NETCONF Working Group                                          K. Watsen
Internet-Draft                                          Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 30, 2017                            June 4, 2018
Expires: May 3, December 6, 2018

          YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Centralized Keystore Mechanism
                     draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-04
                     draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-05

Abstract

   This document defines a YANG 1.1 module called a "keystore", containing
   pinned certificates "ietf-keystore" that
   enables centralized configuration of asymmetric keys and pinned SSH host-keys.  The module also
   defines a grouping for configuring public key pairs their
   associated certificates, and a grouping
   for configuring certificates.  The module also defines a notification
   that a system can use for when one of its configured
   certificates is are about to expire.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
   with finalized values at the time of publication.  This note
   summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed.  No other RFC
   Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.

   Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
   progress.  Please apply the following replacements:

   o  "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

   Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
   publication of this draft.  Please apply the following replacement:

   o  "2017-10-30"  "2018-06-04" --> the publication date of this draft

   The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

   o  Appendix A.  Change Log

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Tree Diagram  . . .   3
   3.  The Keystore Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Example Usage .
     3.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Example Usage .   5
   4.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  YANG Module . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  IANA  12
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  IANA Considerations . .  22
     6.1.  The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.2. .  23
     5.1.  The YANG Module Names IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.1.
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.2.
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.1.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.2.  01 to 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.3.  02 to 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.4.  03 to 04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.5.  04 to 05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module for a system-level
   mechanism, herein called a "keystore".  The keystore provides a "ietf-
   keystore" that enables centralized location configuration of asymmetric keys
   and their associated certificates, and notification for security sensitive data, as described below. when
   configured certificates are about to expire.

   This module has the following characteristics:

   o  A 'grouping' also defines Six groupings designed for a public/private key pair, and maximum reuse.
   These groupings include one for the public half of an 'action' asymmetric key,
   one for
      requesting both the system to generate a new public and private key.

   o  A 'grouping' halves of an asymmetric key, one
   for both halves of an asymmetric key and a list of certificates associated
   certificates, one for an asymmetric key that might may be associated
      with configured
   locally or via a public/private key pair, and reference to an 'action' the requesting a
      system to generate asymmetric key in the keystore, one
   for a trust anchor certificate signing request.

   o  An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned
      certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates.
      This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned
      certificates on a case-by-case basis.  For instance, and, lastly, one set of
      pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when
      connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of
      pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating
      client connections (e.g., certificate-based client
      authentication).

   o  An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned
      SSH host key set contains for an unordered list of pinned SSH host
      keys.  This structure enables a server to use specific sets of
      pinned SSH host-keys on a case-by-case basis.  For instance, SSH
      clients can be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host
      keys when connecting to different SSH servers.

   o  A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire. end entity
   certificate.

   Special consideration has been given for systems that have
   cryptographic hardware, such as a Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). Module (TPM).
   These systems are unique in that the TPM cryptographic hardware
   completely hides the private keys and must perform all private key
   operations.  To support such hardware, the "private-key" can be the
   special value "hardware-protected" and the actions "generate-private-
   key" and "generate-certificate-signing-request" can be directed used to generate new keys (it is not possible direct
   these operations to load a
   key into a TPM) the hardware .

   This document in compliant with Network Management Datastore
   Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].  For instance, to support keys and
   associated certificates installed during manufacturing (e.g., for a
   IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate), it is expected that such data
   may appear only in <operational>.

   While only asymmetric keys are currently supported, the module has
   been designed to enable other key types to be introduced in the
   future.

   The module does not possible support protecting the contents of the keystore
   (e.g., via encryption), though it could be extended to backup/restore do so in the TPM's
   private keys as configuration.
   future.

   It is not required that a system has an operating system level
   keystore utility to implement this module.

1.1.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.

