Oblivious HTTP Application Intermediation                     M. Thomson
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                               C.A. Wood
Expires: 29 May 19 August 2022                                       Cloudflare
                                                        25 November 2021
                                                        15 February 2022

                             Oblivious HTTP


   This document describes a system for the forwarding of encrypted HTTP
   messages.  This allows a client to make multiple requests of a server
   without the server being able to link those requests to the client or
   to identify the requests as having come from the same client.

Discussion Venues

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://ietf-wg-  Status
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   Application Intermediation Working Group mailing list
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Key Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Key Configuration Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Key Configuration Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
   5.  HPKE Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
     5.1.  Encapsulation of Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
     5.2.  Encapsulation of Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  HTTP Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
     6.1.  Informational Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  15
     6.2.  Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  15
   7.  Media Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  message/ohttp-req Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  message/ohttp-res Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Client Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.2.  Proxy Responsibilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       8.2.1.  Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       8.2.2.  Linkability Through Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . .  20
     8.3.  Server Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.4.  Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  22
       8.4.1.  Use of Date for Anti-Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.5.  Post-Compromise Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23  24
   10. Operational and Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  24
     10.1.  Performance Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.2.  Resource Mappings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.3.  Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

   11. Repurposing the Encapsulation Format  . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   12.  26
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     12.1.  26
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     12.2.  26
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25  27
   Appendix A.  Complete Example of a Request and Response . . . . .  27  29
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29  31
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29  31

1.  Introduction

   The act of making a request using HTTP reveals information about the
   client identity to a server.  Though the content of requests might
   reveal information, that is information under the control of the
   client.  In comparison, the source address on the connection reveals
   information that a client has only limited control over.

   Even where an IP address is not directly attributed to an individual,
   the use of an address over time can be used to correlate requests.
   Servers are able to use this information to assemble profiles of
   client behavior, from which they can make inferences about the people
   involved.  The use of persistent connections to make multiple
   requests improves performance, but provides servers with additional
   certainty about the identity of clients in a similar fashion.

   Use of an HTTP proxy can provide a degree of protection against
   servers correlating requests.  Systems like virtual private networks
   or the Tor network [Dingledine2004], provide other options for

   Though the overhead imposed by these methods varies, the cost for
   each request is significant.  Preventing request linkability requires
   that each request use a completely new TLS connection to the server.
   At a minimum, this requires an additional round trip to the server in
   addition to that required by the request.  In addition to having high
   latency, there are significant secondary costs, both in terms of the
   number of additional bytes exchanged and the CPU cost of
   cryptographic computations.

   This document describes a method of encapsulation for binary HTTP
   messages [BINARY] using Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE; [HPKE]).
   This protects the content of both requests and responses and enables
   a deployment architecture that can separate the identity of a
   requester from the request.

   Though this scheme requires that servers and proxies explicitly
   support it, this design represents a performance improvement over
   options that perform just one request in each connection.  With
   limited trust placed in the proxy (see Section 8), clients are
   assured that requests are not uniquely attributed to them or linked
   to other requests.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Encapsulated Request:  An HTTP request that is encapsulated in an
      HPKE-encrypted message; see Section 5.1.

   Encapsulated Response:  An HTTP response that is encapsulated in an
      HPKE-encrypted message; see Section 5.2.

   Oblivious Proxy Resource:  An intermediary that forwards requests and
      responses between clients and a single oblivious request resource.

   Oblivious Request Resource:  A resource that can receive an
      encapsulated request, extract the contents of that request,
      forward it to an oblivious target resource, receive a response,
      encapsulate that response, then return that response.

   Oblivious Target Resource:  The resource that is the target of an
      encapsulated request.  This resource logically handles only
      regular HTTP requests and responses and so might be ignorant of
      the use of oblivious HTTP to reach it.

   This draft includes pseudocode that uses the functions and
   conventions defined in [HPKE].

   Encoding an integer to a sequence of bytes in network byte order is
   described using the function encode(n, v), where n is the number of
   bytes and v is the integer value.  The function len() returns the
   length of a sequence of bytes.

   Formats are described using notation from Section 1.3 of [QUIC].

3.  Overview

   A client learns the following:

   *  The identity of an oblivious request resource.  This might include
      some information about oblivious target resources that the
      oblivious request resource supports.

   *  The details of an HPKE public key that the oblivious request
      resource accepts, including an identifier for that key and the
      HPKE algorithms that are used with that key.

   *  The identity of an oblivious proxy resource that will forward
      encapsulated requests and responses to the a single oblivious request
      resource.  See Section 10.2 for more information about the mapping
      between oblivious proxy and oblivious request resources.

   This information allows the client to make a request of an oblivious
   target resource without that resource having only a limited ability
   to correlate that request with the client IP or other requests that
   the client might make to that server.

   +---------+       +----------+       +----------+    +----------+
   | Client  |       | Proxy    |       | Request  |    | Target   |
   |         |       | Resource |       | Resource |    | Resource |
   +----+----+       +----+-----+       +----+-----+    +----+-----+
        |                 |                  |               |
        | Encapsulated    |                  |               |
        | Request         |                  |               |
        +---------------->| Encapsulated     |               |
        |                 | Request          |               |
        |                 +----------------->| Request       |
        |                 |                  +-------------->|
        |                 |                  |               |
        |                 |                  |      Response |
        |                 |     Encapsulated |<--------------+
        |                 |         Response |               |
        |    Encapsulated |<-----------------+               |
        |        Response |                  |               |
        |<----------------+                  |               |
        |                 |                  |               |

                    Figure 1: Overview of Oblivious HTTP

   In order to make a request to an oblivious target resource, the
   following steps occur, as shown in Figure 1:

   1.   The client constructs an HTTP request for an oblivious target

   2.   The client encodes the HTTP request in a binary HTTP message and
        then encapsulates that message using HPKE and the process from
        Section 5.1.

