draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-00.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01.txt 
OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed. OAuth Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track August 22, 2014 Intended status: Standards Track November 30, 2014
Expires: February 23, 2015 Expires: June 3, 2015
OAuth Token Introspection OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection
draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-00 draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-01
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines a method for a client or protected This specification defines a method for a protected resource to query
resource to query an OAuth authorization server to validate the an OAuth 2.0 authorization server to determine the active state of an
active state of an OAuth token and to determine meta-information OAuth 2.0 token and to determine meta-information about this token.
about an OAuth token. OAuth 2.0 deployments can use this method to convey information about
the authorization context of the token from the authorization server
to the protected resource.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 23, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 3, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Introspection Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Introspection Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Introspection Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Introspection Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Non-normative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Non-normative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix C. Use with Proof of Posession Tokens . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In OAuth, the contents of tokens are opaque to clients. This means In OAuth 2.0, the contents of tokens are opaque to clients. This
that the client does not need to know anything about the content or means that the client does not need to know anything about the
structure of the token itself, if there is any. However, there is content or structure of the token itself, if there is any. However,
still a large amount of metadata that may be attached to a token, there is still a large amount of metadata that may be attached to a
such as its current validity, approved scopes, and extra information token, such as its current validity, approved scopes, and information
about the authentication context in which the token was issued. about the context in which the token was issued. These pieces of
These pieces of information are often vital to Protected Resources information are often vital to protected resources making
making authorization decisions based on the tokens being presented. authorization decisions based on the tokens being presented. Since
Since OAuth2 defines no direct relationship between the Authorization OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines no direct relationship between the
Server and the Protected Resource, only that they must have an authorization server and the protected resource, only that they must
agreement on the tokens themselves, there have been many different have an agreement on the tokens themselves, there have been many
approaches to bridging this gap. different approaches to bridging this gap. These include using
structured token formats such as JWT [JWT] or SAML [[ Editor's Note:
Which SAML document should we reference here? ]] and proprietary
inter-service communication mechanisms (such as shared databases and
protected enterprise service buses) that convey token information.
This specification defines an Introspection Endpoint that allows the This specification defines an interoperable web API that allows
holder of a token to query the Authorization Server to discover the authorized protected resources to query the authorization server to
set of metadata for a token. A Protected Resource may use the determine the set of metadata for a given token that was presented to
mechanism described in this draft to query the Introspection Endpoint them by an OAuth 2.0 client. This metadata includes whether or not
in a particular authorization decision context and ascertain the the token is currently active (or if it has expired or otherwise been
relevant metadata about the token in order to make this authorization revoked), what rights of access the token carries (usually conveyed
decision appropriately. through OAuth 2.0 scopes), and the authorization context in which the
token was granted (including who authorized the token and which
client it was issued to). Token introspection allows a protected
resource to query this information regardless of whether or not it is
carried in the token itself, allowing this method to be used along
with or independently of structured token values. Additionally, a
protected resource can use the mechanism described in this
specification to introspect the token in a particular authorization
decision context and ascertain the relevant metadata about the token
in order to make this authorization decision appropriately.
2. Introspection Endpoint 2. Introspection Endpoint
The Introspection Endpoint is an OAuth 2 Endpoint that responds to The introspection endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 endpoint that takes a
HTTP POST requests (and optionally HTTP GET requests) from token parameter representing an OAuth 2.0 token and returns a JSON
holders, particularly including Resource Servers and Clients. The [RFC7159] document representing the meta information surrounding the
endpoint takes a single parameter representing the token (and token.
optionally further authentication) and returns a JSON document
representing the meta information surrounding the token.
The endpoint MUST be protected by TLS or equivalent. The introspection endpoint MUST be protected by TLS of at least
version 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-
layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS,
the client or protected resource MUST perform a TLS/SSL server
certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. Implementation security
considerations can be found in Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS
and DTLS [TLS.BCP].
