draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc. Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: August 25, 2013 J. Schoenwaelder Expires: November 11, 2013 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
February 21, 2013 May 10, 2013
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges. This document obsoletes RFC protocol to secure the exchange of NETCONF messages. This document
5539. obsoletes RFC 5539.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. Client to Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization . . 4 2.1.2. Server to Client (Call Home) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Message Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client 2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK Identities . . . . 7 2.4.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5. Pre-Shared-Key-based Authentication, Identification
4.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.6. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Module 'ietf-netconf-config' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Submodule 'ietf-netconf-common' . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Submodule 'ietf-netconf-tls' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 A.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 to A.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for
certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key
derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual
authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport
Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246]. Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246]. A YANG data model
is provided for configuring the policy used to map X.509 certificates
into NETCONF usernames and to provision TLS pre-shared keys and to
associate these keys with NETCONF usernames.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. NETCONF over TLS 2. NETCONF over TLS
Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on
top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how
NETCONF can be used within a TLS session. NETCONF can be used within a TLS session.
2.1. Connection Initiation 2.1. Connection Initiation
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST also act as the TLS In many deployments, the NETCONF client will initiate the connection
client. The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS to a NETCONF server as described in Section 2.1.1. However, in order
server passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP to use NETCONF in environments where middleboxes prevent the client
port 6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello from establishing the connection, the server may initiate the
message to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has connection as described in Section 2.1.2 (call home).
finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF
messages. Client and server identity verification (as described in 2.1.1. Client to Server
Section 3) is done before the <hello> message is sent; for the
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST act as the TLS client.
The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server
passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port
6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message
to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the
client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client
and server identity verification (as described in Section 2.4 and
Section 2.5) is done before the <hello> message is sent; for the
server, this means the identity verification is completed before the server, this means the identity verification is completed before the
NETCONF session has started. NETCONF session has started.
2.1.2. Server to Client (Call Home)
The peer acting as the NETCONF server MUST act as the TLS client.
The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS server
passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port
YYYY. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message
to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the
client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF messages. Client
and server identity verification (as described in Section 2.4 and
Section 2.5) is done before the <hello> message is sent; for the
server, this means the identity verification is completed before the
NETCONF session has started.
2.2. Message Framing
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not
be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is
not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, and at the not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, this document
same time be compatible with existing implementations, this document adopts the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as follows:
uses the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as following:
The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence
]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the receiving peer's ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the receiving peer's
TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the <hello> message to the TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the <hello> message to the
Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both
peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session. [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session.
Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of
[RFC6242]) is used. [RFC6242]) is used.
Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY 2.3. Connection Closure
implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication
[RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite,
which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to
apply to future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-
implement cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
2.2. Connection Closure
Exiting NETCONF is accomplished using the <close-session> operation.
A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF
client in the order in which they are received. When the NETCONF client in the order in which they are received. A NETCONF session is
server processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server closed using the <close-session> operation. When the NETCONF server
SHALL respond and close the TLS session. The NETCONF server MUST NOT processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server SHALL
process any NETCONF messages received after the <close-session> respond and close the TLS session as described in [RFC5246] Section
operation. The TLS session is closed as described in [RFC5246] 7.2.1. The NETCONF server MUST NOT process any NETCONF messages
Section 7.2.1. received after the <close-session> operation.
3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization 2.4. X.509-based Authentication, Identification and Authorization
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based
authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS
certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply. certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply.
3.1. Server Identity 2.4.1. Server Identity
If the server's presented certificate has passed certification path If the certificate presented by a NETCONF server has passed
validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, the client MUST certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor,
carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to the NETCONF client MUST carefully examine the certificate presented
determine if it meets the client's expectations. Particularly, the by the server to determine if it meets the client's expectations.
client MUST check its understanding of the server hostname against Particularly, the NETCONF client MUST check its understanding of the
the server's identity as presented in the server Certificate message, NETCONF server hostname against the server's identity as presented in
in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. the server Certificate message, in order to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined
in [RFC6125]. in [RFC6125]. If the match fails, the NETCONF client MUST either ask
for explicit user confirmation or terminate the connection and
If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user indicate the NETCONF server's identity is suspect.
confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's
identity is suspect.
Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of Additionally, NETCONF clients MUST verify the binding between the
the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by identity of the NETCONF servers to which they connect and the public
those servers. Clients SHOULD implement the algorithm in Section 6 keys presented by those servers. NETCONF clients SHOULD implement
of [RFC5280] for general certificate validation, but MAY supplement the algorithm in Section 6 of [RFC5280] for general certificate
that algorithm with other validation methods that achieve equivalent validation, but MAY supplement that algorithm with other validation
levels of verification (such as comparing the server certificate methods that achieve equivalent levels of verification (such as
against a local store of already-verified certificates and identity comparing the NETCONF server certificate against a local store of
bindings). already-verified certificates and identity bindings).
If the client has external information as to the expected identity of If the NETCONF client has external information as to the expected
the server, the hostname check MAY be omitted. identity of the NETCONF server, the hostname check MAY be omitted.
3.2. Client Identity 2.4.2. Client Identity
The server MUST verify the identity of the client to ensure that the The NETCONF server MUST verify the identity of the NETCONF client to
incoming client request is legitimate before the NETCONF session is ensure that the incoming request to establish a NETCONF session is
started. legitimate before the NETCONF session is started.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] requires that the transport protocol's
authentication process MUST result in an authenticated client authentication process MUST result in an authenticated NETCONF client
identity whose permissions are known to the server. The identity whose permissions are known to the server. The
authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the authenticated identity of a client is commonly referred to as the
NETCONF username. NETCONF username.
The username provided by the TLS implementation will be made The username provided by the NETCONF over TLS implementation will be
available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username made available to the NETCONF message layer as the NETCONF username
without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF without modification. If the username does not comply to the NETCONF
requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not
representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped. representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped.
Algorithms for mapping certificates or PSK identities (sent by the 2.4.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames from X.509 Certificates
client) to NETCONF usernames are described below.
3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client Certificates After completing the TLS handshake, the NETCONF server attempts to
derive a NETCONF username from the X.509 certificate presented by the
NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server cannot derive a valid NETCONF
username from the presented certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST
close the TLS connection, and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over
it. The NETCONF server uses the algorithm defined in
[I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg] to extract a NETCONF username from the
X.509 certificate presented by the NETCONF client. The cert-map list
in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG submodule specifies how a NETCONF server
transforms a certificate into a NETCONF username.
The algorithm for deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS certificates is 2.5. Pre-Shared-Key-based Authentication, Identification and
patterned after the algorithm for deriving tmSecurityNames from TLS Authorization
certificates specified in the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
[RFC6353]. The NETCONF server MUST implement the algorithms for
deriving NETCONF usernames from presented certificates that are
documented in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in
Section 4.2. This YANG module lets the NETCONF security
administrator configure how the NETCONF server derives NETCONF
usernames from presented certificates. It also lets different
certificate-to-username derivation algorithms be used for different
certificates.
When a NETCONF server accepts a TLS connection from a NETCONF client, Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
the NETCONF server attempts to derive a NETCONF username from the authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key
certificate presented by the NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in
cannot derive a valid NETCONF username from the client's presented the ietf-netconf-tls YANG submodule, defined in Section 4.3,
certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST close the TLS connection, specifies how a NETCONF server associates a TLS pre-shared key with a
and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it. The NETCONF server NETCONF username.
uses one of the following algorithms to produce a NETCONF username
from the certificate presented by the NETCONF client:
o Map a certificate directly to a specified, pre-configured, NETCONF 2.6. Cipher Suites
username;
o Extract the subjectAltName's rfc822Name from the certificate, then Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY
use the extracted rfc822Name as the NETCONF username; implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication
[RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite,
which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to
apply to future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-
implement cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
o Extract the subjectAltName's dnsName from the certificate, then 3. Data Model Overview
use the extracted dnsName as the NETCONF username;
o Extract the subjectAltName's iPAddress from the certificate, then In order to support future extensibility of the NETCONF configuration
use the extracted iPAddress as the NETCONF username; data model, the YANG definitions have been organized in a set of YANG
submodules, all sharing the same module namespace.
o Examine the subjectAltName's rfc822Name, dnsName, and iPAddress o ietf-netconf-config: The module importing the submodules and
fields in a pre-defined order. Return the value from the first defining the module namespace.
subjectAltName field that is examined, defined, and populated with
a non-empty value. If no subjectAltName field of a specific type
is defined, then the examination skips that field and proceeds to
examine the next field type. If a subjectAltName field is
defined, but the value is not populated, or is populated by an
empty value, then the examination skips that field and proceeds to
examine the next field type.
