draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory Internet-Draft Zayed University
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: August 2, 2014 J. Schoenwaelder Expires: April 3, 2015 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
January 29, 2014 September 30, 2014
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol to secure the exchange of NETCONF messages. This document protocol to secure the exchange of NETCONF messages. This revision
obsoletes RFC 5539 and it adds an optional mechanism to establish the of RFC 5539 documents the new message framing for NETCONF 1.1 and it
underlying TCP connection from the NETCONF server to the NETCONF obsoletes RFC 5539.
client (call home).
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Client to Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Server to Client (Call Home) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3. Port Number Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and 2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and
Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Pre-Shared-Key-based Authentication, Identification 2.4.3. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates . 5
and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for This document defines how NETCONF messages can be exchanged over
certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]. The TLS protocol provides
derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual support for certificate-based mutual authentication, key derivation,
authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport protected ciphersuite negotiation, and key management capabilities.
Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246]. It also provides
an optional mechanism to establish the underlying TCP connection from
the NETCONF server to the NETCONF client (call home).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.1. Applicability Statement
The "call home" technique described in Section 2.1.2 of this document
MUST only be used for a NETCONF server to initiate a connection to a
NETCONF client, as described in this document.
The reason for this restriction is that different protocols have
different security assumptions. This specification requires NETCONF
clients and servers to verify the identity of the other party before
the NETCONF session is started. Further, strong cryptographic
authentication is used for both the NETCONF client and server. This
reduces the risk that a malicious party could impersonate a NETCONF
server and contact the NETCONF client using the "call home"
technique. Protocols other than NETCONF might not be so well
protected.
2. NETCONF over TLS 2. NETCONF over TLS
Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on
top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how
NETCONF can be used within a TLS session. NETCONF can be used within a TLS session.
2.1. Connection Initiation 2.1. Connection Initiation
In many deployments, the NETCONF client will initiate the connection
to a NETCONF server as described in Section 2.1.1. However, in order
to use NETCONF in environments where middleboxes [RFC3234] prevent
the client from establishing the connection, the server may initiate
the connection as described in Section 2.1.2 (call home).
2.1.1. Client to Server
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client. The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client.
The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server
passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port
6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message 6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message
to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the
client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client
and server identity verification (as described in Section 2.4 and and server identity verification (as described in Section 2.4) is
Section 2.5) is done before the <hello> message is sent. This means done before the <hello> message is sent. This means that the
that the identity verification is completed before the NETCONF identity verification is completed before the NETCONF session has
session has started. started.
2.1.2. Server to Client (Call Home)
The peer acting as the NETCONF server first actively opens a TCP
connection to the NETCONF client using the default port number YYYY.
Once the connection has been established, the NETCONF client, which
has accepted the incoming TCP connection, takes initiative. It from
now on MUST act as the TLS client and it therefore sends the TLS
ClientHello message to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS
handshake has finished, the client and the server MAY begin to
exchange NETCONF messages. Client and server identity verification
(as described in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5) is done before the
<hello> message is sent. This means that the identity verification
is completed before the NETCONF session has started.
2.1.3. Port Number Usage
A NETCONF client and a NETCONF server provide two different services.
The NETCONF server executes RPC requests and manipulates local
datastores while the NETCONF client invokes RPC requests. It is
possible to have both a NETCONF server and a NETCONF client running
on the same node.
The well-known port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen The well-known port number 6513 is used by NETCONF servers to listen
for connections established by NETCONF clients. NETCONF clients for connections established by NETCONF clients. NETCONF clients
connect to the server on the server port 6513 in order to execute RPC connect to the server on the server port 6513 in order to send
calls on the server. NETCONF messages to the NETCONF server.
The port number YYYY is used by NETCONF clients that support call-
home to listen for incoming connections. A NETCONF server using
call-home will connect to a NETCONF client in order to let the client
subsequently initiate RPC calls.
