draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
Internet-Draft Zayed University Internet-Draft Zayed University
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: April 3, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder Expires: June 11, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
September 30, 2014 December 8, 2014
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 Mutual X.509 Authentication
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol to secure the exchange of NETCONF messages. This revision protocol with mutual X.509 authentication to secure the exchange of
of RFC 5539 documents the new message framing for NETCONF 1.1 and it NETCONF messages. This revision of RFC 5539 documents the new
obsoletes RFC 5539. message framing used by NETCONF 1.1 and it obsoletes RFC 5539.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and 6. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.3. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates . 5 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 12. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.7. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]. The TLS protocol provides Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]. Implementations MUST
support for certificate-based mutual authentication, key derivation, support mutual TLS certificate-based authentication [RFC5246]. This
protected ciphersuite negotiation, and key management capabilities. assures the NETCONF server of the identity of the principal who
wishes to manipulate the management information. It assures the
NETCONF client of the identity of the server for which it wishes to
manipulate the management information.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. NETCONF over TLS 2. Connection Initiation
Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on
top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how
NETCONF can be used within a TLS session.
2.1. Connection Initiation
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client. The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client.
The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server
passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port passively listens for the incoming TLS connections. The well-known
6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message TCP port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen for TCP
to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the connections established by NETCONF over TLS clients. The TLS client
client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client MUST send the TLS ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake.
and server identity verification (as described in Section 2.4) is Once the TLS handshake has finished, the client and the server MAY
done before the <hello> message is sent. This means that the begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client and server identity
identity verification is completed before the NETCONF session has verification is done before the NETCONF <hello> message is sent.
started. This means that the identity verification is completed before the
NETCONF session is started.
The well-known port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen
for connections established by NETCONF clients. NETCONF clients
connect to the server on the server port 6513 in order to send
NETCONF messages to the NETCONF server.
2.2. Message Framing 3. Message Framing
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not
be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is
not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document
adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows: adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence The NETCONF <hello> message MUST be followed by the character
]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers inspect the sequence ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers
announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by inspect the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is
both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of advertised by both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in
[RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session. Section 4.2 of [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF
Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of session. Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see
[RFC6242]) is used. Section 4.3 of [RFC6242]) is used.
2.3. Connection Closure 4. Connection Closure
A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF
client in the order in which they are received. A NETCONF session is client in the order in which they are received. A NETCONF session is
closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server
processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL
respond and close the TLS session as described in Section 7.2.1 of respond and close the TLS session as described in Section 7.2.1 of
[RFC5246]. [RFC5246].
2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and Authorization 5. Certificate Validation
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based Both peers use X.509 certificate path validation [RFC5280] to verify
authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS the integrity of the certificate presented by the peer. presented
certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply. X.509 certificate may also be considered valid if it matches a
locally configured certificate fingerprint. If X.509 certificate
path validation fails and the presented X.509 certificate does not
match a locally configured certificate fingerprint, the connection
MUST be terminated as defined in [RFC5246].
2.4.1. Server Identity 6. Server Identity
If the certificate presented by a NETCONF server has passed The NETCONF client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented
certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, by the NETCONF server to determine if it meets the client's
the NETCONF client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented expectations. If the NETCONF client has external information as to
by the server to determine if it meets the client's expectations. If the expected identity of the NETCONF server, the hostname check MAY
the NETCONF client has external information as to the expected be omitted. Otherwise, the NETCONF client MUST check its
identity of the NETCONF server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. understanding of the NETCONF server hostname against the server's
Otherwise, the NETCONF client MUST check its understanding of the identity as presented in the server certificate message, in order to
NETCONF server hostname against the server's identity as presented in prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined
in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the NETCONF client MUST either ask in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the NETCONF client MUST either ask
for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and
indicate the NETCONF server's identity is suspect. indicate the NETCONF server's identity is suspect.
Additionally, NETCONF clients MUST verify the binding between the 7. Client Identity
identity of the NETCONF servers to which they connect and the public
keys presented by those servers. NETCONF clients SHOULD implement
the algorithm in Section 6 of [RFC5280] for general certificate
validation, but MAY supplement that algorithm with other validation
methods that achieve equivalent levels of verification (such as
comparing the NETCONF server certificate against a local store of
already-verified certificates and identity bindings).
2.4.2. Client Identity
The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to
ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is
legitimate before the NETCONF session is started. legitimate before the NETCONF session is started.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's
authentication process MUST result in an authenticated NETCONF client authentication process MUST result in an authenticated NETCONF client
identity whose permissions are known to the server. The identity whose permissions are known to the server. The
authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the
NETCONF username. NETCONF username. The following algorithm is used by the NETCONF
server to derive a NETCONF username from a certificate:
The server maintains an ordered list of mappings of certificates
to names. The username is derived by considering each list entry
in order. The fingerprint member of a list entry determines
whether the list entry is a match:
1. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches that of the
presented certificate, then consider the list entry as a
successful match.
2. If the list entry's fingerprint value matches that of a
locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate, and that CA
certificate was part of the CA certificate chain to the
presented certificate, then consider the list entry as a
successful match.
Once a matching list entry has been found, the map-type member of
the list entry is used to determine how the name associated with
the certificate should be determined. Possible options are:
A. The username is explicitly configured.
B. The subjectAltName's rfc822Name is mapped to a username.
C. The subjectAltName's dNSName is mapped to a username.
D. The subjectAltName's iPAddress is mapped to a username.
E. Any of the subjectAltName's rfc822Name, dNSName, iPAddress is
mapped to a username.
F. The certificate's CommonName is mapped to a username.
If it is impossible to determine a name from the cert-to-name list
entry's data combined with the data presented in the certificate,
then additional cert-to-name list entries MUST be searched looking
for another potential match.
