draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-00.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-01.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks Internet-Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track G. Wu Intended status: Standards Track March 13, 2017
Expires: May 4, 2017 Cisco Networks Expires: September 14, 2017
October 31, 2016
Keystore Model Keystore Model
draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-00 draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a YANG data module for a system-level keystore This document defines a YANG data module for a system-level keystore
mechanism, that might be used to hold onto private keys and mechanism, that might be used to hold onto private keys and
certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for
this module. this module.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note with finalized values at the time of publication. This note
summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both
in the Normative References section, as well as in body text
throughout. Please update the following references to reflect their
final RFC assignments:
o draft-ietf-netconf-restconf
o draft-ietf-netconf-call-home
o draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft o "VVVV" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
o "XXXX" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-restconf
o "YYYY" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-call-home
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for ports
pending IANA assignment from "draft-ietf-netconf-call-home". Please
apply the following replacements:
o "7777" --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-ssh"
o "8888" --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-tls"
o "9999" --> the assigned port value for "restconf-ch-tls"
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
o "2016-10-31" --> the publication date of this draft o "2017-03-13" --> the publication date of this draft
The following two Appendix sections are to be removed prior to The following two Appendix sections are to be removed prior to
publication: publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log o Appendix A. Change Log
o Appendix B. Open Issues o Appendix B. Open Issues
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 2, line 38 skipping to change at page 2, line 12
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Tree Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. The Keystore Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.1. server-model-09 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.3. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] data module for a system-level This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] data module for a system-level
keystore mechanism, which can be used to hold onto private keys and keystore mechanism, which can be used to hold onto private keys and
certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for certificates that are trusted by the system advertising support for
this module. this module.
This module provides a centralized location for security sensitive This module provides a centralized location for security sensitive
data, so that the data can be then referenced by other modules. data, so that the data can be then referenced by other modules.
skipping to change at page 5, line 25 skipping to change at page 5, line 5
o An RPC to request the server to generate a new private key using o An RPC to request the server to generate a new private key using
the specified algorithm and key length. the specified algorithm and key length.
o An RPC to request the server to load a new private key. o An RPC to request the server to load a new private key.
2.1. Overview 2.1. Overview
The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see The keystore module has the following tree diagram. Please see
Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram. Section 1.2 for information on how to interpret this diagram.
module: ietf-keystore module: ietf-keystore
+--rw keystore +--rw keystore
+--rw private-keys +--rw keys
| +--rw private-key* [name] | +--rw key* [name]
| | +--rw name string | +--rw name string
| | +--ro algorithm? identityref | +--rw algorithm-identifier identityref
| | +--ro key-length? uint32 | +--rw private-key union
| | +--ro public-key binary | +--ro public-key binary
| | +--rw certificate-chains | +--rw certificates
| | | +--rw certificate-chain* [name] | | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | | +--rw name string | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw certificate* binary | | +--rw value? binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key +--rw trusted-certificates* [name]
| | +---w input | +--rw name string
| | +---w name string | +--rw description? string
| | +---w algorithm identityref | +--rw trusted-certificate* [name]
| | +---w key-length? uint32 | +--rw name string
| +---x load-private-key | +--rw certificate? binary
| +---w input +--rw trusted-host-keys* [name]
| +---w name string +--rw name string
| +---w private-key binary +--rw description? string
+--rw trusted-certificates* [name] +--rw trusted-host-key* [name]
| +--rw name string +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string +--rw host-key binary
| +--rw trusted-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw certificate? binary
+--rw trusted-ssh-host-keys* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw trusted-host-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw host-key binary
+--rw user-auth-credentials
+--rw user-auth-credential* [username]
+--rw username string
+--rw auth-method* [priority]
+--rw priority uint8
+--rw (auth-type)?
+--:(certificate)
| +--rw certificate* -> /keystore/private
-keys/private-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/name
+--:(public-key)
| +--rw public-key* -> /keystore/private
-keys/private-key/name
+--:(ciphertext-password)
| +--rw ciphertext-password? string
+--:(cleartext-password)
+--rw cleartext-password? string
notifications: notifications:
+---n certificate-expiration +---n certificate-expiration
+--ro certificate instance-identifier +--ro certificate instance-identifier
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time +--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
2.2. Example Usage 2.2. Example Usage
The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding. object might look like. The private-key shown below is consistent
with the generate-private-key and generate-certificate-signing-
REQUEST request examples above. This example also assumes that the resulting
------- CA-signed certificate has been configured back onto the server.