   3.   The client sends a POST request to the oblivious proxy resource
        with the encapsulated request as the content of that message.

   4.   The oblivious proxy resource forwards this request to the
        oblivious request resource.

   5.   The oblivious request resource receives this request and removes
        the HPKE protection to obtain an HTTP request.

   6.   The oblivious request resource makes an HTTP request that
        includes the target URI, method, fields, and content of the
        request it acquires.

   7.   The oblivious target resource answers this HTTP request with an
        HTTP response.

   8.   The oblivious request resource encapsulates the HTTP response
        following the process in Section 5.2 and sends this in response
        to the request from the oblivious proxy resource.

   9.   The oblivious proxy resource forwards this response to the

   10.  The client removes the encapsulation to obtain the response to
        the original request.

3.1.  Applicability

   Oblivious HTTP has limited applicability.  Many uses of HTTP benefit
   from being able to carry state between requests, such as with cookies
   ([RFC6265]), authentication (Section 11 of [HTTP]), or even
   alternative services ([RFC7838]).  Oblivious HTTP seeks to prevent
   this sort of linkage, which requires that applications not carry
   state between requests.

   Oblivious HTTP is primarily useful where privacy risks associated
   with possible stateful treatment of requests are sufficiently
   negative that the cost of deploying this protocol can be justified.
   Oblivious HTTP is simpler and less costly than more robust systems,
   like Prio ([PRIO]) or Tor ([Dingledine2004]), which can provide
   stronger guarantees at higher operational costs.

   Oblivious HTTP is more costly than a direct connection to a server.
   Some costs, like those involved with connection setup, can be
   amortized, but there are several ways in which oblivious HTTP is more
   expensive than a direct request:

   *  Each oblivious request requires at least two regular HTTP
      requests, which adds latency.

   *  Each request is expanded in size with additional HTTP fields,
      encryption-related metadata, and AEAD expansion.

   *  Deriving cryptographic keys and applying them for request and
      response protection takes non-negligible computational resources.

   Examples of where preventing the linking of requests might justify
   these costs include:

   *  DNS queries.  DNS queries made to a recursive resolver reveal
      information about the requester, particularly if linked to other

   *  Telemetry submission.  Applications that submit reports about
      their usage to their developers might use oblivious HTTP for some
      types of moderately sensitive data.

   These are examples of requests where there is information in a
   request that - if it were connected to the identity of the user -
   might allow a server to learn something about that user even if the
   identity of the user is pseudonymous.  Other examples include the
   submission of anonymous surveys, making search queries, or requesting
   location-specific content (such as retrieving tiles of a map

4.  Key Configuration

   A client needs to acquire information about the key configuration of
   the oblivious request resource in order to send encapsulated

   In order to ensure that clients do not encapsulate messages that
   other entities can intercept, the key configuration MUST be
   authenticated and have integrity protection.

   This document describes the "application/ohttp-keys" media type; see
   Section 4.2.  This media type might be used, for example with HTTPS,
   as part of a system for configuring or discovering key
   configurations.  Note however that such a system needs to consider
   the potential for key configuration to be used to compromise client
   privacy; see Section 9.

   Specifying a format for expressing the information a client needs to
   construct an encapsulated request ensures that different client
   implementations can be configured in the same way.  This also enables
   advertising key configurations in a consistent format.

   A client might have multiple key configurations to select from when
   encapsulating a request.  Clients are responsible for selecting a
   preferred key configuration from those it supports.  Clients need to
   consider both the key encapsulation method (KEM) and the combinations
   of key derivation function (KDF) and authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) in this decision.

   Evolution of the key configuration format is supported through the
   definition of new formats that are identified by new media types.

4.1.  Key Configuration Encoding

   A single key configuration consists of a key identifier, a public
   key, an identifier for the KEM that the public key uses, and a set
   HPKE symmetric algorithms.  Each symmetric algorithm consists of an
   identifier for a KDF and an identifier for an AEAD.

   Figure 2 shows a single key configuration, KeyConfig, that is
   expressed using the TLS syntax; see Section 3 of [TLS].

   opaque HpkePublicKey[Npk];
   uint16 HpkeKemId;
   uint16 HpkeKdfId;
   uint16 HpkeAeadId;

   struct {
     HpkeKdfId kdf_id;
     HpkeAeadId aead_id;
   } HpkeSymmetricAlgorithms;

   struct {
     uint8 key_id;
     HpkeKemId kem_id;
     HpkePublicKey public_key;
     HpkeSymmetricAlgorithms cipher_suites<4..2^16-4>;
   } KeyConfig;

                    Figure 2: A Single Key Configuration

   The types HpkeKemId, HpkeKdfId, and HpkeAeadId identify a KEM, KDF,
   and AEAD respectively.  The definitions for these identifiers and the
   semantics of the algorithms they identify can be found in [HPKE].
   The Npk parameter corresponding to the HpkeKdfId can be found in

4.2.  Key Configuration Media Type

   The "application/ohttp-keys" format is a media type that identifies a
   serialized collection of key configurations.  The content of this
   media type comprises one or more key configuration encodings (see
   Section 4.1) that are concatenated.

