draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-10.txt   rfc7589.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Badra
Internet-Draft Zayed University Request for Comments: 7589 Zayed University
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc. Category: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: October 12, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
April 10, 2015 June 2015
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Mutual X.509 Authentication with Mutual X.509 Authentication
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-10
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol with mutual X.509 authentication to secure the exchange of protocol with mutual X.509 authentication to secure the exchange of
NETCONF messages. This revision of RFC 5539 documents the new NETCONF messages. This revision of RFC 5539 documents the new
message framing used by NETCONF 1.1 and it obsoletes RFC 5539. message framing used by NETCONF 1.1 and it obsoletes RFC 5539.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2015. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7589.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over
skipping to change at page 3, line 23 skipping to change at page 3, line 43
The TLS server MUST send a CertificateRequest in order to request a The TLS server MUST send a CertificateRequest in order to request a
certificate from the TLS client. Once the TLS handshake has certificate from the TLS client. Once the TLS handshake has
finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF
messages. Client and server identity verification is done before the messages. Client and server identity verification is done before the
NETCONF <hello> message is sent. This means that the identity NETCONF <hello> message is sent. This means that the identity
verification is completed before the NETCONF session is started. verification is completed before the NETCONF session is started.
3. Message Framing 3. Message Framing
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible for multiple NETCONF messages to be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or for a NETCONF message to be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version of this document [RFC5539] used the framing The previous version of this specification [RFC5539] used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC4742]. This version aligns with [RFC6242] sequence defined in [RFC4742]. This version aligns with [RFC6242]
and adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows: and adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
The NETCONF <hello> message MUST be followed by the character The NETCONF <hello> message MUST be followed by the character
sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers
inspect the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is inspect the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is
advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in
Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF
session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see
Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used. Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used.
skipping to change at page 4, line 27 skipping to change at page 5, line 5
The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to
ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is
legitimate before the NETCONF session is started. legitimate before the NETCONF session is started.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's
authentication process results in an authenticated NETCONF client authentication process results in an authenticated NETCONF client
identity whose permissions are known to the server. The identity whose permissions are known to the server. The
authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the
NETCONF username. The following algorithm is used by the NETCONF NETCONF username. The following algorithm is used by the NETCONF
server to derive a NETCONF username from a certificate. (Note that server to derive a NETCONF username from a certificate. (Note that
the algorithm below is the same as the one described in the SNMP-TLS- the algorithm below is the same as the one described in the
TM-MIB MIB module defined in [RFC6353] and in the ietf-x509-cert-to- SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB MIB module defined in [RFC6353] and in the
name YANG module defined in [RFC7407].) ietf-x509-cert-to-name YANG module defined in [RFC7407].)
(a) The server maintains an ordered list of mappings of certificates (a) The server maintains an ordered list of mappings of certificates
to NETCONF usernames. Each list entry contains to NETCONF usernames. Each list entry contains
* a certificate fingerprint (used for matching the presented * a certificate fingerprint (used for matching the presented
certificate), certificate),
* a map type (indicates how the NETCONF username is derived * a map type (indicates how the NETCONF username is derived
from the certificate), and from the certificate), and
* optional auxiliary data (used to carry a NETCONF username if * optional auxiliary data (used to carry a NETCONF username if
the map type indicates the user name is explicitly the map type indicates the username is explicitly
configured). configured).
(b) The NETCONF username is derived by considering each list entry (b) The NETCONF username is derived by considering each list entry
in order. The fingerprint member of the current list entry in order. The fingerprint member of the current list entry
determines whether the current list entry is a match: determines whether the current list entry is a match:
1. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches the 1. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches the
fingerprint of the presented certificate, then consider the fingerprint of the presented certificate, then consider the
list entry as a successful match. list entry as a successful match.
2. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches that of a 2. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches that of a
locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate, and that CA locally held copy of a trusted certification authority (CA)
certificate was part of the CA certificate chain to the certificate, and that CA certificate was part of the CA
presented certificate, then consider the list entry as a certificate chain to the presented certificate, then
successful match. consider the list entry as a successful match.
(c) Once a matching list entry has been found, the map type of the (c) Once a matching list entry has been found, the map type of the
current list entry is used to determine how the username current list entry is used to determine how the username
associated with the certificate should be determined. Possible associated with the certificate should be determined. Possible
mapping options are: mapping options are:
A. The username is taken from the auxiliary data of the current A. The username is taken from the auxiliary data of the current
list entry. This means the username is explicitely list entry. This means the username is explicitly
configured (map type 'specified'). configured (map type 'specified').
