draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02.txt 
NETCONF Working Group M. Badra NETCONF Working Group M. Badra
Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory Internet-Draft LIMOS Laboratory
Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk Obsoletes: 5539 (if approved) A. Luchuk
Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research Intended status: Standards Track SNMP Research, Inc.
Expires: April 25, 2013 J. Schoenwaelder Expires: August 25, 2013 J. Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
October 22, 2012 February 21, 2013
NETCONF Over Transport Layer Security (TLS) Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
Abstract Abstract
The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) provides mechanisms to
install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices. install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of network devices.
This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) This document describes how to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges. This document obsoletes RFC protocol to secure NETCONF exchanges. This document obsoletes RFC
5539. 5539.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. NETCONF over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Connection Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization . . 4 3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization . . 4
3.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Server Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client 3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK identities . . . . 7 3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK Identities . . . . 7
3.2.3. Remote Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . 15
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Contributor's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 to A.1. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.2. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 to
A.2. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.3. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a The NETCONF protocol [RFC6241] defines a mechanism through which a
network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented, network device can be managed. NETCONF is connection-oriented,
requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection requiring a persistent connection between peers. This connection
must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and must provide integrity, confidentiality, peer authentication, and
reliable, sequenced data delivery. reliable, sequenced data delivery.
This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for This document defines "NETCONF over TLS", which includes support for
certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key certificate and pre-shared key (PSK)-based authentication and key
derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual derivation, utilizing the protected ciphersuite negotiation, mutual
authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport authentication, and key management capabilities of the TLS (Transport
Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246]. Layer Security) protocol, described in [RFC5246].
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. NETCONF over TLS 2. NETCONF over TLS
Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on Since TLS is application-protocol-independent, NETCONF can operate on
top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how top of the TLS protocol transparently. This document defines how
NETCONF can be used within a TLS session. NETCONF can be used within a TLS session.
2.1. Connection Initiation 2.1. Connection Initiation
The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST also act as the TLS The peer acting as the NETCONF client MUST also act as the TLS
client. The client actively opens the TLS connection and the server client. The TLS client actively opens the TLS connection and the TLS
passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP port server passively listens for the incoming TLS connection on the TCP
6513. It MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello message to begin port 6513. The TLS client MUST therefore send the TLS ClientHello
the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has finished, the client message to begin the TLS handshake. Once the TLS handshake has
and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF data. In particular, finished, the client and the server MAY begin to exchange NETCONF
the client will send complete XML documents to the server containing messages. Client and server identity verification (as described in
<rpc> elements, and the server will respond with complete XML Section 3) is done before the <hello> message is sent; for the
documents containing <rpc-reply> elements. The client MAY indicate server, this means the identity verification is completed before the
interest in receiving event notifications from a server by creating a NETCONF session has started.
subscription to receive event notifications [RFC5277]. In this case,
the server replies to indicate whether the subscription request was
successful and, if it was successful, the server begins sending the
event notifications to the client as the events occur within the
system.
All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is All NETCONF messages MUST be sent as TLS "application data". It is
possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS possible that multiple NETCONF messages be contained in one TLS
record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS record, or that a NETCONF message be transferred in multiple TLS
records. records.
The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the same framing The previous version [RFC5539] of this document used the framing
sequence defined in [RFC6242], under the assumption that it could not sequence defined in [RFC4742], under the assumption that it could not
be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is be found in well-formed XML documents. However, this assumption is
not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, and at the not correct [RFC6242]. In order to solve this problem, and at the
same time be compatible with existing implementations, this document same time be compatible with existing implementations, this document
uses the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as following: uses the framing protocol defined in [RFC6242] as following:
The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence The <hello> message MUST be followed by the character sequence
]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the receiving peer's ]]>]]>. Upon reception of the <hello> message, the receiving peer's
TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the <hello> message to the TLS Transport layer conceptually passes the <hello> message to the
Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both Messages layer. If the :base:1.1 capability is advertised by both
peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of peers, the chunked framing mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of
[RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session. [RFC6242] is used for the remainder of the NETCONF session.
Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of Otherwise, the old end-of-message-based mechanism (see Section 4.3 of
[RFC6242]) is used. [RFC6242]) is used.
