draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-08.txt   draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-09.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Intended status: Standards Track T. Clausen Intended status: Standards Track T. Clausen
Expires: August 3, 2012 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique Expires: September 7, 2012 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
January 31, 2012 March 6, 2012
MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for MANETs
draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-08 draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-09
Abstract Abstract
This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value This document describes general and flexible TLVs for representing
structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as cryptographic integrity check values (ICV) (i.e. digital signatures
timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format defined or MACs) as well as timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/
in RFC 5444. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two message format defined in RFC 5444. It defines two Packet TLVs, two
Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs, for affixing ICVs and
timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively. timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 3, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Signature: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. ICV: Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. Signature: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value . . . . . 10 12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value . . . . . . . . 9
12.1. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the Signature . . . . . . . 11 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.2. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.3. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.3. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.3. Example of a Message including an ICV . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.5. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13.5. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies: This document specifies:
o Two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in o Two TLVs for carrying integrity check values (ICV) and timestamps
packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444], in packets, messages, and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444],
o A generic framework for calculating cryptographic signatures,
accounting (for Message TLVs) for mutable message header fields
(<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>), where these fields are
present in messages.
This document requests from IANA:
o Allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from o A generic framework for ICVs, accounting (for Message TLVs) for
the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-
0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444], count>), where these fields are present in messages.
o Creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash This document sets up IANA registries for recording code points for
function and signature calculation, respectively. hash function and ICV calculation, respectively.
Finally, this document defines, in Section 12: Moreover, this document defines, in Section 12:
o One common method for generating signatures as a cryptographic o One common method for generating ICVs as a cryptographic function,
function, calculated over the hash value of the content to be calculated over the hash value of the content to be signed.
signed.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
In particular, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are used in In particular, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are used in
skipping to change at page 4, line 16 skipping to change at page 4, line 5
of [RFC5444]. of [RFC5444].
3. Applicability Statement 3. Applicability Statement
MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
accorded the ability to carry additional information in control accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so
included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension included MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension
of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification. of a MANET routing protocol, according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for This document specifies how to include an ICV for a packet, a
a packet, a message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, and addresses in address blocks within a message, by way of
message, by way of such TLVs. This document also specifies how to such TLVs. This document also specifies how to treat "mutable"
treat "mutable" fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg- fields, specifically the <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields,
hop-limit> fields, if present in the message header when calculating if present in the message header when calculating ICVs, such that the
signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly resulting ICV can be correctly verified by any recipient, and how to
verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature. include this ICV.
This document describes a generic framework for creating signatures, This document describes a generic framework for creating ICVs, and
and how to include these signatures in TLVs. In Section 12, an how to include these ICVs in TLVs. In Section 12, an example method
example method for calculating such signatures is given, using a for calculating such ICVs is given, using a cryptographic function
cryptographic function over the hash value of the content to be over the hash value of the content to be signed.
signed.
4. Security Architecture 4. Security Architecture
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be
rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded. rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" prior to it being processed
MANET routing protocols such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] recognize or forwarded. MANET routing protocols such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2]
external reasons (such as failure to verify a signature) for recognize external reasons (such as failure to verify an ICV) for
rejecting a message as "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for rejecting a message, and therefore "invalid for processing". This
processing". This architecture is a result of the observation that architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
with respect to security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
that MANET routing protocol deployment domains have varying security protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
requirements ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
virtue of this approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
(and implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms. proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms.
The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
follows: follows:
o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a
clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to
processing/forwarding) as "badly formed". processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure".
o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as
"badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain "badly formed" or "insecure", as appropriate for a given
specific security requirement. deployment-domain specific security requirement.
o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a
common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, making reservations
reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address Block TLV
Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among MANET routing
MANET routing protocol security extensions. protocol security extensions.
For the specific decomposition of a signature into a cryptographic For the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic
function over a hash value, specified in Section 12, this document function over a hash value, specified in Section 12, this document
establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash functions establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash functions
and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444]. and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444].
With respect to [RFC5444], this document: With respect to [RFC5444], this document:
o Is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o Is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444]. use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444].
o Is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of o Is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
5. Overview and Functioning 5. Overview and Functioning
This document specifies a syntactical representation of security This document specifies a syntactical representation of security
related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and related information for use with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and
packets, as well as establishes IANA registrations and registries. packets, as well as establishes IANA registrations and registries.
Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing Moreover, this document provides guidelines for how MANET routing
protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions, using this protocols, and MANET routing protocol extensions, using this
specification, should treat Signature and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable specification, should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, and mutable
fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand- fields in messages. This specification does not represent a stand-
alone protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol alone protocol; MANET routing protocols and MANET routing protocol
extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to extensions, using this specification, MUST provide instructions as to
how to handle packets, messages and addresses with security how to handle packets, messages and addresses with security
information, associated as specified in this document. information, associated as specified in this document.
This document requests assignment of TLV types from the registries This document requests assignment of TLV types from the registries
defined for Packet, Message and Address Block TLVs in [RFC5444]. defined for Packet, Message and Address Block TLVs in [RFC5444].
When a TLV type is assigned from one of these registries, a registry When a TLV type is assigned from one of these registries, a registry
for "Type Extensions" for that TLV type is created by IANA. This for "Type Extensions" for that TLV type is created by IANA. This
document utilizes these "Type Extension" registries so created, in document utilizes these "Type Extension" registries so created, in
order to specify internal structure (and accompanying processing) of order to specify internal structure (and accompanying processing) of
the <value> field of a TLV. the <value> field of a TLV.
For example, and as defined in this document, a SIGNATURE TLV with For example, and as defined in this document, an ICV TLV with Type
Type Extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre- Extension = 0 specifies that the <value> field has no pre-defined
defined internal structure, but is simply a sequence of octets. A internal structure, but is simply a sequence of octets. An ICV TLV
SIGNATURE TLV with Type Extension = 1 specifies that the <value> with Type Extension = 1 specifies that the <value> field has a pre-
field has a pre-defined internal structure, and defines its defined internal structure, and defines its interpretation
interpretation (specifically, the <value> field consists of a (specifically, the <value> field consists of a cryptographic
cryptographic operation over a hash value, with fields indicating operation over a hash value, with fields indicating which hash
which hash function and cryptographic operation has been used, function and cryptographic operation has been used, specified in
specified in Section 12). Section 12).
Other documents can request assignments for other Type Extensions, Other documents can request assignments for other Type Extensions,
and MUST, if so, specify their internal structure (if any) and and MUST, if so, specify their internal structure (if any) and
interpretation. interpretation.
6. General Signature TLV Structure 6. General ICV TLV Structure
The value of the Signature TLV is: The value of the ICV TLV is:
<value> := <signature-value> <value> := <ICV-value>
where: where:
<signature-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the <ICV-value> is a field, of <length> octets, which contains the
information, to be interpreted by the signature verification information, to be interpreted by the ICV verification process, as
process, as specified by the Type Extension. specified by the Type Extension.
Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <signature- Note that this does not stipulate how to calculate the <ICV-value>,
value>, nor the internal structure hereof, if any; such MUST be nor the internal structure hereof, if any; such MUST be specified by
specified by way of the Type Extension for the SIGNATURE TLV type, way of the Type Extension for the ICV TLV type, see Section 13. This
see Section 13. This document specifies two such type-extensions, document specifies two such type-extensions, for ICVs without pre-
for signatures without pre-defined structures, and for signatures defined structures, and for ICVs constructed by way of a
constructed by way of a cryptographic operation over a hash-value. cryptographic operation over a hash-value.
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure 7. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The value of the Timestamp TLV is: The value of the Timestamp TLV is:
<value> := <time-value> <value> := <time-value>
where: where:
<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which <time-value> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which
skipping to change at page 7, line 21 skipping to change at page 7, line 7
see Section 13. see Section 13.
A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
setting and interpretation is to be determined by the MANET routing setting and interpretation is to be determined by the MANET routing
protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the protocol, or MANET routing protocol extension, that uses the
timestamp, and can, e.g., correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp, and can, e.g., correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS
timestamp or a simple sequence number. timestamp or a simple sequence number.
8. Packet TLVs 8. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic ICV of a
signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the time at which
time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
8.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV 8.1. Packet ICV TLV
A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
in Section 6. Section 6.
The following considerations apply: The following considerations apply:
o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, no o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, no
special considerations are required regarding mutable fields (e.g. special considerations are required regarding mutable fields (e.g.
<msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating
the signature. the ICV.
o Any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block o Any Packet ICV TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block MUST
MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block
TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed size MUST be recalculated accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be
SIGNATURE TLVs SHOULD be restored after having calculated the restored after having calculated the ICV value.
signature value.
The rationale for removing any Packet SIGNATURE TLV already present The rationale for removing any Packet ICV TLV already present prior
prior to calculating the signature is that several signatures may be to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
added to the same packet, e.g., using different signature functions. packet, e.g., using different ICV functions.
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV 8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV
A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE in Section 7. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV,
SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.
signature.
