draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-05.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-06.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks Internet-Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track June 4, 2018 Intended status: Standards Track September 20, 2018
Expires: December 6, 2018 Expires: March 24, 2019
YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-05 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-06
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called "ietf-keystore" that
enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys and their enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys and their
associated certificates, and notification for when configured associated certificates, and notification for when configured
certificates are about to expire. certificates are about to expire.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
skipping to change at page 1, line 33 skipping to change at page 1, line 33
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
o "2018-06-04" --> the publication date of this draft o "2018-09-20" --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log o Appendix A. Change Log
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 24, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 34 skipping to change at page 2, line 34
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf- This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-
keystore" that enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys keystore" that enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys
and their associated certificates, and notification for when and their associated certificates, and notification for when
configured certificates are about to expire. configured certificates are about to expire.
This module also defines Six groupings designed for maximum reuse. This module also defines Six groupings designed for maximum reuse.
These groupings include one for the public half of an asymmetric key, These groupings include one for the public half of an asymmetric key,
skipping to change at page 3, line 26 skipping to change at page 3, line 26
certificates, one for an asymmetric key that may be configured certificates, one for an asymmetric key that may be configured
locally or via a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore, one locally or via a reference to an asymmetric key in the keystore, one
for a trust anchor certificate and, lastly, one for an end entity for a trust anchor certificate and, lastly, one for an end entity
certificate. certificate.
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Special consideration has been given for systems that have
cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM). cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Module (TPM).
These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware These systems are unique in that the cryptographic hardware
completely hides the private keys and must perform all private key completely hides the private keys and must perform all private key
operations. To support such hardware, the "private-key" can be the operations. To support such hardware, the "private-key" can be the
special value "hardware-protected" and the actions "generate-private- special value "permanently-hidden" and the actions "generate-hidden-
key" and "generate-certificate-signing-request" can be used to direct key" and "generate-certificate-signing-request" can be used to direct
these operations to the hardware . these operations to the hardware .
This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, to support keys and Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, to support keys and
associated certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for a associated certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for a
IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate), it is expected that such data IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate), it is expected that such data
may appear only in <operational>. may appear only in <operational>.
While only asymmetric keys are currently supported, the module has While only asymmetric keys are currently supported, the module has
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3.1. Tree Diagram 3.1. Tree Diagram
This section provides a tree diagrams [RFC8340] for the "ietf- This section provides a tree diagrams [RFC8340] for the "ietf-
keystore" module that presents both the protocol-accessible keystore" module that presents both the protocol-accessible
"keystore" as well the all the groupings intended for external usage. "keystore" as well the all the groupings intended for external usage.
module: ietf-keystore module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore +--rw keystore
+--rw asymmetric-keys +--rw asymmetric-keys
+--rw asymmetric-key* [name] +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string +--rw name string
| +--rw algorithm +--rw algorithm?
| | ct:key-algorithm-ref | ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +--rw public-key binary +--rw public-key? binary
| +--rw private-key union +--rw private-key? union
| +--rw certificates +---x generate-hidden-key
| | +--rw certificate* [name] | +---w input
| | +--rw name string | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| | +--rw cert +---x install-hidden-key
| | | ct:end-entity-cert-cms | +---w input
| | +---n certificate-expiration | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| | +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time | +---w public-key? binary
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | +---w private-key? binary
| +---w input +--rw certificates
| | +---w subject binary | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +---w attributes? binary | +--rw name string
| +--ro output | +--rw cert
| +--ro certificate-signing-request binary | | ct:end-entity-cert-cms
+---x generate-asymmetric-key | +---n certificate-expiration
+---w input | +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time
+---w name string +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
+---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref +---w input
| +---w subject binary
| +---w attributes? binary
+--ro output
+--ro certificate-signing-request binary
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms +-- (local-or-keystore)
+---n certificate-expiration +--:(local) {local-keys-supported}?
+-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time | +-- algorithm? ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +-- public-key? binary
| +-- private-key? union
| +---x generate-hidden-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +---x install-hidden-key
| +---w input
| +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +---w public-key? binary
| +---w private-key? binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- reference? ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) +--:(local) {local-keys-supported}?
| +-- algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref | +-- algorithm? ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +-- public-key binary | +-- public-key? binary
| +-- private-key union | +-- private-key? union
| +---x generate-hidden-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +---x install-hidden-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| | +---w public-key? binary
| | +---w private-key? binary
| +-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms | +-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration | +---n certificate-expiration
| +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time | +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time
+--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- reference +-- reference?
ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore) +-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local) +--:(local) {local-keys-supported}?
| +-- algorithm | +-- algorithm?
| | ct:key-algorithm-ref | | ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +-- public-key binary | +-- public-key? binary
| +-- private-key union | +-- private-key? union
| +---x generate-hidden-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +---x install-hidden-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| | +---w public-key? binary
| | +---w private-key? binary
| +-- certificates | +-- certificates
| | +-- certificate* [name] | | +-- certificate* [name]
| | +-- name? string | | +-- name? string
| | +-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms | | +-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration | | +---n certificate-expiration
| | +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time | | +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| +---w input | +---w input
| | +---w subject binary | | +---w subject binary
| | +---w attributes? binary | | +---w attributes? binary
| +--ro output | +--ro output
| +--ro certificate-signing-request binary | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
+--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}? +--:(keystore) {keystore-supported}?
+-- reference +-- reference?
ks:asymmetric-key-ref ks:asymmetric-key-ref
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping
+-- cert ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+-- algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
+-- public-key binary
+-- private-key union
grouping public-key-grouping
+-- algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
+-- public-key binary
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
+-- algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
+-- public-key binary
+-- private-key union
+-- certificates
| +-- certificate* [name]
| +-- name? string
| +-- cert ct:end-entity-cert-cms
| +---n certificate-expiration
| +-- expiration-date? yang:date-and-time
+---x generate-certificate-signing-request
+---w input
| +---w subject binary
| +---w attributes? binary
+--ro output
+--ro certificate-signing-request binary
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
+-- (local-or-keystore)
+--:(local)
| +-- algorithm ct:key-algorithm-ref
| +-- public-key binary
| +-- private-key union
+--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}?
+-- reference ks:asymmetric-key-ref
3.2. Example Usage 3.2. Example Usage
The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore
might look like in <operational>, as described by Section 5.3 in might look like in <operational>, as described by Section 5.3 in
[RFC8342]. This datastore view illustrates data set by the [RFC8342]. This datastore view illustrates data set by the
manufacturing process alongside conventional configuration. This manufacturing process alongside conventional configuration. This
keystore instance has three keys, two having one associated keystore instance has four keys, two having one associated
certificate and one having two associated certificates. certificate, one having two associated certificates, and one empty
key.
[Note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore" <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin" xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"
or:origin="or:intended">
<asymmetric-keys> <asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:intended"> <asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-rsa-key</name> <name>ex-rsa-key</name>
<algorithm>ct:rsa1024</algorithm> <algorithm>ct:rsa1024</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name> <name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:intended"> <asymmetric-key>
<name>tls-ec-key</name> <name>tls-ec-key</name>
<algorithm>ct:secp256r1</algorithm> <algorithm>ct:secp256r1</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>tls-ec-cert</name> <name>tls-ec-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system"> <asymmetric-key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name> <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>ct:rsa2048</algorithm> <algorithm or:origin="or:system">ct:rsa2048</algorithm>
<private-key>hardware-protected</private-key> <private-key or:origin="or:system">permanently-hidden</private\
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> -key>
<public-key or:origin="or:system">base64encodedvalue==</public\
-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate or:origin="or:system">
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name> <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate> </certificate>
<certificate or:origin="or:intended"> <certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name> <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</asymmetric-key> </asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>empty-key</name>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys> </asymmetric-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<asymmetric-keys>
<generate-asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<algorithm
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
ct:secp521r1
</algorithm>
</generate-asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<ok/>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
<attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<certificate-signing-request
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
base64encodedvalue==
</certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<asymmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<certificate-expiration>
<expiration-date>
2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00
</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</keystore>
</notification>
The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the
"local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in the "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in the
"ietf-keystore" module. "ietf-keystore" module.
module ex-keystore-usage { module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage"; namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix "eku"; prefix "eku";
skipping to change at page 12, line 27 skipping to change at page 9, line 27
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</key> </key>
<key> <key>
<name>keystore-defined key</name> <name>keystore-defined key</name>
<reference>ex-rsa-key</reference> <reference>ex-rsa-key</reference>
</key> </key>
</keys> </keys>
3.3. YANG Module 3.3. YANG Module
This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536], [RFC6991], and This YANG module has normative references to [RFC8341] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. This module uses data types defined [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], and an informative reference to
in [RFC2986], [RFC3447], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC6125], and [RFC8342].
