draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-02.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-03.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks Internet-Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track June 13, 2017 Intended status: Standards Track October 17, 2017
Expires: December 15, 2017 Expires: April 20, 2018
Keystore Model YANG Data Model for a "Keystore" Mechanism
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-02 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG data module for a system-level keystore This document defines a YANG module for a system-level mechanism,
mechanism, that might be used to hold onto private keys and called a "keystore", containing security-sensitive data including
certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for private keys, pinned certificates, and pinned SSH host-keys.
this module.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note with finalized values at the time of publication. This note
summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
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The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log o Appendix A. Change Log
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.1. server-model-09 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.3. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.3. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.4. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.4. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 A.5. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] data module for a system-level This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for a system-level
keystore mechanism, which can be used to hold onto private keys and mechanism, herein called a "keystore". The keystore provides a
certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for centralized location for security sensitive data, as described below.
this module.
This module provides a centralized location for security sensitive This module has the following characteristics:
data, so that the data can be then referenced by other modules.
There are two types of data that are maintained by this module:
o Private keys, and any associated public certificates. o A configurable list of keys, each a public/private key pair. If a
key is used to sign a certificate signing request (CSR), which is
then signed by a certificate authority (CA), then the resulting
certificate may be configured as being associated with the key.
Keys are expected to be configured using standard configuration
mechanisms, however, to support hardware that generates keys, the
key may also be created via an action called 'generate-private-
key" action. Keys may also be preinstalled (e.g., a key
associated to an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009] certificate).
o Sets of trusted certificates. o An unordered list of pinned certificate sets, where each pinned
certificate set contains an unordered list of pinned certificates.
This structure enables a server to use specific sets of pinned
certificates on a case-by-case basis. For instance, one set of
pinned certificates might be used by an HTTPS-client when
connecting to particular HTTPS servers, while another set of
pinned certificates might be used by a server when authenticating
client connections (e.g., certificate-based client
authentication).
This document extends special consideration for systems that have o An unordered list of pinned SSH host key sets, where each pinned
Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that SSH host key set contains an unordered list of pinned SSH host
the TPM must be directed to generate new private keys (it is not keys. This enables a server to use specific sets of pinned SSH
possible to load a private key into a TPM) and it is not possible to host-keys on a case-by-case basis. For instance, SSH clients can
backup/restore the TPM's private keys as configuration. be configured to use different sets of pinned SSH host keys when
connecting to different SSH servers.
o An action to request the server to generate a new key using the
specified algorithm. The resulting key is present in
<operational>.
o An action to request the server to generate a certificate signing
request for an existing key. Passed into the action are the
subject and attributes to be used, and returned is the CSR
(certificate signing request) structure, signed by the key
protected by the keystore. The CSR can be signed by an external
certificate authority (CA). The signed certificate returned by
the CA can be associated with the key in the keystore, using a
standard configuration operation (<edit-config>).
o A notification to indicate when a certificate is about to expire.
Special consideration has been given for systems that have Trusted
Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in that the TPM
must be directed to generate new keys (it is not possible to load a
key into a TPM) and it is not possible to backup/restore the TPM's
private keys as configuration.
It is not required that a system has an operating system level It is not required that a system has an operating system level
keystore utility to implement this module. keystore utility to implement this module.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Tree Diagram Notation 1.2. Tree Diagram Notation
A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as
follows: follows:
o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys. o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
o Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the o Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate that the
skipping to change at page 4, line 11 skipping to change at page 4, line 47
o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!"
means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list. means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.
o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also
marked with a colon (":"). marked with a colon (":").
o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not
shown. shown.
2. The Keystore Model 2. Design Considerations
The keystore module defined in this section provides a configurable
object having the following characteristics:
o A semi-configurable list of private keys, each with one or more
associated certificates. Private keys MUST be either preinstalled
(e.g., a key associated to an IDevID [Std-802.1AR-2009]
certificate), be generated by request, or be loaded by request.