Lastly, this example shows that three lists of trusted certificates
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only] having been configured.
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-keystore:keystore/\
private-keys/generate-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+json
{
"ietf-keystore:input" : {
"name" : "ex-key-sect571r1",
"algorithm" : "sect571r1"
}
}
RESPONSE <keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
-------- <!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<keys>
<key>
<name>ex-rsa-key</name>
<algorithm-identifier>rsa1024</algorithm-identifier>
<private-key>Base64-encoded RSA Private Key</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded RSA Public Key</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-rsa-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content <key>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT <name>tls-ec-key</name>
Server: example-server <algorithm-identifier>secp256r1</algorithm-identifier>
<private-key>Base64-encoded EC Private Key</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded EC Public Key</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>tls-ec-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
The following example illustrates the "load-private-key" action in <key>
use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding. <name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm-identifier>rsa2048</algorithm-identifier>
<private-key>Base64-encoded RSA Private Key</private-key>
<public-key>Base64-encoded RSA Public Key</public-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>builtin-idevid-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>my-ldevid-cert</name>
<value>Base64-encoded PKCS#7</value>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</key>
</keys>
REQUEST <!-- trusted netconf/restconf client certificates -->
------- <trusted-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description>
Specific client authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted clients. These are needed for client certificates
that are not signed by a trusted CA.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only] <trusted-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-server-certs</name>
<description>
Specific server authentication certificates for explicitly
trusted servers. These are needed for server certificates
that are not signed by a trusted CA.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-keystore:keystore/\ <!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for authenticating clients -->
private-keys/load-private-key HTTP/1.1 <trusted-certificates>
HOST: example.com <name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+xml <description>
Trust anchors (i.e. CA certs) that are used to authenticate
client connections. Clients are authenticated if their
certificate has a chain of trust to one of these configured
CA certificates.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name>
<certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<input xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> <!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name> <trusted-certificates>
<private-key> <name>common-ca-certs</name>
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\ <description>
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\ Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\ These certificates are similar to those that might be
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN\ shipped with a web browser.
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ\ </description>
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ\ <trusted-certificate>
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC\ <name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM\ <certificate>Base64-encoded X.509v3</certificate>
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk\ </trusted-certificate>
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot\ </trusted-certificates>
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</private-key>
</input>
RESPONSE <!-- trusted SSH host keys -->
-------- <trusted-host-keys>
<name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
<description>
Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
These host keys would be analogous to those stored in
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description>
<trusted-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<host-key>Base64-encoded OneAsymmetricKey</host-key>
</trusted-host-key>
</trusted-host-keys>
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content </keystore>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT
Server: example-server
The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing- The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol. request" action in use with the NETCONF protocol.
REQUEST REQUEST
------- -------
<rpc message-id="101" <rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1"> <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
skipping to change at page 10, line 5 skipping to change at page 9, line 38
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0 mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg== SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate-signing-request> </certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply> </rpc-reply>
The following example illustrates what a fully configured keystore
object might look like. The private-key shown below is consistent
with the generate-private-key and generate-certificate-signing-
request examples above. This example also assumes that the resulting
CA-signed certificate has been configured back onto the server.
Lastly, this example shows that three lists of trusted certificates
having been configured.