[ITU.X690.2015].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2018-09-20.yang"
[Note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2018-06-04.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix "ks"; prefix "ks";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct; prefix ct;
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"; "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
} }
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>"; <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
skipping to change at page 13, line 30 skipping to change at page 10, line 31
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2018-06-04" { revision "2018-09-20" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism"; "RFC VVVV:
YANG Data Model for a Centralized Keystore Mechanism";
} }
// Features // Features
feature keystore-implemented { feature keystore-supported {
description description
"The 'keystore-implemented' feature indicates that the server "The 'keystore-supported' feature indicates that the server
implements the keystore, and therefore groupings defined in supports the keystore.";
this module that reference the keystore are usable."; }
feature local-keys-supported {
description
"The 'local-keys-supported' feature indocates that the
server supports locally-defined keys.";
} }
// Typedefs // Typedefs
typedef asymmetric-key-ref { typedef asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
+ "/ks:name"; + "/ks:name";
require-instance false; require-instance false;
} }
skipping to change at page 14, line 34 skipping to change at page 11, line 41
"This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference "This typedef enables modules to easily define a reference
to a specific certificate associated with an asymmetric key to a specific certificate associated with an asymmetric key
stored in the keystore. The require instance attribute is stored in the keystore. The require instance attribute is
false to enable the referencing of certificates that exist false to enable the referencing of certificates that exist
only in <operational>."; only in <operational>.";
reference reference
"RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)"; "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
} }
// Groupings // Groupings
//
// These groupings are factored out more than needed for
// reusability purposes.
grouping public-key-grouping {
description
"A public key.";
leaf algorithm {
type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically,
this leaf specifies how the 'public-key' binary leaf
is encoded.";
reference
"RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
RFC 5915.";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair.";
uses public-key-grouping;
leaf private-key {
type union {
type binary;
type enumeration {
enum "hardware-protected" {
description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being
protected by a cryptographic hardware module
(e.g., a TPM).";
}
}
}
mandatory true;
description
"A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in RFC 5915.";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
description
"A certificate, and a notification for when it might expire.";
leaf cert {
type ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
}
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
description
"A certificate, and a notification for when it might expire.";
leaf cert {
type ct:end-entity-cert-cms;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
//mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and associated certificates.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
container certificates {
description
"Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.
More than one certificate supports, for instance,
a TPM-protected asymmetric key that has both IDevID
and LDevID certificates associated.";
list certificate {
key name;
description
"A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
}
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
} // end certifcate
} // end certificates
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values. The specified assertions need
to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
RFC 6125 processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntaxi
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary;
description
"The 'attributes' field from the structure
CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
} // MOVED TO CRYPTO TYPES DRAFT? - OKAY TO REMOVE HERE NOW?
} // end output //
} // end generate-certificate-signing-request // grouping public-key-grouping {
} // description
// "A public key.";
// leaf algorithm {
// type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
// description
// "Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically,
// this leaf specifies how the 'public-key' binary leaf
// is encoded.";
// reference
// "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
// }
// leaf public-key {
// type binary;
// description
// "A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
// interpretation of the content is defined by the key
// algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
// key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
// RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
// is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
// RFC 5915.";
// reference
// "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
// RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
// RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
// }
// }
//
// grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
// description
// "A private/public key pair.";
// uses ct:public-key-grouping;
// leaf private-key {
// nacm:default-deny-all;
// type union {
// type binary;
// type enumeration {
// enum "permanently-hidden" {
// description
// "The private key is inaccessible due to being
// protected by the system (e.g., a cryptographic
// hardware module). It is not possible to
// configure a permanently hidden key, as a real
// private key value must be set. Permanently
// hidden keys cannot be archived or backed up.";
// }
// }
// }
// description
// "A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
// interpretation of the content is defined by the key
// algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
// key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
// RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
// is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in RFC 5915.";
// reference
// "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
// RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
// RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
// }
// action generate-hidden-key {
// description
// "Requests the device to generate a hidden key using the
// specified asymmetric key algorithm. This action is
// used to request the system the generate a key that
// is 'permanently-hidden', perhaps protected by a
// cryptographic hardware module. The resulting
// asymmetric key values are considered operational
// state and hence present only in <operational>.";
// input {
// leaf algorithm {
// type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "The algorithm to be used when generating the
// asymmetric key.";
// reference
// "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
// }
// }
// } // end generate-hidden-key
// action install-hidden-key {
// description
// "Requests the device to load the specified values into
// a hidden key. The resulting asymmetric key values are
// considered operational state and hence present only in
// <operational>.";
// input {
// leaf algorithm {
// type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "The algorithm to be used when generating the
// asymmetric key.";
// reference
// "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
// }
// leaf public-key {
// type binary;
// description
// "A binary that contains the value of the public key.