3.  The Keystore Model

3.1.  Tree Diagram

   The following tree diagram [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]

   This section provides an overview of the data model a tree diagrams [RFC8340] for the "ietf-keystore"
   module. "ietf-
   keystore" module that presents both the protocol-accessible
   "keystore" as well the all the groupings intended for external usage.

   module: ietf-keystore
     +--rw keystore
        +--rw pinned-certificates* asymmetric-keys
           +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
           |  +--rw name                                    string
           |  +--rw description?          string algorithm
           |  |       ct:key-algorithm-ref
           |  +--rw pinned-certificate* [name] public-key                              binary
           |  +--rw name    string private-key                             union
           |  +--rw data    binary certificates
           |  |  +--rw pinned-host-keys* certificate* [name]
           |  |     +--rw name                      string
           |  |     +--rw description?       string
             +--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
                +--rw cert
           |  |     |       ct:end-entity-cert-cms
           |  |     +---n certificate-expiration
           |  |        +-- expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
           |  +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
           |     +---w input
           |     |  +---w subject       binary
           |     |  +---w attributes?   binary
           |     +--ro output
           |        +--ro certificate-signing-request    binary
           +---x generate-asymmetric-key
              +---w input
                 +---w name         string
                +--rw data
                 +---w algorithm    ct:key-algorithm-ref

     grouping end-entity-cert-grouping
       +-- cert                      ct:end-entity-cert-cms
       +---n certificate-expiration
          +-- expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
     grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping
       +-- (local-or-keystore)
          +--:(local)
          |  +-- algorithm                 ct:key-algorithm-ref
          |  +-- public-key                binary

     notifications:
          |  +-- private-key               union
          |  +-- cert                      ct:end-entity-cert-cms
          |  +---n certificate-expiration
          +--ro certificate        instance-identifier
          +--ro expiration-date
          |     +-- expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
          +--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}?
             +-- reference
                     ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref
     grouping certificate-grouping
       +---- local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping
       +-- (local-or-keystore)
          +--:(local)
          |  +-- algorithm
          |  |       ct:key-algorithm-ref
          |  +-- public-key                              binary
          |  +-- private-key                             union
          |  +-- certificates
          |  +----  |  +-- certificate* [name]
          |     +----  |     +-- name?                     string
          |     +---- value?   binary  |     +-- cert                      ct:end-entity-cert-cms
          |  |     +---n certificate-expiration
          |  |        +-- expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
          |  +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
          |     +---w input
          |     |  +---w subject       binary
          |     |  +---w attributes?   binary
          |     +--ro output
          |        +--ro certificate-signing-request    binary
          +--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}?
             +-- reference
                     ks:asymmetric-key-ref
     grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping
       +-- cert    ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms
     grouping private-key-grouping
       +---- algorithm?              identityref
       +---- private-key? asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
       +-- algorithm      ct:key-algorithm-ref
       +-- public-key     binary
       +-- private-key    union
       +---- public-key?
     grouping public-key-grouping
       +-- algorithm     ct:key-algorithm-ref
       +-- public-key    binary
     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
       +-- algorithm                               ct:key-algorithm-ref
       +-- public-key                              binary
       +-- private-key                             union
       +-- certificates
       |  +-- certificate* [name]
       |     +-- name?                     string
       |     +-- cert                      ct:end-entity-cert-cms
       |     +---n certificate-expiration
       |        +-- expiration-date?   yang:date-and-time
       +---x generate-private-key generate-certificate-signing-request
          +---w input
          |  +---w subject       binary
          |  +---w attributes?   binary
          +--ro output
             +--ro certificate-signing-request    binary
     grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
       +-- (local-or-keystore)
          +--:(local)
          |  +-- algorithm    identityref

3.      ct:key-algorithm-ref
          |  +-- public-key     binary
          |  +-- private-key    union
          +--:(keystore) {keystore-implemented}?
             +-- reference      ks:asymmetric-key-ref

3.2.  Example Usage

   The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore
   might look like.

