draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-03.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-04.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks Internet-Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track October 17, 2017 Intended status: Standards Track October 30, 2017
Expires: April 20, 2018 Expires: May 3, 2018
YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-03 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-04
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG module for a system-level mechanism, This document defines a YANG module called a "keystore", containing
called a "keystore", containing security-sensitive data including pinned certificates and pinned SSH host-keys. The module also
private keys, pinned certificates, and pinned SSH host-keys. defines a grouping for configuring public key pairs and a grouping
for configuring certificates. The module also defines a notification
that a system can use when one of its configured certificates is
about to expire.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note with finalized values at the time of publication. This note
summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
o "2017-10-18" --> the publication date of this draft o "2017-10-30" --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log o Appendix A. Change Log
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.3. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.4. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.5. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level
mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a
centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below. centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below.
This module has the following characteristics: This module has the following characteristics:
o A configurable list of keys, each a public/private key pair. If a o A 'grouping' for a public/private key pair, and an 'action' for
key is used to sign a certificate signing request (CSR), which is requesting the system to generate a new private key.
then signed by a certificate authority (CA), then the resulting
certificate may be configured as being associated with the key. o A 'grouping' for a list of certificates that might be associated
Keys are expected to be configured using standard configuration with a public/private key pair, and an 'action' the requesting a
mechanisms, however, to support hardware that generates keys, the system to generate a certificate signing request.
key may also be created via an action called 'generate-private-
key" action. Keys may also be preinstalled (e.g., a key
associated to an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate).
o An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned o An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned
certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates. certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates.
This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned
certificates on a case-by-case basis. For instance, one set of certificates on a case-by-case basis. For instance, one set of
pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when
connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of
pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating
client connections (e.g., certificate-based client client connections (e.g., certificate-based client
authentication). authentication).
o An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned o An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned
SSH host key set contains an unordered list of pinned SSH host SSH host key set contains an unordered list of pinned SSH host
keys. This enables a server to use specific sets of pinned SSH keys. This structure enables a server to use specific sets of
host-keys on a case-by-case basis. For instance, SSH clients can pinned SSH host-keys on a case-by-case basis. For instance, SSH
be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host keys when clients can be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host
connecting to different SSH servers. keys when connecting to different SSH servers.
o An action to request the server to generate a new key using the
specified algorithm. The resulting key is present in
<operational>.
o An action to request the server to generate a certificate signing
request for an existing key. Passed into the action are the
subject and attributes to be used, and returned is the CSR
(certificate signing request) structure, signed by the key
protected by the keystore. The CSR can be signed by an external
certificate authority (CA). The signed certificate returned by
the CA can be associated with the key in the keystore, using a
standard configuration operation (<edit-config>).
o A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire. o A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire.
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted
Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM
must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a
key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's
private keys as configuration. private keys as configuration.
It is not required that a system has an operating system level It is not required that a system has an operating system level
keystore utility to implement this module. keystore utility to implement this module.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Tree Diagram Notation 2. Tree Diagram
A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as
follows:
o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
o Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the
named feature must be present for the subtree to be present.
o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration
(read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only).
o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!"
means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.
o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
marked with a colon (":").
o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
shown.
2. Design Considerations
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message
Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out
of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the
future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output
statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option,
would enable a backwards compatible solution.
In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only the
most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA
algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module
or added into a future version of this document.
This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported. This
was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g.,
matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are
needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future
version of this document.
For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was
evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to
also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to
support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.
3. Tree Diagram The following tree diagram [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
provides an overview of the data model for the "ietf-keystore"
module.
The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see module: ietf-keystore
Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram. +--rw keystore
+--rw pinned-certificates* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw pinned-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw data binary
+--rw pinned-host-keys* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description? string
+--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw data binary
module: ietf-keystore notifications:
+--rw keystore +---n certificate-expiration
+--rw keys +--ro certificate instance-identifier
| +--rw key* [name] +--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw algorithm identityref
| | +--rw private-key union
| | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw value? binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key
| +---w input
| +---w name string
| +---w algorithm identityref
+--rw pinned-certificates* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw pinned-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw data binary
+--rw pinned-host-keys* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description? string
+--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw data binary
notifications: grouping certificate-grouping
+---n certificate-expiration +---- certificates
+--ro certificate instance-identifier | +---- certificate* [name]
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time | +---- name? string
| +---- value? binary
+---x generate-certificate-signing-request
+---w input
| +---w subject binary
| +---w attributes? binary
+--ro output
+--ro certificate-signing-request binary
grouping private-key-grouping
+---- algorithm? identityref
+---- private-key? union
+---- public-key? binary
+---x generate-private-key
+---w input
+---w algorithm identityref
4. Example Usage 3. Example Usage
The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore The following example illustrates what a configured keystore might
might look like. This keystore has three keys, four sets of trusted look like.
certificates, and one set of trusted host keys.