2.2. Message Framing 2.2. Message Framing
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not
be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is
not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document
adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows: adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence
]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the receiving peer's ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the peers inspect the
TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the <hello> message to the announced capabilities. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by
Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both both peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of
peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session. [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session.
Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of
[RFC6242]) is used. [RFC6242]) is used.
2.3. Connection Closure 2.3. Connection Closure
A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF
client in the order in which they are received. A NETCONF session is client in the order in which they are received. A NETCONF session is
closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server
processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL
respond and close the TLS session as described in [RFC5246] Section respond and close the TLS session as described in Section 7.2.1 of
7.2.1. The NETCONF server MUST NOT process any NETCONF messages [RFC5246].
received after the <close-session> operation.
2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and Authorization 2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and Authorization
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based
authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS
certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply. certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply.
2.4.1. Server Identity 2.4.1. Server Identity
If the certificate presented by a NETCONF server has passed If the certificate presented by a NETCONF server has passed
certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor,
the NETCONF client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented the NETCONF client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented
by the server to determine if it meets the client's expectations. by the server to determine if it meets the client's expectations. If
Particularly, the NETCONF client MUST check its understanding of the the NETCONF client has external information as to the expected
identity of the NETCONF server, the hostname check MAY be omitted.
Otherwise, the NETCONF client MUST check its understanding of the
NETCONF server hostname against the server's identity as presented in NETCONF server hostname against the server's identity as presented in
the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks. attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined
in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the NETCONF client MUST either ask in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the NETCONF client MUST either ask
for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and
indicate the NETCONF server's identity is suspect. indicate the NETCONF server's identity is suspect.
Additionally, NETCONF clients MUST verify the binding between the Additionally, NETCONF clients MUST verify the binding between the
identity of the NETCONF servers to which they connect and the public identity of the NETCONF servers to which they connect and the public
keys presented by those servers. NETCONF clients SHOULD implement keys presented by those servers. NETCONF clients SHOULD implement
the algorithm in Section 6 of [RFC5280] for general certificate the algorithm in Section 6 of [RFC5280] for general certificate
validation, but MAY supplement that algorithm with other validation validation, but MAY supplement that algorithm with other validation
methods that achieve equivalent levels of verification (such as methods that achieve equivalent levels of verification (such as
comparing the NETCONF server certificate against a local store of comparing the NETCONF server certificate against a local store of
already-verified certificates and identity bindings). already-verified certificates and identity bindings).
If the NETCONF client has external information as to the expected
identity of the NETCONF server, the hostname check MAY be omitted.
2.4.2. Client Identity 2.4.2. Client Identity
The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to
ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is
legitimate before the NETCONF session is started. legitimate before the NETCONF session is started.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's
authentication process MUST result in an authenticated NETCONF client authentication process MUST result in an authenticated NETCONF client
identity whose permissions are known to the server. The identity whose permissions are known to the server. The
authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the
NETCONF username. NETCONF username.
The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be
made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username
without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF
requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not
representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped. representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped.
2.4.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates 2.4.3. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates
After completing the TLS handshake, the NETCONF server attempts to After completing the TLS handshake, the NETCONF server attempts to
derive a NETCONF username from the X.509 certificate presented by the derive a NETCONF username from the X.509 certificate presented by the
NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server cannot derive a valid NETCONF NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server cannot derive a valid NETCONF
username from the presented certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST username from the presented certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST
close the TLS connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over close the TLS connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over
it. The NETCONF server uses the algorithm defined in it. The NETCONF server uses the algorithm defined in
[I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg] to extract a NETCONF username from the [I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model] to extract a NETCONF username from
X.509 certificate presented by the NETCONF client. The cert-to-name the X.509 certificate presented by the NETCONF client.
list in the ietf-netconf-server YANG module, defined in
[I-D.kwatsen-netconf-server], specifies how a NETCONF server
transforms a certificate into a NETCONF username.