Implementation of the protocol specified in this document MAY Implementations of the protocol specified in this document MAY
implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication implement any TLS cipher suite that provides mutual authentication
[RFC5246]. [RFC5246]. However, implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite,
Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to
support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite, which is apply to future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. This document is assumed to apply to implement cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
future versions of TLS; in which case, the mandatory-to-implement
cipher suite for the implemented version MUST be supported.
2.2. Connection Closure 2.2. Connection Closure
Exiting NETCONF is accomplished using the <close-session> operation. Exiting NETCONF is accomplished using the <close-session> operation.
A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF A NETCONF server will process NETCONF messages from the NETCONF
client in the order in which they are received. When the NETCONF client in the order in which they are received. When the NETCONF
server processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server server processes a <close-session> operation, the NETCONF server
SHALL respond and close the TLS session channel. The NETCONF server SHALL respond and close the TLS session. The NETCONF server MUST NOT
MUST NOT process any NETCONF messages received after the <close- process any NETCONF messages received after the <close-session>
session> operation. The TLS session is closed as described in operation. The TLS session is closed as described in [RFC5246]
[RFC6242] Section 7.2.1. Section 7.2.1.
3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization 3. Endpoint Authentication, Identification and Authorization
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS certificate-based
authentication [RFC5246]. If the implementation supports TLS
certificate-based authentication, then the following sections apply.
3.1. Server Identity 3.1. Server Identity
If the server's presented certificate has passed certification path If the server's presented certificate has passed certification path
validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, the client MUST validation [RFC5280] to a configured trust anchor, the client MUST
carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to carefully examine the certificate presented by the server to
determine if it meets the client's expectations. Particularly, the determine if it meets the client's expectations. Particularly, the
client MUST check its understanding of the server hostname against client MUST check its understanding of the server hostname against
the server's identity as presented in the server Certificate message, the server's identity as presented in the server Certificate message,
in order to prevent man- in-the-middle attacks. in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined Matching is performed according to the rules and guidelines defined
in [RFC6125]. in [RFC6125].
If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user If the match fails, the client MUST either ask for explicit user
confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's confirmation or terminate the connection and indicate the server's
identity is suspect. identity is suspect.
Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of Additionally, clients MUST verify the binding between the identity of
the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by the servers to which they connect and the public keys presented by
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requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not requirements on usernames [RFC6241], i.e., the username is not
representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped. representable in XML, the TLS session MUST be dropped.
Algorithms for mapping certificates or PSK identities (sent by the Algorithms for mapping certificates or PSK identities (sent by the
client) to NETCONF usernames are described below. client) to NETCONF usernames are described below.
3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client Certificates 3.2.1. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From NETCONF Client Certificates
The algorithm for deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS certificates is The algorithm for deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS certificates is
patterned after the algorithm for deriving tmSecurityNames from TLS patterned after the algorithm for deriving tmSecurityNames from TLS
certificates specified in Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport certificates specified in the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [RFC6353]. Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
The NETCONF server MUST implement the algorithms for deriving NETCONF [RFC6353]. The NETCONF server MUST implement the algorithms for
usernames from presented certificates that are documented in the deriving NETCONF usernames from presented certificates that are
ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in Section 3.2.3. This YANG documented in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in
module lets the NETCONF security administrator configure how the Section 4.2. This YANG module lets the NETCONF security
NETCONF server derives NETCONF usernames from presented certificates. administrator configure how the NETCONF server derives NETCONF
It also lets different certificate-to-username derivation algorithms usernames from presented certificates. It also lets different
be used for different certificates. certificate-to-username derivation algorithms be used for different
certificates.