2.1. Introspection Request 2.1. Introspection Request
token REQUIRED. The string value of the token. The protected resource calls the introspection endpoint using an HTTP
POST [RFC2616] request (or optionally an HTTP GET request). The
protected resource sends a parameter representing the token along
with optional parameters representing additional context that is
known by the protected resource to aid the authorization server in
its response.
token REQUIRED. The string value of the token. For access tokens,
this is the "access_token" value returned from the token endpoint
defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] section 5.1. For refresh tokens,
this is the "refresh_token" value returned from the token endpoint
as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] section 5.1. Other token types
are outside the scope of this specification.
resource_id OPTIONAL. A service-specific string identifying the resource_id OPTIONAL. A service-specific string identifying the
resource that the client doing the introspection is asking about. resource that the token is being used for. This value allows the
protected resource to convey to the authorization server the
context in which the token is being used at the protected
resource, allowing the authorization server to tailor its response
accordingly if desired.
token_type_hint OPTIONAL. A hint about the type of the token token_type_hint OPTIONAL. A hint about the type of the token
submitted for introspection. Clients MAY pass this parameter in submitted for introspection. The protected resource re MAY pass
order to help the authorization server to optimize the token this parameter in order to help the authorization server to
lookup. If the server is unable to locate the token using the optimize the token lookup. If the server is unable to locate the
given hint, it MUST extend its search accross all of its supported token using the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all
token types. An authorization server MAY ignore this parameter, of its supported token types. An authorization server MAY ignore
particularly if it is able to detect the token type automatically. this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the token
Values for this field are defined in OAuth Token Revocation type automatically. Values for this field are defined in OAuth
[RFC7009]. Token Revocation [RFC7009].
The endpoint MAY allow other parameters to provide context to the The endpoint MAY allow other parameters to provide further context to
query. For instance, an authorization service may need to know the the query. For instance, an authorization service may need to know
IP address of the Client in order to determine the appropriateness of the IP address of the client accessing the protected resource in
the token being presented. order to determine the appropriateness of the token being presented.
The endpoint SHOULD also require some form of authentication to To prevent unauthorized token scanning attacks, the endpoint SHOULD
access this endpoint, such as the Client Authentication as described also require some form of authorization to access this endpoint, such
in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] or a separate OAuth 2.0 Access Token such as as client authentication as described in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] or a
the Bearer token described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. separate OAuth 2.0 access token such as the bearer token described in
The methods of managing and validating these authentication OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. The methods of managing and
credentials are out of scope of this specification. validating these authentication credentials are out of scope of this
specification, though it is RECOMMENDED that these credentials be
distinct from those used at an authorization server's token endpoint.
2.2. Introspection Response 2.2. Introspection Response
The server responds with a JSON object [RFC4627] in "application/ The server responds with a JSON object [RFC7159] in "application/
json" format with the following top-level members. Specific json" format with the following top-level members. Specific
implementations MAY extend this structure with their own service- implementations MAY extend this structure with their own service-
specific pieces of information. specific pieces of information.
active REQUIRED. Boolean indicator of whether or not the presented active REQUIRED. Boolean indicator of whether or not the presented
token is currently active. token is currently active. The authorization server determines
whether and when a given token is in an active state.
exp OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds exp OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds
since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token will expire. since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token will expire.
iat OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds iat OPTIONAL. Integer timestamp, measured in the number of seconds
since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token was since January 1 1970 UTC, indicating when this token was
originally issued. originally issued.
scope OPTIONAL. A space-separated list of strings representing the scope OPTIONAL. A space-separated list of strings representing the
scopes associated with this token, in the format described in scopes associated with this token, in the format described in
Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
client_id OPTIONAL. Client Identifier for the OAuth Client that client_id OPTIONAL. Client identifier for the OAuth 2.0 client that
requested this token. requested this token.
sub OPTIONAL. Machine-readable identifier local to the AS of the sub OPTIONAL. Machine-readable identifier of the resource owner who
Resource Owner who authorized this token. authorized this token.
user_id OPTIONAL. Human-readable identifier for the user who user_id OPTIONAL. Human-readable identifier for the user who
authorized this token. authorized this token.
aud OPTIONAL. Service-specific string identifier or list of string aud OPTIONAL. Service-specific string identifier or list of string
identifiers representing the intended audience for this token. identifiers representing the intended audience for this token.
iss OPTIONAL. String representing the issuer of this token. iss OPTIONAL. String representing the issuer of this token.
token_type OPTIONAL. Type of the token as defined in OAuth 2.0 token_type OPTIONAL. Type of the token as defined in section 5.1 of
section 5.1. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
The response MAY be cached according to HTTP caching headers. The response MAY be cached by the protected resource, and the
authorization server SHOULD communicate appropriate cache controls
using applicable HTTP headers.