Each private key is MAY have associated certificates, either
preinstalled or configured after creation.
o A configurable list of lists of trust anchor certificates. This This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
enables the server to have use-case specific trust anchors. For signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message
instance, one list of trust anchors might be used to authenticate Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
management connections (e.g., client certificate-based was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out
authentication for NETCONF or RESTCONF connections), and a of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the
different list of trust anchors might be used for when connecting future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output
to a specific Internet-based service (e.g., a zero touch bootstrap statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option,
server). would enable a backwards compatible solution.
o An RPC to generate a certificate signing request for an existing In order to use YANG identities for algorithm identifiers, only the
private key, a passed subject, and an optional attributes. The most commonly used RSA key lengths are supported for the RSA
signed certificate returned from an external certificate authority algorithm. Additional key lengths can be defined in another module
(CA) can be later set using a standard configuration change or added into a future version of this document.
request (e.g., <edit-config>).
o An RPC to request the server to generate a new private key using This document limits the number of elliptical curves supported. This
the specified algorithm and key length. was done to match industry trends and IETF best practice (e.g.,
matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional algorithms are
needed, they can be defined by another module or added into a future
version of this document.
o An RPC to request the server to load a new private key. For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was
evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to
also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to
support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.
2.1. Overview 3. Tree Diagram
The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see
Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram. Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram.
module: ietf-keystore module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore +--rw keystore
+--rw keys +--rw keys
| +--rw key* [name] | +--rw key* [name]
| | +--rw name string | | +--rw name string
| | +--rw algorithm-identifier identityref | | +--rw algorithm identityref
| | +--rw private-key union | | +--rw private-key union
| | +--ro public-key binary | | +--rw public-key binary
| | +--rw certificates | | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate* [name] | | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string | | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw value? binary | | | +--rw value? binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input | | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary | | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary | | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output | | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary | | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key | +---x generate-private-key
| +---w input | +---w input
| +---w name string | +---w name string
| +---w algorithm identityref | +---w algorithm identityref
+--rw trusted-certificates* [name] +--rw pinned-certificates* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string | +--rw description? string
| +--rw trusted-certificate* [name] | +--rw pinned-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| +--rw certificate? binary | +--rw data binary
+--rw trusted-host-keys* [name] +--rw pinned-host-keys* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw description? string +--rw description? string
+--rw trusted-host-key* [name] +--rw pinned-host-key* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw host-key binary +--rw data binary
notifications: notifications:
+---n certificate-expiration +---n certificate-expiration
+--ro certificate instance-identifier +--ro certificate instance-identifier
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time +--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
2.2. Example Usage 4. Example Usage
The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore
object might look like. The private-key shown below is consistent might look like. This keystore has three keys, four sets of trusted
with the generate-private-key and generate-certificate-signing- certificates, and one set of trusted host keys.
request examples above. This example also assumes that the resulting
CA-signed certificate has been configured back onto the server.
Lastly, this example shows that three lists of trusted certificates
having been configured.
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates --> <!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<keys> <keys>
<key> <key>
<name>ex-rsa-key</name> <name>ex-rsa-key</name>
<algorithm-identifier>rsa1024</algorithm-identifier> <algorithm>rsa1024</algorithm>
<private-key>Base64-encoded RSA Private Key</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded RSA Public Key</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name> <name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value> <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</key> </key>
<key> <key>
<name>tls-ec-key</name> <name>tls-ec-key</name>
<algorithm-identifier>secp256r1</algorithm-identifier> <algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
<private-key>Base64-encoded EC Private Key</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded EC Public Key</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>tls-ec-cert</name> <name>tls-ec-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value> <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</key> </key>
<key> <key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name> <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm-identifier>rsa2048</algorithm-identifier> <algorithm>rsa2048</algorithm>
<private-key>Base64-encoded RSA Private Key</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded RSA Public Key</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<certificates> <certificates>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name> <name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value> <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate> </certificate>
<certificate> <certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name> <name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value> <value>base64encodedvalue==</value>
</certificate> </certificate>
</certificates> </certificates>
</key> </key>
</keys> </keys>
<!-- trusted netconf/restconf client certificates --> <!-- Manufacturer's trust root CA certs -->
<trusted-certificates> <pinned-certificates>
<name>manufacturers-root-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Certificates built into the device for authenticating
manufacturer-signed objects, such as TLS server certificates,
vouchers, etc.. Note, though listed here, these are not
configurable; any attempt to do so will be denied.