When a NETCONF server accepts a TLS connection from a NETCONF client, When a NETCONF server accepts a TLS connection from a NETCONF client,
the NETCONF server attempts to derive a NETCONF username from the the NETCONF server attempts to derive a NETCONF username from the
certificate presented by the NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server certificate presented by the NETCONF client. If the NETCONF server
cannot derive a valid NETCONF username from the client's presented cannot derive a valid NETCONF username from the client's presented
certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST close the TLS connection, certificate, then the NETCONF server MUST close the TLS connection,
and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it. The NETCONF server and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it. The NETCONF server
uses one of the following algorithms to produce a NETCONF username uses one of the following algorithms to produce a NETCONF username
from the certificate presented by the NETCONF client: from the certificate presented by the NETCONF client:
o Map a certificate directly to a specified, pre-configured, NETCONF o Map a certificate directly to a specified, pre-configured, NETCONF
username; username;
o Extract the subjectAltName's rfc822Name from the certificate, then o Extract the subjectAltName's rfc822Name from the certificate, then
use the extracted rfc822Name as the NETCONF username; use the extracted rfc822Name as the NETCONF username;
o Extract the subjectAltName's dnsName from the certificate, then o Extract the subjectAltName's dnsName from the certificate, then
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If the fingerprint of locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate If the fingerprint of locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate
is configured in the cert-map list in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG is configured in the cert-map list in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
module, and that CA certificate is used to validate the certificate module, and that CA certificate is used to validate the certificate
presented by the client, then the NETCONF server uses that cert-map presented by the client, then the NETCONF server uses that cert-map
list entry to produce the NETCONF username. This allows multiple list entry to produce the NETCONF username. This allows multiple
client certificates (all signed by the same trusted CA certificate) client certificates (all signed by the same trusted CA certificate)
to be mapped to a NETCONF username by a single entry in the cert-map to be mapped to a NETCONF username by a single entry in the cert-map
list. list.
3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK identities 3.2.2. Deriving NETCONF Usernames From PSK Identities
Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Implementations MAY optionally support TLS Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key authentication [RFC4279]. RFC4279 describes pre-shared key
ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in ciphersuites for TLS. The description of the psk-maps container in
the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in section 3.2.3, specifies the ietf-netconf-tls YANG module, defined in Section 4.2, specifies
how a NETCONF server transforms a TLS pre-shared key into a NETCONF how a NETCONF server transforms a TLS pre-shared key into a NETCONF
username. username.
3.2.3. Remote Configuration 4. Data Model
The ietf-netconf-tls YANG module defines objects for remotely 4.1. Data Model Overview
configuring the mapping of TLS certficates and of PSK Identities to
NETCONF usernames.
module ietf-netconf-tls { The YANG module "ietf-netconf-tls", which defines configuration
parameters for mapping TLS parameters to NETCONF usernames, has the
following structure. Square brackets are used to enclose a list's
keys, and "?" means that the node is optional. Choice and case nodes
are enclosed in parenthesis, and a case node is marked with a colon
(":").
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls"; module: ietf-netconf-tls
+--rw netconf-tls
+--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-security-name [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint tls-fingerprint
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw cert-specified-security-name nacm:user-name-type
+--rw psk-maps
+--rw psk-map [psk-identity]
+--rw psk-identity string
+--rw user-name nacm:user-name-type
+--rw valid-not-before? yang:date-and-time
+--rw valid-not-after? yang:date-and-time
+--rw key string
prefix "nctls"; 4.2. YANG Module
import ietf-yang-types { The ietf-netconf-tls YANG module defines objects for remotely
prefix yang; configuring the mapping of TLS certficates and of PSK Identities to
} NETCONF usernames.
import ietf-netconf-acm { <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-tls@2013-02-19.yang"
prefix nacm;
}
organization module ietf-netconf-tls {
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls";
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue prefix "nctls";
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Bert Wijnen import ietf-yang-types {
<mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net> prefix yang;
}
Editor: Mohamad Badra import ietf-netconf-acm {
<mailto:mbadra@gmail.com>"; prefix nacm;
}
description organization
"This module applies to NETCONF over TLS. It specifies how NETCONF "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
servers transform X.509 certificates presented by clients into
NETCONF usernames. It also specifies how NETCONF servers transform
pre-shared TLS keys into NETCONF usernames.
The cert-maps container in this YANG module is patterned after parts contact
of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defined in RFC 6353. Much of the description "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
text has been copied directly from the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB, and modified WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
as necessary.