<keystore xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<private-keys>
<private-key>
<name>my-rsa-user-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa</algorithm>
<public-key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
mJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYmZ2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87Zm
JvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-rsa-chain</name>
<certificate>
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
<private-key>
<name>my-ec-user-key</name>
<algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
<public-key>
mJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYmZ2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87Zm
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
JvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-ec-chain</name>
<certificate>
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
<private-key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>sect571r1</algorithm>
<public-key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
mJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYmZ2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87Zm
JvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>default-idevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
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GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
<certificate>
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
FaNzlnNlNWVldsMldzaHE1bUViCkJNNitGNzdjbTAvU25FcFE0TnV
bXBDT2YKQWdNQkFBR2pnYXd3Z2Frd0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZKY1o2W
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
URiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFNR1FHQTFVZApJd1JkTUZ1QU
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-ldevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
FaNzlnNlNWVldsMldzaHE1bUViCkJNNitGNzdjbTAvU25FcFE0TnV
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
<certificate>
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
FaNzlnNlNWVldsMldzaHE1bUViCkJNNitGNzdjbTAvU25FcFE0TnV
bXBDT2YKQWdNQkFBR2pnYXd3Z2Frd0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZKY1o2W
URiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFNR1FHQTFVZApJd1JkTUZ1QU
ZKY1o2WURiR0lPNDB4ajlPb3JtREdsRUNCVTFvVGlrTmpBME1Rc3d
mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
RBR0FRSC9BZ0VBTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQgpCUVVBQTRHQkFMMmx
rWmFGNWcyaGR6MVNhZnZPbnBneHA4eG00SHRhbStadHpLazFlS3Bx
TXp4YXJCbFpDSHlLCklVbC9GVzRtV1RQS1VDeEtFTE40NEY2Zmk2d
c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
</private-keys>
<!-- trusted netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description>
Specific client authentication certificates that are to be
explicitly trusted NETCONF/RESTCONF clients. These are
needed for client certificates not signed by our CA.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name>
<certificate>
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
RV0JCU2t2MXI2SFNHeUFUVkpwSmYyOWtXbUU0NEo5akJrQmdOVkhTTUVY
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
UxNQWtHQTFVRUJoTUNWVk14RURBT0JnTlZCQW9UQjJWNApZVzF3YkdVeE
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW
xWVE1SQXdEZ1lEVlFRSwpFd2RsZUdGdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3B
EVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVUFBNEdCCkFFc3BK
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
TQzcjFZSjk0M1FQLzV5eGUKN2QxMkxCV0dxUjUrbEl5N01YL21ka2M4al
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
LS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<certificate>
VlEVlFRREV3Vm9ZWEJ3ZVRDQm56QU5CZ2txaGtpRzl3MEJBUUVGQUFPQm
pRQXdnWWtDCmdZRUE1RzRFSWZsS1p2bDlXTW44eUhyM2hObUFRaUhVUzV
rRUpPQy9hSFA3eGJXQW1ra054ZStUa2hrZnBsL3UKbVhsTjhSZUd1ODhG
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW
xWVE1SQXdEZ1lEVlFRSwpFd2RsZUdGdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3B
EVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVUFBNEdCCkFFc3BK
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
QWtUOCBDRVUUZJ0RUF==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for netconf/restconf clients -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trust anchors used only to authenticate NETCONF/RESTCONF
client connections. Since our security policy only allows
authentication for clients having a certificate signed by
our CA, we only configure its certificate below.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name>
<certificate>
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>common-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
These certificates are similar to those that might be
shipped with a web browser.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
<certificate>
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trusted SSH host keys -->
<trusted-ssh-host-keys>
<name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
<description>
Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
These host keys would be analogous to those stored in
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description>
<trusted-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<host-key>
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</host-key>
</trusted-host-key>
</trusted-ssh-host-keys>
<!-- user credentials and associated authentication methods -->
<user-auth-credentials>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>admin</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<certificate-chain>my-ec-chain</certificate-chain>
<certificate-chain>my-rsa-chain</certificate-chain>
</auth-method>
<auth-method>
<priority>2</priority>
<public-key>my-rsa-user-key</public-key>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>tester</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<cleartext-password>testing123</cleartext-password>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>ldevid</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<certificate-chain>my-ldevid-chain</certificate-chain>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
</user-auth-credentials>
</keystore>
The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration" The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration"
notification in XML. notification in XML.