9. Message TLVs 9. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic ICV of
signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating a message, and for including the timestamp indicating the time at
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
9.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV 9.1. Message ICV TLV
A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
in Section 6. When determining the <signature-value> for a message, Section 6. When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the
the following considerations MUST be applied: following considerations MUST be applied:
o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST o The fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST
both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the
signature. ICV.
o Any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV o Any Message ICV TLVs already present in the Message TLV block MUST
block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as
message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated
recalculated accordingly. Removed SIGNATURE TLVs SHOULD be accordingly. Removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after having
restored after having calculated the signature value. calculated the ICV value.
The rationale for removing any Message SIGNATURE TLV already present The rationale for removing any Message ICV TLV already present prior
prior to calculating the signature is that several signatures may be to calculating the ICV is that several ICVs may be added to the same
added to the same message, e.g., using different signature functions. message, e.g., using different ICV functions.
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV 9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV
A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE in Section 7. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV,
TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV,
SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the in order that it be included in the calculation of the ICV.
signature.
10. Address Block TLVs 10. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic
signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating ICV to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating the
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. time at which the cryptographic ICV was calculated.
10.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV 10.1. Address Block ICV TLV
An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as An Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV as described in
described in Section 6. The signature is calculated over the Section 6. The ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with
address, concatenated with any other values, for example, any other any other values, for example, any other Address Block TLV <value>
address block TLV <value> fields, that is associated with that fields, that is associated with that address. A MANET routing
address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using Address Block ICV
extension using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of
include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the the address in the verification process of the ICV. When determining
verification process of the signature. When determining the the <ICV-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be
<signature-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be
applied: applied:
o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for o If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for
calculating the signature, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block calculating the ICV, these TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs
SIGNATURE TLVs already associated with the address. already associated with the address.
The rationale for not concatenating the address with any SIGNATURE The rationale for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV
TLV values already associated with the address when calculating the values already associated with the address when calculating the ICV
signature is that several signatures may be added to the same is that several ICVs may be added to the same address, e.g., using
address, e.g., using different signature functions. different ICV functions.
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV
An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
described in Section 7. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV described in Section 7. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are
are associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> SHOULD be associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered
considered when calculating the value of the signature. when calculating the value of the ICV to be contained in the ICV TLV
value (i.e. concatenated with the associated address and any other
values as described in Section 10.1).
11. Signature: Basic 11. ICV: Basic
The basic signature, represented by way of a SIGNATURE TLV with Type The basic ICV, represented by way of an ICV TLV with Type Extension =
Extension = 0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic 0, is a simple bit-field containing the cryptographic ICV. This
signature. This assumes that the mechanism stipulating how assumes that the mechanism stipulating how ICVs are calculated and
signatures are calculated and verified is established outside of this verified is established outside of this specification, e.g., by way
specification, e.g., by way of administrative configuration or of administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling.
external out-of-band signaling. Thus, the <signature-value> for when Thus, the <ICV-value> for when using Type Extension = 0 is:
using Type Extension = 0 is:
<signature-value> := <signature-data> <ICV-value> := <ICV-data>
where: where:
<signature-data> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, <ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, of length <length>, which
which contains the cryptographic signature. contains the cryptographic ICV.
12. Signature: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value 12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value
One common way of calculating a signature is applying a cryptographic One common way of calculating an ICV is applying a cryptographic
function on a hash value of the content. This decomposition is function on a hash value of the content. This decomposition is
specified in the following, using a Type Extension = 1 in the specified in the following, using a Type Extension = 1 in the ICV
Signature TLVs. TLVs.
12.1. General Signature TLV Structure 12.1. General ICV TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function ICV, including specification of the appropriate hash function and
and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature: cryptographic function used for calculating the ICV:
<signature-value> := <hash-function> <ICV-value> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function> <cryptographic-function>
<key-index> <key-index>
<signature-data> <ICV-data>
where: where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function. hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field <cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function. specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-index> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key <key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows length of the <key-id> field in number of octets. The value 0x00
unique identification of different keys with the same originator. is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key.
It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and
that all key indices have a value not equal to 0x00. The value
0x00 is reserved for a pre-installed, shared key.
<signature-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <key-id> is a field specifying the key identifier of the key that
<length> - 3, and which contains the cryptographic signature. was used to sign the message, which allows unique identification
of different keys with the same originator. It is the
responsibility of each key originator to make sure that actively
used keys that it issues have distinct key identifiers. If <key-
id-length> equals to 0x00, the <key-id> field is not contained in
the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used.
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length> -
3 - <key-id-length>, and which contains the cryptographic ICV.