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
authors of the code. All rights reserved. <mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject <mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see Editor: Mohamad Badra
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; <mailto:mbadra@gmail.com>
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication Alan Luchuk
<mailto:luchuk@snmp.com>
revision "2012-02-13" { Juergen Schoenwaelder
description <mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>";
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature map-certificates { description
description "This module applies to NETCONF over TLS. It specifies how
"The map-certificates feature indicates that the server implements NETCONF servers transform X.509 certificates presented by clients
mapping X.509 certificates to NETCONF user names."; into NETCONF usernames. It also specifies how NETCONF servers
} transform pre-shared TLS keys into NETCONF usernames.
feature map-pre-shared-keys { The cert-maps container in this YANG module is patterned after
description parts of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defined in RFC 6353. Much of the
"The map-pre-shared-keys feature indicates that the server description text has been copied directly from the
implements mapping TLS pre-shared keys to NETCONF user names."; SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB, and modified as necessary.
} Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
typedef tls-fingerprint-type { Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
type string { without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*'; to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
} License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
description Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
"A cryptographic signature (fingerprint) value that can be used to (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
uniquely reference other data of potentially arbitrary length.";
}
container netconf-config { This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
container tls { // RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
// revision "2013-02-19" {
// Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from X.509 description
// certificates. "Initial version";
// reference
"RFC XXXX: NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
container cert-maps { feature map-certificates {
if-feature map-certificates; description
config true; "The map-certificates feature indicates that the server
implements mapping X.509 certificates to NETCONF user names.";
}
description feature map-pre-shared-keys {
"The cert-maps container is used by a NETCONF server to map the description
NETCONF client's presented X.509 certificate to a NETCONF username. "The map-pre-shared-keys feature indicates that the server
implements mapping TLS pre-shared keys to NETCONF user names.";
}
On an incoming TLS connection, the client's presented certificate // [DISCUSS] This definition of tls-fingerprint is the same as
MUST either be validated based on an established trust anchor, or // the one in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-01.txt; can
it MUST directly match a fingerprint in the 'cert-map' list. This // we avoid this duplication?
module does not provide any mechanisms for configuring the
trust anchors; the transfer of any needed trusted certificates
for certificate chain validation is expected to occur through an
out-of-band transfer.
Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by typedef tls-fingerprint {
certificate chain validation or directly matching a fingerprint type yang:hex-string {
in the cert-map list), the cert-map list is consulted to determine pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2}){0,254}';
the appropriate NETCONF username to associate with the remote }
connection. This is done by considering each cert-map list entry description
in order. The cert-map entry's fingerprint determines whether the "A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
list entry is a match for the incoming connection: other data of potentially arbitrary length.
1) If the cert-map list entry's fingerprint value matches that An tls-fingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing
of the presented certificate, then consider the list entry algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The
as a successful match. octet value encoded is taken from the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm
Registry (RFC 5246). The remaining octets are filled using
the results of the hashing algorithm.
2) If the cert-map list entry's fingerprint value matches that The corresponding TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows a zero-length
of a locally held copy of a trusted CA certificate, and value to be used for objects that are optional. In the YANG
that CA certificate was part of the CA certificate chain data models, such objects are represented as optional leafs.";
to the presented certificate, then consider the list entry reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.SnmpTLSFingerprint";
as a successful match. }
Once a matching cert-map list entry has been found, the NETCONF /* Identities */
server uses the map-type list to determine how the NETCONF username
associated with the session should be determined. See the map-
type leaf's description for details on determining the NETCONF
username value. If it is impossible to determine a NETCONF
username from the cert-map list entry's data combined with the data
presented in the certificate, then additional cert-map list entries
MUST be searched looking for another potential match. If a resulting
NETCONF username mapped from a given cert-map list entry is not
compatible with the needed requirements of a NETCONF username,
then it MUST be considered an invalid match and additional cert-map
list entries MUST be searched looking for another potential match.
If no matching and valid cert-map list entry can be found, then the // [DISCUSS] The definitions of identities is the same as
NETCONF server MUST close the connection, and MUST NOT accept // the those in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-01.txt; can
NETCONF messages over it. // we avoid this duplication?