</description>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 1</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
<pinned-certificate>
<name>Manufacturer Root CA cert 2</name>
<data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</pinned-certificate>
</pinned-certificates>
<!-- pinned netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name> <name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description> <description>
Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates
that are not signed by a trusted CA. that are not signed by a pinned CA.
</description> </description>
<trusted-certificate> <pinned-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name> <name>George Jetson</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</trusted-certificate> </pinned-certificate>
</trusted-certificates> </pinned-certificates>
<trusted-certificates> <!-- pinned netconf/restconf server certificates -->
<pinned-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name> <name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
<description> <description>
Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates
that are not signed by a trusted CA. that are not signed by a pinned CA.
</description> </description>
<trusted-certificate> <pinned-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name> <name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</trusted-certificate> </pinned-certificate>
</trusted-certificates> </pinned-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients --> <!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients -->
<trusted-certificates> <pinned-certificates>
<name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name> <name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
<description> <description>
Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate
client connections. Clients are authenticated if their client connections. Clients are authenticated if their
certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured
CA certificates. CA certificates.
</description> </description>
<trusted-certificate> <pinned-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name> <name>ca.example.com</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</trusted-certificate> </pinned-certificate>
</trusted-certificates> </pinned-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet --> <!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<trusted-certificates> <pinned-certificates>
<name>common-ca-certs</name> <name>common-ca-certs</name>
<description> <description>
Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers. Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
These certificates are similar to those that might be These certificates are similar to those that might be
shipped with a web browser. shipped with a web browser.
</description> </description>
<trusted-certificate> <pinned-certificate>
<name>ex-certificate-authority</name> <name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</trusted-certificate> </pinned-certificate>
</trusted-certificates> </pinned-certificates>
<!-- trusted SSH host keys --> <!-- pinned SSH host keys -->
<trusted-host-keys> <pinned-host-keys>
<name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name> <name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
<description> <description>
Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers. Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
These host keys would be analogous to those stored in These host keys would be analogous to those stored in
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH. a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description> </description>
<trusted-host-key> <pinned-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name> <name>corp-fw1</name>
<host-key>Base64-encoded OneAsymmetricKey</host-key> <data>base64encodedvalue==</data>
</trusted-host-key> </pinned-host-key>
</trusted-host-keys> </pinned-host-keys>
</keystore> </keystore>
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing- The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST REQUEST
------- -------
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<rpc message-id="101" <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1"> <keys>
<keystore <key>
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<keys> <generate-certificate-signing-request>
<key> <subject>base64encodedvalue==</subject>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name> <attributes>base64encodedvalue==</attributes>
<generate-certificate-signing-request> </generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject> </key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2R </keys>
manZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNlmO </keystore>
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo= </action>
</subject> </rpc>
<attributes>
bwtakWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvut4
arnZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYm
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmC6Rhp=
</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101" RESPONSE
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> --------
<certificate-signing-request <rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z <certificate-signing-request
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd base64encodedvalue==
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE </certificate-signing-request>
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl </rpc-reply>
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
FaNzlnNlNWVldsMldzaHE1bUViCkJNNitGNzdjbTAvU25FcFE0TnV
bXBDT2YKQWdNQkFBR2pnYXd3Z2Frd0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZKY1o2W
URiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFNR1FHQTFVZApJd1JkTUZ1QU
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding. in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-keystore:keystore/\
keys/generate-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+json
{
"ietf-keystore:input" : {
"name" : "ex-key-sect571r1",
"algorithm" : "sect571r1"
}
}
RESPONSE
--------
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content REQUEST
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT -------
Server: example-server <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<keys>
<generate-private-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<algorithm xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">ks:secp521r1</algorithm>
</generate-private-key>
</keys>
</keystore>
</action>
</rpc>
The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration" RESPONSE
notification in XML. --------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<ok/>
</rpc-reply>
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only] The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
notification in use with the NETCONF protocol.
