draft-ietf-masque-ip-proxy-reqs-00.txt   draft-ietf-masque-ip-proxy-reqs-01.txt 
Network Working Group A. Chernyakhovsky Network Working Group A. Chernyakhovsky
Internet-Draft D. McCall Internet-Draft D. McCall
Intended status: Informational D. Schinazi Intended status: Informational D. Schinazi
Expires: 17 April 2021 Google LLC Expires: 12 July 2021 Google LLC
14 October 2020 8 January 2021
Requirements for a MASQUE Protocol to Proxy IP Traffic Requirements for a MASQUE Protocol to Proxy IP Traffic
draft-ietf-masque-ip-proxy-reqs-00 draft-ietf-masque-ip-proxy-reqs-01
Abstract Abstract
There is interest among MASQUE working group participants in There is interest among MASQUE working group participants in
designing a protocol that can proxy IP traffic over HTTP. This designing a protocol that can proxy IP traffic over HTTP. This
document describes the set of requirements for such a protocol. document describes the set of requirements for such a protocol.
Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the MASQUE IETF Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the MASQUE IETF
mailing list masque@ietf.org or on the GitHub repository which mailing list masque@ietf.org or on the GitHub repository which
contains the draft: https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf- contains the draft: https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 April 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 July 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Consumer VPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Consumer VPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Point to Point Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Point to Point Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Point to Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Point to Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Network to Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.4. Network to Network Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. IP Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. IP Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Proxying of IP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Proxying of IP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Maximum Transmission Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Maximum Transmission Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. IP Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. IP Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Route Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.5. Route Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.6. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.6. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.7. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.8. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.8. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.9. Reliable Transmission of IP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.9. Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.10. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.10. Support HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.11. Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.11. Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.12. Support HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.13. Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Load balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.14. Load balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.15. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. Reliable Transmission of IP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Non-requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.4. Configuration of Congestion and Flow Control . . . . . . 7
4.1. Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.5. Data Transport Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Non-requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. IP Packet Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.1. Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. IP Packet Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
There exist several IETF standards for proxying IP in a way that is There exist several IETF standards for proxying IP in a way that is
authenticated and confidential, such as IKEv2/IPsec [IKEV2]. authenticated and confidential, such as IKEv2/IPsec [IKEV2].
However, those are distinguishable from common Internet traffic and However, those are distinguishable from common Internet traffic and
often blocked. Additionally, large server deployments have expressed often blocked. Additionally, large server deployments have expressed
interest in using a VPN solution that leverages existing security interest in using a VPN solution that leverages existing security
protocols such as QUIC [QUIC] or TLS [TLS] to avoid adding another protocols such as QUIC [QUIC] or TLS [TLS] to avoid adding another
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1.1. Conventions 1.1. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
* Data Transport: The method by which IP packets are transmitted. * Data Transport: The mechanism responsible for transmitting IP
This can involve streams or datagrams. packets over HTTP. This can involve streams or datagrams.
* IP Session: An association between client and server whereby both * IP Session: An association between client and server whereby both
agree to proxy IP traffic given certain configuration properties. agree to proxy IP traffic given certain configuration properties.
This is similar to a Child Security Association in IKEv2 This is similar to a Child Security Association in IKEv2
terminology. terminology. An IP Session uses Data Transports to transmit
packets.
2. Use Cases 2. Use Cases
There are multiple reasons to deploy an IP proxying protocol. This There are multiple reasons to deploy an IP proxying protocol. This
section discusses some examples of use cases that MUST be supported section discusses some examples of use cases that MUST be supported
by the protocol. by the protocol. Note that while the protocol needs to support these
use cases, the protocol elements that allow them may be optional.
2.1. Consumer VPN 2.1. Consumer VPN
Consumer VPNs refer to network applications that allow a user to hide Consumer VPNs refer to network applications that allow a user to hide
some properties of their traffic from some network observers. In some properties of their traffic from some network observers. In
particular, it can hide the identity of servers the client is particular, it can hide the identity of servers the client is
connecting to from the client's network provider, and can hide the connecting to from the client's network provider, and can hide the
client's IP address (and derived geographical information) from the client's IP address (and derived geographical information) from the
servers they are communicating with. Note that this hidden servers they are communicating with. Note that this hidden
information is now available to the VPN service provider, so is only information is now available to the VPN service provider, so is only
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2.3. Point to Network Connectivity 2.3. Point to Network Connectivity
Point-to-Network connectivity is the more traditional remote-access Point-to-Network connectivity is the more traditional remote-access
"VPN" use case, frequently used when a user needs to connect to a "VPN" use case, frequently used when a user needs to connect to a
different network (such as an enterprise network) for access to different network (such as an enterprise network) for access to
resources that are not exposed to the public Internet. resources that are not exposed to the public Internet.