B. The subjectAltName's rfc822Name field is mapped to the B. The subjectAltName's rfc822Name field is mapped to the
username (map type 'san-rfc822-name'). The local part of username (map type 'san-rfc822-name'). The local part of
the rfc822Name is used unaltered but the host-part of the the rfc822Name is used unaltered, but the host-part of the
name must be converted to lowercase. name must be converted to lowercase.
C. The subjectAltName's dNSName is mapped to the username (map C. The subjectAltName's dNSName is mapped to the username (map
type 'san-dns-name'). The characters of the dNSName are type 'san-dns-name'). The characters of the dNSName are
converted to lowercase. converted to lowercase.
D. The subjectAltName's iPAddress is mapped to the username D. The subjectAltName's iPAddress is mapped to the username
(map type 'san-ip-address'). IPv4 addresses are converted (map type 'san-ip-address'). IPv4 addresses are converted
into decimal-dotted quad notation (e.g., '192.0.2.1'). IPv6 into decimal-dotted quad notation (e.g., '192.0.2.1'). IPv6
addresses are converted into a 32-character all lowercase addresses are converted into a 32-character all lowercase
hexadecimal string without any colon separators. hexadecimal string without any colon separators.
E. Any of the subjectAltName's rfc822Name, dNSName, iPAddress E. The rfc822Name, dNSName, or iPAddress of the subjectAltName
is mapped to the username (map type 'san-any'). The first is mapped to the username (map type 'san-any'). The first
matching subjectAltName value found in the certificate of matching subjectAltName value found in the certificate of
the above types MUST be used when deriving the name. the above types MUST be used when deriving the name.
F. The certificate's CommonName is mapped to the username (map F. The certificate's CommonName is mapped to the username (map
type 'common-name'). The CommonName is converted to UTF-8 type 'common-name'). The CommonName is converted to UTF-8
encoding. The usage of CommonNames is deprecated and users encoding. The usage of CommonNames is deprecated and users
are encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods are encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods
instead. instead.
(d) If it is impossible to determine a username from the list (d) If it is impossible to determine a username from the list
entry's data combined with the data presented in the entry's data combined with the data presented in the
certificate, then additional list entries MUST be searched certificate, then additional list entries MUST be searched to
looking for another potential match. Similarily, if the look for another potential match. Similarly, if the username
username does not comply to the NETCONF requirements on does not comply to the NETCONF requirements on usernames
usernames [RFC6241], then additional list entries MUST be [RFC6241], then additional list entries MUST be searched to look
searched looking for another potential match. If there are no for another potential match. If there are no further list
further list entries, the TLS session MUST be terminated. entries, the TLS session MUST be terminated.
The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be
made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username
without modification. without modification.
The NETCONF server configuration data model The NETCONF server configuration data model [NETCONF-RESTCONF] covers
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] covers NETCONF over TLS and provides NETCONF over TLS and provides further details such as certificate
further details such as certificate fingerprint formats exposed to fingerprint formats exposed to network configuration systems.
network configuration systems.
8. Cipher Suites 8. Cipher Suites
Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to
support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. Implementations MAY support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. Implementations MAY
implement additional TLS cipher suites that provide mutual implement additional TLS cipher suites that provide mutual
authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF
[RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given [RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given
in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. in [RFC7525].
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
NETCONF is used to access configuration and state information and to NETCONF is used to access configuration and state information and to
modify configuration information, so the ability to access this modify configuration information, so the ability to access this
protocol should be limited to users and systems that are authorized protocol should be limited to users and systems that are authorized
to view the NETCONF server's configuration and state or to modify the to view the NETCONF server's configuration and state or to modify the
NETCONF server's configuration. NETCONF server's configuration.
Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such
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document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support
of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations
for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well. for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well.
NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should
establish a NETCONF over TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected, establish a NETCONF over TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected,
or incorrect identity on the opposite side. Note that the decision or incorrect identity on the opposite side. Note that the decision
whether a certificate presented by the client is accepted can depend whether a certificate presented by the client is accepted can depend
on whether a trusted CA certificate is white listed (see Section 7). on whether a trusted CA certificate is white listed (see Section 7).