The NETCONF server MUST implement all of these algorithms, and allow o ietf-netconf-common: The submodule providing common definitions
the deployer to choose the algorithm used. The cert-map list in the shared by all submodules.
ietf-netconf-tls YANG module specifies how a NETCONF server
transforms a certificate into a NETCONF username.
If the fingerprint of locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate o ietf-netconf-tls: The submodule defining configuration objects for
is configured in the cert-map list in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG the NETCONF over TLS transport.
module, and that CA certificate is used to validate the certificate
presented by the client, then the NETCONF server uses that cert-map
list entry to produce the NETCONF username. This allows multiple
client certificates (all signed by the same trusted CA certificate)
to be mapped to a NETCONF username by a single entry in the cert-map
list.
3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK Identities This organizations allows to add configuration support for additional
NETCONF features while keeping the number of namespaces that have to
be dealt with down to a minimum. If new definitions need to be added
to the NETCONF configuration data model, either an existing YANG
submodule can be updated or a new YANG submodule can be written. In
both cases, the new document will carry an updated version of the
"ietf-netconf-config" module importing the submodules.
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK) The YANG submodule "ietf-netconf-tls" defines (i) how to configure
authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key the policy used to map X.509 certificates into NETCONF usernames and
ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in (ii) the mechanisms used to provision pre-shared keys and to
the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in Section 4.2, specifies associate them with NETCONF usernames. The mapping of X.509
how a NETCONF server transforms a TLS pre-shared key into a NETCONF certificates to NETCONF usernames imports definitions from [RFC6536]
username. and [I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg].
4. Data Model +--rw netconf
+--rw tls
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint x509c2n:tls-fingerprint
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw name string
+--rw psk-maps
+--rw psk-map* [psk-identity]
+--rw psk-identity string
+--rw user-name nacm:user-name-type
+--rw not-valid-before? yang:date-and-time
+--rw not-valid-after? yang:date-and-time
+--rw key string
4.1. Data Model Overview The meaning of the symbols in this diagrams is as follows:
The YANG module "ietf-netconf-tls", which defines configuration o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
parameters for mapping TLS parameters to NETCONF usernames, has the
following structure. Square brackets are used to enclose a list's
keys, and "?" means that the node is optional. Choice and case nodes
are enclosed in parenthesis, and a case node is marked with a colon
(":").
module: ietf-netconf-tls o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration
+--rw netconf-tls (read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only).
+--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-security-name [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint tls-fingerprint
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw cert-specified-security-name nacm:user-name-type
+--rw psk-maps
+--rw psk-map [psk-identity]
+--rw psk-identity string
+--rw user-name nacm:user-name-type
+--rw valid-not-before? yang:date-and-time
+--rw valid-not-after? yang:date-and-time
+--rw key string
4.2. YANG Module o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node and "*"
denotes a "list" and "leaf-list".
The ietf-netconf-tls YANG module defines objects for remotely o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
configuring the mapping of TLS certficates and of PSK Identities to marked with a colon (":").
NETCONF usernames.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-tls@2013-02-19.yang" o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
shown.
module ietf-netconf-tls { 4. Definitions
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls"; The YANG modules and submodules import type definitions and groupings
from [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6021-bis], [RFC6536], and
[I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg].
prefix "nctls"; 4.1. Module 'ietf-netconf-config'
import ietf-yang-types { <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-config@2013-05-07.yang"
prefix yang;
module ietf-netconf-config {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-config";
prefix "ncconf";
include ietf-netconf-common {
revision-date 2013-05-07;
} }
import ietf-netconf-acm { include ietf-netconf-tls {
prefix nacm; revision-date 2013-05-07;
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
skipping to change at page 8, line 44 skipping to change at page 9, line 13
Editor: Mohamad Badra Editor: Mohamad Badra
<mailto:mbadra@gmail.com> <mailto:mbadra@gmail.com>
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
<mailto:luchuk@snmp.com> <mailto:luchuk@snmp.com>
Juergen Schoenwaelder Juergen Schoenwaelder
<mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>"; <mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>";
description description
"This module applies to NETCONF over TLS. It specifies how "This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
NETCONF servers transform X.509 certificates presented by clients configuring NETCONF servers.
into NETCONF usernames. It also specifies how NETCONF servers
transform pre-shared TLS keys into NETCONF usernames.