2.4. Network to Network Connectivity 2.4. Network to Network Connectivity
Network-to-Network connectivity is also called a site-to-site VPN. Network-to-Network connectivity is also called a site-to-site VPN.
Like the point-to-network use case, the goal is to connect to a Similar to the point-to-network use case, the goal is to connect two
network that is not exposed publicly. The site-to-site aspects make networks that are not exposed publicly. The site-to-site aspects
this transparent to the user; the entire networks are connected to make this transparent to the user; the entire networks are connected
each other and route packets transparently without a VPN client to each other and route packets transparently without a VPN client
installed on the user's device. This style of connectivity can also installed on the user's device. This style of connectivity can also
be used to connect devices that cannot run VPN clients through to the be used to connect devices that cannot run VPN clients through to the
network. network.
3. Requirements 3. Requirements
This section lists requirements for a protocol that can proxy IP over This section lists requirements for a protocol that can proxy IP over
an HTTP connection. an HTTP connection.
3.1. IP Session Establishment 3.1. IP Session Establishment
The protocol will allow the client to request establishment of an IP The protocol will allow the client to request establishment of an IP
Session, along with configuration options and one or more associated Session, along with configuration options and one or more associated
Data Transports. The server will have the ability to accept or deny Data Transports. The server will have the ability to accept or deny
the client's request. the client's request.
3.2. Proxying of IP packets 3.2. Proxying of IP packets
The protocol will establish Data Transports, which will be able to The protocol will establish Data Transports, which will be able to
forward IP packets, in their unmodified entirety. The protocol will forward IP packets. The Data Transports MUST be able to forward
support both IPv6 [IPV6] and IPv4 [IPV4]. packets in their unmodified entirety, although extensions may enable
the use of modified packet formats (e.g., compression). The protocol
will support both IPv6 [IPV6] and IPv4 [IPV4].
3.3. Maximum Transmission Unit 3.3. Maximum Transmission Unit
The protocol will allow endpoints to inform each other of the Maximum The protocol will allow endpoints to inform each other of the Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) they are willing to forward. This will allow Transmission Unit (MTU) they are willing to forward. This will allow
avoiding IP fragmentation, especially as IPv6 does not allow IP avoiding IP fragmentation, especially as IPv6 does not allow IP
fragmentation by nodes along the path. fragmentation by nodes along the path.
3.4. IP Assignment 3.4. IP Assignment
The client will be able to request to be assigned an IP address The client will be able to request to be assigned an IP address
range, optionally specifying a preferred range. In response to that range, optionally specifying a preferred range. In response to that
request, the server will either assign a range of its choosing to the request, the server will either assign a range of its choosing to the
client, or decline the request. Similarly, to support the network- client, or decline the request. For symmetry, the server may request
to-network use case, the server will be able to request assignment of assignment of an IP address range from the client, and the client
an IP address range from the client, and the client will either will either assign a range or decline the request.
assign a range or decline the request.
3.5. Route Negotiation 3.5. Route Negotiation
At any point in an IP Session (not limited to its initial At any point in an IP Session (not limited to its initial
negotiation), the protocol will allow both client and server to negotiation), the protocol will allow both client and server to
inform its peer that it can route a set of IP prefixes. Both inform its peer that it can route a set of IP prefixes. Both
endpoints can also request a route to a given prefix, and the peer endpoints can also request a route to a given prefix, and the peer
can choose to provide that route or not. can choose to provide that route or not.
Note that if an endpoint provides its peer with a route, the peer is
in no way obligated to route its traffic through the endpoint.
3.6. Identity 3.6. Identity
When negotiating the creation of an IP Session, the protocol will When negotiating the creation of an IP Session, the protocol will
allow both endpoints to exchange an identifier. For example, both allow both endpoints to exchange an identifier. As examples, the
endpoints will be able to identify themselves by sending a fully- identity could be a user name, an email address, a token, or a fully-
qualified domain name. Note that the Identity requirement does not qualified domain name. Note that this requirement does not cover
cover authenticating the identifier; that requirement is covered by authenticating the identifier.
Section 3.8.
3.7. Transport Security 3.7. Transport Security
The protocol MUST be run over a protocol that provides mutual The protocol MUST be run over a protocol that provides mutual
authentication, confidentiality and integrity. Using QUIC or TLS authentication, confidentiality and integrity. Using QUIC or TLS
would meet this requirement. would meet this requirement.
3.8. Authentication 3.8. Flow Control
Additionally to the authentication provided by the transport, the
protocol will have the ability to authenticate both client and server
during the establishment of the IP Session. In particular, it will
be possible for the client to offer an OAuth Access Token [OAUTH] to
the server when requesting IP proxying, potentially through an
extension of the protocol. The protocol will also have the ability
to support vendor-specific authentication mechanisms as extensions.
