draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-09.txt   rfc6622.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America Request for Comments: 6622 Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Intended status: Standards Track T. Clausen Category: Standards Track T. Clausen
Expires: September 7, 2012 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique ISSN: 2070-1721 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
March 6, 2012 May 2012
Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for MANETs Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions
draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-09 for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
Abstract Abstract
This document describes general and flexible TLVs for representing This document describes general and flexible TLVs for representing
cryptographic integrity check values (ICV) (i.e. digital signatures cryptographic Integrity Check Values (ICVs) (i.e., digital signatures
or MACs) as well as timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/ or Message Authentication Codes (MACs)) as well as timestamps, using
message format defined in RFC 5444. It defines two Packet TLVs, two the generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) packet/message format
Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs, for affixing ICVs and defined in RFC 5444. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs,
timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively. and two Address Block TLVs for affixing ICVs and timestamps to a
packet, a message, and an address, respectively.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the Status of This Memo
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2012. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6622.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology .....................................................3
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Applicability Statement .........................................3
4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Architecture ...........................................4
5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Overview and Functioning ........................................5
6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. General ICV TLV Structure .......................................6
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure .................................6
8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Packet TLVs .....................................................7
8.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Packet ICV TLV .............................................7
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV .......................................7
9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Message TLVs ....................................................8
9.1. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Message ICV TLV ............................................8
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV ......................................8
10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Address Block TLVs .............................................8
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV .....................................8
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV ...............................9
11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. ICV: Basic .....................................................9
12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value . . . . . . . . 9 12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value ..................9
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure ................................10
12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.1. Rationale .........................................11
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV ...................11
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV ....................................11
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV ...................................11
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV .............................11
12.3. Example of a Message including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV ....................12
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13. IANA Considerations ...........................................13
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines .....................13
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations ............................14
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations ...........................15
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations .....................16
13.5. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 13.5. Hash Functions ...........................................17
13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 13.6. Cryptographic Functions ..................................18
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 14. Security Considerations .......................................18
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 15. Acknowledgements ..............................................19
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 16. References ....................................................19
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 16.1. Normative References .....................................19
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 16.2. Informative References ...................................21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies: This document specifies
o Two TLVs for carrying integrity check values (ICV) and timestamps o Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps
in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444], in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444].
o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for
mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop- mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and
count>), where these fields are present in messages. <msg-hop-count>), where these fields are present in messages.
This document sets up IANA registries for recording code points for This document sets up IANA registries for recording code points for
hash function and ICV calculation, respectively. hash-function and ICV calculation, respectively.
Moreover, this document defines, in Section 12: Moreover, in Section 12, this document defines the following:
o One common method for generating ICVs as a cryptographic function, o One common method for generating ICVs as a cryptographic function,
calculated over the hash value of the content to be signed. calculated over the hash value of the content.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
In particular, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are used in In particular, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are used in
this specification: this specification:
<msg-hop-limit> - hop limit of a message, as specified in Section <msg-hop-limit> is the hop limit of a message, as specified in
5.2 of [RFC5444]. Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<msg-hop-count> - hop count of a message, as specified in Section <msg-hop-count> is the hop count of a message, as specified in
5.2 of [RFC5444]. Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<length> - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 <length> is the length of a TLV in octets, as specified in
of [RFC5444]. Section 5.4.1 of [RFC5444].
3. Applicability Statement 3. Applicability Statement
MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
accorded the ability to carry additional information in control accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so messages and packets, through the inclusion of TLVs. Information so
included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension
of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification. of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a
message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, by way of message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, by way of
such TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat "mutable" such TLVs. This document also specifies a) how to treat "mutable"
fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields, fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields,
if present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the if present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the
resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient, and how to resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient, and b) how
include this ICV. to include this ICV.
This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and
how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method
for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function
over the hash value of the content to be signed. over the hash value of the content.