The cert-maps container in this YANG module is patterned after
parts of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defined in RFC 6353. Much of the
description text has been copied directly from the
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB, and modified as necessary.
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved. authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note // remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
revision "2013-02-19" { revision "2013-05-07" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)"; "RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
} }
}
<CODE ENDS>
feature map-certificates { 4.2. Submodule 'ietf-netconf-common'
description
"The map-certificates feature indicates that the server <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-common@2013-05-07.yang"
implements mapping X.509 certificates to NETCONF user names.";
} submodule ietf-netconf-common {
belongs-to ietf-netconf-config {
prefix ncconf;
feature map-pre-shared-keys {
description
"The map-pre-shared-keys feature indicates that the server
implements mapping TLS pre-shared keys to NETCONF user names.";
} }
// [DISCUSS] This definition of tls-fingerprint is the same as organization
// the one in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-01.txt; can "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
// we avoid this duplication?
typedef tls-fingerprint { contact
type yang:hex-string { "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2}){0,254}'; WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
}
description
"A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
other data of potentially arbitrary length.
An tls-fingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
octet value encoded is taken from the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm
Registry (RFC 5246). The remaining octets are filled using
the results of the hashing algorithm.
The corresponding TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows a zero-length WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
value to be used for objects that are optional. In the YANG <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
data models, such objects are represented as optional leafs.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.SnmpTLSFingerprint";
}
/* Identities */ Editor: Mohamad Badra
<mailto:mbadra@gmail.com>
// [DISCUSS] The definitions of identities is the same as Alan Luchuk
// the those in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-01.txt; can <mailto:luchuk@snmp.com>
// we avoid this duplication?
identity cert-to-tm-security-name { Juergen Schoenwaelder
} <mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>";
identity specified { description
base cert-to-tm-security-name; "This submodule contains a collection of common YANG definitions
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSpecified"; for configuring NETCONF servers.
}
identity san-rfc822-name { Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
base cert-to-tm-security-name; authors of the code. All rights reserved.
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name";
}
identity san-dns-name { Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
base cert-to-tm-security-name; without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName"; to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
revision "2013-05-07" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
} }
identity san-ip-address { container netconf {
base cert-to-tm-security-name; description
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress"; "Top-level container for NETCONF related configuration
objects.";
} }
}
<CODE ENDS>
identity san-any { 4.3. Submodule 'ietf-netconf-tls'
base cert-to-tm-security-name;
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANAny"; <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-tls@2013-05-07.yang"
submodule ietf-netconf-tls {
belongs-to ietf-netconf-config {
prefix ncconf;
} }
identity common-name { import ietf-yang-types {
base cert-to-tm-security-name; prefix yang;
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertCommonName"; }
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
}
import ietf-x509-cert-to-name {
prefix x509c2n;
} }
container netconf-tls { include ietf-netconf-common;
// Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from X.509 organization
// certificates. "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
container cert-maps { contact
if-feature map-certificates; "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
description WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
"The cert-maps container is used by a NETCONF server to
map the NETCONF client's presented X.509 certificate to
a NETCONF username.
On an incoming TLS connection, the client's presented WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
certificate MUST either be validated based on an established <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
trust anchor, or it MUST directly match a fingerprint in the
'cert-map' list. This module does not provide any mechanisms
for configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed
trusted certificates for certificate chain validation is
expected to occur through an out-of-band transfer.
Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
certificate chain validation or directly matching a <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
fingerprint in the cert-map list), the cert-map list is
consulted to determine the appropriate NETCONF username to
associate with the remote connection. This is done by
considering each cert-to-security-name list entry in order.
The cert-to-security-name entry's fingerprint determines
whether the list entry is a match for the incoming
connection:
1) If the cert-to-security-name list entry's fingerprint Editor: Mohamad Badra
value matches that of the presented certificate, then <mailto:mbadra@gmail.com>
consider the list entry as a successful match.
