134-v6out",
           "acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
           "ietf-mud:packet-direction": "from-device",
           "access-list-entries": {
             "ace": [
                 "rule-name": "entout0-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout1-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:dns", "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns",
                   "protocol": 6,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 53,
                     "upper-port": 53
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [
                 "rule-name": "entout2-in",
                 "matches": {
                   "ietf-mud:controller": "urn:mud:ntp", "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp",
                   "protocol": 17,
                   "source-port-range": {
                     "lower-port": 123,
                     "upper-port": 123
                 "actions": {
                   "permit": [

Authors' Addresses

   Eliot Lear
   Cisco Systems
   Richtistrasse 7
   Wallisellen  CH-8304

   Phone: +41 44 878 9200

   Ralph Droms

   Phone: +1 978 376 3731

   Dan Romascanu