3.9. Reliable Transmission of IP Packets
While it is desirable to transmit IP packets unreliably in most
cases, the protocol will provide a mechanism to allow forwarding some
packets reliably. For example, when using HTTP/3, this can be
accomplished by allowing Data Transports to run over both DATAGRAM
and STREAM frames.
3.10. Flow Control
The protocol will allow the ability to proxy IP packets without flow The protocol will allow the ability to proxy IP packets without flow
control, at least when HTTP/3 is in use. QUIC DATAGRAM frames are control, at least when HTTP/3 is in use. QUIC DATAGRAM frames are
not flow controlled and would meet this requirement. The document not flow controlled and would meet this requirement. The document
defining the protocol will provide guidance on how best to use flow defining the protocol will provide guidance on how best to use flow
control to improve IP Session performance. control to improve IP Session performance.
3.11. Indistinguishability 3.9. Indistinguishability
A passive network observer not participating in the encrypted A passive network observer not participating in the encrypted
connection should not be able to distinguish an IP proxying session connection should not be able to distinguish IP proxying from regular
from regular encrypted HTTP Web traffic. Specifically, any data sent encrypted HTTP Web traffic by only observing non-encrypted parts of
unencrypted (such as headers, or parts of the handshake) should look the traffic. Specifically, any data sent unencrypted (such as
like the same unencrypted data that would be present for Web traffic. headers, or parts of the handshake) should look like the same
Traffic analysis is out of scope for this requirement. unencrypted data that would be present for Web traffic. Traffic
analysis is out of scope for this requirement.
3.12. Support HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 3.10. Support HTTP/2 and HTTP/3
The IP proxying protocol discussed in this document will run over The IP proxying protocol discussed in this document will run over
HTTP. The protocol SHOULD strongly prefer to use HTTP/3 [H3] and HTTP. The protocol SHOULD strongly prefer to use HTTP/3 [H3] and
SHOULD use the QUIC DATAGRAM frames [DGRAM] when available to improve SHOULD use the QUIC DATAGRAM frames [DGRAM] when available to improve
performance. The protocol SHOULD also support HTTP/2 [H2] as a performance. The protocol SHOULD also support HTTP/2 [H2] as a
fallback when UDP is blocked on the network path. Proxying IP over fallback when UDP is blocked on the network path. Proxying IP over
HTTP/2 MAY result in lower performance than over HTTP/3. HTTP/2 MAY result in lower performance than over HTTP/3.
3.13. Multiplexing 3.11. Multiplexing
Since recent HTTP versions support concurrently running multiple Since recent HTTP versions support concurrently running multiple
requests over the same connection, the protocol SHOULD support requests over the same connection, the protocol SHOULD support
multiple independent instances of IP proxying over a given HTTP multiple independent instances of IP proxying over a given HTTP
connection. connection.
3.14. Load balancing 4. Extensibility
Clients and servers should each be able to instantiate new Data
Transports. This facilitates multi-threaded servers being able to
handle a higher bandwidth of IP proxied packets.
The IP proxying mechanisms need to support load balancing of the
traffic sent across the session, such as to another server. The
document defining the new protocol should provide guidance for when
additional connections and/or sessions should be opened, as opposed
to reusing existing ones.
3.15. Extensibility
The protocol will provide a mechanism by which clients and servers The protocol will provide a mechanism by which clients and servers
can add extension information to the exchange that establishes the IP can add extension information to the exchange that establishes the IP
session. If the solution uses an HTTP request and response, this Session. If the solution uses an HTTP request and response, this
could be accomplished using HTTP headers. could be accomplished using HTTP headers.
Once the session is established, the protocol will provide a Once the IP Session is established, the protocol will provide a
mechanism that allows reliably exchanging vendor-specific messages in mechanism that allows reliably exchanging extension messages in both
both directions at any point in the lifetime of the IP Session. directions at any point in the lifetime of the IP Session.
4. Non-requirements The subsections below list possible extensions that designers of the
protocol will keep in mind to ensure it will be possible to design
such extensions.
4.1. Load balancing
This extension would allow for load balancing of the traffic sent
across the IP Session, such as to another server. This allows the IP
proxying mechanisms to scale-out to multiple servers.
4.2. Authentication
Since the protocol will offer a way to convey identity, extensions
will allow authenticating that identity, from both the client and
server, during the establishment of the IP Session. For example, an
extension could allow a client to offer an OAuth Access Token [OAUTH]
when requesting an IP Session. As another example, another extension
could allow an endpoint to demonstrate knowledge of a cryptographic
secret.
4.3. Reliable Transmission of IP Packets
While it is desirable to transmit IP packets unreliably in most
cases, an extension could provide a mechanism to allow forwarding
some packets reliably. For example, when using HTTP/3, this can be
accomplished by allowing Data Transports to run over both DATAGRAM
and STREAM frames.