4. Security Architecture 4. Security Architecture
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be security"; however, they have a clause allowing a control message to
rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to it being processed be rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to the message
or forwarded. MANET routing protocols such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] being processed or forwarded. MANET routing protocols such as the
recognize external reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the Optimized
rejecting a message, and therefore "invalid for processing". This Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [OLSRv2] recognize external
architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for rejecting a message
security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing that would be considered "invalid for processing". This architecture
protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements is a result of the observation that with respect to security in
ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing protocol
approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and deployment domains have varying security requirements ranging from
implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this approach is
proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms. that MANET routing protocol specifications (and implementations) can
remain "generic", with extensions providing proper security
mechanisms specific to a deployment domain.
The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
follows: follows:
o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a
clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to
processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure". processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure".
o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as
"badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given "badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given security
deployment-domain specific security requirement. requirement specific to a deployment domain.
o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for o Code points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a This document addresses the last of the issues listed above by
common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making reservations specifying a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making
from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address Block TLV reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address
registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among MANET routing Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among
protocol security extensions. MANET routing protocol security extensions.
For the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic For the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic
function over a hash value, specified in Section 12, this document function over a hash value (specified in Section 12), this document
establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash functions establishes two IANA registries for code points for hash functions
and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444]. and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444].
With respect to [RFC5444], this document: With respect to [RFC5444], this document is
o Is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o Intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444]. use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444].
o Is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of o A specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
5. Overview and Functioning 5. Overview and Functioning
This document specifies a syntactical representation of security This document specifies a syntactical representation of security-
related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and
packets, as well as establishes IANA registrations and registries. packets, and also establishes IANA registrations of TLV types and
type extension registries for these TLV types.
Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing
protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions, using this protocols and MANET routing protocol extensions using this
specification, should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable specification should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable fields
fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand- in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-alone
alone protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol
extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to
how to handle packets, messages and addresses with security how to handle packets, messages, and addresses with security
information, associated as specified in this document. information, associated as specified in this document.
This document requests assignment of TLV types from the registries This document assigns TLV types from the registries defined for
defined for Packet, Message and Address Block TLVs in [RFC5444]. Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs in [RFC5444]. When a TLV
When a TLV type is assigned from one of these registries, a registry type is assigned from one of these registries, a registry for type
for "Type Extensions" for that TLV type is created by IANA. This extensions for that TLV type is created by IANA. This document
document utilizes these "Type Extension" registries so created, in utilizes these type extension registries so created, in order to
order to specify internal structure (and accompanying processing) of specify internal structure (and accompanying processing) of the
the <value> field of a TLV. <value> field of a TLV.
For example, and as defined in this document, an ICV TLV with Type For example, and as defined in this document, an ICV TLV with type
Extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined
internal structure, but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV internal structure but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV
with Type Extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a pre- with type extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a
defined internal structure, and defines its interpretation pre-defined internal structure and defines its interpretation.
(specifically, the <value> field consists of a cryptographic
(Specifically, the <value> field consists of a cryptographic
operation over a hash value, with fields indicating which hash operation over a hash value, with fields indicating which hash
function and cryptographic operation has been used, specified in function and cryptographic operation have been used; this is
Section 12). specified in Section 12.)
Other documents can request assignments for other Type Extensions, Other documents can request assignments for other type extensions; if
and MUST, if so, specify their internal structure (if any) and they do so, they MUST specify their internal structure (if any) and
interpretation. interpretation.
6. General ICV TLV Structure 6. General ICV TLV Structure
The value of the ICV TLV is: The value of the ICV TLV is
<value> := <ICV-value> <value> := <ICV-value>
where: where
<ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the <ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the
information, to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as information to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as
specified by the Type Extension. specified by the type extension.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value>, Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value>
nor the internal structure hereof, if any; such MUST be specified by nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such information MUST be
way of the Type Extension for the ICV TLV type, see Section 13. This specified by way of the type extension for the ICV TLV type. See
document specifies two such type-extensions, for ICVs without pre- Section 13. This document specifies two such type extensions -- one
defined structures, and for ICVs constructed by way of a for ICVs without pre-defined structures, and one for ICVs constructed
cryptographic operation over a hash-value. by way of a cryptographic operation over a hash value.