// The interpretation of the content is defined by the key
// algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an
// RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
// RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
// is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
// RFC 5915.";
// reference
// "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
// RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
// RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
// }
// leaf private-key {
// type binary;
// description
// "A binary that contains the value of the private key.
// The interpretation of the content is defined by the k\
ey
// algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
// key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
// RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
// is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in RFC 5915.\
";
// reference
// "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
// RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
// RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
// }
// }
// } // end install-hidden-key
// }
//
// grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
// description
// "A certificate, and a notification for when it might expire.";
// leaf cert {
// type ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
// reference
// "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
// }
// }
//
// grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
// description
// "A certificate, and a notification for when it might expire.";
// leaf cert {
// type ct:end-entity-cert-cms;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
// reference
// "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
// }
// notification certificate-expiration {
// description
// "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
// is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
// send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
// but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
// month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
// then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
// leaf expiration-date {
// type yang:date-and-time;
// //mandatory true;
// description
// "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
// }
// }
// }
//
// grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
// description
// "A private/public key pair and associated certificates.";
// uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
// container certificates {
// description
// "Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.
// More than one certificate supports, for instance,
// a TPM-protected asymmetric key that has both IDevID
// and LDevID certificates associated.";
// list certificate {
// must "../../algorithm
// and ../../public-key
// and ../../private-key";
// key name;
// description
// "A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
// leaf name {
// type string;
// description
// "An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
// }
// uses ct:end-entity-cert-grouping;
// } // end certifcate
// } // end certificates
// action generate-certificate-signing-request {
// description
// "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
// the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
// and attribute values. The specified assertions need
// to be appropriate for the certificate's use. For
// example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
// SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
// RFC 6125 processing.";
// input {
// leaf subject {
// type binary;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "The 'subject' field per the CertificationRequestInfo
// structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
// encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
// rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
// reference
// "RFC 2986:
// PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntaxi
// Specification Version 1.7.
// ITU-T X.690:
// Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
// Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
// Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
// Encoding Rules (DER).";
// }
// leaf attributes {
// type binary;
// description
// "The 'attributes' field from the structure
// CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
// Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
// encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
// reference
// "RFC 2986:
// PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
// Specification Version 1.7.
// ITU-T X.690:
// Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
// Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
// Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
// Encoding Rules (DER).";
// }
// }
// output {
// leaf certificate-signing-request {
// type binary;
// mandatory true;
// description
// "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
// RFC 2986, Section 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
// distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
// in ITU-T X.690.";
// reference
// "RFC 2986:
// PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
// Specification Version 1.7.
// ITU-T X.690:
// Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
// Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
// Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
// Encoding Rules (DER).";
//
// }
// } // end output
// } // end generate-certificate-signing-request
// }
//
// MOVED TO CRYPTO TYPES DRAFT? - OKAY TO REMOVE HERE NOW?