The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be
made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username
without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF
requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not
representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped. representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped.
2.4.3. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates 8. Cipher Suites
After completing the TLS handshake, the NETCONF server attempts to
derive a NETCONF username from the X.509 certificate presented by the
NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server cannot derive a valid NETCONF
username from the presented certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST
close the TLS connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over
it. The NETCONF server uses the algorithm defined in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] to extract a NETCONF username from
the X.509 certificate presented by the NETCONF client.
2.5. Cipher Suites
Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to
implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. Implementations MAY
[RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] implement additional TLS cipher suites that provide mutual
and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite. authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality as required by NETCONF
[RFC6241]. Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given
in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
3. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
NETCONF is used to access configuration and state information and to NETCONF is used to access configuration and state information and to
modify configuration information, so the ability to access this modify configuration information, so the ability to access this
protocol should be limited to users and systems that are authorized protocol should be limited to users and systems that are authorized
to view the NETCONF server's configuration and state or to modify the to view the NETCONF server's configuration and state or to modify the
NETCONF server's configuration. NETCONF server's configuration.
Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such
as usernames or security keys. So, NETCONF requires communications as usernames or security keys. So, NETCONF requires communications
channels that provide strong encryption for data privacy. This channels that provide strong encryption for data privacy. This
document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support
of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations
for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well. for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well.
NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should
establish a NETCONF over SSH connection with an unknown, unexpected, establish a NETCONF over TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected,
or incorrect identity on the opposite side. This document does not or incorrect identity on the opposite side. This document does not
support third-party authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, support third-party authentication (e.g., backend Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS
does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends
on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third- on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third-
party authentication is needed, the SSH transport can be used. party authentication is needed, the SSH transport can be used.
RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>, RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>,
cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be
mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open
space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is
however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This
document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message
to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both
peers implement base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol peers implement base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol
(chunked framing mechanism; see Section 2.2) is used for the rest of (chunked framing mechanism; see Section 3) is used for the rest of
the NETCONF session, to avoid injection attacks. the NETCONF session, to avoid injection attacks.
4. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has
assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers"
range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the
default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2.1. Below default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2. Below is
is the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335]. the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
Service Name: netconf-tls Service Name: netconf-tls
Transport Protocol(s): TCP Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org> Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS Description: NETCONF over TLS
Reference: RFC XXXX Reference: RFC XXXX
Port Number: 6513 Port Number: 6513
5. Acknowledgements 11. Acknowledgements
The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon, The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, David Harrington, Alfred Hoenes, Simon Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, David Harrington, Alfred Hoenes, Simon
Josefsson, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen and Josefsson, Tom Petch, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert
the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on this document. Wijnen and the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on
Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk provided a thorough review this document. Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk provided a
of previous versions of this document. thorough review of previous versions of this document.
Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme. under its Seventh Framework Programme.
6. Contributor's Address 12. Contributor's Address
Ibrahim Hajjeh Ibrahim Hajjeh
Ineovation Ineovation
France France
EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr
7. References 13. References
7.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
Configuration Model", draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-03 "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
(work in progress), September 2014. ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07 (work in progress), November 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 8, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 29
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC
6335, August 2011. 6335, August 2011.
7.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006. December 2006.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, May 2009.
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539
This section lists major changes between this document and RFC 5539. This section lists major changes between this document and RFC 5539.
o Documented that NETCONF uses the new message framing if both peers o Documented that NETCONF uses the new message framing if both peers
support the base:1.1 capability. support the base:1.1 capability.
o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF
specifications. specifications and restructured the text.
o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are extracted
text. from certificates.
o Removed the reference to BEEP. o Removed the reference to BEEP.
Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-07
o Limited the scope of the document to TLS with mutual X.509
authentication.
o Added a high-level description how NETCONF usernames are extracted
from certificates.
o Editorial changes
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06
o Removed all call-home related text. o Removed all call-home related text.
o Removed redundant text as discussed at the Toronto IETF meeting. o Removed redundant text as discussed at the Toronto IETF meeting.
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05
o Removed the YANG configuration data model since it became a o Removed the YANG configuration data model since it became a
separate document. separate document.
o Added reference to RFC 3234 plus editorial updates. o Added reference to RFC 3234 plus editorial updates.
B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04
o Added the applicability statement proposed by Stephen Hanna. o Added the applicability statement proposed by Stephen Hanna.
o Added call-home configuration objects and a tls-call-home feature. o Added call-home configuration objects and a tls-call-home feature.
o Rewrote the text such that the role swap happens right after the o Rewrote the text such that the role swap happens right after the
TCP connection has been established. TCP connection has been established.
B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03
o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number, o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number,
rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a
NETCONF server to be a TLS client). NETCONF server to be a TLS client).
o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the
text. text.
o Extended the IANA considerations section. o Extended the IANA considerations section.
o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP
configuration data model and updated the examples. configuration data model and updated the examples.
o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF
following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration
model. model.
B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85 o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85
* Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this * Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this
draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module
specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children
of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the
tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module. tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module.
* Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG * Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
skipping to change at page 10, line 7 skipping to change at page 10, line 42
pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource- pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource-
constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509 constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509
certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this
specification. specification.
o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the
document related to the data model. document related to the data model.
o Updated author's addresses. o Updated author's addresses.
B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 B.7. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
o Remove the reference to BEEP. o Remove the reference to BEEP.
o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822. o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
Zayed University Zayed University
Email: mbadra@gmail.com Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research, Inc. SNMP Research, Inc.
3001 Kimberlin Heights Road 3001 Kimberlin Heights Road
Knoxville, TN 37920 Knoxville, TN 37920
USA USA
 End of changes. 42 change blocks. 
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