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The value of the Timestamp TLV is: The value of the Timestamp TLV is
<value> := <time-value> <value> := <time-value>
where: where
<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which
contains the timestamp. contains the timestamp.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <time- Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the
value>, nor the internal structure hereof, if any; such MUST be <time-value> nor the internal structure thereof, if any; such
specified by way of the Type Extension for the TIMESTAMP TLV type, information MUST be specified by way of the type extension for the
see Section 13. TIMESTAMP TLV type. See Section 13.
A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
setting and interpretation is to be determined by the MANET routing setting and interpretation are to be determined by the MANET routing
protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the
timestamp, and can, e.g., correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp and can, for example, correspond to a UNIX timestamp, GPS
timestamp or a simple sequence number. timestamp, or a simple sequence number.
8. Packet TLVs 8. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic ICV of a Two Packet TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the time at which of a packet and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
8.1. Packet ICV TLV 8.1. Packet ICV TLV
A Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in A Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. Section 6.
The following considerations apply: The following considerations apply:
o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, no o Because packets as defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by
special considerations are required regarding mutable fields (e.g. routers, no special considerations are required regarding mutable
<msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating fields (e.g., <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present,
the ICV. when calculating the ICV.
o Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block MUST o Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block MUST
be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block
size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be
restored after having calculated the ICV value. restored after having calculated the ICV value.
The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
packet, e.g., using different ICV functions. packet, e.g., using different ICV functions.
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV
A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV,
in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV. in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.
9. Message TLVs 9. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic ICV of Two Message TLVs are defined: one for including the cryptographic ICV
a message, and for including the timestamp indicating the time at of a message and one for including the timestamp indicating the time
which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
9.1. Message ICV TLV 9.1. Message ICV TLV
A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the
following considerations MUST be applied: following considerations MUST be applied:
o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST
both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating
ICV. the ICV.
o Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV block MUST o Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV block MUST
be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as
well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated
accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having
calculated the ICV value. calculated the ICV value.
The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior
to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
message, e.g., using different ICV functions. message, e.g., using different ICV functions.
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV
A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV,
in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV. in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.
10. Address Block TLVs 10. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic Two Address Block TLVs are defined: one for associating a
ICV to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating the cryptographic ICV to an address and one for including the timestamp
time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated. indicating the time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV
An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with
any other values, for example, any other Address Block TLV <value> any other values -- for example, any other Address Block TLV <value>
fields, that is associated with that address. A MANET routing fields -- associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or
protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST
TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address
the address in the verification process of the ICV. When determining in the verification process of the ICV. When determining the
the <ICV-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be <ICV-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be
applied: applied:
o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for
calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs
already associated with the address. already associated with the address.
The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV
values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV
is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using
different ICV functions. different ICV functions.
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV
An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
described in Section 7. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are described in Section 7. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are
associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered
when calculating the value of the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV when calculating the value of the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV
value (i.e. concatenated with the associated address and any other value (i.e., concatenated with the associated address and any other
values as described in Section 10.1). values as described in Section 10.1).
11. ICV: Basic 11. ICV: Basic
The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with Type Extension = The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with type
0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic ICV. This extension = 0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic
assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are calculated and ICV. This assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are
verified is established outside of this specification, e.g., by way calculated and verified is established outside of this specification,
of administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling. e.g., by way of administrative configuration or external out-of-band
Thus, the <ICV-value> for when using Type Extension = 0 is: signaling. Thus, the <ICV-value>, when using type extension = 0, is
<ICV-value> := <ICV-data> <ICV-value> := <ICV-data>
where: where
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which
contains the cryptographic ICV. contains the cryptographic ICV.