Security administrators are encouraged to make use of certificates identity cert-to-tm-security-name {
with subjectAltName fields that can be used as NETCONF usernames }
so that a single root CA certificate can allow all child
certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a NETCONF
usernames via a 1:1 transformation.";
list cert-map { identity specified {
key "key"; base cert-to-tm-security-name;
ordered-by user; reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSpecified";
description }
"A single list entry that specifies a mapping for an incoming
TLS certificate to a NETCONF username.";
leaf key { identity san-rfc822-name {
type string; base cert-to-tm-security-name;
nacm:default-deny-all; reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name";
description }
"The key associated with the cert-map list.";
}
container fingerprint { identity san-dns-name {
choice algorithm-and-hash { base cert-to-tm-security-name;
mandatory true; reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName";
leaf md5 { }
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
leaf sha1 {
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
leaf sha224 {
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
leaf sha256 {
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
leaf sha384 {
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
leaf sha512 {
type tls-fingerprint-type;
}
description
"Specifies the signature algorithm and cryptographic
signature (fingerprint) used to identify an X.509
certificate.
Implementations of this YANG module MAY, but are not identity san-ip-address {
required to, implement all of these cryptographic signature base cert-to-tm-security-name;
algorithms. Implementations of this YANG module MUST reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress";
implement at least one of these cryptographic signature }
algorithms.
The available choices may be extended in the future as identity san-any {
stronger cryptographic signature algorithms become base cert-to-tm-security-name;
available and are deemed necessary."; reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertSANAny";
}
reference identity common-name {
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol base cert-to-tm-security-name;
Version 1.2; Section 7.4.1.4.1, Signature Algorithms"; reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertCommonName";
} // choice algorithm-and-hash }
} // container fingerprint
choice map-type { container netconf-tls {
leaf specified {
type nacm:user-name-type;
description
"Directly specifies the NETCONF username to be used for this
certificate.";
}
leaf-list from-certificate {
ordered-by user;
type enumeration {
enum rfc822Name {
description
"Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a NETCONF username.
The local part of the rfc822Name is passed unaltered but
the domain-part of the name MUST be passed in lowercase.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
equivalent subjectAltName rfc822Name values and NETCONF
username values except that the domain-part of the name
MUST be passed in lowercase.
Example rfc822Name Field: FooBar@Example.COM // Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from X.509
is mapped to NETCONF username: FooBar@example.com."; // certificates.
}
enum dNSName {
description
"Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a NETCONF username after
first converting it to all lowercase (RFC 5280 does not
specify converting to lowercase so this involves an extra
step). This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName dNSName values and the NETCONF username
values.
reference: RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public Key container cert-maps {
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate if-feature map-certificates;
Revocation List (CRL) Profile."; description
} "The cert-maps container is used by a NETCONF server to
enum ipAddress { map the NETCONF client's presented X.509 certificate to
description a NETCONF username.
"Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a NETCONF username by
transforming the binary encoded address as follows:
1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a On an incoming TLS connection, the client's presented
decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1'). certificate MUST either be validated based on an established
trust anchor, or it MUST directly match a fingerprint in the
'cert-map' list. This module does not provide any mechanisms
for configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed
trusted certificates for certificate chain validation is
expected to occur through an out-of-band transfer.
2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by
32-character all lowercase hexadecimal string certificate chain validation or directly matching a
without any colon separators. fingerprint in the cert-map list), the cert-map list is
consulted to determine the appropriate NETCONF username to
associate with the remote connection. This is done by
considering each cert-to-security-name list entry in order.
The cert-to-security-name entry's fingerprint determines
whether the list entry is a match for the incoming
connection:
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between 1) If the cert-to-security-name list entry's fingerprint
subjectAltName iPAddress values and the NETCONF username value matches that of the presented certificate, then
values."; consider the list entry as a successful match.
}
}
} // leaf-list from-certificate
description
"Specifies the algorithm for deriving a NETCONF username from
a certificate. If a mapping succeeds, then it will return a
NETCONF username.
If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the 2) If the cert-to-security-name list entry's fingerprint
needed requirements of a NETCONF username, then subsequent value matches that of a locally held copy of a trusted CA
cert-map list entries MUST be searched for additional certificate, and that CA certificate was part of the CA
matches to look for a mapping that succeeds."; certificate chain to the presented certificate, then
consider the list entry as a successful match.