2) If the cert-to-security-name list entry's fingerprint Alan Luchuk
value matches that of a locally held copy of a trusted CA <mailto:luchuk@snmp.com>
certificate, and that CA certificate was part of the CA
certificate chain to the presented certificate, then
consider the list entry as a successful match.
Once a matching cert-to-security-name list entry has been Juergen Schoenwaelder
found, the NETCONF server uses the map-type to determine how <mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>";
the NETCONF username associated with the session should be
determined. See the map-type leaf's description for details
on determining the NETCONF username value. If it is
impossible to determine a NETCONF username from the
cert-to-security-name list entry's data combined with the
data presented in the certificate, then additional
cert-to-tm-security-name list entries MUST be searched
looking for another potential match. If a resulting
NETCONF username mapped from a given cert-to-security-name
list entry is not compatible with the needed requirements
of a NETCONF username, then it MUST be considered an invalid
match and additional cert-to-security-name list entries MUST
be searched looking for another potential match.
If no matching and valid cert-to-security-name list entry can description
be found, then the NETCONF server MUST close the connection,
and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it.
Security administrators are encouraged to make use of "This submodule applies to NETCONF over TLS. It specifies how
certificates with subjectAltName fields that can be used as NETCONF servers transform X.509 certificates presented by
NETCONF usernames so that a single root CA certificate can NETCONF clients into NETCONF usernames. It also specifies
allow all child certificate's subjectAltName to map directly how NETCONF servers transform pre-shared TLS keys into NETCONF
to a NETCONF usernames via a 1:1 transformation."; usernames.
list cert-to-security-name { Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
key id; authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
revision "2013-05-07" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls {
description
"A server implements this feature if it supports NETCONF
over Transport Layer Security (TLS).";
reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls-map-certificates {
description
"The tls-map-certificates feature indicates that the
server implements mapping X.509 certificates to NETCONF
usernames.";
}
feature tls-map-pre-shared-keys {
description
"The tls-map-pre-shared-keys feature indicates that the
server implements mapping TLS pre-shared keys to NETCONF
usernames.";
}
augment /ncconf:netconf {
if-feature tls;
container tls {
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
description description
"This list defines how certificates are mapped to "Enables NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS).";
security names."; }
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry";
leaf id { // Objects for deriving NETCONF usernames from X.509
type uint32; // certificates.
description
"The id specifies the order in which the entries in the
cert-to-security-name container are searched. Entries
with lower numbers are searched first.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNID";
}
leaf fingerprint {
type tls-fingerprint;
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies a value with which the fingerprint of the
certificate presented by the peer is compared. If the
fingerprint of the certificate presented by the peer does
not match the fingerprint configured, then the entry is
skipped and the search for a match continues.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint";
}
leaf map-type {
type identityref {
base cert-to-tm-security-name;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies the algorithm used to map the certificate
presented by the peer to the NETCONF username.
Mappings that use the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column container cert-maps {
need to augment the 'cert-to-tm-security-name' list if-feature tls-map-certificates;
with additional configuration objects corresponding uses x509c2n:cert-to-name;
to the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData value. Such objects description
should use the 'when' statement to make them "The cert-maps container is used by a NETCONF server to
conditional based on the 'map-type'."; map the NETCONF client's presented X.509 certificate to
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType"; a NETCONF username.
}
leaf cert-specified-security-name {
when "../map-type = 'snmp:specified'";
type nacm:user-name-type;
mandatory true;
description
"Directly specifies the NETCONF username when the
'map-type' is 'specified'.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNData";
}
} // list cert-to-security-name
} // container cert-maps
// Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS If no matching and valid cert-to-name list entry can be
// pre-shared keys. found, then the NETCONF server MUST close the connection,
and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it.";
}
container psk-maps { // Objects for deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS
if-feature map-pre-shared-keys; // pre-shared keys.