<notification ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate>/ks:keystore/ks:private-keys/ks:private-key\
/ks:certificate-chains/ks:certificate-chain/ks:certificate[3]\
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
2.3. YANG Module <notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate xmlns:ks="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
/ks:keystore/ks:keys/ks:key[ks:name='ex-rsa-key']/ks:certificates/ks:certificate[ks:name='ex-rsa-cert']
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
This YANG module makes extensive use of data types defined in 5. YANG Module
[RFC5280] and [RFC5958].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-06-13.yang" This YANG module imports modules defined in [RFC6536] and [RFC6991].
This module uses data types defined in [RFC2315], [RFC2986],
[RFC3447], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5915], and [ITU.X690.1994].
This module uses algorithms defined in [RFC3447] and [RFC5480].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-10-18.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix "ks"; prefix "ks";
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
reference reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
skipping to change at page 11, line 40 skipping to change at page 12, line 37
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>"; <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description description
"This module defines a keystore to centralize management "This module defines a keystore to centralize management
of security credentials. of security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2017-06-13" { revision "2017-10-18" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration "RFC VVVV: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
Models";
} }
// Identities // Identities
identity key-algorithm { identity key-algorithm {
description description
"Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived."; "Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
} }
identity rsa1024 { identity rsa1024 {
skipping to change at page 14, line 4 skipping to change at page 14, line 48
} }
identity secp384r1 { identity secp384r1 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp384r1 algorithm."; "The secp384r1 algorithm.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
} }
identity secp521r1 { identity secp521r1 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp521r1 algorithm."; "The secp521r1 algorithm.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
} }
// data model // protocol accessible nodes
container keystore { container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"The keystore contains both active material (e.g., private keys "The keystore contains private keys, X.509 certificates, and
and passwords) and passive material (e.g., trust anchors). SSH host keys.";
The active material can be used to support either a server (e.g.,
a TLS/SSH server's private) or a client (a private key used for
TLS/SSH client-certificate based authentication, or a password
used for SSH/HTTP-client authentication).
The passive material can be used to support either a server
(e.g., client certificates to trust) or clients (e.g., server
certificates to trust).";
container keys { container keys {
description description
"A list of keys maintained by the keystore."; "A list of public-private key pairs.";
list key { list key {
key name; key name;
description description
"A key maintained by the keystore."; "A public-private key pair.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the key."; "An arbitrary name for the key.";
} }
leaf algorithm-identifier { leaf algorithm {
type identityref { type identityref {
base "key-algorithm"; base "key-algorithm";
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Identifies which algorithm is to be used to generate the "Identifies the key's algorithm. More specifically, this
key."; leaf specifies how the 'private-key' and 'public-key'
// no 'params' like in RFC 5912? - none are set for binary leafs are encoded.";
// algs we care about, but what about the future?
} }
leaf private-key { leaf private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all; nacm:default-deny-all;
type union { type union {
type binary; type binary;
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum "INACCESSIBLE" { enum "hardware-protected" {
description description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being protected "The private key is inaccessible due to being
by a cryptographic hardware module (e.g., a TPM)."; protected by a cryptographic hardware module
(e.g., a TPM).";
} }
} }
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A binary string that contains the value of the private "A binary that contains the value of the private key. The
key. The interpretation of the content is defined in the interpretation of the content is defined by the key
registration of the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
is an INTEGER, an RSA key is represented as RSAPrivateKey key is represented as RSAPrivateKey as defined in
as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
(ECC) key is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in [RFC5915]";
[RFC5915]"; // text lifted from RFC5958 reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
} }
// no key usage (ref: RFC 5912, pg 101 -- too X.509 specific?)
leaf public-key { leaf public-key {
type binary; type binary;
config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A binary string that contains the value of the public "A binary that contains the value of the public key. The
key. The interpretation of the content is defined in the interpretation of the content is defined by the key
registration of the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key algorithm. For example, a DSA key is an integer, an RSA
is an INTEGER, an RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey key is represented as RSAPublicKey as defined in
as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
(ECC) key is represented using the 'publicKey' described in is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
[RFC5915]"; [RFC5915]";
reference
"RFC 3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.