} // choice map-type Once a matching cert-to-security-name list entry has been
} // list cert-map found, the NETCONF server uses the map-type to determine how
} // container cert-maps the NETCONF username associated with the session should be
determined. See the map-type leaf's description for details
on determining the NETCONF username value. If it is
impossible to determine a NETCONF username from the
cert-to-security-name list entry's data combined with the
data presented in the certificate, then additional
cert-to-tm-security-name list entries MUST be searched
looking for another potential match. If a resulting
NETCONF username mapped from a given cert-to-security-name
list entry is not compatible with the needed requirements
of a NETCONF username, then it MUST be considered an invalid
match and additional cert-to-security-name list entries MUST
be searched looking for another potential match.
// If no matching and valid cert-to-security-name list entry can
// Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS pre-shared be found, then the NETCONF server MUST close the connection,
// keys. and MUST NOT accept NETCONF messages over it.
//
container psk-maps { Security administrators are encouraged to make use of
if-feature map-pre-shared-keys; certificates with subjectAltName fields that can be used as
NETCONF usernames so that a single root CA certificate can
allow all child certificate's subjectAltName to map directly
to a NETCONF usernames via a 1:1 transformation.";
description list cert-to-security-name {
"During the TLS Handshake, the client indicates which key to use key id;
by including a PSK identity in the TLS ClientKeyExchange message. description
On the server side, this PSK identity is used to look up an entry "This list defines how certificates are mapped to
in the psk-map list. If such an entry is found, and the pre-shared security names.";
keys match, then the client is authenticated. The server uses the reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry";
value from the user-name leaf in the psk-map list as the NETCONF
username. If the server cannot find an entry in the psk-map list,
or if the pre-shared keys do not match, then the server terminates
the connection. For details on how the PSK identity MAY be encoded
in UTF-8, see section 5.1. of RFC 4279.";
reference leaf id {
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer type uint32;
Security (TLS)"; description
"The id specifies the order in which the entries in the
cert-to-security-name container are searched. Entries
with lower numbers are searched first.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNID";
}
leaf fingerprint {
type tls-fingerprint;
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies a value with which the fingerprint of the
certificate presented by the peer is compared. If the
fingerprint of the certificate presented by the peer does
not match the fingerprint configured, then the entry is
skipped and the search for a match continues.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint";
}
leaf map-type {
type identityref {
base cert-to-tm-security-name;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies the algorithm used to map the certificate
presented by the peer to the NETCONF username.
list psk-map { Mappings that use the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column
key psk-identity; need to augment the 'cert-to-tm-security-name' list
with additional configuration objects corresponding
to the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData value. Such objects
should use the 'when' statement to make them
conditional based on the 'map-type'.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType";
}
leaf cert-specified-security-name {
when "../map-type = 'snmp:specified'";
type nacm:user-name-type;
mandatory true;
description
"Directly specifies the NETCONF username when the
'map-type' is 'specified'.";
reference "SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB.snmpTlstmCertToTSNData";
}
} // list cert-to-security-name
} // container cert-maps
leaf psk-identity { // Objects related to deriving NETCONF usernames from TLS
type string; // pre-shared keys.