The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that
calculating the signature can be decomposed into: calculating the ICV can be decomposed into:
signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in
Section 13. Section 13.
12.1.1. Rationale 12.1.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is that adding single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is that adding
further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may further hash functions or cryptographic functions in the future may
lead to a non-contiguous number space. lead to a non-contiguous number space.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic signature in the TLV is that, before being able to cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before being able to validate a
validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or cryptographic ICV, routers have to exchange or acquire keys (e.g.
acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be public keys). Any additional parameters can be provided together
provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is therefore not
therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to transmit the
transmit the parameters within every message. One implicitly parameters within every message. One implicitly available parameter
available parameter is the length of the signature, which is <length> is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>,
- 3, and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function. and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the Signature 12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV
In the following, considerations are listed, which MUST be applied In the following, considerations are listed, which MUST be applied
when calculating the signature for Packet, Message and Address when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message and Address ICV TLVs,
SIGNATURE TLVs, respectively. respectively.
12.2.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV 12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for a Packet, the signature is When determining the <ICV-value> for a Packet, the ICV is calculated
calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic- over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function> <key-id-
function> and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order), concatenated
entire Packet, including the packet header, all Packet TLVs (other with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all Packet TLVs
than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included Messages and their (other than Packet ICV TLVs) and all included Messages and their
message headers, in accordance with Section 8.1. message headers, in accordance with Section 8.1.
12.2.2. Message SIGNATURE TLV 12.2.2. Message ICV TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for a message, the signature When determining the <ICV-value> for a message, the ICV is calculated
is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic- over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function> <key-id-
function>, and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order), concatenated
entire message. The considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be applied. with the entire message. The considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be
applied.
12.2.3. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV 12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for an address, the signature When determining the <ICV-value> for an address, the ICV is
is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic- calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>
function>, and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the <key-id-length>, and - if present - <key-id> (in that order),
address, concatenated with any other values, for example, any other concatenated with the address, concatenated with any other values,
address block TLV <value> that is associated with that address. A for example, any other address block TLV <value> that is associated
MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension using with that address. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing
Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to include any such protocol extension using Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to
concatenated attribute of the address in the verification process of include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the
the signature. The considerations in Section 10.2 MUST be applied. verification process of the ICV. The considerations in Section 10.2
MUST be applied.
12.3. Example of a Signed Message 12.3. Example of a Message including an ICV
The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from appendix D of The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from appendix D of
[RFC5444]. The message contains a SIGNATURE Message TLV, with the [RFC5444]. The message contains an ICV Message TLV, with the value
value representing a 16 octet long signature of the whole message. representing a 16 octet long ICV of the whole message, and a 4 octet
The type extension of the Message TLV is 1, for the specific long key identifier. The type extension of the Message TLV is 1, for
decomposition of a signature into a cryptographic function over a the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic function
hash value, as specified in Section 12. over a hash value, as specified in Section 12.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | | PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 40 | Msg. Orig Addr| | MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 44 | Msg. Orig Addr|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | | Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number | Msg. TLV Block| | Hop Count | Message Sequence Number | Msg. TLV Block|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 30 | SIGNATURE | MTLVF = 144 | MTLVExt = 1 | | Length = 27 | ICV | MTLVF = 144 | MTLVExt = 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Value Len = 19 | Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index | |Value Len = 23 | Hash Func | Crypto Func |Key ID length=4|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value | | Key Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | ICV Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Example message with signature Figure 1: Example message with ICV
13. IANA Considerations 13. IANA Considerations
This specification defines: This specification defines:
o Two Packet TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-223 range o Two Packet TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-223 range
of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as
specified in Table 1, specified in Table 1,
o Two Message TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-127 o Two Message TLV types, which must be allocated from the 0-127
skipping to change at page 13, line 22 skipping to change at page 13, line 12
This specification requests: This specification requests:
o Creation of type extension registries for these TLV types with o Creation of type extension registries for these TLV types with
initial values as in Table 1 to Table 3. initial values as in Table 1 to Table 3.
IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet
TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name. TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name.
The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
"Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned", "Namespace", "Registration", and "Designated Expert".
"Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert".
The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following policy is used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
"Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action". "Expert Review".
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is
required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet,
Message and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically. Message and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically.