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the key to be either stored "A grouping that expands to allow the key to be either stored
locally within the using data model, or be a reference to an locally within the using data model, or be a reference to an
asymmetric key stored in the keystore."; asymmetric key stored in the keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; if-feature "local-keys-supported";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-implemented"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf reference { leaf reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
mandatory true;
description description
"A reference to a value that exists in the keystore."; "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the key to be either stored "A grouping that expands to allow the key to be either stored
locally within the using data model, or be a reference to an locally within the using data model, or be a reference to an
asymmetric key stored in the keystore."; asymmetric key stored in the keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; if-feature "local-keys-supported";
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-implemented"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf reference { leaf reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
mandatory true;
description description
"A reference to a value that exists in the keystore."; "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping { grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping {
description description
"A grouping that expands to allow the end-entity certificate "A grouping that expands to allow the end-entity certificate
(and the associated private key) to be either stored locally (and the associated private key) to be either stored locally
within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific within the using data model, or be a reference to a specific
certificate in the keystore."; certificate in the keystore.";
choice local-or-keystore { choice local-or-keystore {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
case local { case local {
uses ks:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping; if-feature "local-keys-supported";
uses ks:end-entity-cert-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
uses ct:end-entity-cert-grouping;
} }
case keystore { case keystore {
if-feature "keystore-implemented"; if-feature "keystore-supported";
leaf reference { leaf reference {
type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref; type ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
mandatory true;
description description
"A reference to a value that exists in the keystore."; "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
description description
"A choice between an inlined definition and a definition "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
that exists in the keystore."; that exists in the keystore.";
} }
} }
// protocol accessible nodes // protocol accessible nodes
container keystore { container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"The keystore contains a list of keys."; "The keystore contains a list of keys.";
container asymmetric-keys { container asymmetric-keys {
description description
"A list of asymmetric keys."; "A list of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key { list asymmetric-key {
must "(algorithm and public-key and private-key)
or not (algorithm or public-key or private-key)";
key name; key name;
description description
"An asymmetric key."; "An asymmetric key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key."; "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key.";
} }
uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping; uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
} // end asymmetric-key } // end asymmetric-key
action generate-asymmetric-key {
description
"Requests the device to generate an asymmetric key using
the specified asymmetric key algorithm. This action is
primarily to support cryptographic processors that must
generate the asymmetric key themselves. The resulting
asymmetric key is considered operational state and hence
present only in <operational>.";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name the asymmetric key should have when listed
in /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key, in
<operational>.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the
asymmetric key.";
reference
"RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
}
}
} // end generate-asymmetric-key
} // end asymmetric-keys } // end asymmetric-keys
} // end keystore } // end keystore
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
authentication. authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability: and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to /: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to
write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of
keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically keys, certificates, etc., can dramatically alter the
alter the implemented security policy. However, no NACM implemented security policy. For this reason, the NACM
annotations are applied as the data SHOULD be editable by users extension "default-deny-write" has been set for the entire data
other than a designated 'recovery session'. tree.
/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: When /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: When
writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the
strength of the key being configured is not greater than the strength of the key being configured is not greater than the
strength of the underlying secure transport connection over strength of the underlying secure transport connection over
which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the which it is communicated. Implementations SHOULD fail the
write-request if ever the strength of the private key is write-request if ever the strength of the private key is
greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and
alert the client that the strength of the key may have been alert the client that the strength of the key may have been
compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node, compromised. Additionally, when deleting this node,
skipping to change at page 22, line 36 skipping to change at page 20, line 44
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: This node /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key: This node
is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in
normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client. The
best reason for returning this node is to support backup/ best reason for returning this node is to support backup/
restore type workflows. However, no NACM annotations are restore type workflows. For this reason, the NACM extension
applied as the data SHOULD be editable by users other than a "default-deny-all" has been set for this data node. Note that
designated 'recovery session'. this extension is inherited from the grouping in the
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] module.
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is
RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding
[RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent
the request is the same as the device authenticated when the
secure transport layer was established.
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message
Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
was market demand for it. If it is desired to support CRMF in the
future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output
statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option,
would enable a backwards compatible solution.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. The IETF XML Registry 5.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
requested: requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
skipping to change at page 23, line 42 skipping to change at page 21, line 37
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography", Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography",
draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-00 (work in progress),
June 2018. June 2018.
[ITU.X690.2015]
International Telecommunication Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
skipping to change at page 27, line 7 skipping to change at page 24, line 7
o Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths o Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
o Removed Design Considerations section o Removed Design Considerations section
o Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings o Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings
A.5. 04 to 05 A.5. 04 to 05
o FIXME o Removed trust anchors (now in their own draft)
o FIXME o Added back global keystore structure
o FIXME o Added groupings enabling keys to either be locally defined or a
reference to the keystore.
A.6. 05 to 06
o Added feature "local-keys-supported"
o Added nacm:default-deny-all and nacm:default-deny-write
o Renamed generate-asymmetric-key to generate-hidden-key
o Added an install-hidden-key action
o Moved actions inside fo the "asymmetric-key" container
o Moved some groupings to draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David
Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Mahesh Jethanandani, Radek Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Mahesh Jethanandani, Radek
Krejci, Reshad Rahman, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer, Krejci, Reshad Rahman, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer,
Sean Turner, Eric Voit, Bert Wijnen, and Liang Xia. Sean Turner, Eric Voit, Bert Wijnen, and Liang Xia.
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