4.4. Configuration of Congestion and Flow Control
An extension will allow exchanging congestion and flow control
parameters to improve performance. For example, an extension could
disable congestion control for non-retransmitted Data Transports if
it knows that the proxied traffic is itself congestion-controlled.
4.5. Data Transport Compression
While the core protocol Data Transports will transmit IP packets in
their unmodified entirety, an extension can allow compressing these
packets.
5. Non-requirements
This section discusses topics that are explicitly out of scope for This section discusses topics that are explicitly out of scope for
the IP Proxying protocol. These topics MAY be handled by the IP Proxying protocol. These topics MAY be handled by
implementers or future extensions. implementers or future extensions.
4.1. Addressing Architecture 5.1. Addressing Architecture
This document only describes the requirements for a protocol that This document only describes the requirements for a protocol that
allows IP proxying. It does not discuss how the IPs assigned are allows IP proxying. It does not discuss how the IPs assigned are
determined, managed, or translated. While these details are determined, managed, or translated. While these details are
important for producing a functional system, they do not need to be important for producing a functional system, they do not need to be
handled by the protocol beyond the ability to convey those handled by the protocol beyond the ability to convey those
assignments. assignments.
4.2. Translation Similarly, "ownership" of an IP range is out of scope. If an
endpoint communicates to its peer that it can allocate addresses from
a range, or route traffic to a range, the peer has no obligation to
trust that information. Whether or not to trust this information is
left to individual implementations and deployments.
5.2. Translation
Some servers may wish to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) or Some servers may wish to perform Network Address Translation (NAT) or
any other modification to packets they forward. Doing so is out of any other modification to packets they forward. Doing so is out of
scope for the proxying protocol. In particular, the ability to scope for the proxying protocol. In particular, the ability to
discover the presence of a NAT, negotiate NAT bindings, or check discover the presence of a NAT, negotiate NAT bindings, or check
connectivity through a NAT is explicitly out of scope and left to connectivity through a NAT is explicitly out of scope and left to
future extensions. future extensions.
Servers that do not perform NAT will commonly forward packets Servers that do not perform NAT will commonly forward packets
similarly to how a traditional IP router would, but the specific of similarly to how a traditional IP router would, but the specific of
that are considered out of scope. In particular, decrementing the that are considered out of scope. In particular, decrementing the
Hop Limit (or TTL) field of the IP header is out of scope for MASQUE Hop Limit (or TTL) field of the IP header is out of scope for MASQUE
and expected to be performed by a router behind the MASQUE server, or and expected to be performed by a router behind the MASQUE server, or
collocated with it. collocated with it.
4.3. IP Packet Extraction 5.3. IP Packet Extraction
How packets are forwarded between the IP proxying connection and the How packets are forwarded between the IP proxying connection and the
physical network is out of scope. This is deliberately not specified physical network is out of scope. For example, this can be
and will be left to individual implementations. accomplished on some operating systems using a TUN interface. How
this is done is deliberately not specified and will be left to
individual implementations.
5. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document only discusses requirements on a protocol that allows This document only discusses requirements on a protocol that allows
IP proxying. That protocol will need to document its security IP proxying. That protocol will need to document its security
considerations. considerations.
6. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document requests no actions from IANA. This document requests no actions from IANA.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank participants of the MASQUE working The authors would like to thank participants of the MASQUE working
group for their feedback. group for their feedback.
References References
Normative References Normative References
[DGRAM] Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., and D. Schinazi, "An Unreliable [DGRAM] Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., and D. Schinazi, "An Unreliable
Datagram Extension to QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet- Datagram Extension to QUIC", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-quic-datagram-01, 24 August 2020, Draft, draft-ietf-quic-datagram-01, 24 August 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-
datagram-01.txt>. datagram-01.txt>.
[H2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [H2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
skipping to change at page 9, line 19 skipping to change at page 9, line 45
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-
datagram-01.txt>. datagram-01.txt>.
[H2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [H2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[H3] Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3 [H3] Bishop, M., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
(HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- (HTTP/3)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
quic-http-31, 24 September 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/ quic-http-33, 15 December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-http-31.txt>. internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-http-33.txt>.
[IPV4] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, [IPV4] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[IPV6] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [IPV6] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[QUIC] Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed [QUIC] Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-quic-transport-31, 24 September 2020, draft-ietf-quic-transport-33, 13 December 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-
transport-31.txt>. transport-33.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[TLS] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [TLS] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
Informative References Informative References
[CONNECT-UDP] [CONNECT-UDP]
Schinazi, D., "The CONNECT-UDP HTTP Method", Work in Schinazi, D., "The CONNECT-UDP HTTP Method", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-
00, 28 August 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ 03, 5 January 2021, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-00.txt>. draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-03.txt>.
[IKEV2] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. [IKEV2] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[OAUTH] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [OAUTH] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
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