   Type name:  application

   Subtype name:  ohttp-keys

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  None

   Encoding considerations:  only "8bit" or "binary" is permitted

   Security considerations:  see Section 8

   Interoperability considerations:  N/A

   Published specification:  this specification

   Applications that use this media type:  N/A

   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A

   Additional information:  Magic number(s):  N/A

                            Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A

                            File extension(s):  N/A

                            Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information:  see Aut
      hors' Addresses section

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  N/A

   Author:  see Authors' Addresses section

   Change controller:  IESG

5.  HPKE Encapsulation

   HTTP message encapsulation uses HPKE for request and response

   An encapsulated HTTP message includes the following

   1.  A request contains a binary-encoded HTTP message; see [BINARY].

   2.  Padding of arbitrary length which MUST contain all zeroes.

   The encoding of an HTTP message is as follows:

   Plaintext Message
   [BINARY] and no other fields; see Figure 3.

   Request {
     Binary HTTP Message Length (i),
     Message (..),
     Padding Length (i),
     Padding (..),

                    Figure 3: Plaintext Request Content

   An Encapsulated Request is comprised of a length-prefixed key
   identifier and a HPKE-protected request message.  HPKE protection
   includes an encapsulated KEM shared secret (or enc), plus the AEAD-
   protected request message.  An Encapsulated Request is shown in
   Figure 3. 4.  Section 5.1 describes the process for constructing and
   processing an Encapsulated Request.

   Encapsulated Request {
     Key Identifier (8),
     KEM Identifier (16),
     KDF Identifier (16),
     AEAD Identifier (16),
     Encapsulated KEM Shared Secret (8*Nenc),
     AEAD-Protected Request (..),

                       Figure 3: 4: Encapsulated Request

   The Nenc parameter corresponding to the HpkeKdfId can be found in
   Section 7.1 of [HPKE].

   An encapsulated HTTP response includes a binary-encoded HTTP message
   [BINARY] and no other content; see Figure 5.

   Response {
     Binary HTTP Message (..),

                    Figure 5: Plaintext Response Content

   Responses are bound to responses and so consist only of AEAD-
   protected content.  Section 5.2 describes the process for
   constructing and processing an Encapsulated Response.

   Encapsulated Response {
     Nonce (Nk),
     AEAD-Protected Response (..),

                      Figure 4: 6: Encapsulated Response

   The Nenc and Nk parameters corresponding to the HpkeKdfId can be
   found in [HPKE].  Nenc refers to the size of the Nonce field encapsulated KEM
   shared secret, in an Encapsulated Response corresponds bytes; Nk refers to the size of an the AEAD key for
   the corresponding HPKE ciphersuite. ciphersuite, in bits.

5.1.  Encapsulation of Requests

   Clients encapsulate a request request using values from a key

   *  the key identifier from the configuration, keyID, with the
      corresponding KEM identified by kemID,

   *  the public key from the configuration, pkR, and

   *  a selected combination of KDF, identified by kdfID, and AEAD,
      identified by aeadID.

   The client then constructs an encapsulated request, enc_request, from
   a binary encoded HTTP request, request, as follows:

   1.  Compute an HPKE context using pkR, pkR and a label of "message/bhttp
       request", yielding context and encapsulation key enc.

   2.  Construct associated data, aad, by concatenating the values of
       keyID, kemID, kdfID, and aeadID, as one 8-bit integer and three
       16-bit integers, respectively, each in network byte order.

   3.  Encrypt (seal) request with aad as associated data using context,
       yielding ciphertext ct.

   4.  Concatenate the values of aad, enc, and ct, yielding an
       Encapsulated Request enc_request.

   Note that enc is of fixed-length, so there is no ambiguity in parsing
   this structure.

   In pseudocode, this procedure is as follows:

   enc, context = SetupBaseS(pkR, "request") "message/bhttp request")
   aad = concat(encode(1, keyID),
                encode(2, kemID),
                encode(2, kdfID),
                encode(2, aeadID))
   ct = context.Seal(aad, request)
   enc_request = concat(aad, enc, ct)

   Servers decrypt an Encapsulated Request by reversing this process.
   Given an Encapsulated Request enc_request, a server:

   1.  Parses enc_request into keyID, kemID, kdfID, aeadID, enc, and ct
       (indicated using the function parse() in pseudocode).  The server
       is then able to find the HPKE private key, skR, corresponding to

       a.  If keyID does not identify a key matching the type of kemID,
       the server returns an error.

       b.  If kdfID and aeadID identify a combination of KDF and AEAD
       that the server is unwilling to use with skR, the server returns
       an error.

   2.  Compute an HPKE context using skR skR, a label of "message/bhttp
       request", and the encapsulated key enc, yielding context.

   3.  Construct additional associated data, aad, from keyID, kemID,
       kdfID, and aeadID or as the first seven bytes of enc_request.

   4.  Decrypt ct using aad as associated data, yielding request or an
       error on failure.  If decryption fails, the server returns an

   In pseudocode, this procedure is as follows:

   keyID, kemID, kdfID, aeadID, enc, ct = parse(enc_request)
   aad = concat(encode(1, keyID),
                encode(2, kemID),
                encode(2, kdfID),
                encode(2, aeadID))
   context = SetupBaseR(enc, skR, "request") "message/bhttp request")
   request, error = context.Open(aad, ct)

5.2.  Encapsulation of Responses

   Given an HPKE context context, a request message request, and a
   response response, servers generate an Encapsulated Response
   enc_response as follows:

   1.  Export a secret secret from context, using the string "response" "message/
       bhttp response" as context.  The length of this secret is max(Nn,
       Nk), where Nn and Nk are the length of AEAD key and nonce
       associated with context.