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only] ['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate>/ks:keystore/ks:private-keys/ks:private-key\
/ks:certificate-chains/ks:certificate-chain/ks:certificate[3]\
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
<certificate>
/ks:keystore/ks:private-keys/ks:private-key/ks:certificate-chains\
/ks:certificate-chain/ks:certificate[3]
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
2.3. YANG Module 2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module makes extensive use of data types defined in This YANG module makes extensive use of data types defined in
[RFC5280] and [RFC5958]. [RFC5280] and [RFC5958].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2016-10-31.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-keystore@2017-03-13.yang"
module ietf-keystore { module ietf-keystore {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore";
prefix "ks"; prefix "ks";
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
reference reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types"; "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
} }
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 6536: Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access
Control Model";
}
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>"; <mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description description
"This module defines a keystore to centralize management of "This module defines a keystore to centralize management
security credentials. of security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified
authors of the code. All rights reserved. as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."; the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-10-31" { revision "2017-03-13" {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration "RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models"; Models";
} }
// Identities
identity key-algorithm { identity key-algorithm {
description description
"Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived."; "Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
} }
identity rsa { identity rsa1024 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The RSA algorithm."; "The RSA algorithm using a 1024-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa2048 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 2048-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa3072 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa4096 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 4096-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa7680 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 7680-bit key.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity rsa15360 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm using a 15360-bit key.";
reference reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: "RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1."; RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
} }
identity secp192r1 { identity secp192r1 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp192r1 algorithm."; "The secp192r1 algorithm.";
reference reference
skipping to change at page 19, line 21 skipping to change at page 13, line 35
identity secp521r1 { identity secp521r1 {
base key-algorithm; base key-algorithm;
description description
"The secp521r1 algorithm."; "The secp521r1 algorithm.";
reference reference
"RFC5480: "RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information."; Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
} }
// data model
container keystore { container keystore {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description description
"A list of private-keys and their associated certificates, as "The keystore contains both active material (e.g., private keys
well as lists of trusted certificates for client certificate and passwords) and passive material (e.g., trust anchors).
authentication. RPCs are provided to generate a new private
key and to generate a certificate signing requests.";
container private-keys { The active material can be used to support either a server (e.g.,
a TLS/SSH server's private) or a client (a private key used for
TLS/SSH client-certificate based authentication, or a password
used for SSH/HTTP-client authentication).
The passive material can be used to support either a server
(e.g., client certificates to trust) or clients (e.g., server
certificates to trust).";
container keys {
description description
"A list of private key maintained by the keystore."; "A list of keys maintained by the keystore.";
list private-key { list key {
key name; key name;
description description
"A private key."; "A key maintained by the keystore.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the private key."; "An arbitrary name for the key.";
} }
leaf algorithm { leaf algorithm-identifier {
type identityref { type identityref {
base "key-algorithm"; base "key-algorithm";
} }
config false; mandatory true;
description description
"The algorithm used by the private key."; "Identifies which algorithm is to be used with the key.
This value determines how the 'private-key' and 'public-
key' fields are interpreted.";
// no params, such as in RFC 5912? (no are set for algs
// we care about, but what about the future?
} }
leaf key-length { leaf private-key {
type uint32; nacm:default-deny-all;
config false; type union {
type binary;
type enumeration {
enum "RESTRICTED" {
description
"The private key is restricted due to access-control.";
}
enum "INACCESSIBLE" {
description
"The private key is inaccessible due to being protected
by the cryptographic hardware modules (e.g., a TPM).";
}
}
}
mandatory true;
description description
"The key-length used by the private key."; "A binary string that contains the value of the private
key. The interpretation of the content is defined in the
registration of the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key
is an INTEGER, an RSA key is represented as RSAPrivateKey
as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) key is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in
[RFC5915]"; // text lifted from RFC5958
} }
// no key usage (ref: RFC 5912, pg 101 -- too X.509 specific?)
leaf public-key { leaf public-key {
type binary; type binary;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified "A binary string that contains the value of the public
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 key. The interpretation of the content is defined in the
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified registration of the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key
in ITU-T X.690."; is an INTEGER, an RSA key is represented as RSAPublicKey
reference as defined in [RFC3447], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography
"RFC 5958: (ECC) key is represented using the 'publicKey' described in
Asymmetric Key Packages [RFC5915]";
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
container certificate-chains { container certificates {
description description
"Certificate chains associated with this private key. "Certificates associated with this private key. More
More than one chain per key is enabled to support, than one certificate per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates."; both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate-chain { list certificate {
key name; key name;
description description
"A certificate chain for this public key."; "A certificate for this private key.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate chain. The "An arbitrary name for the certificate. The name
name must be a unique across all private keys, not must be a unique across all keys, not just within
just within this private key."; this key.";
} }
leaf-list certificate { leaf value {
type binary; type binary;
ordered-by user;
description description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC "An unsigned PKCS #7 SignedData structure, as specified
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished by Section 9.1 in RFC 2315, containing just certificates
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690. (no content, signatures, or CRLs), encoded using ASN.1
The list of certificates that run from the server distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
certificate towards the trust anchor. The chain MAY ITU-T X.690.