   <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">

     <!-- Manufacturer's trust root CA certs -->
     <pinned-certificates>
       <name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
       <description>
         Certificates built into the device for authenticating
         manufacturer-signed objects, such like in <operational>, as TLS server certificates,
         vouchers, etc..  Note, though listed here, these are not
         configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 1</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 2</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
     </pinned-certificates>

     <!-- pinned netconf/restconf client certificates -->
     <pinned-certificates>
       <name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
       <description>
         Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly
         trusted clients.  These are needed for client certificates
         that are not signed described by a pinned CA.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>George Jetson</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
     </pinned-certificates>

     <!-- pinned netconf/restconf server certificates -->
     <pinned-certificates>
       <name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
       <description>
         Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly
         trusted servers.  These are needed for server certificates
         that are not signed Section 5.3 in
   [RFC8342].  This datastore view illustrates data set by a pinned CA.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>Fred Flintstone</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
     </pinned-certificates>

     <!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients -->
     <pinned-certificates>
       <name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
       <description>
         Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate
         client connections.  Clients are authenticated if their
         certificate the
   manufacturing process alongside conventional configuration.  This
   keystore instance has a chain of trust to three keys, two having one of these configured
         CA associated
   certificate and one having two associated certificates.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>ca.example.com</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
     </pinned-certificates>

     <!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
     <pinned-certificates>
       <name>common-ca-certs</name>
       <description>
         Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
         These certificates are similar to those that might be
         shipped with a web browser.
       </description>
       <pinned-certificate>
         <name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-certificate>
     </pinned-certificates>

     <!-- pinned SSH host keys -->
     <pinned-host-keys>
       <name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
       <description>
         Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
         These host keys would be analogous to those stored

   <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"
             xmlns:or="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-origin"
             xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
     <asymmetric-keys>

       <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:intended">
         <name>ex-rsa-key</name>
         <algorithm>ct:rsa1024</algorithm>
         <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
         <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
         <certificates>
           <certificate>
             <name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
             <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
           </certificate>
         </certificates>
       </asymmetric-key>

       <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:intended">
         <name>tls-ec-key</name>
         <algorithm>ct:secp256r1</algorithm>
         <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
         <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
         <certificates>
           <certificate>
             <name>tls-ec-cert</name>
             <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
           </certificate>
         </certificates>
       </asymmetric-key>

       <asymmetric-key or:origin="or:system">
         <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
         <algorithm>ct:rsa2048</algorithm>
         <private-key>hardware-protected</private-key>
         <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
         <certificates>
           <certificate>
             <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
             <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
           </certificate>
           <certificate or:origin="or:intended">
             <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
             <cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert>
           </certificate>
         </certificates>
       </asymmetric-key>

     </asymmetric-keys>
   </keystore>

   The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
   in
         a known_hosts file use with the NETCONF protocol.

   REQUEST
   -------
   <rpc message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
       <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
         <asymmetric-keys>
           <generate-asymmetric-key>
             <name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
             <algorithm
              xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
                 ct:secp521r1
             </algorithm>
           </generate-asymmetric-key>
         </asymmetric-keys>
       </keystore>
     </action>
   </rpc>

   RESPONSE
   --------
   <rpc-reply message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <ok/>
   </rpc-reply>

   The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
   request" action in OpenSSH.
       </description>
       <pinned-host-key>
         <name>corp-fw1</name>
         <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
       </pinned-host-key>
     </pinned-host-keys> use with the NETCONF protocol.

   REQUEST
   -------
   <rpc message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
       <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
         <asymmetric-keys>
           <asymmetric-key>
             <name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
             <generate-certificate-signing-request>
               <subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
               <attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
             </generate-certificate-signing-request>
           </asymmetric-key>
         </asymmetric-keys>
       </keystore>
     </action>
   </rpc>

   RESPONSE
   --------
   <rpc-reply message-id="101"
      xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
      <certificate-signing-request
        xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
        base64encodedvalue==
      </certificate-signing-request>
   </rpc-reply>

   The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
   notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.

   [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]

   <notification
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
     <eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
     <certificate-expiration
     <eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
     <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
       <certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore\
   ">
         /ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certifica\
   tes/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert']
       </certificate>
       <expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
       <asymmetric-keys>
         <asymmetric-key>
           <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
           <certificates>
             <certificate>
               <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
               <certificate-expiration>
                 <expiration-date>
                   2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00
                 </expiration-date>
               </certificate-expiration>
             </certificate>
           </certificates>
         </asymmetric-key>
       </asymmetric-keys>
     </keystore>
   </notification>

   The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the
   groupings
   "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping defined in the
   "ietf-keystore" module.