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<keys>
<key>
<name>ex-rsa-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa1024</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
<key>
<name>tls-ec-key</name>
<algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>tls-ec-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
<key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
</keys>
<!-- Manufacturer's trust root CA certs --> <!-- Manufacturer's trust root CA certs -->
<pinned-certificates> <pinned-certificates>
<name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name> <name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
<description> <description>
Certificates built into the device for authenticating Certificates built into the device for authenticating
manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates, manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates,
vouchers, etc.. Note, though listed here, these are not vouchers, etc.. Note, though listed here, these are not
configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied. configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
</description> </description>
skipping to change at page 9, line 46 skipping to change at page 7, line 7
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH. a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description> </description>
<pinned-host-key> <pinned-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name> <name>corp-fw1</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-host-key> </pinned-host-key>
</pinned-host-keys> </pinned-host-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
[ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore\
">
/ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certifica\
tes/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert']
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
The following example module has been constructed to illustrate the
groupings defined in the "ietf-keystore" module.
module ex-keystore-usage {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage";
prefix "eku";
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module uses the groupings defines the keystore draft
for illustration.";
revision "YYYY-MM-DD" {
description
"Initial version";
}
container key {
uses ks:private-key-grouping;
uses ks:certificate-grouping;
description
"A container of certificates, and an action to generate
a certificate signing request.";
}
}
The following example illustrates what a configured key might look
like. This example uses the "ex-keystore-usage" module above.
[ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]
<key xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
<algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">ks:\
secp521r1</algorithm>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>domain certificate</name>
<value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing- The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. This example uses
the "ex-keystore-usage" module above.
REQUEST REQUEST
------- -------
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1"> <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <key xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
<keys> <generate-certificate-signing-request>
<key> <subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name> <attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
<generate-certificate-signing-request> </generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject> </key>
<attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action> </action>
</rpc> </rpc>
RESPONSE RESPONSE
-------- --------
<rpc-reply message-id="101" <rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<certificate-signing-request <certificate-signing-request
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
base64encodedvalue== base64encodedvalue==
</certificate-signing-request> </certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply> </rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
in use with the NETCONF protocol. in use with the NETCONF protocol. This example uses the "ex-
keystore-usage" module above.
REQUEST
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<keys>
<generate-private-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">ks:secp521r1</algorithm>
</generate-private-key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<ok/>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration" REQUEST
notification in use with the NETCONF protocol. -------
[ note: '\' line wrapping for formatting only]
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only] <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0\
">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<key xmlns="http://example.com/ns/example-keystore-usage">
<generate-private-key>
<algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keysto\
re">ks:secp521r1</algorithm>
</generate-private-key>
</key>
</action>
</rpc>
<notification RESPONSE
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0"> --------
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime> <rpc-reply message-id="101"
<certificate-expiration xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <ok/>
<certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> </rpc-reply>
/ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certificates/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert']
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
5. YANG Module 4. YANG Module
This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991]. This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991].
This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986], This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986],
[RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994]. [RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994].