include the trust anchor certificate itself.";
This structure contains, in order, the certificate
itself and all intermediate certificates leading up
to a trust anchor certificate. The certificate MAY
optionally include the trust anchor certificate.";
reference reference
"RFC 5280: "RFC 2315:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
} }
action generate-certificate-signing-request { action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated private key using the passed subject and the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. Please review both the Security attribute values. Please review both the Security
Considerations and Design Considerations sections in Considerations and Design Considerations sections in
RFC VVVV for more information regarding this action RFC VVVV for more information regarding this action
skipping to change at page 22, line 34 skipping to change at page 17, line 34
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
} }
} }
action generate-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified algorithm and key length.";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keystore/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint32;
description
"For algorithms that need a key length specified
when generating the key.";
}
}
}
action load-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to load a private key";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keystore/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf private-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey structure as specified by RFC
5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
Note that this is the raw private with no shrouding
to protect it. The strength of this private key
MUST NOT be greater than the strength of the secure
connection over which it is communicated. Devices
SHOULD fail this request if ever that happens.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
} }
list trusted-certificates { list trusted-certificates {
key name; key name;
description description
"A list of trusted certificates. These certificates "A list of trusted certificates. These certificates
can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by
to authenticate servers. The certificates may be endpoint clients to authenticate servers. The certificates may
specific or for certificate authorities (to authenticate many be endpoint specific or for certificate authorities,
clients at once. Each list of certificates SHOULD be specific to authenticate many clients at once. Each list of
to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be referenced by other certificates SHOULD be specific to a purpose, as the
modules. For instance, a NETCONF server model might point to list as a whole may be referenced by other modules.
a list of certificates to use when authenticating client For instance, a NETCONF server model might point to
certificates."; a list of certificates to use when authenticating
client certificates.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted certificates."; "An arbitrary name for this list of trusted certificates.";
} }
leaf description { leaf description {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted "An arbitrary description for this list of trusted
certificates."; certificates.";
} }
list trusted-certificate { list trusted-certificate {
key name; key name;
description description
skipping to change at page 25, line 14 skipping to change at page 18, line 45
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
} }
} }
} }
list trusted-ssh-host-keys { list trusted-host-keys {
key name; key name;
description description
"A list of trusted host-keys. These host-keys can be used "A list of trusted host-keys. These host-keys can be used
by clients to authenticate SSH servers. The host-keys are by clients to authenticate SSH servers. The host-keys are
endpoint specific. Each list of host-keys SHOULD be endpoint specific. Each list of host-keys SHOULD be
specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be
referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF
client model might point to a list of host-keys to use client model might point to a list of host-keys to use
when authenticating servers host-keys."; when authenticating servers host-keys.";
leaf name { leaf name {
skipping to change at page 26, line 9 skipping to change at page 19, line 39
Note that, for when the SSH client is able to listen Note that, for when the SSH client is able to listen
for call-home connections as well, there is no reference for call-home connections as well, there is no reference
identifier (e.g., hostname, IP address, etc.) that it identifier (e.g., hostname, IP address, etc.) that it
can use to uniquely identify the server with. The can use to uniquely identify the server with. The
call-home draft recommends SSH servers use X.509v3 call-home draft recommends SSH servers use X.509v3
certificates (RFC6187) when calling home."; certificates (RFC6187) when calling home.";
} }
leaf host-key { // rename to 'data'? leaf host-key { // rename to 'data'?
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description // is this the correct type?
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified "An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690."; in ITU-T X.690.";
reference reference
"RFC 5958: "RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690: ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)."; Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
/*
Are the auth credentials truly limited to SSH?