   module ex-keystore-usage {
     yang-version 1.1;

     namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
     prefix "eku";

     import ietf-keystore {
       prefix ks;
       reference
         "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
     }

     organization
      "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
      "Example Corporation";

     contact
      "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
       WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
       Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
      "Author: YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";

     description
      "This module uses illustrates the groupings defines grouping defined in the keystore
       draft
       for illustration."; called 'local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping'.";

     revision "YYYY-MM-DD" {
       description
        "Initial version";
       reference
        "RFC XXXX: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
     }

     container key keys {
       uses ks:private-key-grouping;
       uses ks:certificate-grouping;
       description
         "A container of certificates, and an action keys.";
       list key {
         key name;
         leaf name {
           type string;
           description
             "An arbitrary name for this key.";
         }
         uses ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping;
         description
           "A key which may be configured locally or be a reference to generate
            a certificate signing request."; key in the keystore.";
       }
     }
   }
   The following example illustrates what a two configured key keys, one local
   and the other remote, might look like.  This example uses consistent with
   other examples above (i.e., the "ex-keystore-usage" module above.

  [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]

  <key referenced key is in an example
   above).

   <keys xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
     <key>
       <name>locally-defined key</name>
       <algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">ks:\
  secp521r1</algorithm>
         xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
         ct:secp521r1
       </algorithm>
       <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
       <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
    <certificates>
      <certificate>
        <name>domain certificate</name>
        <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
      </certificate>
    </certificates>
     </key>

   The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
   request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
     <key>
       <name>keystore-defined key</name>
       <reference>ex-rsa-key</reference>
     </key>
   </keys>

3.3.  YANG Module

   This example uses
   the "ex-keystore-usage" module above.

  REQUEST
  -------
  <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
    <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
      <key xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
        <generate-certificate-signing-request>
          <subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
          <attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
        </generate-certificate-signing-request>
      </key>
    </action>
  </rpc>

  RESPONSE
  --------
  <rpc-reply message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <certificate-signing-request
       xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
       base64encodedvalue==
     </certificate-signing-request>
  </rpc-reply>

   The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
   in use with the NETCONF protocol.  This example uses the "ex-
   keystore-usage" module above.

   REQUEST
   -------
   [ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]

   <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0\
   ">
     <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
       <key xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
         <generate-private-key>
           <algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keysto\
   re">ks:secp521r1</algorithm>
         </generate-private-key>
       </key>
     </action>
   </rpc>

   RESPONSE
   --------
   <rpc-reply message-id="101"
      xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <ok/>
   </rpc-reply>

4.  YANG Module

   This YANG YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] [RFC6536], [RFC6991], and [RFC6991].
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].  This module uses data types defined
   in [RFC2315], [RFC2986], [RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC6125], and [ITU.X690.1994].
   This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480].
   [ITU.X690.2015].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-30.yang" "ietf-keystore@2018-06-04.yang"
   module ietf-keystore {
     yang-version 1.1;

     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
     prefix "ks";

     import ietf-yang-types {
       prefix yang;
       reference
         "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
     }

     import ietf-netconf-acm ietf-crypto-types {
       prefix nacm; ct;
       reference
         "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access
         Control Model"; CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
     }

     organization
      "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
      "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>   <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
       WG List:  <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>

       Author:   Kent Watsen
                 <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";

     description
      "This module defines a keystore to centralize management
       of security credentials.

       Copyright (c) 2017 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified
       as authors of the code. All rights reserved.

       Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
       or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
       subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
       BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
       Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
       (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

       This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
       the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision "2017-10-30" "2018-06-04" {
       description
        "Initial version";
       reference
        "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
     }

     // Identities

    identity key-algorithm Features

     feature keystore-implemented {
       description
        "Base identity from which all key-algorithms
        "The 'keystore-implemented' feature indicates that the server
         implements the keystore, and therefore groupings defined in
         this module that reference the keystore are derived."; usable.";
     }

    identity rsa1024

     // Typedefs

     typedef asymmetric-key-ref {
       type leafref {
      base key-algorithm;
         path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
              + "/ks:name";
         require-instance false;
       }
       description
        "The RSA algorithm using
         "This typedef enables modules to easily define a 1024-bit key."; reference
        "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                  RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
          to an asymmetric key stored in the keystore. The require
          instance attribute is false to enable the referencing of
          asymmetric keys that exist only in <operational>.";
       reference
         "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
     }