This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480]. This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-18.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-30.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix "ks"; prefix "ks";
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
reference reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
} }
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access "RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access
Control Model"; Control Model";
}
organization }
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact organization
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen contact
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>"; "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
description Author: Kent Watsen
"This module defines a keystore to centralize management <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
of security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified description
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. "This module defines a keystore to centralize management
of security credentials.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
revision "2017-10-18" { This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
description the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
// Identities revision "2017-10-30" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
identity key-algorithm { // Identities
description
"Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
}
identity rsa1024 { identity key-algorithm {
base key-algorithm; description
description "Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
"The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key."; }
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa2048 { identity rsa1024 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key."; "The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa3072 { reference
base key-algorithm; "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
description RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
"The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key."; }
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa4096 { identity rsa2048 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key."; "The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
} }
identity rsa7680 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa15360 { identity rsa3072 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key."; "The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
} }
identity secp192r1 { identity rsa4096 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp192r1 algorithm."; "The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
} }
identity secp256r1 { identity rsa7680 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp256r1 algorithm."; "The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
} }
identity secp384r1 { identity rsa15360 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp384r1 algorithm."; "The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity secp521r1 { }
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp521r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
// protocol accessible nodes identity secp192r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp192r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
container keystore { identity secp256r1 {
nacm:default-deny-write; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The keystore contains private keys, X.509 certificates, and "The secp256r1 algorithm.";
SSH host keys."; reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
container keys { identity secp384r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description description
"A list of public-private key pairs."; "The secp384r1 algorithm.";
list key { reference
key name; "RFC5480:
description Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
"A public-private key pair."; }
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the key.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically, this
leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
binary leafs are encoded.";
}
leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type union {
type binary;
type enumeration {
enum "hardware-protected" {
description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being
protected by a cryptographic hardware module
(e.g., a TPM).";
}
}
} identity secp521r1 {
mandatory true; base key-algorithm;
description description
"A binary that contains the value of the private key. The "The secp521r1 algorithm.";
interpretation of the content is defined by the key reference
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA "RFC5480:
key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key }
is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
[RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
container certificates {
description
"Certificates associated with this private key. More
than one certificate per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate {
key name;
description
"A certificate for this private key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name
must be unique across all keys, not just within
this key, as otherwise leafrefs to a certificate
might be ambiguous.";
}
leaf value {
type binary;
description
"A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
(no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.
This structure contains the certificate itself as well // typedefs
as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY
be included as well.";
reference
"RFC 2315:
PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. The specified assertions need to be
appropriate for the certificate's use. For example,
an entity certificate for a TLS server SHOULD have
values that enable clients to satisfy RFC 6125
processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), typedef pinned-certificates {
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished type leafref {
Encoding Rules (DER)."; path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-certificates/ks:name";
} }
leaf attributes { description
type binary; "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
description reference to pinned-certificates. Use of this type also
"The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo impacts the YANG tree diagram output.";
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded reference
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as "I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams";
specified in ITU-T X.690."; }
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC
2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
typedef pinned-host-keys {
type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:pinned-host-keys/ks:name";
}
description
"This typedef enables importing modules to easily define a
reference to pinned-host-keys. Use of this type also
impacts the YANG tree diagram output.";
reference
"I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams: YANG Tree Diagrams";
}
// groupings
grouping private-key-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair, and an action to request the
system to generate a private key.";
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
description
"Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically, this
leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
binary leafs are encoded.";
}
leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type union {
type binary;
type enumeration {
enum "hardware-protected" {
description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being
protected by a cryptographic hardware module
(e.g., a TPM).";
} }
} }
} }
} // end key must "../algorithm";
description
"A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
must "../algorithm";
must "../private-key";
description
"A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
interpretation of the content is defined by the key
algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
[RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
[RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
}
action generate-private-key { action generate-private-key {
description description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the "Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to
support cryptographic processors that must generate support cryptographic processors that must generate
the private key themselves. The resulting key is the private key themselves. The resulting key is
considered operational state and hence only present considered operational state and hence only present
in the <operational>."; in the <operational>.";
input { input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name the key should have when listed in
/keys/key, in <operational>.";
}
leaf algorithm { leaf algorithm {
type identityref { type identityref {
base "key-algorithm"; base "key-algorithm";
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key."; "The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
} }
} }
} // end generate-private-key } // end generate-private-key
} // end keys }
grouping certificate-grouping {
list pinned-certificates {
key name;
description description
"A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be "A container of certificates, and an action to generate
used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to a certificate signing request.";
authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates container certificates {
SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole
may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a
NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list
of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF
client connections.";
leaf name {
type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates."; "Certificates associated with this key. More than one
certificate supports, for instance, a TPM-protected
key that has both IDevID and LDevID certificates
associated.";
list certificate {
key name;
description
"A certificate for this private key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
}
leaf value {
type binary;
description
"A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
(no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.