Could they be used by an HTTP client to log into an HTTP server?
If truly just for SSH, maybe rename?
*/
container user-auth-credentials {
description
"A list of user authentication credentials that can be used
by an SSH client to log into an SSH server, using any of
the supported authentication methods (e.g., password,
public key, client certificate, etc.).";
list user-auth-credential {
key username;
description
"The authentication credentials for a specific user.";
leaf username {
type string;
description
"The username of this user. This will be the username
used, for instance, to log into an SSH server.";
}
list auth-method {
key priority;
description
"A method of authenticating as this user.";
leaf priority {
type uint8;
description
"When multiple authentication methods in this list are
supported by the server, the one with the lowest priority
value will be the one that is used.";
}
choice auth-type {
description
"The authentication type.";
leaf-list certificate {
type leafref {
path "/keystore/private-keys/private-key/"
+ "certificate-chains/certificate-chain/name";
}
ordered-by user;
description
"A list of references to certificates that can be used
for user authentication. When multiple certificates
in this list supported by the server, the one that
comes before the others in the leaf-list will be
used.";
}
leaf-list public-key {
type leafref {
path "/keystore/private-keys/private-key/name";
}
ordered-by user;
description
"A list of references to public keys that can be used
for user authentication. When multiple public keys
in this list supported by the server, the one that
comes before the others in the leaf-list will be
used.";
}
leaf ciphertext-password {
type string;
description
"An ciphertext password. The method of encipherment
and how that method can be determined from this
string is implementation-specific.";
}
leaf cleartext-password {
type string;
description
"An cleartext password.";
}
}
} }
} }
} }
} }
notification certificate-expiration { notification certificate-expiration {
description description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is "A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
skipping to change at page 28, line 37 skipping to change at page 20, line 38
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate."; "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
3. Design Considerations 3. Design Considerations
This document, along with four other drafts, was split out from the
original draft "draft-ietf-netconf-server-model". The split was made
so that each draft would have better focus, and also becuase there
was a desire to define client modules, in addition to server modules.
The complete list of drafts that resulted from the split includes:
- draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
- draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server
- draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server
- draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server
- draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server
This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate- This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message signing-request" action. The use of Certificate Request Message
Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was considered, but is was unclear if there
was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out was market demand for it, and so support for CRMF has been left out
of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the of this specification. If it is desired to support CRMF in the
future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output future, placing a "choice" statement in both the input and output
statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option, statements, along with an "if-feature" statement on the CRMF option,
would enable a backwards compatible solution. would enable a backwards compatible solution.
This document puts a limit of the number of elliptical curves This document puts a limit of the number of elliptical curves
supported by default. This was done to match industry trends in IETF supported by default. This was done to match industry trends in IETF
best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If best practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If
additional algorithms are needed, they MAY be augmented in by another additional algorithms are needed, they MAY be augmented in by another
module, or added directly in a future version of this document. module, or added directly in a future version of this document.
Both this document and Key Chain YANG Data Model
[draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain] regard a similar idea. The authors
looked at this and agree that they two modules server different
purposes and hence not worth merging into one document. To
underscore this further, this document renamed its module from "ietf-
keychain" to "ietf-keystore", to contrast it with the other
document's module "ietf-key-chain".
For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format [RFC5914] was
evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to
also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to also support pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to
support NETCONF over TLS client authentication. support NETCONF over TLS client authentication.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document defines a keystore mechanism that is entrusted with the The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed
safe keeping of private keys, and the safe keeping of trusted via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and
certificates. Nowhere in this API is there an ability to access RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to-
(read out) a private key once it is known to the keystore. Further, implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual
associated public keys and attributes (e.g., algorithm name, key authentication.
length, etc.) are read-only. That said, this document allows for the
deletion of private keys and their certificates, as well the deletion
of trusted certificates. Access control mechanisms (e.g., NACM
[RFC6536]) MUST be in place so as to authorize such client actions.
Further, whilst the data model allows for private keys and trusted
certificates in general to be deleted, implementations should be well
aware that some privates keys (e.g., those in a TPM) and some trusted
certificates, should never be deleted, regardless if the
authorization mechanisms would generally allow for such actions.