    identity rsa2048

     typedef asymmetric-key-certificate-ref {
      base key-algorithm;
       type leafref {
         path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
              + "/ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name";
         require-instance false;
       }
       description
        "The RSA algorithm using
         "This typedef enables modules to easily define a 2048-bit key."; reference
        "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                  RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
    }

    identity rsa3072 {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The RSA algorithm using
          to a 3072-bit key."; specific certificate associated with an asymmetric key
          stored in the keystore.  The require instance attribute is
          false to enable the referencing of certificates that exist
          only in <operational>.";
       reference
        "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                  RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
         "RFC 8342: Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)";
     }

    identity rsa4096

     // Groupings
     //
     // These groupings are factored out more than needed for
     // reusability purposes.

     grouping public-key-grouping {
      base key-algorithm;
       description
        "The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit
         "A public key.";
      reference
        "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                  RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
    }

    identity rsa7680
       leaf algorithm {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
         type ct:key-algorithm-ref;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Identifies the key's algorithm.  More specifically,
            this leaf specifies how the 'public-key' binary leaf
            is encoded.";
         reference
        "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                  RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
           "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
       }

    identity rsa15360
       leaf public-key {
      base key-algorithm;
         type binary;
         mandatory true;
         description
        "The
           "A binary that contains the value of the public key.  The
            interpretation of the content is defined by the key
            algorithm.  For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA algorithm
            key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
            RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
            is represented using a 15360-bit key."; the 'publicKey' described in
            RFC 5915.";
         reference
        "RFC3447:
           "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                      RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";

    }

    identity secp192r1 {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The secp192r1 algorithm.";
      reference
        "RFC5480:
           Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
    }

    identity secp256r1 {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The secp256r1 algorithm.";
      reference
        "RFC5480:
           Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
    }

    identity secp384r1 {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The secp384r1 algorithm.";
      reference
        "RFC5480:
           Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
    }

    identity secp521r1 {
      base key-algorithm;
      description
        "The secp521r1 algorithm.";
      reference
        "RFC5480: 2.1.
            RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Private Key Information.";
    }

    // typedefs

    typedef pinned-certificates {
      type leafref {
        path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-certificates/ks:name";
      }
      description
        "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
         reference to pinned-certificates.  Use of this type also
         impacts the YANG tree diagram output.";
      reference
        "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams";
    }

    typedef pinned-host-keys {
      type leafref {
        path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-host-keys/ks:name"; Structure.";
       }
      description
        "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
         reference to pinned-host-keys.  Use of this type also
         impacts the YANG tree diagram output.";
      reference
        "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams";
     }

    // groupings

     grouping private-key-grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
       description
         "A private/public key pair, and an action to request the
         system to generate a private key.";
      leaf algorithm {
        type identityref {
          base "key-algorithm";
        }
        description
          "Identifies the key's algorithm.  More specifically, this
           leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
           binary leafs are encoded.";
      } pair.";
       uses public-key-grouping;
       leaf private-key {
        nacm:default-deny-all;
         type union {
           type binary;
           type enumeration {
             enum "hardware-protected" {
               description
                "The private key is inaccessible due to being
                 protected by a cryptographic hardware module
                 (e.g., a TPM).";
             }
           }
         }
        must "../algorithm";
         mandatory true;
         description
           "A binary that contains the value of the private key.  The
            interpretation of the content is defined by the key
            algorithm.  For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
            key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
           [RFC3447],
            RFC 3447, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
            is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]"; RFC 5915.";
         reference
           "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                      RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
            RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
       }
      leaf public-key
     }
     grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
        type binary;
        must "../algorithm";
        must "../private-key";
       description
        "A binary that contains the value of the public key.  The
           interpretation of the content is defined by the key
           algorithm.  For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
           key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
           [RFC3447], certificate, and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
           is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
           [RFC5915]";
        reference
          "RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
                     RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
           RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
      }
      action generate-private-key {
        description
          "Requests the device to generate a private key using the
           specified key algorithm.  This action is primarily to
           support cryptographic processors that must generate
           the private key themselves.  The resulting key is
           considered operational state and hence only present
           in the <operational>.";
        input { notification for when it might expire.";
       leaf algorithm cert {
         type identityref {
              base "key-algorithm";
            } ct:trust-anchor-cert-cms;
         mandatory true;
         description
          "The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
          }
        } binary certificate data for this certificate.";
         reference
          "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
       } // end generate-private-key
     }