   2.  Generate a random value of length max(Nn, Nk) bytes, called

   3.  Extract a pseudorandom key prk using the Extract function
       provided by the KDF algorithm associated with context.  The ikm
       input to this function is secret; the salt input is the
       concatenation of enc (from enc_request) and response_nonce

   4.  Use the Expand function provided by the same KDF to extract an
       AEAD key key, of length Nk - the length of the keys used by the
       AEAD associated with context.  Generating key uses a label of

   5.  Use the same Expand function to extract a nonce nonce of length
       Nn - the length of the nonce used by the AEAD.  Generating nonce
       uses a label of "nonce".

   6.  Encrypt response, passing the AEAD function Seal the values of
       key, nonce, empty aad, and a pt input of request, which yields

   7.  Concatenate response_nonce and ct, yielding an Encapsulated
       Response enc_response.  Note that response_nonce is of fixed-
       length, so there is no ambiguity in parsing either response_nonce
       or ct.

   In pseudocode, this procedure is as follows:

   secret = context.Export("response", context.Export("message/bhttp response", Nk)
   response_nonce = random(max(Nn, Nk))
   salt = concat(enc, response_nonce)
   prk = Extract(salt, secret)
   aead_key = Expand(prk, "key", Nk)
   aead_nonce = Expand(prk, "nonce", Nn)
   ct = Seal(aead_key, aead_nonce, "", response)
   enc_response = concat(response_nonce, ct)

   Clients decrypt an Encapsulated Request by reversing this process.
   That is, they first parse enc_response into response_nonce and ct.
   They then follow the same process to derive values for aead_key and

   The client uses these values to decrypt ct using the Open function
   provided by the AEAD.  Decrypting might produce an error, as follows:

   reponse, error = Open(aead_key, aead_nonce, "", ct)

6.  HTTP Usage

   A client interacts with the oblivious proxy resource by constructing
   an encapsulated request.  This encapsulated request is included as
   the content of a POST request to the oblivious proxy resource.  This
   request MUST only contain those fields necessary to carry the
   encapsulated request: a method of POST, a target URI of the oblivious
   proxy resource, a header field containing the content type (see
   (Section 7), and the encapsulated request as the request content.
   Clients MAY include fields that do not reveal information about the
   content of the request, such as Alt-Used [ALT-SVC], or information
   that it trusts the oblivious proxy resource to remove, such as fields
   that are listed in the Connection header field.

   The oblivious proxy resource interacts with the oblivious request
   resource by constructing a request using the same restrictions as the
   client request, except that the target URI is the oblivious request
   resource.  The content of this request is copied from the client.
   The oblivious proxy resource MUST NOT add information about the
   client to this request.

   When a response is received from the oblivious request resource, the
   oblivious proxy resource forwards the response according to the rules
   of an HTTP proxy; see Section 7.6 of [HTTP].

   An oblivious request resource, if it receives any response from the
   oblivious target resource, sends a single 200 response containing the
   encapsulated response.  Like the request from the client, this
   response MUST only contain those fields necessary to carry the
   encapsulated response: a 200 status code, a header field indicating
   the content type, and the encapsulated response as the response
   content.  As with requests, additional fields MAY be used to convey
   information that does not reveal information about the encapsulated

   An oblivious request resource acts as a gateway for requests to the
   oblivious target resource (see Section 7.6 of [HTTP]).  The one
   exception is that any information it might forward in a response MUST
   be encapsulated, unless it is responding to errors it detects before
   removing encapsulation of the request; see Section 6.2.

6.1.  Informational Responses

   This encapsulation does not permit progressive processing of
   responses.  Though the binary HTTP response format does support the
   inclusion of informational (1xx) status codes, the AEAD encapsulation
   cannot be removed until the entire message is received.

   In particular, the Expect header field with 100-continue (see
   Section 10.1.1 of [HTTP]) cannot be used.  Clients MUST NOT construct
   a request that includes a 100-continue expectation; the oblivious
   request resource MUST generate an error if a 100-continue expectation
   is received.

6.2.  Errors

   A server that receives an invalid message for any reason MUST
   generate an HTTP response with a 4xx status code.

   Errors detected by the oblivious proxy resource and errors detected
   by the oblivious request resource before removing protection
   (including being unable to remove encapsulation for any reason)
   result in the status code being sent without protection in response
   to the POST request made to that resource.

   Errors detected by the oblivious request resource after successfully
   removing encapsulation and errors detected by the oblivious target
   resource MUST be sent in an encapsulated response.

7.  Media Types

   Media types are used to identify encapsulated requests and responses.

   Evolution of the format of encapsulated requests and responses is
   supported through the definition of new formats that are identified
   by new media types.

7.1.  message/ohttp-req Media Type

   The "message/ohttp-req" identifies an encapsulated binary HTTP
   request.  This is a binary format that is defined in Section 5.1.

   Type name:  message

   Subtype name:  ohttp-req

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  None
   Encoding considerations:  only "8bit" or "binary" is permitted

   Security considerations:  see Section 8

   Interoperability considerations:  N/A

   Published specification:  this specification

   Applications that use this media type:  N/A

   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A

   Additional information:  Magic number(s):  N/A

                            Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A

                            File extension(s):  N/A

                            Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information:  see Aut
      hors' Addresses section

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  N/A

   Author:  see Authors' Addresses section

   Change controller:  IESG

7.2.  message/ohttp-res Media Type

   The "message/ohttp-res" identifies an encapsulated binary HTTP
   response.  This is a binary format that is defined in Section 5.2.