2.5. Pre-Shared-Key-based Authentication, Identification and
Authorization
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key
ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in
the ietf-netconf-server YANG module, defined in
[I-D.kwatsen-netconf-server], specifies how a NETCONF server
associates a TLS pre-shared key with a NETCONF username.
2.6. Cipher Suites 2.5. Cipher Suites
Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY
implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication
[RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] [RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite, and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite.
which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to
apply to future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-
implement cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and NETCONF is used to access configuration and state information and to
[RFC6241] apply here as well. modify configuration information, so the ability to access this
protocol should be limited to users and systems that are authorized
to view the NETCONF server's configuration and state or to modify the
NETCONF server's configuration.
This document in its current version does not support third-party Configuration or state data may include sensitive information, such
authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and as usernames or security keys. So, NETCONF requires communications
Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify channels that provide strong encryption for data privacy. This
this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport document defines a NETCONF over TLS mapping that provides for support
protocol for the authentication service. If third-party of strong encryption and authentication. The security considerations
authentication is needed, SSH transport can be used. for TLS [RFC5246] and NETCONF [RFC6241] apply here as well.
An attacker might be able to inject arbitrary NETCONF messages via NETCONF over TLS requires mutual authentication. Neither side should
some application that does not carefully check exchanged messages. establish a NETCONF over SSH connection with an unknown, unexpected,
When the :base:1.1 capability is not advertised by both peers, an or incorrect identity on the opposite side. This document does not
attacker might be able to deliberately insert the delimiter sequence support third-party authentication (e.g., backend Authentication,
]]>]]> in a NETCONF message to create a DoS attack. If the :base:1.1 Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS
capability is not advertised by both peers, applications and NETCONF does not specify this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends
APIs MUST ensure that the delimiter sequence ]]>]]> never appears in on the transport protocol for the authentication service. If third-
NETCONF messages; otherwise, those messages can be dropped, garbled, party authentication is needed, the SSH transport can be used.
or misinterpreted. More specifically, if the delimiter sequence is
found in a NETCONF message by the sender side, a robust
implementation of this document SHOULD warn the user that illegal
characters have been discovered. If the delimiter sequence is found
in a NETCONF message by the receiver side (including any XML
attribute values, XML comments, or processing instructions), a robust
implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message
without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session.
Finally, this document does not introduce any new security RFC 5539 assumes that the end-of-message (EOM) sequence, ]]>]]>,
considerations compared to [RFC6242]. cannot appear in any well-formed XML document, which turned out to be
mistaken. The EOM sequence can cause operational problems and open
space for attacks if sent deliberately in NETCONF messages. It is
however believed that the associated threat is not very high. This
document still uses the EOM sequence for the initial <hello> message
to avoid incompatibility with existing implementations. When both
peers implement base:1.1 capability, a proper framing protocol
(chunked framing mechanism; see Section 2.2) is used for the rest of
the NETCONF session, to avoid injection attacks.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has
assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers"
range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the
default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2.1.1. default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2.1. Below
Below is the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335]. is the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
Service Name: netconf-tls Service Name: netconf-tls
Transport Protocol(s): TCP Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org> Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org> Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS Description: NETCONF over TLS
Reference: RFC XXXX Reference: RFC XXXX
Port Number: 6513 Port Number: 6513
This document requests that IANA assigns a TCP port number in the
"Registered Port Numbers" range with the service name
"netconf-tls-ch". This port will be the default port for NETCONF
over TLS when the NETCONF server calls home, as defined in
Section 2.1.2. Below is the registration template following the
rules in [RFC6335].
Service Name: netconf-tls-ch
Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS (call home)
Reference: RFC XXXX
Port Number: YYYY
5. Acknowledgements 5. Acknowledgements
A significant amount of the text in Section 2.4 was lifted from
[RFC4642].