     grouping certificate-grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
       description
        "A container of certificates, certificate, and an action to generate a certificate signing request.";
      container certificates notification for when it might expire.";
       leaf cert {
         type ct:end-entity-cert-cms;
         mandatory true;
         description
          "Certificates associated with this key.  More than one
          "The binary certificate supports, data for instance, a TPM-protected
           key that has both IDevID and LDevID certificates
           associated.";
        list certificate this certificate.";
         reference
           "RFC YYYY: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
       }
       notification certificate-expiration {
          key name;
         description
           "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
            is either about to expire or has already expired.  When to
            send notifications is an implementation specific decision,
            but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
            month for this private key."; 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
            then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.";
         leaf name expiration-date {
           type string; yang:date-and-time;
           //mandatory true;
           description
              "An arbitrary name for
             "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
         }
          leaf value
       }
     }

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
            type binary;
       description
         "A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
              Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
              (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
              distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
              ITU-T X.690.

              This structure contains the certificate itself as well
              as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
              anchor certificate.  The trust anchor certificate MAY
              be included as well.";
            reference
              "RFC 2315:
                 PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
               ITU-T X.690:
                 Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                 Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) private/public key pair and associated certificates.";
       uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
       container certificates {
         description
           "Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.

            More than one certificate supports, for instance,
            a TPM-protected asymmetric key that has both IDevID
            and Distinguished
                 Encoding Rules (DER)."; LDevID certificates associated.";
         list certificate {
           key name;
           description
             "A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
           leaf name {
             type string;
             description
               "An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
           }
           uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
         } // end certifcate
       } // end certificates
       action generate-certificate-signing-request {
         description
           "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
            the associated private asymmetric key using the passed subject
            and attribute values.  The specified assertions need
            to be appropriate for the certificate's use.  For
            example, an entity certificate for a TLS server
            SHOULD have values that enable clients to satisfy
            RFC 6125 processing.";
         input {
           leaf subject {
             type binary;
             mandatory true;
             description
              "The 'subject' field from per the CertificationRequestInfo
                structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1
                encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
                rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
             reference
               "RFC 2986:
                  PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Syntaxi
                            Specification Version 1.7.
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER).";
           }
           leaf attributes {
             type binary;
             description
               "The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo structure
                CertificationRequestInfo as specified by RFC 2986,
                Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
                encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
             reference
               "RFC 2986:
                  PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                            Specification Version 1.7.
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER).";
           }
         }
         output {
           leaf certificate-signing-request {
             type binary;
             mandatory true;
             description
               "A CertificationRequest structure as specified by
                RFC 2986, Section 4.1 4.2 encoded using the ASN.1
                distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
                in ITU-T X.690.";
             reference
               "RFC 2986:
                  PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                            Specification Version 1.7.
                ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER).";

           }
         }
      } // end output
       } // protocol accessible nodes

    container keystore {
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      description
        "The keystore contains X.509 certificates and SSH host keys.";

      list pinned-certificates end generate-certificate-signing-request
     }

     grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping {
        key name;
       description
         "A list of pinned certificates.  These certificates can be
           used by a server grouping that expands to authenticate clients, or by clients allow the key to
           authenticate servers.   Each list of pinned certificates
           SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as either stored
          locally within the list as a whole
           may using data model, or be referenced by other modules.  For instance, a
           NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list
           of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF
           client connections.";
        leaf name reference to an
          asymmetric key stored in the keystore.";
       choice local-or-keystore {
          type string;
          description
            "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
         mandatory true;
         case local {
           uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
         }
         case keystore {
           if-feature "keystore-implemented";
           leaf description reference {
             type string;
          description
            "An arbitrary ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
             mandatory true;
             description for this list of pinned
             certificates.";
               "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
           }
         }
        list pinned-certificate {
          key name;
         description
           "A pinned certificate.";
          leaf name choice between an inlined definition and a definition
            that exists in the keystore.";
       }
     }