   Type name:  message

   Subtype name:  ohttp-res

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  None

   Encoding considerations:  only "8bit" or "binary" is permitted

   Security considerations:  see Section 8
   Interoperability considerations:  N/A

   Published specification:  this specification

   Applications that use this media type:  N/A

   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A

   Additional information:  Magic number(s):  N/A

                            Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A

                            File extension(s):  N/A

                            Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information:  see Aut
      hors' Addresses section

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  N/A

   Author:  see Authors' Addresses section

   Change controller:  IESG

8.  Security Considerations

   In this design, a client wishes to make a request of a server that is
   authoritative for the oblivious target resource.  The client wishes
   to make this request without linking that request with either:

   1.  The identity at the network and transport layer of the client
       (that is, the client IP address and TCP or UDP port number the
       client uses to create a connection).

   2.  Any other request the client might have made in the past or might
       make in the future.

   In order to ensure this, the client selects a proxy (that serves the
   oblivious proxy resource) that it trusts will protect this
   information by forwarding the encapsulated request and response
   without passing the server (that serves the oblivious request

   In this section, a deployment where there are three entities is

   *  A client makes requests and receives responses

   *  A proxy operates the oblivious proxy resource

   *  A server operates both the oblivious request resource and the
      oblivious target resource

   To achieve the stated privacy goals, the oblivious proxy resource
   cannot be operated by the same entity as the oblivious request
   resource.  However, colocation of the oblivious request resource and
   oblivious target resource simplifies the interactions between those
   resources without affecting client privacy.

   As a consequence of this configuration, Oblivious HTTP prevents
   linkability described above.  Informally, this means:

   1.  Requests and responses are known only to clients and targets in
       possession of the corresponding response encapsulation key and
       HPKE keying material.  In particular, the oblivious proxy knows
       the origin and destination of an encapsulated request and
       response, yet does not know the decapsulated contents.  Likewise,
       targets know only the oblivious request origin, i.e., the proxy,
       and the decapsulated request.  Only the client knows both the
       plaintext request and response.

   2.  Targets cannot link requests from the same client in the absence
       of unique per-client keys.

   Traffic analysis that might affect these properties are outside the
   scope of this document; see Section 8.2.2.

   A formal analysis of Oblivious HTTP is in [OHTTP-ANALYSIS].

8.1.  Client Responsibilities

   Clients MUST ensure that the key configuration they select for
   generating encapsulated requests is integrity protected and
   authenticated so that it can be attributed to the oblivious request
   resource; see Section 4.

   Since clients connect directly to the proxy instead of the target,
   application configurations wherein clients make policy decisions
   about target connections, e.g., to apply certificate pinning, are
   incompatible with Oblivious HTTP.  In such cases, alternative
   technologies such as HTTP CONNECT (Section 9.3.6 of [HTTP]) can be
   used.  Applications could implement related policies on key
   configurations and proxy connections, though these might not provide
   the same properties as policies enforced directly on target
   connections.  When this difference is relevant, applications can
   instead connect directly to the target at the cost of either privacy
   or performance.

   Clients MUST NOT include identifying information in the request that
   is encapsulated.  Identifying information includes cookies [COOKIES],
   authentication credentials or tokens, and any information that might
   reveal client-specific information such as account credentials.

   Clients cannot carry connection-level state between requests as they
   only establish direct connections to the proxy responsible for the
   oblivious proxy resource.  However, clients need to ensure that they
   construct requests without any information gained from previous
   requests.  Otherwise, the server might be able to use that
   information to link requests.  Cookies [COOKIES] are the most obvious
   feature that MUST NOT be used by clients.  However, clients need to
   include all information learned from requests, which could include
   the identity of resources.

   Clients MUST generate a new HPKE context for every request, using a
   good source of entropy ([RANDOM]) for generating keys.  Key reuse not
   only risks requests being linked, reuse could expose request and
   response contents to the proxy.

   The request the client sends to the oblivious proxy resource only
   requires minimal information; see Section 6.  The request that
   carries the encapsulated request and is sent to the oblivious proxy
   resource MUST NOT include identifying information unless the client
   ensures that this information is removed by the proxy.  A client MAY
   include information only for the oblivious proxy resource in header
   fields identified by the Connection header field if it trusts the
   proxy to remove these as required by Section 7.6.1 of [HTTP].  The
   client needs to trust that the proxy does not replicate the source
   addressing information in the request it forwards.

   Clients rely on the oblivious proxy resource to forward encapsulated
   requests and responses.  However, the proxy can only refuse to
   forward messages, it cannot inspect or modify the contents of
   encapsulated requests or responses.

8.2.  Proxy Responsibilities

   The proxy that serves the oblivious proxy resource has a very simple
   function to perform.  For each request it receives, it makes a
   request of the oblivious request resource that includes the same
   content.  When it receives a response, it sends a response to the
   client that includes the content of the response from the oblivious
   request resource.  When generating a request, the proxy MUST follow
   the forwarding rules in Section 7.6 of [HTTP].

   A proxy can also generate responses, though it assumed to not be able
   to examine the content of a request (other than to observe the choice
   of key identifier, KDF, and AEAD), so it is also assumed that it
   cannot generate an encapsulated response.

   A proxy MUST NOT add information about the client identity when
   forwarding requests.  This includes the Via field, the Forwarded
   field [FORWARDED], and any similar information.  A client does not
   depend on the proxy using an authenticated and encrypted connection
   to the oblivious request resource, only that information about the
   client not be attached to forwarded requests.

8.2.1.  Denial of Service

   As there are privacy benefits from having a large rate of requests
   forwarded by the same proxy (see Section 8.2.2), servers that operate
   the oblivious request resource might need an arrangement with
   proxies.  This arrangement might be necessary to prevent having the
   large volume of requests being classified as an attack by the server.