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations 13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Packet TLV Types" IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Packet TLV Types"
namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 1. namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 1.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a packet | | ICV | TBD1 | 0 | ICV of a packet |
| | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | value, as specified in Section 12 | | | | | specified in Section 12 in this |
| | | | in this document. | | | | | document. |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | 2-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol | | | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | has to define how to interpret | | | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | this timestamp | | | | | this timestamp |
| | | 1-251 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV types Table 1: Packet TLV types
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Message TLV Types" IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Message TLV Types"
namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs specified in Table 2. namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs specified in Table 2.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a message | | ICV | TBD3 | 0 | ICV of a message |
| | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | value, as specified in Section 12 | | | | | specified in Section 12 in this |
| | | | in this document. | | | | | document. |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | 2-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. | | | | | field. |
| | | 1-251 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV types Table 2: Message TLV types
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Address Block TLV IANA is requested to make allocations from the "Address Block TLV
Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in
Table 3. Table 3.
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD5 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an | | ICV | TBD5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g. an address) |
| | | | address) | | | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into | | | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash | | | | | specified in Section 12 in this |
| | | | value, as specified in Section 12 | | | | | document. |
| | | | in this document. |
| | | 2-251 | Expert Review | | | | 2-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. | | | | | field. |
| | | 1-251 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-251 | Expert Review |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV types Table 3: Address Block TLV types
13.5. Hash Function 13.5. Hash Function
IANA is requested to create a new registry for hash functions that IANA is requested to create a new registry for hash functions that
can be used when creating a signature, as specified in Section 12 of can be used when creating an ICV, as specified in Section 12 of this
this document. The initial assignments and allocation policies are document. The initial assignments and allocation policies are
specified in Table 4. specified in Table 4.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description | | Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| function | | | | function | | |
| value | | | | value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself | | | | of an object is the object itself |
| 1-251 | | Expert Review | | 1 | SHA1 | [SHS] |
| 2 | SHA224 | [SHS] |
| 3 | SHA256 | [SHS] |
| 4 | SHA384 | [SHS] |
| 5 | SHA512 | [SHS] |
| 6-251 | | Expert Review |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use | | 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 4: Hash-Function registry Table 4: Hash-Function registry
13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm 13.6. Cryptographic Algorithm
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic
function, as specified in Section 12 of this document. Initial function, as specified in Section 12 of this document. Initial
assignments and allocation policies are specified in Table 5. assignments and allocation policies are specified in Table 5.
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| function value | | | | function value | | |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself | | | | itself |
| 1-251 | | Expert Review | | 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] |
| 2 | DSA | [DSA] |
| 3 | HMAC | [RFC2104] |
| 4 | 3DES | [3DES] |
| 5 | AES | [AES] |
| 6 | ECDSA | [ECDSA] |
| 7-251 | | Expert Review |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use | | 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
Table 5: Cryptographic function registry Table 5: Cryptographic function registry
14. Security Considerations 14. Security Considerations
This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical
component for cryptographic signatures of messages and packets as component for cryptographic ICVs of messages and packets as defined
defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to address security issues of a in [RFC5444]. It can be used to address security issues of a MANET
MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, it
it has the same security considerations as [RFC5444]. has the same security considerations as [RFC5444].
In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol
extension that uses this specification MUST specify the usage as well extension that uses this specification MUST specify the usage as well
as the security that is attained by the cryptographic signatures of a as the security that is attained by the cryptographic ICVs of a
message or a packet. message or a packet.
As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to
reject "badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain reject "badly formed" or "insecure" messages if a control message
a valid signature, SHOULD indicate the security assumption that if does not contain a valid ICV, SHOULD indicate the security assumption
the signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also that if the ICV is valid, the message is considered valid. It also
SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this
measure (e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that measure (e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that
are not counteracted (e.g. compromised keys). are not counteracted (e.g. compromised keys).
15. Acknowledgements 15. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE),
Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert
(Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique) and Henning Rogge (Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique) and Henning Rogge
(FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document. (FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document.
The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews from the Area
Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen Farrel
(Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as well as
Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate.
16. References 16. References
16.1. Normative References 16.1. Normative References
[3DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA) Block Cipher", NIST Special Publication 800-67,
May 2004.
[AES] National Institute of Standards & Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
May 2008. May 2008.
[DSA] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Digital ICV
Standard", NIST, FIPS PUB 186, May 1994.
[ECDSA] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital ICV Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANS X9.62-
2005, November 2005.
[POSIX] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for
Information Technology - Portable Operating System
Interface (POSIX)", Base Specifications Issue 7,
December 2008.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC3447] Staddon, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC4330] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 4330, January 2006.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, "Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
February 2009. February 2009.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", NIST FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
16.2. Informative References 16.2. Informative References
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in
progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-13.txt, October 2011. progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-13.txt, October 2011.
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130, Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130,
March 2011. March 2011.
 End of changes. 105 change blocks. 
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