container psk-maps {
if-feature map-pre-shared-keys;
description description
"The PSK identity encoded as a UTF-8 string."; "During the TLS Handshake, the client indicates which key to
use by including a PSK identity in the TLS ClientKeyExchange
message. On the server side, this PSK identity is used to
look up an entry in the psk-map list. If such an entry is
found, and the pre-shared keys match, then the client is
authenticated. The server uses the value from the user-name
leaf in the psk-map list as the NETCONF username. If the
server cannot find an entry in the psk-map list, or if the
pre-shared keys do not match, then the server terminates
the connection.";
reference reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer "RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)"; Security (TLS)";
}
leaf user-name { list psk-map {
type nacm:user-name-type; key psk-identity;
mandatory true;
description
"The NETCONF username associated with this PSK identity.";
}
leaf valid-not-before { leaf psk-identity {
type yang:date-and-time; type string;
description description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given data "The PSK identity encoded as a UTF-8 string. For details on
and time."; how the PSK identity MAY be encoded in UTF-8, see section
} 5.1. of RFC 4279.";
reference
"RFC 4279: Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)";
}
leaf user-name {
type nacm:user-name-type;
mandatory true;
description
"The NETCONF username associated with this PSK identity.";
}
leaf valid-not-before {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given data
and time.";
}
leaf valid-not-after {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given date
and time.";
}
leaf key {
type string {
pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*';
}
mandatory true;
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"The key associated with the PSK identity";
}
} // list psk-map
} // container psk-maps
leaf valid-not-after { } // container netconf-tls
type yang:date-and-time; }
description
"This PSK identity is not valid before the given date
and time.";
}
leaf key { <CODE ENDS>
type string {
pattern '([0-9a-fA-F]){2}(:([0-9a-fA-F]){2})*';
}
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"The key associated with the PSK identity";
}
} // list psk-map
} // container psk-maps
} // container tls 5. Usage Examples
} // container netconf-config
}
4. Security Considerations 5.1. Certificate Mapping Configuration Example
The following XML shows an example of parameters for mapping an X.509
certificate to a NETCONF username:
<netconf-tls
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls">
<cert-maps>
<cert-to-security-name>
<id>10</id>
<fingerprint>de:ad:be:ef</fingerprint> <!-- Not valid -->
<map-type>specified</map-type>
<cert-specified-security-name>
admin
</cert-specified-security-name>
</cert-to-security-name>
</cert-maps>
</netconf-tls>
5.2. PSK Mapping Configuration Example
The following XML shows an example of parameters for mapping a pre-
shared key to a NETCONF username:
<netconf-tls
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-tls">
<psk-maps>
<psk-map>
<psk-identity>a8gc8]klh59</psk-identity>
<user-name>admin</user-name>
<valid-not-before>2013-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</valid-not-before>
<valid-not-after>2014-01-01T00:00:00-00:00</valid-not-after>
</psk-map>
</psk-maps>
</netconf-tls>
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and The security considerations described throughout [RFC5246] and
[RFC6241] apply here as well. [RFC6241] apply here as well.
This document in its current version does not support third-party This document in its current version does not support third-party
authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and authentication (e.g., backend Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify Accounting (AAA) servers) due to the fact that TLS does not specify
this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport this way of authentication and that NETCONF depends on the transport
protocol for the authentication service. If third-party protocol for the authentication service. If third-party
authentication is needed, SSH transport can be used. authentication is needed, SSH transport can be used.
skipping to change at page 15, line 30 skipping to change at page 16, line 32
implementation of this document SHOULD warn the user that illegal implementation of this document SHOULD warn the user that illegal
characters have been discovered. If the delimiter sequence is found characters have been discovered. If the delimiter sequence is found
in a NETCONF message by the receiver side (including any XML in a NETCONF message by the receiver side (including any XML
attribute values, XML comments, or processing instructions), a robust attribute values, XML comments, or processing instructions), a robust
implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message implementation of this document MUST silently discard the message
without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session. without further processing and then stop the NETCONF session.
Finally, this document does not introduce any new security Finally, this document does not introduce any new security
considerations compared to [RFC6242]. considerations compared to [RFC6242].
5. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has Based on the previous version of this document, RFC 5539, IANA has
assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers" assigned a TCP port number (6513) in the "Registered Port Numbers"
range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the default range with the name "netconf-tls". This port will be the default
port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document. port for NETCONF over TLS, as defined in this document.
Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, mbadra@gmail.com. Registration Contact: Mohamad Badra, mbadra@gmail.com.
Transport Protocol: TCP. Transport Protocol: TCP.
Port Number: 6513 Port Number: 6513
Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No. Broadcast, Multicast or Anycast: No.
Port Name: netconf-tls. Port Name: netconf-tls.
Service Name: netconf. Service Name: netconf.
Reference: RFC 5539 Reference: RFC 5539
6. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from A significant amount of the text in Section 3 was lifted from
[RFC4642]. [RFC4642].