description
"During the TLS Handshake, the client indicates which key to
use by including a PSK identity in the TLS ClientKeyExchange
message. On the server side, this PSK identity is used to
look up an entry in the psk-map list. If such an entry is
found, and the pre-shared keys match, then the client is
authenticated. The server uses the value from the user-name
leaf in the psk-map list as the NETCONF username. If the
server cannot find an entry in the psk-map list, or if the
pre-shared keys do not match, then the server terminates
the connection.";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)";
list psk-map { container psk-maps {
key psk-identity; if-feature tls-map-pre-shared-keys;
description
"During the TLS Handshake, the client indicates which
key to use by including a PSK identity in the TLS
ClientKeyExchange message. On the server side, this
PSK identity is used to look up an entry in the psk-map
list. If such an entry is found, and the pre-shared keys
match, then the client is authenticated. The server uses
the value from the user-name leaf in the psk-map list as
the NETCONF username. If the server cannot find an entry
in the psk-map list, or if the pre-shared keys do not
match, then the server terminates the connection.";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)";
leaf psk-identity { list psk-map {
type string; key psk-identity;
description
"The PSK identity encoded as a UTF-8 string. For details on
how the PSK identity MAY be encoded in UTF-8, see section
5.1. of RFC 4279.";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)";
}
leaf user-name {
type nacm:user-name-type;
mandatory true;
description
"The NETCONF username associated with this PSK identity.";
}
leaf valid-not-before {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given data
and time.";
}
leaf valid-not-after {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given date
and time.";
}
leaf key {
type string {
pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*';
}
mandatory true;
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"The key associated with the PSK identity";
}
} // list psk-map
} // container psk-maps
} // container netconf-tls leaf psk-identity {
type string;
description
"The PSK identity encoded as a UTF-8 string. For
details on how the PSK identity MAY be encoded in
UTF-8, see section 5.1. of RFC 4279.";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)";
}
leaf user-name {
type nacm:user-name-type;
mandatory true;
description
"The NETCONF username associated with this PSK
identity.";
}
leaf not-valid-before {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given date
and time.";
}
leaf not-valid-after {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given date
and time.";
}
leaf key {
type yang:hex-string;
mandatory true;
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"The key associated with the PSK identity";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)";
}
} // list psk-map
} // container psk-maps
}
}
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5. Usage Examples 5. Usage Examples
5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example 5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example
The following XML shows an example of parameters for mapping an X.509 The following XML shows an example configuration mapping a specific
certificate to a NETCONF username: X.509 certificate to a NETCONF username:
<netconf-tls <netconf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-config">
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls"> <tls>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<cert-maps> <cert-maps>
<cert-to-security-name> <!-- Use a subject alt name field of a specific
<id>10</id> certificate as the NC username. -->
<fingerprint>de:ad:be:ef</fingerprint> <!-- Not valid --> <cert-to-name>
<map-type>specified</map-type> <id>1</id>
<cert-specified-security-name> <fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
admin <map-type>x509c2n:san-any</map-type>
</cert-specified-security-name> </cert-to-name>
</cert-to-security-name> <!-- Map a specific certificate to the NC username
'Joe Cool'. -->
<cert-to-name>
<id>2</id>
<fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:specified</map-type>
<name>Joe Cool</name>
</cert-to-name>
</cert-maps> </cert-maps>
</netconf-tls> </tls>
</netconf>
5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example 5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example
The following XML shows an example of parameters for mapping a pre- The following XML shows an example configuration mapping a pre-shared
shared key to a NETCONF username: key to a NETCONF username:
<netconf-tls <netconf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-config">
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls"> <tls>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<psk-maps> <psk-maps>
<psk-map> <psk-map>
<psk-identity>a8gc8]klh59</psk-identity> <psk-identity>a8gc8]klh59</psk-identity>
<user-name>admin</user-name> <user-name>admin</user-name>
<valid-not-before>2013-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</valid-not-before> <not-valid-before>2013-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</not-valid-before>
<valid-not-after>2014-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</valid-not-after> <not-valid-after>2014-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</not-valid-after>
</psk-map> </psk-map>
</psk-maps> </psk-maps>
</netconf-tls> </tls>
</netconf>
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and
[RFC6241] apply here as well. [RFC6241] apply here as well.
This document in its current version does not support third-party This document in its current version does not support third-party
authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify
this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport
skipping to change at page 16, line 36 skipping to change at page 17, line 14
implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message
without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session. without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session.
Finally, this document does not introduce any new security Finally, this document does not introduce any new security
considerations compared to [RFC6242]. considerations compared to [RFC6242].
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has
assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers"
range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the default range with the service name "netconf-tls". This port will be the
port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document. default port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in Section 2.1.1.