2.3. Non-normative Example 2.3. Error Response
For example, a Protected Resource recieves a request from a Client If the protected resource uses OAuth 2.0 client credentials to
carrying an OAuth2 Bearer Token. In order to know how and whether to authenticate to the introspection endpoint and its credentials are
serve the request, the Protected Resource then makes the following invalid, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad
request to the Introspection Endpoint of the Authorization Server. Request) as described in section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
The Protected Resource is here authenticating with its own Client ID
and Client Secret as per OAuth2 [RFC6749] Section 2.3.1. If the protected resource uses an OAuth 2.0 bearer token to authorize
its call to the introspection endpoint and the token used for
authorization does not contain sufficient privileges or is otherwise
invalid for this request, the authorization server responds with an
HTTP 400 code as described in section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
Usage [RFC6750].
3. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
4. Security Considerations
If left unprotected and un-throttled, the introspection endpoint
could present a means for an attacker to poll a series of possible
token values, fishing for a valid token. The specifics of this
authentication credentials are out of scope of this specification,
but commonly these credentials could take the form of any valid
client authentication mechanism used with the token endpoint, an
OAuth 2.0 access token, or other HTTP authorization or authentication
mechanism. The authorization server SHOULD issue credentials to any
protected resources that need to access the introspection endpoint,
SHOULD require protected resources to be specifically authorized to
call the introspection endpoint, and SHOULD NOT allow a single piece
of software acting as both a client and a protected resource to re-
use the same credentials between the token endpoint and the
introspection endpoint.
Since the introspection endpoint takes in OAuth 2.0 tokens as
parameters, the server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and
MAY support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its
security requirements. When using TLS, the client or protected
resource MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC
6125 [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations can be found
in Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [TLS.BCP].
In order to prevent the values of access tokens being from leaking
into server-side logs via query parameters, an authorization server
offering token introspection MAY disallow HTTP GET and instead
require an HTTP POST method only to the introspection endpoint.
An authorization server offering token introspection MUST be able to
understand the token values being presented to it during this call.
The exact means by which this happens is an implementation detail and
outside the scope of this specification. For unstructured tokens,
this could take the form of a simple server-side database query
against a data store containing the context information for the
token. For structured tokens, this could take the form of the server
parsing the token, validating its signature or other protection
mechanisms, and returning the information contained in the token back
to the protected resource (allowing the protected resource to be
unaware of the token's contents, much like the client).
Note that for a token carrying encrypted information that is needed
during the introspection process, the authorization server MUST be
able to decrypt and validate the token in order to access this
information. In cases where the authorization server stores no
information about the token and has no means of accessing information
about the token, it can not likely offer an introspection service.
5. Privacy Considerations
The introspection response may contain privacy-sensitive information
such as user identifiers for resource owners. When this is the case,
measures MUST be taken to prevent disclosure of this information to
unintended parties. One way to limit disclosure is to require
authorization to call the introspection endpoint and to limit calls
to only registered and trusted protected resource servers. Another
method is to transmit user identifiers as opaque service-specific
strings, potentially returning different identifiers to each
protected resource. Omitting privacy-sensitive information from an
introspection response is the simplest way of minimizing privacy
issues.
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the OAuth Working Group and the UMA Working Group for
feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0
Token Revocation", RFC 7009, August 2013.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.
7.2. Informative References
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in
progress), July 2014.
[TLS.BCP] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", November
2014.
Appendix A. Document History
[[ To be removed by the RFC Editor. ]]
- 01
o Fixed casing and consistent term usage.
o Incorporated working group comments.
o Clarified that authorization servers need to be able to understand
the token if they're to introspect it.
o Various editorial cleanups.