The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou, The author would like to acknowledge David Harrington, Miao Fuyou,
Eric Rescorla, Simon Josefsson, Olivier Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes, and Eric Rescorla, Simon Josefsson, Olivier Coupelon, Alfred Hoenes, and
the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on the document. the NETCONF mailing list members for their comments on the document.
The author also appreciates Bert Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue, and Dan The author also appreciates Bert Wijnen, Mehmet Ersue, and Dan
Romascanu for their efforts on issues resolving discussion; and Romascanu for their efforts on issues resolving discussion; and
Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk for the thorough review of Charlie Kaufman, Pasi Eronen, and Tim Polk for the thorough review of
previous versions of this document. previous versions of this document.
7. Contributor's Address Juergen Schoenwaelder and was partly funded by Flamingo, a Network of
Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the European Commission
under its Seventh Framework Programme.
9. Contributor's Address
Ibrahim Hajjeh Ibrahim Hajjeh
Ineovation Ineovation
France France
EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr EMail: ibrahim.hajjeh@ineovation.fr
Martin Bjorklund 10. References
Tail-f Systems
Email: mbj@tail-f.com
8. References
8.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279,
December 2005. December 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
skipping to change at page 17, line 18 skipping to change at page 18, line 15
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport [RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 6353, July 2011. RFC 6353, July 2011.
8.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using [RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006. Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, October 2006.
[RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event [RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Notifications", RFC 5277, July 2008. Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)", RFC 4742,
December 2006.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 5539, May 2009. RFC 5539, May 2009.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6241, June 2011. RFC 6241, June 2011.
Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication) Appendix A. Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)
A.1. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 to A.1. Open Issues
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01
o Update Section 3.2 and address some issues raised during WGLC o The identities etc. have been essentially copied from the SNMP
configuration model. Are we really happy with this reuse by
copying? If so, do we keep the SNMP configuration model names or
adapt them to the NETCONF context?
A.2. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to o Right now, the YANG module focuses on the username mapping only.
There are certainly more configuration objects for the TLS
transport, e.g., which ports to listen on, which CERT to use etc.
o Shall we add support for call home, i.e., a device, after
initiating and establishing a TCP connection and executing the TLS
handshake, would switch role and subsequently act as a NETCONF
server. (This would likely also include new port numbers.)
A.2. From draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-01 to
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-02
o Addressed remaining issues identified at IETF 85
* Harmonized the cert-maps container of the YANG module in this
draft with the tlstm container in the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module
specified in draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg. Replaced the children
of the cert-maps container with the children copied from the
tlstm container of the ietf-snmp-tls sub-module.
* Added an overview of data model in the ietf-netconf-tls YANG
module.
* Added example configurations.
o Addessed issues posted on NETCONF WG E-mail list.
o Deleted the superfluous tls container that was directly below the
netconf-config container.
o Added a statement to the text indicating that support for mapping
X.509 certificates to NETCONF usernames is optional. This is
analogous to existing text indicating that support for mapping
pre-shared keys to NETCONF usernames is optional. Resource-
constrained systems now can omit support for mapping X.509
certificates to NETCONF usernames and still comply with this
specification.
o Clarified the document structure by promoting the sections of the
document related to the data model.
o Updated author's addresses.
A.3. From draft-badra-netconf-rfc5539bis-02 to
draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00 draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-00
o Remove the reference to BEEP o Remove the reference to BEEP
o Rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822. o rename host-part to domain-part in the description of RFC822.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mohamad Badra Mohamad Badra
LIMOS Laboratory LIMOS Laboratory
Email: mbadra@gmail.com Email: mbadra@gmail.com
Alan Luchuk Alan Luchuk
SNMP Research SNMP Research, Inc.
3001 Kimberlin Heights Road
Knoxville, TN 37920
US
Phone: +1 865 573 1434
Email: luchuk@snmp.com Email: luchuk@snmp.com
URI: http://www.snmp.com/
Juergen Schoenwaelder Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen Jacobs University Bremen
Campus Ring 1
28759 Bremen
Germany
Phone: +49 421 200 3587
Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de Email: j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de
URI: http://www.jacobs-university.de/
 End of changes. 101 change blocks. 
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