Below is the registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, mbadra@gmail.com. Service Name: netconf-tls
Transport Protocol: TCP. Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Port Number: 6513 Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No. Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Port Name: netconf-tls. Description: NETCONF over TLS
Service Name: netconf. Reference: RFC XXXX
Reference: RFC 5539 Port Number: 6513
This document requests that IANA assigns a TCP port number in the
"Registered Port Numbers" range with the service name
"netconf-tls-ch". This port will be the default port for NETCONF
over TLS when the NETCONF server calls home, as defined in
Section 2.1.2. Below is the registration template following the
rules in [RFC6335].
Service Name: netconf-tls-ch
Transport Protocol(s): TCP
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS (call home)
Reference: RFC XXXX
Port Number: YYYY
This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in RFC 3688, the following registration is
requested to be made.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-config
Registrant Contact: The NETMOD WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020].
name: ietf-netconf-config
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-config
prefix: ncconf
reference: RFC XXXX
The document registers the following YANG submodules in the YANG
Module Names registry [RFC6020].
name: ietf-netconf-common
parent: ietf-netconf-config
reference: RFC XXXX
name: ietf-netconf-tls
parent: ietf-netconf-config
reference: RFC XXXX
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from A significant amount of the text in Section 2.4 was lifted from
[RFC4642]. [RFC4642].
The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou, The authors like to acknowledge Martin Bjorklund, Olivier Coupelon,
Eric Rescorla, Simon Josefsson, Olivier Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes, and Mehmet Ersue, Miao Fuyou, David Harrington, Alfred Hoenes, Simon
the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on the document. Josefsson, Eric Rescorla, Dan Romascanu, Bert Wijnen and the NETCONF
The author also appreciates Bert Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue, and Dan mailing list members for their comments on this document. Charlie
Romascanu for their efforts on issues resolving discussion; and Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk provided a the thorough review of
Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk for the thorough review of
previous versions of this document. previous versions of this document.
Juergen Schoenwaelder and was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of Juergen Schoenwaelder and was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme. under its Seventh Framework Programme.
9. Contributor's Address 9. Contributor's Address
Ibrahim Hajjeh Ibrahim Hajjeh
Ineovation Ineovation
France France
EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6021-bis]
Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types",
draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6021-bis-02 (work in progress),
May 2013.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg]
Bjorklund, M. and J. Schoenwaelder, "A YANG Data Model for
SNMP Configuration", draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-02 (work
in progress), April 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
December 2005. December 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6241, June 2011.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
RFC 6353, July 2011. Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, August 2011.
[RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
March 2012.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using [RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006. Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742, Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006. December 2006.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, May 2009.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6241, June 2011.
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
A.1. Open Issues A.1. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-03
o The identities etc. have been essentially copied from the SNMP o Added support for call home (allocation of a new port number,
configuration model. Are we really happy with this reuse by rewrote text to allow a NETCONF client to be a TLS server and a
copying? If so, do we keep the SNMP configuration model names or NETCONF server to be a TLS client).
adapt them to the NETCONF context?
o Right now, the YANG module focuses on the username mapping only. o Merged sections 2 and 3 into a new section 2 and restructured the
There are certainly more configuration objects for the TLS text.
transport, e.g., which ports to listen on, which CERT to use etc.
o Shall we add support for call home, i.e., a device, after o Extended the IANA considerations section.
initiating and establishing a TCP connection and executing the TLS
handshake, would switch role and subsequently act as a NETCONF
server. (This would likely also include new port numbers.)
A.2. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 to o Using the cert-to-name mapping grouping from the SNMP
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 configuration data model and updated the examples.
o Creating an extensible set of YANG (sub)modules for NETCONF
following the (sub)module structure of the SNMP configuration
model.
A.2. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85 o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85
* Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this * Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this
draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module
specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children
of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the
tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module. tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module.
* Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG * Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
skipping to change at page 19, line 39 skipping to change at page 21, line 45
pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource- pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource-
constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509 constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509
certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this
specification. specification.
o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the
document related to the data model. document related to the data model.
o Updated author's addresses. o Updated author's addresses.
A.3. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to A.3. draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
o Remove the reference to BEEP o Remove the reference to BEEP.
o rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822. o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
LIMOS Laboratory LIMOS Laboratory
Email: mbadra@gmail.com Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research, Inc. SNMP Research, Inc.
 End of changes. 114 change blocks. 
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