12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value 12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value
One common way of calculating an ICV is applying a cryptographic One common way of calculating an ICV is applying a cryptographic
function on a hash value of the content. This decomposition is function over a hash value of the content. This decomposition is
specified in the following, using a Type Extension = 1 in the ICV specified in this section, using a type extension = 1 in the
TLVs. ICV TLVs.
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and
cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV: cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV:
<ICV-value> := <hash-function> <ICV-value> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function> <cryptographic-function>
<key-index> <key-id-length>
<key-id>
<ICV-data> <ICV-data>
where: where
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function. hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field <cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function. specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00 length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00
is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key. is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key.
<key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that <key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that
was used to sign the message, which allows unique identification was used to calculate the ICV of the message, which allows unique
of different keys with the same originator. It is the identification of different keys with the same originator. It is
responsibility of each key originator to make sure that actively the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers. If <key- actively used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers.
id-length> equals to 0x00, the <key-id> field is not contained in If <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field is not
the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used. contained in the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used.
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length> - <ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is
3 - <key-id-length>, and which contains the cryptographic ICV. <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which contains the
cryptographic ICV.
The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that
calculating the ICV can be decomposed into: calculating the ICV can be decomposed into
ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in entries in two IANA registries, which are set up by this
Section 13. specification and are described in Section 13.
12.1.1. Rationale 12.1.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is that adding single octet -- possibly as a TLV type extension -- is that adding
further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may
lead to a non-contiguous number space. lead to a non-contiguous number space.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a
cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g. cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g.,
public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together
with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not
necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the
parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter
is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>,
and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function. and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV
In the following, considerations are listed, which MUST be applied The considerations listed in the following subsections MUST be
when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message and Address ICV TLVs, applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address ICV
respectively. TLVs, respectively.
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for a Packet, the ICV is calculated When determining the <ICV-value> for a packet, the ICV is calculated
over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function> <key-id- over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>,
length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order), concatenated <key-id-length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order),
with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all Packet TLVs concatenated with the entire packet, including the packet header, all
(other than Packet ICV TLVs) and all included Messages and their Packet TLVs (other than Packet ICV TLVs), and all included Messages
message headers, in accordance with Section 8.1. and their message headers, in accordance with Section 8.1.
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the ICV is calculated When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the ICV is calculated
over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function> <key-id- over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>,
length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order), concatenated <key-id-length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order),
with the entire message. The considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be concatenated with the entire message. The considerations in
applied. Section 9.1 MUST be applied.
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV
When determining the <ICV-value> for an address, the ICV is When determining the <ICV-value> for an address, the ICV is
calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function> calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>,
<key-id-length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order), <key-id-length>, and -- if present -- <key-id> (in that order),
concatenated with the address, concatenated with any other values, concatenated with the address, and concatenated with any other values
for example, any other address block TLV <value> that is associated -- for example, any other address block TLV <value> that is
with that address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing associated with that address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET
protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify
include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the
verification process of the ICV. The considerations in Section 10.2 verification process of the ICV. The considerations in Section 10.1
MUST be applied. MUST be applied.
12.3. Example of a Message including an ICV 12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV
The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from appendix D of The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from Appendix D of
[RFC5444]. The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value [RFC5444]. The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value
representing a 16 octet long ICV of the whole message, and a 4 octet representing an ICV that is 16 octets long of the whole message, and
long key identifier. The type extension of the Message TLV is 1, for a key identifier that is 4 octets long. The type extension of the
the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic function Message TLV is 1, for the specific decomposition of an ICV into a
over a hash value, as specified in Section 12. cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in Section 12.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | | PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 44 | Msg. Orig Addr| | MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 44 | Msg. Orig Addr|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | | Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 12, line 31 skipping to change at page 12, line 45
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value | | ICV Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Example message with ICV Figure 1: Example Message with ICV
13. IANA Considerations 13. IANA Considerations
This specification defines: This specification defines the following:
o Two Packet TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-223 range o Two Packet TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-223
of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as range of the "Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as
specified in Table 1, specified in Table 1.
o Two Message TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-127 o Two Message TLV types, which have been allocated from the 0-127
range of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] range of the "Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as
as specified in Table 2, specified in Table 2.
o Two Address Block TLV types, which must be allocated from the o Two Address Block TLV types, which have been allocated from the
0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository 0-127 range of the "Address Block TLV Types" repository of
of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3. [RFC5444], as specified in Table 3.
