draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-10.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
Internet-Draft Zayed University Internet-Draft Zayed University
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: August 16, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder Expires: October 12, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
February 12, 2015 April 10, 2015
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
Mutual X.509 Authentication Mutual X.509 Authentication
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-10
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol with mutual X.509 authentication to secure the exchange of protocol with mutual X.509 authentication to secure the exchange of
NETCONF messages. This revision of RFC 5539 documents the new NETCONF messages. This revision of RFC 5539 documents the new
message framing used by NETCONF 1.1 and it obsoletes RFC 5539. message framing used by NETCONF 1.1 and it obsoletes RFC 5539.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.7. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over
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document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Connection Initiation 2. Connection Initiation
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client. The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client.
The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server
passively listens for the incoming TLS connections. The well-known passively listens for the incoming TLS connections. The well-known
TCP port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen for TCP TCP port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen for TCP
connections established by NETCONF over TLS clients. The TLS client connections established by NETCONF over TLS clients. The TLS client
MUST send the TLS ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake. MUST send the TLS ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake.
Once the TLS handshake has finished, the client and the server MAY The TLS server MUST send a CertificateRequest in order to request a
begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client and server identity certificate from the TLS client. Once the TLS handshake has
verification is done before the NETCONF <hello> message is sent. finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF
This means that the identity verification is completed before the messages. Client and server identity verification is done before the
NETCONF session is started. NETCONF <hello> message is sent. This means that the identity
verification is completed before the NETCONF session is started.
3. Message Framing 3. Message Framing
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing The previous version of this document [RFC5539] used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not sequence defined in [RFC4742]. This version aligns with [RFC6242]
be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is and adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document
adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
The NETCONF <hello> message MUST be followed by the character The NETCONF <hello> message MUST be followed by the character
sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers
inspect the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is inspect the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is
advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in
Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF
session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see
Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used. Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used.
4. Connection Closure 4. Connection Closure
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closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server
processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL
respond and close the TLS session as described in Section 7.2.1 of respond and close the TLS session as described in Section 7.2.1 of
[RFC5246]. [RFC5246].
5. Certificate Validation 5. Certificate Validation
Both peers MUST use X.509 certificate path validation [RFC5280] to Both peers MUST use X.509 certificate path validation [RFC5280] to
verify the integrity of the certificate presented by the peer. The verify the integrity of the certificate presented by the peer. The
presented X.509 certificate may also be considered valid if it presented X.509 certificate may also be considered valid if it
matches a locally configured certificate fingerprint. If X.509 matches one obtained by another trusted mechanism, such as using a
certificate path validation fails and the presented X.509 certificate locally configured certificate fingerprint. If X.509 certificate
does not match a locally configured certificate fingerprint, the path validation fails and the presented X.509 certificate does not
connection MUST be terminated as defined in [RFC5246]. match a certificate obtained by a trusted mechanism, the connection
MUST be terminated as defined in [RFC5246].
6. Server Identity 6. Server Identity
The NETCONF client MUST check the identity of the server according to The NETCONF client MUST check the identity of the server according to
Section 6 of [RFC6125]. Section 6 of [RFC6125].
7. Client Identity 7. Client Identity
The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to
ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is
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type 'common-name'). The CommonName is converted to UTF-8 type 'common-name'). The CommonName is converted to UTF-8
encoding. The usage of CommonNames is deprecated and users encoding. The usage of CommonNames is deprecated and users
are encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods are encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods
instead. instead.
(d) If it is impossible to determine a username from the list (d) If it is impossible to determine a username from the list
entry's data combined with the data presented in the entry's data combined with the data presented in the
certificate, then additional list entries MUST be searched certificate, then additional list entries MUST be searched
looking for another potential match. Similarily, if the looking for another potential match. Similarily, if the
username does not comply to the NETCONF requirements on username does not comply to the NETCONF requirements on
usernames [RFC6241] (i.e., the username is not representable in usernames [RFC6241], then additional list entries MUST be
XML), then additional list entries MUST be searched looking for searched looking for another potential match. If there are no
another potential match. If there are no further list entries, further list entries, the TLS session MUST be terminated.
the TLS session MUST be terminated.
The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be
made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username
without modification. without modification.
The NETCONF server configuration data model
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] covers NETCONF over TLS and provides
further details such as certificate fingerprint formats exposed to
network configuration systems.
8. Cipher Suites 8. Cipher Suites
Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to
support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. Implementations MAY support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. Implementations MAY
implement additional TLS cipher suites that provide mutual implement additional TLS cipher suites that provide mutual
authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF
[RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given [RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given
in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
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Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such
as usernames or security keys. So, NETCONF requires communications as usernames or security keys. So, NETCONF requires communications
channels that provide strong encryption for data privacy. This channels that provide strong encryption for data privacy. This
document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support
of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations
for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well. for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well.
NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should
establish a NETCONF over TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected, establish a NETCONF over TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected,
or incorrect identity on the opposite side. This document does not or incorrect identity on the opposite side. Note that the decision
support third-party authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, whether a certificate presented by the client is accepted can depend
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS on whether a trusted CA certificate is white listed (see Section 7).
does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends If deployments make use of this option, it is recommended that the
on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third- white listed CA certificate is used only to issue certificates that
party authentication is needed, the SSH transport can be used. are used for accessing NETCONF servers. Should the CA certificate be
used to issue certificates for other purposes, then all certificates
created for other purposes will be accepted by a NETCONF server as
well, which is likely not suitable.
This document does not support third-party authentication (e.g.,
backend Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers)
due to the fact that TLS does not specify this way of authentication
and that NETCONF depends on the transport protocol for the
authentication service. If third-party authentication is needed, the
SSH transport [RFC6242] can be used.
RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>, RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>,
cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be
mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open
space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is
however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This
document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message
to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both
peers implement :base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol peers implement :base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol
(chunked framing mechanism; see Section 3) is used for the rest of (chunked framing mechanism; see Section 3) is used for the rest of
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Description: NETCONF over TLS Description: NETCONF over TLS
Reference: RFC XXXX Reference: RFC XXXX
Port Number: 6513 Port Number: 6513
[[CREF1: RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX above with the allocated RFC [[CREF1: RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX above with the allocated RFC
number and remove this comment. --JS]] number and remove this comment. --JS]]
11. Acknowledgements 11. Acknowledgements
The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon, The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, Ibrahim Hajjeh, David Harrington, Alfred Mehmet Ersue, Stephen Farrell, Miao Fuyou, Ibrahim Hajjeh, David
Hoenes, Simon Josefsson, Tom Petch, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Harrington, Sam Hartman, Alfred Hoenes, Simon Josefsson, Barry Leiba,
Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen and the NETCONF mailing list members for Tom Petch, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen,
their comments on this document. Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Stefan Winter and the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments
Tim Polk provided a thorough review of previous versions of this on this document. Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk
document. provided a thorough review of previous versions of this document.
Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme. under its Seventh Framework Programme.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft- "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09 (work in progress), February 2015. ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09 (work in progress), February 2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
skipping to change at page 8, line 43 skipping to change at page 9, line 5
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC
6335, August 2011. 6335, August 2011.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model]
Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and
RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", draft-ietf-netconf-
server-model-06 (work in progress), February 2015.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006. December 2006.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, May 2009.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport [RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, July 2011. STD 78, RFC 6353, July 2011.
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o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF
specifications and restructured the text. Alignment with specifications and restructured the text. Alignment with
[RFC6125]. [RFC6125].
o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are derived o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are derived
from certificates. from certificates.
o Removed the reference to BEEP. o Removed the reference to BEEP.
Appendix B. Change Log
[[CREF2: RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix before publication.
--JS]]
B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07
o Limited the scope of the document to TLS with mutual X.509
authentication.
o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are extracted
from certificates.
o Editorial changes
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06
o Removed all call-home related text.
o Removed redundant text as discussed at the Toronto IETF meeting.
B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05
o Removed the YANG configuration data model since it became a
separate document.
o Added reference to RFC 3234 plus editorial updates.
B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04
o Added the applicability statement proposed by Stephen Hanna.
o Added call-home configuration objects and a tls-call-home feature.
o Rewrote the text such that the role swap happens right after the
TCP connection has been established.
B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03
o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number,
rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a
NETCONF server to be a TLS client).
o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the
text.
o Extended the IANA considerations section.
o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP
configuration data model and updated the examples.
o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF
following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration
model.
B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85
* Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this
draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module
specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children
of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the
tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module.
* Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
module.
* Added example configurations.
o Addessed issues posted on NETCONF WG E-mail list.
o Deleted the superfluous tls container that was directly below the
netconf-config container.
o Added a statement to the text indicating that support for mapping
X.509 certificates to NETCONF usernames is optional. This is
analogous to existing text indicating that support for mapping
pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource-
constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509
certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this
specification.
o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the
document related to the data model.
o Updated author's addresses.
B.7. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
o Remove the reference to BEEP.
o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
Zayed University Zayed University
Email: mbadra@gmail.com Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research, Inc. SNMP Research, Inc.
3001 Kimberlin Heights Road 3001 Kimberlin Heights Road
Knoxville, TN 37920 Knoxville, TN 37920
USA USA
Phone: +1 865 573 1434 Phone: +1 865 573 1434
Email: luchuk@snmp.com Email: luchuk@snmp.com
URI: http://www.snmp.com/ URI: http://www.snmp.com/
Juergen Schoenwaelder Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
Campus Ring 1 Campus Ring 1
28759 Bremen 28759 Bremen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Phone: +49 421 200 3587
Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de
URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/ URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/
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