   If a server accepts a larger volume of requests from a proxy, it
   needs to trust that the proxy does not allow abusive levels of
   request volumes from clients.  That is, if a server allows requests
   from the proxy to be exempt from rate limits, the server might want
   to ensure that the proxy applies a rate limiting policy that is
   acceptable to the server.

   Servers that enter into an agreement with a proxy that enables a
   higher request rate might choose to authenticate the proxy to enable
   the higher rate.

8.2.2.  Linkability Through Traffic Analysis

   As the time at which encapsulated request or response messages are
   sent can reveal information to a network observer.  Though messages
   exchanged between the oblivious proxy resource and the oblivious
   request resource might be sent in a single connection, traffic
   analysis could be used to match messages that are forwarded by the

   A proxy could, as part of its function, add delays in order to
   increase the anonymity set into which each message is attributed.
   This could latency to the overall time clients take to receive a
   response, which might not be what some clients want.

   A proxy can use padding to reduce the effectiveness of traffic
   analysis.  Padding is a capability provided by binary HTTP messages;
   see Section 3.8 of [BINARY].

   A proxy that forwards large volumes of exchanges can provide better
   privacy by providing larger sets of messages that need to be matched.

8.3.  Server Responsibilities

   A server that operates both oblivious request and oblivious target
   resources is responsible for removing request encapsulation,
   generating a response the encapsulated request, and encapsulating the

   Servers should account for traffic analysis based on response size or
   generation time.  Techniques such as padding or timing delays can
   help protect against such attacks; see Section 8.2.2.

   If separate entities provide the oblivious request resource and
   oblivious target resource, these entities might need an arrangement
   similar to that between server and proxy for managing denial of
   service; see Section 8.2.1.  It is also necessary to provide
   confidentiality protection for the unprotected requests and
   responses, plus protections for traffic analysis; see Section 8.2.2.

   An oblivious request resource needs to have a plan for replacing
   keys.  This might include regular replacement of keys, which can be
   assigned new key identifiers.  If an oblivious request resource
   receives a request that contains a key identifier that it does not
   understand or that corresponds to a key that has been replaced, the
   server can respond with an HTTP 422 (Unprocessable Content) status

   A server can also use a 422 status code if the server has a key that
   corresponds to the key identifier, but the encapsulated request
   cannot be successfully decrypted using the key.

   A server MUST ensure that the HPKE keys it uses are not valid for any
   other protocol that uses HPKE with the "message/bhttp request" label.
   Designers of protocols that reuse this encapsulation format,
   especially new versions of this protocol, can ensure key diversity by
   choosing a different label in their use of HPKE.  The "message/bhttp
   response" label was chosen for symmetry only as it provides key
   diversity only within the HPKE context created using the "message/
   bhttp request" label; see Section 11.

   A server is responsible for either rejecting replayed requests or
   ensuring that the effect of replays does not adversely affect clients
   or resources; see Section 8.4.

8.4.  Replay Attacks

   Encapsulated requests can be copied and replayed by the oblivious
   proxy resource.  The design of oblivious HTTP does not assume that
   the oblivious proxy resource will not replay requests.  In addition,
   if a client sends an encapsulated request in TLS early data (see
   Section 8 of [TLS] and [RFC8470]), a network-based adversary might be
   able to cause the request to be replayed.  In both cases, the effect
   of a replay attack and the mitigations that might be employed are
   similar to TLS early data.

   A client or oblivious proxy resource MUST NOT automatically attempt
   to retry a failed request unless it receives a positive signal
   indicating that the request was not processed or forwarded.  The
   HTTP/2 REFUSED_STREAM error code (Section 8.1.4 of [RFC7540]), the
   HTTP/3 H3_REQUEST_REJECTED error code (Section 8.1 of [QUIC-HTTP]),
   or a GOAWAY frame with a low enough identifier (in either protocol
   version) are all sufficient signals that no processing occurred.
   Connection failures or interruptions are not sufficient signals that
   no processing occurred.

   The anti-replay mechanisms described in Section 8 of [TLS] are
   generally applicable to oblivious HTTP requests.  Servers can use the  The encapsulated
   keying material as (or enc) can be used in place of a unique key for identifying
   potential replays. nonce to uniquely
   identify a request.  This depends on clients generating value is a new HPKE
   context high-entropy value that is
   freshly generated for every request. request, so two valid requests will have
   different values with overwhelming probability.

   The mechanism used in TLS for managing differences in client and
   server clocks cannot be used as it depends on being able to observe
   previous interactions.  Oblivious HTTP explicitly prevents such
   linkability.  Applications can still include an explicit indication
   of time

   The considerations in [RFC8470] as they relate to limit managing the span of time over which a server might need to
   track accepted requests.  Clock information could be used for client
   identification, so reduction in precision or obfuscation might be

   The considerations in [RFC8470] as they relate to managing the risk risk
   of replay also apply, though there is no option to delay the
   processing of a request.

   Limiting requests to those with safe methods might not be
   satisfactory for some applications, particularly those that involve
   the submission of data to a server.  The use of idempotent methods
   might be of some use in managing replay risk, though it is important
   to recognize that different idempotent requests can be combined to be
   not idempotent.

   Idempotent actions with a narrow scope based on the value of a
   protected nonce could enable data submission with limited

   Even without replay
   exposure.  A nonce might be added as an explicit part of a request,
   or, if prevention, the oblivious request and target resources are co-located, the
   encapsulated keying material can be used to produce a nonce.