This specification requests: This specification created the following:
o Creation of type extension registries for these TLV types with o A type extension registry for each of these TLV types with initial
initial values as in Table 1 to Table 3. values as listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet IANA has assigned the same numerical value to the Packet TLV, Message
TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name. TLV, and Address Block TLV types with the same name.
The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following terms are used as defined in [BCP26]: "Namespace",
"Namespace", "Registration", and "Designated Expert". "Registration", and "Designated Expert".
The following policy is used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following policy is used as defined in [BCP26]: "Expert Review".
"Expert Review".
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is For TLV type extensions registries where an Expert Review is
required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general required, the Designated Expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as those specified by [RFC5444].
For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet,
Message and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically. Message, and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically.
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Packet TLV Types" IANA has made allocations from the "Packet TLV Types" namespace of
namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 1. [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 1.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | TBD1 | 0 | ICV of a packet | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a packet |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 in this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document. | | | | | document |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | | | | |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | has to define how to interpret | | | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | this timestamp | | | | | this timestamp |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as | | | | | |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | [RFC4330] | | | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV types Table 1: Packet TLV Types
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Message TLV Types" IANA has made allocations from the "Message TLV Types" namespace of
namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs specified in Table 2. [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs specified in Table 2.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | TBD3 | 0 | ICV of a message | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a message |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 in this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document. | | | | | document |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | | | | |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | field. | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as | | | | | field |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] | | | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | [RFC4330] | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV types Table 2: Message TLV Types
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Address Block TLV IANA has made allocations from the "Address Block TLV Types"
Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 3.
Table 3.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | TBD5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g. an address) | | ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g., an |
| | | | address) |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 in this | | | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document. | | | | | document |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | | | | |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | field. | | | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as | | | | | field |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] | | | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | [RFC4330] | | | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary | | | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as | | | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it | | | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value | | | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review | | | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV types Table 3: Address Block TLV Types
13.5. Hash Function 13.5. Hash Functions
IANA is requested to create a new registry for hash functions that IANA has created a new registry for hash functions that can be used
can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in Section 12 of this when creating an ICV, as specified in Section 12 of this document.
document. The initial assignments and allocation policies are The initial assignments and allocation policies are specified in
specified in Table 4. Table 4.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description | | Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| function | | | | Function | | |
| value | | | | Value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": The hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself | | | | of an object is the object itself |
| 1 | SHA1 | [SHS] | | | | |
| 2 | SHA224 | [SHS] | | 1 | SHA1 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| 3 | SHA256 | [SHS] | | | | |
| 4 | SHA384 | [SHS] | | 2 | SHA224 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2-change] |
| 5 | SHA512 | [SHS] | | | | |
| 6-251 | | Expert Review | | 3 | SHA256 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 4 | SHA384 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 5 | SHA512 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 6-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use | | 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 4: Hash-Function registry Table 4: Hash-Function Registry
13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm 13.6. Cryptographic Functions
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic IANA has created a new registry for the cryptographic functions, as
function, as specified in Section 12 of this document. Initial specified in Section 12 of this document. Initial assignments and
assignments and allocation policies are specified in Table 5. allocation policies are specified in Table 5.