RFC 5915: Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure.";
} }
container certificates { container certificates {
description description
"Certificates associated with this private key. More "Certificates associated with this private key. More
than one certificate per key is enabled to support, than one certificate per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates."; both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate { list certificate {
key name; key name;
description description
"A certificate for this private key."; "A certificate for this private key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name "An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name
must be a unique across all keys, not just within must be unique across all keys, not just within
this key."; this key, as otherwise leafrefs to a certificate
might be ambiguous.";
} }
leaf value { leaf value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"An unsigned PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified "A PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified by
by Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
(no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1 (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690. ITU-T X.690.
This structure contains, in order, the certificate This structure contains the certificate itself as well
itself and all intermediate certificates leading up as any intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
to a trust anchor certificate. The certificate MAY anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate MAY
optionally include the trust anchor certificate."; be included as well.";
reference reference
"RFC 2315: "RFC 2315:
PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 18, line 14 skipping to change at page 19, line 5
} }
} }
} }
} // end key } // end key
action generate-private-key { action generate-private-key {
description description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the "Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to specified key algorithm. This action is primarily to
support cryptographic processors that MUST generate support cryptographic processors that must generate
the private key themselves. The resulting key is the private key themselves. The resulting key is
considered operational state and hence initially only considered operational state and hence only present
present in the <operational> datastore, as defined in in the <operational>.";
[I-D.netmod-revised-datastores].";
input { input {
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The name this private-key should have when listed "The name the key should have when listed in
in /keys/key. As such, the passed value MUST NOT /keys/key, in <operational>.";
match any existing 'name' value.";
} }
leaf algorithm { leaf algorithm {
type identityref { type identityref {
base "key-algorithm"; base "key-algorithm";
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key."; "The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
} }
} }
} // end generate-private-key } // end generate-private-key
} // end keys } // end keys
list trusted-certificates { list pinned-certificates {
key name; key name;
description description
"A list of trusted certificates. These certificates "A list of pinned certificates. These certificates can be
can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients to
clients to authenticate servers. The certificates may authenticate servers. Each list of pinned certificates
be endpoint specific or for certificate authorities, SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole
to authenticate many clients at once. Each list of may be referenced by other modules. For instance, a
certificates SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the NETCONF server's configuration might use a specific list
list as a whole may be referenced by other modules. of pinned certificates for when authenticating NETCONF
For instance, a NETCONF server model might point to client connections.";
a list of certificates to use when authenticating
client certificates.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted certificates."; "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned certificates.";
} }
leaf description { leaf description {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned
certificates."; certificates.";
} }
list trusted-certificate { list pinned-certificate {
key name; key name;
description description
"A trusted certificate for a specific use. Note, this "A pinned certificate.";
'certificate' is a list in order to encode any
associated intermediate certificates.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this trusted certificate. Must "An arbitrary name for this pinned certificate. The
be unique across all lists of trusted certificates name must be unique across all lists of pinned
(not just this list) so that a leafref to it from certificates (not just this list) so that leafrefs
another module can resolve to unique values."; from another module can resolve to unique values.";
} }
leaf certificate { // rename to 'data'? leaf data {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true;
description description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690."; encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference reference
"RFC 5280: "RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
} }
list trusted-host-keys { list pinned-host-keys {
key name; key name;
description description
"A list of trusted host-keys. These host-keys can be used "A list of pinned host keys. These pinned host-keys can
by clients to authenticate SSH servers. The host-keys are be used by clients to authenticate SSH servers. Each
endpoint specific. Each list of host-keys SHOULD be list of pinned host keys SHOULD be specific to a purpose,
specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be so the list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.
referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF For instance, a NETCONF client's configuration might
client model might point to a list of host-keys to use point to a specific list of pinned host keys for when
when authenticating servers host-keys."; authenticating specific SSH servers.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted SSH host keys."; "An arbitrary name for this list of pinned SSH host keys.";
} }
leaf description { leaf description {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted SSH host "An arbitrary description for this list of pinned SSH host
keys."; keys.";
} }
list trusted-host-key { list pinned-host-key {
key name; key name;
description description
"A trusted host key."; "A pinned host key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this trusted host-key. Must be "An arbitrary name for this pinned host-key. Must be
unique across all lists of trusted host-keys (not just unique across all lists of pinned host-keys (not just
this list) so that a leafref to it from another module this list) so that a leafref to it from another module
can resolve to unique values. can resolve to unique values.";
Note that, for when the SSH client is able to listen
for call-home connections as well, there is no reference
identifier (e.g., hostname, IP address, etc.) that it
can use to uniquely identify the server with. The
call-home draft recommends SSH servers use X.509v3
certificates (RFC6187) when calling home.";
} }
leaf host-key { // rename to 'data'? leaf data {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description // is this the correct type? description
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: string certificate or public key format
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), identifier
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished byte[n] key/certificate data.";
Encoding Rules (DER)."; reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol";
} }
} }
} }
} }
notification certificate-expiration { notification certificate-expiration {
description description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
skipping to change at page 21, line 37 skipping to change at page 22, line 13
} }
leaf expiration-date { leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time; type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate."; "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
3. Design Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message
Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out
of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the
future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output
statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option,
would enable a backwards compatible solution.
This document puts a limit of the number of elliptical curves
supported by default. This was done to match industry trends in IETF
best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If
additional algorithms are needed, they MAY be augmented in by another
module, or added directly in a future version of this document.
For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was
evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to
also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to
support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.
4. Security Considerations
The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
authentication. authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
skipping to change at page 23, line 20 skipping to change at page 23, line 20
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability: nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/keystore/keys/key/private-key: This node is additionally /keystore/keys/key/private-key: This node is additionally
sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it
should never be returned to a client. The best reason for should never be returned to a client. The best reason for
returning this node is to support backup/restore type returning this node is to support backup/restore type
workflows. This being the case, this node is marked with the workflows. This being the case, this node is marked with the
NACM value 'default-deny-all'. NACM value 'default-deny-all'.
Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability: operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
generate-certificate-signing-request: For this RPC operation, it generate-certificate-signing-request: For this action, it is
is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding
[RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent [RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent
the request is the same as the device authenticated when the the request is the same as the device authenticated when the
secure transport layer was established. secure transport layer was established.
5. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
5.1. The IETF XML Registry 7.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
requested: requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the the
following registration is requested: following registration is requested:
name: ietf-keystore name: ietf-keystore
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
prefix: kc prefix: ks
reference: RFC VVVV reference: RFC VVVV
6. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, David
Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch,
Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen. Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.
7. References 9. References
7.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[ITU.X690.1994]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Version 1.5", RFC 2315, DOI 10.17487/RFC2315, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2315>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.
7.2. Informative References [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[Std-802.1AR-2009] [Std-802.1AR-2009]
IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 A.1. server-model-09 to 00
skipping to change at page 26, line 42 skipping to change at page 27, line 42
(Issues #4 and #5) (Issues #4 and #5)
A.4. 01 to 02 A.4. 01 to 02
o Added back 'generate-private-key' action. o Added back 'generate-private-key' action.
o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type. o Removed 'RESTRICTED' enum from the 'private-key' leaf type.
o Fixed up a few description statements. o Fixed up a few description statements.
A.5. 02 to 03
o Changed draft's title.
o Added missing references.
o Collapsed sections and levels.
o Added RFC 8174 to Requirements Language Section.
o Renamed 'trusted-certificates' to 'pinned-certificates'.
o Changed 'public-key' from config false to config true.
o Switched 'host-key' from OneAsymmetricKey to definition from RFC
4253.
Author's Address Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net
 End of changes. 131 change blocks. 
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