If deployments make use of this option, it is recommended that the If deployments make use of this option, it is recommended that the
white listed CA certificate is used only to issue certificates that white-listed CA certificate is used only to issue certificates that
are used for accessing NETCONF servers. Should the CA certificate be are used for accessing NETCONF servers. Should the CA certificate be
used to issue certificates for other purposes, then all certificates used to issue certificates for other purposes, then all certificates
created for other purposes will be accepted by a NETCONF server as created for other purposes will be accepted by a NETCONF server as
well, which is likely not suitable. well, which is likely not suitable.
This document does not support third-party authentication (e.g., This document does not support third-party authentication (e.g.,
backend Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) backend Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers)
due to the fact that TLS does not specify this way of authentication due to the fact that TLS does not specify this way of authentication
and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for the and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for the
authentication service. If third-party authentication is needed, the authentication service. If third-party authentication is needed, the
SSH transport [RFC6242] can be used. Secure Shell (SSH) transport [RFC6242] can be used.
RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>, RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>,
cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be
mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open
space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is
however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This
document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message
to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both
peers implement :base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol peers implement the :base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol
(chunked framing mechanism; see Section 3) is used for the rest of (chunked framing mechanism; see Section 3) is used for the rest of
the NETCONF session, to avoid injection attacks. the NETCONF session, to avoid injection attacks.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has Per RFC 5539, IANA assigned TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered
assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" Port Numbers" range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port
range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the is the default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2.
default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2. Below is Below is the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
Service Name: netconf-tls Service Name: netconf-tls
Transport Protocol(s): TCP Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org> Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS Description: NETCONF over TLS
Reference: RFC XXXX Reference: RFC 7589
Port Number: 6513 Port Number: 6513
[[CREF1: RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX above with the allocated RFC 11. References
number and remove this comment. --JS]]
11. Acknowledgements
The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Mehmet Ersue, Stephen Farrell, Miao Fuyou, Ibrahim Hajjeh, David
Harrington, Sam Hartman, Alfred Hoenes, Simon Josefsson, Barry Leiba,
Tom Petch, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen,
Stefan Winter and the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments
on this document. Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk
provided a thorough review of previous versions of this document.
Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] 11.1. Normative References
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09 (work in progress), February 2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
6241, June 2011. (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
6335, August 2011. RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
12.2. Informative References [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] 11.2. Informative References
[NETCONF-RESTCONF]
Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and
RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", draft-ietf-netconf- RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", Work in Progress,
server-model-06 (work in progress), February 2015. draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-06, February 2015.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006. DOI 10.17487/RFC4742, December 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4742>.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, DOI 10.17487/RFC5539, May 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5539>.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport [RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, July 2011. STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.
[RFC7407] Bjorklund, M. and J. Schoenwaelder, "A YANG Data Model for [RFC7407] Bjorklund, M. and J. Schoenwaelder, "A YANG Data Model for
SNMP Configuration", RFC 7407, December 2014. SNMP Configuration", RFC 7407, DOI 10.17487/RFC7407,
December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7407>.
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539
This section summarizes major changes between this document and RFC This section summarizes major changes between this document and RFC
5539. 5539.
o Documented that NETCONF over TLS uses the new message framing if o Documented that NETCONF over TLS uses the new message framing if
both peers support the :base:1.1 capability. both peers support the :base:1.1 capability.
o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF
specifications and restructured the text. Alignment with specifications and restructured the text. Alignment with
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are derived o Added a high-level description on how NETCONF usernames are
from certificates. derived from certificates.
o Removed the reference to BEEP. o Removed the reference to BEEP.
Acknowledgements
The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Pasi Eronen, Mehmet Ersue, Stephen Farrell, Miao Fuyou, Ibrahim
Hajjeh, David Harrington, Sam Hartman, Alfred Hoenes, Simon
Josefsson, Charlie Kaufman, Barry Leiba, Tom Petch, Tim Polk, Eric
Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen, Stefan Winter, and
the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on this document.
Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
Zayed University Zayed University
P.O. Box 19282
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Phone: +971 4 4021879
EMail: mohamad.badra@zu.ac.ae
URI: http://www.zu.ac.ae
Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research, Inc. SNMP Research, Inc.
3001 Kimberlin Heights Road 3001 Kimberlin Heights Road
Knoxville, TN 37920 Knoxville, TN 37920
USA United States
Phone: +1 865 573 1434 Phone: +1 865 573 1434
Email: luchuk@snmp.com EMail: luchuk@snmp.com
URI: http://www.snmp.com/ URI: http://www.snmp.com/
Juergen Schoenwaelder Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
Campus Ring 1 Campus Ring 1
28759 Bremen 28759 Bremen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Phone: +49 421 200 3587
Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de EMail: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de
URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/ URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/
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