   The server-chosen response_nonce
   field ensures that responses have unique AEAD keys and nonces even
   when requests are replayed.

8.4.1.  Use of Date for Anti-Replay

   Clients SHOULD include a Date header field in encapsulated requests.
   Though HTTP requests often do not include a Date header field, the
   value of this field might be used by a server to limit the amount of
   requests it needs to track when preventing replays.

   A server can maintain state for requests for a small window of time
   over which it wishes to accept requests.  The server then rejects
   requests if the request is the same as one that was previously
   answered within that time window.  Servers can reject requests
   outside of this window and signal that clients might retry with a
   different Date header field; see Section 4 of [REQUEST-DATE].
   Servers can identify duplicate requests using the encapsulation (enc)

   Servers SHOULD allow for the time it takes requests to arrive from
   the client, with a time window that is large enough to allow for
   differences in the clock of clients and servers.  How large a time
   window is needed could depend on the population of clients that the
   server needs to serve.

   Servers MUST NOT treat the time window as secret information.  An
   attacker can actively probe the server with specially crafted request
   timestamps to determine the time window over which the server will
   accept responses.

   [REQUEST-DATE] contains further considerations for the use of the
   Date request header field.  This includes the way in which clients
   might correct for clock skew and the privacy considerations arising
   from that usage.  Servers that reject requests on the basis of the
   Date request header field SHOULD implement the feedback mechanism in
   Section 4 of [REQUEST-DATE] to support clock correction by clients.

8.5.  Post-Compromise Security

   This design does not provide post-compromise security for responses.

   A client only needs to retain keying material that might be used
   compromise the confidentiality and integrity of a response until that
   response is consumed, so there is negligible risk associated with a
   client compromise.

   A server retains a secret key that might be used to remove protection
   from messages over much longer periods.  A server compromise that
   provided access to the oblivious request resource secret key could
   allow an attacker to recover the plaintext of all requests sent
   toward affected keys and all of the responses that were generated.

   Even if server keys are compromised, an adversary cannot access
   messages exchanged by the client with the oblivious proxy resource as
   messages are protected by TLS.  Use of a compromised key also
   requires that the oblivious proxy resource cooperate with the
   attacker or that the attacker is able to compromise these TLS

   The total number of affected messages affected by server key
   compromise can be limited by regular rotation of server keys.

9.  Privacy Considerations

   One goal of this design is that independent client requests are only
   linkable by the chosen key configuration.  The oblivious proxy and
   request resources can link requests using the same key configuration
   by matching KeyConfig.key_id, or, if the oblivious target resource is
   willing to use trial decryption, a limited set of key configurations
   that share an identifier.  An oblivious proxy can link requests using
   the public key corresponding to KeyConfig.key_id.

   Request resources are capable of linking requests depending on how
   KeyConfigs are produced by servers and discovered by clients.
   Specifically, servers can maliciously construct key configurations to
   track individual clients.  A specific method for a client to acquire
   key configurations is not included in this specification.  Clients
   need to consider these tracking vectors when choosing a discovery
   method.  Applications using this design should provide accommodations
   to mitigate tracking using key configurations.  [CONSISTENCY]
   provides an analysis of the options for ensuring the key
   configurations are consistent between different clients.

10.  Operational and Deployment Considerations

   This section discusses various operational and deployment

10.1.  Performance Overhead

   Using Oblivious HTTP adds both cryptographic and latency to requests
   relative to a simple HTTP request-response exchange.  Deploying proxy
   services that are on path between clients and servers avoids adding
   significant additional delay due to network topology.  A study of a
   similar system [ODoH] found that deploying proxies close to servers
   was most effective in minimizing additional latency.

10.2.  Resource Mappings

   This protocol assumes a fixed, one-to-one mapping between the
   Oblivious Proxy Resource and the Oblivious Request Resource.  This
   means that any encapsulated request sent to the Oblivious Proxy
   Resource will always be forwarded to the Oblivious Request Resource.
   This constraint was imposed to simplify proxy configuration and
   mitigate against the Oblivious Proxy Resource being used as a generic
   proxy for unknown Oblivious Request Resources.  The proxy will only
   forward for Oblivious Request Resources that it has explicitly
   configured and allowed.

   It is possible for a server to be configured with multiple Oblivious
   Proxy Resources, each for a different Oblivious Request Resource as

10.3.  Network Management

   Oblivious HTTP might be incompatible with network interception
   regimes, such as those that rely on configuring clients with trust
   anchors and intercepting TLS connections.  While TLS might be
   intercepted successfully, interception middleboxes devices might not
   receive updates that would allow Oblivious HTTP to be correctly
   identified using the media types defined in Section 7.

   Oblivious HTTP has a simple key management design that is not
   trivially altered to enable interception by intermediaries.  Clients
   that are configured to enable interception might choose to disable
   Oblivious HTTP in order to ensure that content is accessible to

11.  Repurposing the Encapsulation Format

   The encapsulated payload of an OHTTP request and response is a binary
   HTTP message [BINARY].  Client and target agree on this encapsulated
   payload type by specifying the media type "message/bhttp" in the HPKE
   encapsulation info string and HPKE export context string for request
   and response encapsulation, respectively.

   Future specifications may repurpose the encapsulation mechanism
   described in Section 5, provided that the content type of the
   encapsulated payload is appropriately reflected in the HPKE info and
   context strings.  For example, if a future specification were to use
   the encapsulation mechanism in this specification for DNS messages,
   identified by the "application/dns-message" media type, then the HPKE
   info string SHOULD be "application/dns-message request" for request
   encapsulation, and the HPKE export context string should be
   "application/dns-message response" for response encapsulation.