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| function value | | | | Function Value | | |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": The value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself | | | | itself |
| | | |
| 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] | | 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] |
| 2 | DSA | [DSA] | | | | |
| 2 | DSA | [NIST-FIPS-186-3] |
| | | |
| 3 | HMAC | [RFC2104] | | 3 | HMAC | [RFC2104] |
| 4 | 3DES | [3DES] | | | | |
| 5 | AES | [AES] | | 4 | 3DES | [NIST-SP-800-67] |
| 6 | ECDSA | [ECDSA] | | | | |
| 7-251 | | Expert Review | | 5 | AES | [NIST-FIPS-197] |
| | | |
| 6 | ECDSA | [ANSI-X9-62-2005] |
| | | |
| 7-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use | | 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
Table 5: Cryptographic function registry
Table 5: Cryptographic Function Registry
14. Security Considerations 14. Security Considerations
This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical
component for cryptographic ICVs of messages and packets as defined component for cryptographic ICVs of messages and packets, as defined
in [RFC5444]. It can be used to address security issues of a MANET in [RFC5444]. It can be used to address security issues of a MANET
routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, it routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, it
has the same security considerations as [RFC5444]. has the same security considerations as [RFC5444].
In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol
extension that uses this specification MUST specify the usage as well extension that uses this specification MUST specify how to use the
as the security that is attained by the cryptographic ICVs of a framework, and the TLVs presented in this document. In addition, the
message or a packet. protection that the MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol
extensions attain by using this framework MUST be described.
As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to
reject "badly formed" or "insecure" messages if a control message reject "badly formed" or "insecure" messages if a control message
does not contain a valid ICV, SHOULD indicate the security assumption does not contain a valid ICV SHOULD indicate the security assumption
that if the ICV is valid, the message is considered valid. It also that if the ICV is valid, the message is considered valid. It also
SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this
measure (e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that measure (e.g., link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that
are not counteracted (e.g. compromised keys). are not counteracted (e.g., compromised keys).
15. Acknowledgements 15. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE),
Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert
(Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique) and Henning Rogge (Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique), and Henning Rogge
(FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document. (FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document.
The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews from the Area The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews from the Area
Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen Farrel Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen Farrell
(Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as well as (Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as well as
Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate. Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate.
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[3DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [ANSI-X9-62-2005]
"Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
(TDEA) Block Cipher", NIST Special Publication 800-67, Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
May 2004. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.
[AES] National Institute of Standards & Technology, [BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001. May 2008.
[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IEEE 1003.1-2008 (POSIX)]
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for
May 2008. Information Technology-Portable Operating System
Interface (POSIX) Base Specifications, Issue 7",
December 2008.
[DSA] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Digital ICV [NIST-FIPS-180-2]
Standard", NIST, FIPS PUB 186, May 1994. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard",
FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
[ECDSA] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key [NIST-FIPS-180-2-change]
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal
Elliptic Curve Digital ICV Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANS X9.62- Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2
2005, November 2005. (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224)", FIPS 180-2,
August 2002, <http:// csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>.
[POSIX] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for [NIST-FIPS-186-3]
Information Technology - Portable Operating System National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Interface (POSIX)", Base Specifications Issue 7, Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-3, June 2009.
December 2008.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [NIST-FIPS-197]
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
February 1997. "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [NIST-SP-800-67]
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA) Block Cipher", Special Publication 800-67,
May 2004.
[RFC3447] Staddon, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. February 1997.
[RFC4330] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 4330, January 2006. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
February 2009. Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
Hash Standard", NIST FIPS 180-2, August 2002. "Generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Packet/Message
Format", RFC 5444, February 2009.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
16.2. Informative References 16.2. Informative References
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg,
Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in "The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2",
progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-13.txt, October 2011. Work in Progress, March 2012.
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, "Mobile Ad Hoc
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130, Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
March 2011. RFC 6130, April 2011.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Ulrich Herberg Ulrich Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America Fujitsu Laboratories of America
1240 E. Arques Ave. 1240 E. Arques Ave.
Sunnyvale, CA, 94085 Sunnyvale, CA 94085
USA USA
Email: ulrich@herberg.name EMail: ulrich@herberg.name
URI: http://www.herberg.name/ URI: http://www.herberg.name/
Thomas Heide Clausen Thomas Heide Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
France France
Phone: +33 6 6058 9349 Phone: +33 6 6058 9349
Email: T.Clausen@computer.org EMail: T.Clausen@computer.org
URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/ URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/
 End of changes. 146 change blocks. 
381 lines changed or deleted 445 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/