The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon, The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, David Harrington, Alfred Hoenes, Simon Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, David Harrington, Alfred Hoenes, Simon
Josefsson, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen and Josefsson, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Kent Watsen, Bert Wijnen and
the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on this document. the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on this document.
Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk provided a the thorough Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk provided a thorough review
review of previous versions of this document. Stephen Hanna wrote of previous versions of this document.
the initial text for the applicability statement.
Juergen Schoenwaelder and was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of Juergen Schoenwaelder was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme. under its Seventh Framework Programme.
6. Contributor's Address 6. Contributor's Address
Ibrahim Hajjeh Ibrahim Hajjeh
Ineovation Ineovation
France France
EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg] [I-D.ietf-netconf-server-model]
Bjorklund, M. and J. Schoenwaelder, "A YANG Data Model for Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server
SNMP Configuration", draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-03 (work Configuration Model", draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-03
in progress), November 2013. (work in progress), September 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
December 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC
RFC 6241, June 2011. 6241, June 2011.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC
RFC 6335, August 2011. 6335, August 2011.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.kwatsen-netconf-server]
Watsen, K. and J. SchoeCnwaelder, "A YANG Data Model for
NETCONF Server Configuration",
draft-kwatsen-netconf-server-00 (work in progress),
January 2014.
[RFC3234] Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
Issues", RFC 3234, February 2002.
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006. December 2006.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, May 2009.
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5539
A.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05 This section lists major changes between this document and RFC 5539.
o Documented that NETCONF uses the new message framing if both peers
support the base:1.1 capability.
o Removed redundant text that can be found in the TLS and NETCONF
specifications.
o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the
text.
o Removed the reference to BEEP.
Appendix B. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
B.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-06
o Removed all call-home related text.
o Removed redundant text as discussed at the Toronto IETF meeting.
B.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-05
o Removed the YANG configuration data model since it became a o Removed the YANG configuration data model since it became a
separate document. separate document.
o Added reference to RFC 3234 plus editorial updates. o Added reference to RFC 3234 plus editorial updates.
A.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04 B.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-04
o Added the applicability statement proposed by Stephen Hanna. o Added the applicability statement proposed by Stephen Hanna.
o Added call-home configuration objects and a tls-call-home feature. o Added call-home configuration objects and a tls-call-home feature.
o Rewrote the text such that the role swap happens right after the o Rewrote the text such that the role swap happens right after the
TCP connection has been established. TCP connection has been established.
A.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 B.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03
o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number, o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number,
rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a
NETCONF server to be a TLS client). NETCONF server to be a TLS client).
o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the
text. text.
o Extended the IANA considerations section. o Extended the IANA considerations section.
o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP
configuration data model and updated the examples. configuration data model and updated the examples.
o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF
following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration
model. model.
A.4. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 B.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85 o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85
* Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this * Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this
draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module
specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children
of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the
tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module. tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module.
* Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG * Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
skipping to change at page 12, line 18 skipping to change at page 10, line 7
pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource- pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource-
constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509 constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509
certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this
specification. specification.
o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the
document related to the data model. document related to the data model.
o Updated author's addresses. o Updated author's addresses.
A.5. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 B.6. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
o Remove the reference to BEEP. o Remove the reference to BEEP.
o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822. o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
LIMOS Laboratory Zayed University
Email: mbadra@gmail.com Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research, Inc. SNMP Research, Inc.
3001 Kimberlin Heights Road 3001 Kimberlin Heights Road
Knoxville, TN 37920 Knoxville, TN 37920
US USA
Phone: +1 865 573 1434 Phone: +1 865 573 1434
Email: luchuk@snmp.com Email: luchuk@snmp.com
URI: http://www.snmp.com/ URI: http://www.snmp.com/
Juergen Schoenwaelder Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
Campus Ring 1 Campus Ring 1
28759 Bremen 28759 Bremen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Phone: +49 421 200 3587
Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de
URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/ URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/
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