12.  IANA Considerations

   Please update the "Media Types" registry at
   ( with the registration
   information in Section 7 for the media types "message/ohttp-req",
   "message/ohttp-res", and "application/ohttp-keys".


13.  References


13.1.  Normative References

   [BINARY]   Thomson, M., M. and C. A. Wood, "Binary Representation of HTTP
              Messages", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-http-
              binary-message-latest, 26 November 2021,
              binary-message-latest>. draft-ietf-
              httpbis-binary-message-01, 3 February 2022,

   [HPKE]     Barnes, R. L., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. A. Wood,
              "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-12, 2 September 2021,

   [HTTP]     Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,

   [QUIC]     Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,

              Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
              (HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              quic-http-34, 2 February 2021,

              Thomson, M., "Using The Date Header Field In HTTP
              Requests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              thomson-httpapi-date-requests-00, 8 February 2022,

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

   [RFC8470]  Thomson, M., Nottingham, M., and W. Tarreau, "Using Early
              Data in HTTP", RFC 8470, DOI 10.17487/RFC8470, September
              2018, <>.

   [TLS]      Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,


13.2.  Informative References

   [ALT-SVC]  Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <>.

              Davidson, A., Finkel, M., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood,
              "Key Consistency and Discovery", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-wood-key-consistency-01, 19 August
              2021, <

   [COOKIES]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,

              Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., and P. Syverson, "Tor: The
              Second-Generation Onion Router", August 2004,

              Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
              RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014,

   [ODoH]     Singanamalla, S., Chunhapanya, S., Vavrusa, M., Verma, T.,
              Wu, P., Fayed, M., Heimerl, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A.
              Wood, "Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH): A Practical
              Privacy Enhancement to DNS", 7 January 2021,

   [ODOH]     Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C. A.
              Wood, "Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-07, 2
              September 2021, draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-10, 31
              January 2022, <

              Hoyland, J., "Tamarin Model of Oblivious HTTP", 23 August
              2021, <>.

   [PRIO]     Corrigan-Gibbs, H. and D. Boneh, "Prio: Private, Robust,
              and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics", 14
              March 2017, <>.

   [RANDOM]   Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,

   [RFC7838]  Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <>.

   [X25519]   Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <>.

Appendix A.  Complete Example of a Request and Response

   A single request and response exchange is shown here.  Binary values
   (key configuration, secret keys, the content of messages, and
   intermediate values) are shown in hexadecimal.  The request and
   response here are absolutely minimal; the purpose of this example is
   to show the cryptographic operations.

   The oblivious request resource generates a key pair.  In this example
   the server chooses DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) and generates an X25519
   key pair [X25519].  The X25519 secret key is:



   The oblivious request resource constructs a key configuration that
   includes the corresponding public key as follows:



   This key configuration is somehow obtained by the client.  Then when
   a client wishes to send an HTTP request of a GET request to, it constructs the following binary HTTP message:


   The client then reads the oblivious request resource key
   configuration and selects a mutually supported KDF and AEAD.  In this
   example, the client selects HKDF-SHA256 and AES-128-GCM.  The client
   then generates an HPKE context that uses the server public key.  This
   results in
   context is constructed from the following encapsulated ephemeral public key:



   The corresponding private key is:



   Applying the Seal operation from the HPKE context produces an
   encrypted message, allowing the client to construct the following
   encapsulated request:



   The client then sends this to the oblivious proxy resource in a POST
   request, which might look like the following HTTP/1.1 request:

   POST / HTTP/1.1
   Content-Type: message/ohttp-req
   Content-Length: 78

   <content is the encapsulated request above>

   The oblivious proxy resource receives this request and forwards it to
   the oblivious request resource, which might look like:

   POST /oblivious/request HTTP/1.1
   Content-Type: message/ohttp-req
   Content-Length: 78

   <content is the encapsulated request above>

   The oblivous request resource receives this request, selects the key
   it generated previously using the key identifier from the message,
   and decrypts the message.  As this request is directed to the same
   server, the oblivious request resource does not need to initiate an
   HTTP request to the oblivious target resource.  The request can be
   served directly by the oblivious target resource, which generates a
   minimal response (consisting of just a 200 status code) as follows:


   The response is constructed by extracting a secret from the HPKE



   The key derivation for the encapsulated response uses both the
   encapsulated KEM key from the request and a randomly selected nonce.
   This produces a salt of:



   The salt and secret are both passed to the Extract function of the
   selected KDF (HKDF-SHA256) to produce a pseudorandom key of:



   The pseudorandom key is used with the Expand function of the KDF and
   an info field of "key" to produce a 16-byte key for the selected AEAD



   With the same KDF and pseudorandom key, an info field of "nonce" is
   used to generate a 12-byte nonce:



   The AEAD Seal function is then used to encrypt the response, which is
   added to the randomized nonce value to produce the encapsulated



   The oblivious request resource then constructs a response:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 04:45:07 GMT
   Cache-Control: private, no-store
   Content-Type: message/ohttp-res
   Content-Length: 38

   <content is the encapsulated response>

   The same response might then be generated by the oblivious proxy
   resource which might change as little as the Date header.  The client
   is then able to use the HPKE context it created and the nonce from
   the encapsulated response to construct the AEAD key and nonce and
   decrypt the response.


   This design is based on a design for oblivious DoH, described in
   [ODOH].  David Benjamin and Eric Rescorla made technical

Authors' Addresses

   Martin Thomson

   Christopher A. Wood