     grouping local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-with-certs-grouping {
            type string;
       description
              "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The
               name must be unique across all lists of pinned
               certificates (not just this list) so
         "A grouping that leafrefs
               from another module can resolve expands to unique values."; allow the key to be either stored
          locally within the using data model, or be a reference to an
          asymmetric key stored in the keystore.";
       choice local-or-keystore {
         mandatory true;
         case local {
           uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
         }
         case keystore {
           if-feature "keystore-implemented";
           leaf data reference {
             type binary; ks:asymmetric-key-ref;
             mandatory true;
             description
              "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
               5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
               encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
               "A reference
              "RFC 5280:
                 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
                 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
               ITU-T X.690:
                  Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
                  Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
                  Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
                  Encoding Rules (DER)."; to a value that exists in the keystore.";
           }
         }
         description
           "A choice between an inlined definition and a definition
            that exists in the keystore.";
       }
     }

      list pinned-host-keys

     grouping local-or-keystore-end-entity-certificate-grouping {
        key name;
       description
         "A list of pinned host keys.  These pinned host-keys can
           be used by clients grouping that expands to authenticate SSH servers.  Each
           list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific allow the end-entity certificate
          (and the associated private key) to a purpose,
           so be either stored locally
          within the list as a whole may using data model, or be referenced by other modules.
           For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might
           point reference to a specific list of pinned host keys for when
           authenticating specific SSH servers.";
        leaf name
          certificate in the keystore.";
       choice local-or-keystore {
          type string;
          description
            "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
        }
        leaf description
         mandatory true;
         case local {
          type string;
          description
            "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host
             keys.";
           uses ks:asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
           uses ks:end-entity-cert-grouping;
         }
        list pinned-host-key
         case keystore {
          key name;
          description
            "A pinned host key.";
           if-feature "keystore-implemented";
           leaf name reference {
             type string; ks:asymmetric-key-certificate-ref;
             mandatory true;
             description
              "An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be
               unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just
               this list) so
               "A reference to a value that exists in the keystore.";
           }
         }
         description
           "A choice between an inlined definition and a leafref to it from another module
               can resolve to unique values."; definition
            that exists in the keystore.";
       }
          leaf data
     }

     // protocol accessible nodes

     container keystore {
            type binary;
            mandatory true;
       description
         "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
               specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:

                 string    certificate or public keystore contains a list of keys.";

       container asymmetric-keys {
         description
           "A list of asymmetric keys.";
         list asymmetric-key {
           key format
                           identifier
                 byte[n]   key/certificate data.";
            reference
              "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
                         Protocol";
          }
        } name;
           description
             "An asymmetric key.";
           leaf name {
             type string;
             description
               "An arbitrary name for the asymmetric key.";
           }
           uses asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping;
         }

    notification certificate-expiration // end asymmetric-key

         action generate-asymmetric-key {
           description
        "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
         either about to expire or has already expired.  When
             "Requests the device to send
         notifications is generate an implementation specific decision, but
         it asymmetric key using
              the specified asymmetric key algorithm.  This action is RECOMMENDED
              primarily to support cryptographic processors that a notification be sent once a month
         for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, must
              generate the asymmetric key themselves.  The resulting
              asymmetric key is considered operational state and then once
         a day thereafter."; hence
              present only in <operational>.";

           input {
             leaf certificate name {
               type instance-identifier; string;
               mandatory true;
               description
          "Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
                 "The name the asymmetric key should have when listed
                  in /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key, in
                  <operational>.";
             }
             leaf expiration-date algorithm {
               type yang:date-and-time; ct:key-algorithm-ref;
               mandatory true;
               description
          "Identifies the expiration date on
                 "The algorithm to be used when generating the certificate.";
                  asymmetric key.";
               reference
                 "RFC CCCC: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography";
             }
           }
         } // end generate-asymmetric-key
       } // end asymmetric-keys
     } // end keystore

   }
   <CODE ENDS>

5.

4.  Security Considerations

   The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
   via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
   RESTCONF [RFC8040].  Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
   implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
   authentication.