- 00
o Created initial IETF drafted based on draft-richer-oauth-
introspection-06 with no normative changes.
Appendix B. Non-normative Example
In this non-normative example, a protected resource receives a
request from a client carrying an OAuth 2.0 bearer token as defined
in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. In order to know how and
whether to serve the request given this token, the protected resource
then makes the following request to the introspection endpoint of the
authorization server. The protected resource authenticates with its
own credentials, here re-using the format of client identifier and
client secret conveyed as HTTP Basic authentication as per OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] Section 2.3.1.
Following is a non-normative example request: Following is a non-normative example request:
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1 POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: authserver.example.com Host: authserver.example.com
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3 Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
token=X3241Affw.4233-99JXJ token=X3241Affw.4233-99JXJ
The Authorization Server validates the client credentials and looks
up the information in the token. If the token is currently active, The authorization server validates the protected resource's
it returns the following JSON document. credentials and looks up the information in the token. If the token
is currently active and the authenticated protected resource is
authorized to know information about this token, the authorization
server returns the following JSON document.
Following is a non-normative example active token response (with line Following is a non-normative example active token response (with line
wraps for display purposes only): wraps for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
{ {
"active": true, "active": true,
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3", "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"scope": "read write dolphin", "scope": "read write dolphin",
"sub": "2309fj32kl", "sub": "2309fj32kl",
"user_id": "jdoe", "user_id": "jdoe",
"aud": "https://example.org/protected-resource/*", "aud": "https://example.org/protected-resource/*",
"iss": "https://authserver.example.com/" "iss": "https://authserver.example.com/"
} }
If the token presented is not currently active (but the If the token presented is not currently active for any reason (for
authentication presented during the request is valid), it returns the instance, it has been revoked by the resource owner) but the
following JSON document. authorization presented during the request is otherwise valid, the
authorization server returns the following JSON document.
Following is a non-normative example response to an inactive or Following is a non-normative example response to an inactive or
invalid token (with line wraps for display purposes only): invalid token (with line wraps for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
{ {
"active": false "active": false
} }
Note that in order to avoid disclosing too much of the authorization
server's state to a third party, the authorization server SHOULD NOT
include any additional information about an inactive token.
If the client credentials are invalid or there is another error, the Appendix C. Use with Proof of Posession Tokens
Authorization Server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request) as
described in OAuth 2.0 section 5.2 [RFC6749].
3. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
4. Security Considerations
If left unprotected and un-throttled, the Introspection Endpoint
could present a means for an attacker to poll a series of possible
token values, fishing for a valid token. Therefore, the
Authorization Server SHOULD issue special client credentials to any
protected resources or clients that need to access the introspection
endpoint. These credentials may be used directly at the endpoint, or
they may be exchanged for an OAuth2 Access token scoped specifically
for the Introspection Endpoint.
Since the introspection endpoint takes in OAuth 2 tokens as
parameters, it MUST be protected by TLS or equivalent.
In order to prevent the access tokens being introspected from leaking
into server-side logs via query parameters, a server MAY require an
HTTP POST method only to the endpoint.
5. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the OAuth Working Group and the UMA Working Group for
feedback.
6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0
Token Revocation", RFC 7009, August 2013.
Appendix A. Document History
- 00
o Created initial IETF drafted based on draft-richer-oauth- With bearer tokens such as those defined by OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
introspection-06 with no normative changes. Usage [RFC6750], the protected resource will have in its posession
the entire secret portion of the token for submission to the
introspection service. However, for proof-of-posession style tokens,
the protected resource will have only a token identifier used during
the request, along with the cryptographic signature on the request.
The protected resource would be able to submit the token identifier
to the authoriation server's token endpoint in order to obtain the
necessary key information needed to validate the signature on the
request. The details of this usage are outside the scope of this
specification and should be defined in an extension to this
specification.
Author's Address Author's Address
Justin Richer (editor) Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation
Email: jricher@mitre.org Email: jricher@mitre.org
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