This structure contains the certificate itself as well
as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY
be included as well.";
reference
"RFC 2315:
PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
} }
leaf description { action generate-certificate-signing-request {
type string;
description description
"An arbitrary description for this list of pinned "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
certificates."; the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. The specified assertions need to be
appropriate for the certificate's use. For example,
an entity certificate for a TLS server SHOULD have
values that enable clients to satisfy RFC 6125
processing.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary;
description
"The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC
2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
} }
list pinned-certificate { }
// protocol accessible nodes
container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"The keystore contains X.509 certificates and SSH host keys.";
list pinned-certificates {
key name; key name;
description description
"A pinned certificate."; "A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be
used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to
authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates
SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole
may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a
NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list
of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF
client connections.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
name must be unique across all lists of pinned
certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs
from another module can resolve to unique values.";
} }
leaf data { leaf description {
type binary; type string;
mandatory true;
description description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished certificates.";
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; }
reference list pinned-certificate {
"RFC 5280: key name;
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate description
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. "A pinned certificate.";
ITU-T X.690: leaf name {
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: type string;
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), description
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The
Encoding Rules (DER)."; name must be unique across all lists of pinned
certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs
from another module can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf data {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
} }
} }
}
list pinned-host-keys { list pinned-host-keys {
key name;
description
"A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can
be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each
list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose,
so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.
For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might
point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when
authenticating specific SSH servers.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host
keys.";
}
list pinned-host-key {
key name; key name;
description description
"A pinned host key."; "A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can
be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each
list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose,
so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.
For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might
point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when
authenticating specific SSH servers.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just
this list) so that a leafref to it from another module
can resolve to unique values.";
} }
leaf data { leaf description {
type binary; type string;
mandatory true;
description description
"The binary public key data for this SSH key, as "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host
specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: keys.";
}
list pinned-host-key {
key name;
description
"A pinned host key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be
unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just
this list) so that a leafref to it from another module
can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf data {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format string certificate or public key format
identifier identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data."; byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol"; Protocol";
}
} }
} }
} }
}
notification certificate-expiration { notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once
a day thereafter.";
leaf certificate {
type instance-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate."; "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once
a day thereafter.";
leaf certificate {
type instance-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
} }
}
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
6. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
authentication. authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
skipping to change at page 23, line 31 skipping to change at page 22, line 31
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability: operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is
RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding
[RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent [RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent
the request is the same as the device authenticated when the the request is the same as the device authenticated when the
secure transport layer was established. secure transport layer was established.
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
7.1. The IETF XML Registry 6.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
requested: requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the
following registration is requested: following registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore name: ietf-keystore
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
prefix: ks prefix: ks
reference: RFC VVVV reference: RFC VVVV
8. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David
Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch,
Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen. Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.
9. References 8. References
9.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[ITU.X690.1994] [ITU.X690.1994]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 1994. X.690, 1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
skipping to change at page 25, line 20 skipping to change at page 24, line 20
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key [RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010, Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
9.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft-
ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-02 (work in progress),
October 2017.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
skipping to change at page 27, line 7 skipping to change at page 26, line 7
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[Std-802.1AR-2009] [Std-802.1AR-2009]
IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 A.1. 00 to 01
o This draft was split out from draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09.
o Removed key-usage parameter from generate-private-key action.
o Now /private-keys/private-key/certificates/certificate/name must
be globally unique (unique across all private keys).
o Added top-level 'trusted-ssh-host-keys' and 'user-auth-
credentials' to support SSH client modules.
A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00
o Renamed module from "keychain" to "keystore" (Issue #3)
A.3. 00 to 01
o Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7 o Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7
structures. (Issue #1) structures. (Issue #1)
o Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the o Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the
'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2) 'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2)
o Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module. o Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
(Issues #4 and #5) (Issues #4 and #5)
A.4. 01 to 02 A.2. 01 to 02
o Added back 'generate-private-key' action. o Added back 'generate-private-key' action.
o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type. o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.
o Fixed up a few description statements. o Fixed up a few description statements.
A.5. 02 to 03 A.3. 02 to 03
o Changed draft's title. o Changed draft's title.
o Added missing references. o Added missing references.
o Collapsed sections and levels. o Collapsed sections and levels.
o Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section. o Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
o Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'. o Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.
o Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true. o Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.
o Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC o Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC
4253. 4253.
A.4. 03 to 04
o Added typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore paths
o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
o Removed Design Considerations section
o Moved key and certificate definitions from data tree to groupings
Author's Address Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net
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