   The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means
   to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
   all available protocol operations and content.

   There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
   writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
   default).  These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
   in some network environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
   to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
   effect on network operations.  These are the subtrees and data nodes
   and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

      /: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to
         write operations.  For instance, the addition or removal of
         keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically
         alter the implemented security policy.  This being the case,
         the top-level node in this module is marked with the  However, no NACM value
         'default-deny-write'.

      /keystore/keys/key/private-key:
         annotations are applied as the data SHOULD be editable by users
         other than a designated 'recovery session'.

      /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key:  When
         writing this node, implementations MUST ensure that the
         strength of the key being configured is not greater than the
         strength of the underlying secure transport connection over
         which it is communicated.  Implementations SHOULD fail the
         write-request if ever the strength of the private key is
         greater then the strength of the underlying transport, and
         alert the client that the strength of the key may have been
         compromised.  Additionally, when deleting this node,
         implementations SHOULD automatically (without explicit request)
         zeroize these keys in the most secure manner available, so as
         to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage locations
         from being analyzed in any meaningful way.

   Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
   sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
   important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
   notification) to these data nodes.  These are the subtrees and data
   nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

      /keystore/keys/key/private-key:

      /keystore/asymmetric-keys/asymmetric-key/private-key:  This node
         is additionally sensitive to read operations such that, in
         normal use cases, it should never be returned to a client.  The
         best reason for returning this node is to support backup/restore backup/
         restore type workflows.  This being the case, this node is marked with the  However, no NACM value 'default-deny-all'. annotations are
         applied as the data SHOULD be editable by users other than a
         designated 'recovery session'.

   Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
   sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
   important to control access to these operations.  These are the
   operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

      generate-certificate-signing-request:  For this action, it is
         RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding
         [RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent
         the request is the same as same as the device authenticated when the
         secure transport layer was established.

   This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
   signing-request" action.  The use of Certificate Request Message
   Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
   was market demand for it.  If it is desired to support CRMF in the
   future, placing a "choice" statement in both the device authenticated when input and output
   statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the
         secure transport layer was established.

6. CRMF option,
   would enable a backwards compatible solution.

5.  IANA Considerations

6.1.

5.1.  The IETF XML Registry

   This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
   Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
   requested:

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
      Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
      XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

6.2.

5.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry

   This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
   registry [RFC6020].  Following the format in [RFC6020], the the
   following registration is requested:

      name:         ietf-keystore
      namespace:    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
      prefix:       ks
      reference:    RFC VVVV

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
   Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David
   Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch,
   Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.

8.

6.  References

8.1.

6.1.  Normative References

   [ITU.X690.1994]

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
              Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography",
              draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-00 (work in progress),
              June 2018.

   [ITU.X690.2015]
              International Telecommunications Telecommunication Union, "Information
              Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
              Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
              Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
              X.690, 1994. ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2315]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
              Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K.,

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5480, 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5915]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
              Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6536]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

8.2.

6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
              Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft-
              ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-02 (work in progress),
              October 2017.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.

   [RFC5914]  Housley, R., Ashmore, S.,

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
              Format",
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 5914, 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>. 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

   [RFC8342]  Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
              and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
              (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.

   [Std-802.1AR-2009]
              IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

Appendix A.  Change Log

A.1.  00 to 01

   o  Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7
      structures.  (Issue #1)

   o  Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the
      'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions.  (Issue #2)

   o  Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
      (Issues #4 and #5)

A.2.  01 to 02

   o  Added back 'generate-private-key' action.

   o  Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.

   o  Fixed up a few description statements.

A.3.  02 to 03

   o  Changed draft's title.

   o  Added missing references.

   o  Collapsed sections and levels.

   o  Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.

   o  Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.

   o  Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.

   o  Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC
      4253.

A.4.  03 to 04

   o  Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths

   o  Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams

   o  Removed Design Considerations section

   o  Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings

A.5.  04 to 05

   o  FIXME

   o  FIXME

   o  FIXME

Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
   Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David
   Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Mahesh Jethanandani, Radek
   Krejci, Reshad Rahman, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer,
   Sean Turner, Eric Voit, Bert Wijnen, and Liang Xia.

Author's Address

   Kent Watsen
   Juniper Networks

   EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net