For the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action, it is The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC6536] provides the means
RECOMMENDED that devices implement assert channel binding [RFC5056], to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
so as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is all available protocol operations and content.
the same as the device authenticated in the secure transport layer
was established.
This document defines a data model that includes a list of private There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
keys. These private keys MAY be deleted using standard NETCONF or writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
RESTCONF operations (e.g., <edit-config>). Implementations SHOULD default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
automatically (without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
most secure manner available, so as to prevent the remnants of their to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
way. and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
The keystore module define within this document defines the "load- /: The entire data tree defined by this module is sensitive to
private-key" action enabling a device to load a client-supplied write operations. For instance, the addition or removal of
private key. This is a private key with no shrouding to protect it. keys, certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically
The strength of this private key MUST NOT be greater than the alter the implemented security policy. This being the case,
strength of the underlying secure transport connection over which it the top-level node in this module is marked with the NACM value
is communicated. Devices SHOULD fail this request if ever the 'default-deny-write'.
strength of the private key is greater then the strength of the
underlying transport. /keystore/keys/key/private-key: When writing this node,
implementations MUST ensure that the strength of the key being
configured is not greater than the strength of the underlying
secure transport connection over which it is communicated.
Implementations SHOULD fail the write-request if ever the
strength of the private key is greater then the strength of the
underlying transport, and alert the client that the strength of
the key may have been compromised. Additionally, when deleting
this node, implementations SHOULD automatically (without
explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner
available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted
storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/keystore/keys/key/private-key: This node is additionally
sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, it
should never be returned to a client. The best reason for
returning this node is to support backup/restore type
workflows. This being the case, this node is marked with the
NACM value 'default-deny-all'.
Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
generate-certificate-signing-request: For this RPC operation, it
is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding
[RFC5056], so as to ensure that the application layer that sent
the request is the same as the device authenticated in the
secure transport layer was established.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. The IETF XML Registry 5.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC2119]. This document registers one URI in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
requested: requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 5.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names This document registers one YANG module in the YANG Module Names
skipping to change at page 31, line 17 skipping to change at page 23, line 17
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk,
Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil
Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen. Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[draft-ietf-netconf-restconf]
Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", draft-ieft-netconf-restconf-04 (work in
progress), 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
skipping to change at page 31, line 47 skipping to change at page 23, line 42
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536,
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain]
Lindem, A., Qu, Y., Yeung, D., Chen, I., Zhang, J., and Y.
Yang, "Key Chain YANG Data Model", draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-
key-chain (work in progress), 2016,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-
key-chain>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6536] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[Std-802.1AR-2009] [Std-802.1AR-2009]
IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and IEEE SA-Standards Board, "IEEE Standard for Local and
metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
A.1. server-model-09 to 00 A.1. server-model-09 to 00
skipping to change at page 33, line 19 skipping to change at page 25, line 19
o This draft was split out from draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09. o This draft was split out from draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09.
o Removed key-usage parameter from generate-private-key action. o Removed key-usage parameter from generate-private-key action.
o Now /private-keys/private-key/certificates/certificate/name must o Now /private-keys/private-key/certificates/certificate/name must
be globally unique (unique across all private keys). be globally unique (unique across all private keys).
o Added top-level 'trusted-ssh-host-keys' and 'user-auth- o Added top-level 'trusted-ssh-host-keys' and 'user-auth-
credentials' to support SSH client modules. credentials' to support SSH client modules.
A.2. keychain-00 to keystore-00
o Renamed module from "keychain" to "keystore" (Issue #3)
A.3. 00 to 01
o Replaced the 'certificate-chain' structures with PKCS#7
structures. (Issue #1)
o Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the
'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions. (Issue #2)
o Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
(Issues #4 and #5)
Appendix B. Open Issues Appendix B. Open Issues
Please see: https://github.com/netconf-wg/keystore/issues. Please see: https://github.com/netconf-wg/keystore/issues.
Authors' Addresses Author's Address
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net EMail: kwatsen@juniper.net
Gary Wu
Cisco Networks
EMail: garywu@cisco.com
 End of changes. 80 change blocks. 
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