draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-03.txt   draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-04.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft T. Clausen Internet-Draft T. Clausen
Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Expires: September 30, 2011 March 29, 2011 Expires: January 12, 2012 July 11, 2011
MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition
draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-03 draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-04
Abstract Abstract
This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value
structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as
timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format
[RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two [RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two
Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and
timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively. timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 12, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Imported TLV Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Imported TLV Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 9
12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 10
12.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Signature Decomposition into Cryptographic
A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Function of a Hash Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.1. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. Considerations for Calculating the Signature . . . . . . . 15
A.2.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2.2. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2.3. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.3. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies: This document specifies:
o two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in o two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in
packets, messages and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444], packets, messages and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444],
o how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for Message o a generic framework for calculating cryptographic signatures,
TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields (<msg-hop- taking (for Message TLVs) into account the mutable message header
limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields are present in fields (<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields
messages. are present in messages,
o a specific calculation of signatures, decomposed as a
cryptographic function over the hash value of the content to be
signed, in the Appendix A of this document.
This document requests from IANA: This document requests from IANA:
o allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from o allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from
the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the
0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444], 0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444],
o creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash o creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash
function and signature calculation, respectively. function and signature calculation, respectively.
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included MAY be used by a routing protocol, or by an extension of a included MAY be used by a routing protocol, or by an extension of a
routing protocol, according to its specification. routing protocol, according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for
a packet, message or address by way of such TLVs. This document also a packet, message or address by way of such TLVs. This document also
specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop-count> and <msg- specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop-count> and <msg-
hop-limit>), if present, in the message header when calculating hop-limit>), if present, in the message header when calculating
signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly
verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature. verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature.
This document is split into two parts: (i) a generic framework of
creating signatures in the presence of mutable fields, and how to
include these signatures in TLVs, (ii) a specific description of how
to calculate a signature, using a cryptographic function over the
hash value of the content to be signed, in the Appendix A of this
document. Note that (ii) is a possible and widely-used way of
calculating a signature, but other means may exist. Such other means
of calculating a signature have to be specified in another document.
That new document MUST use the TLV structures specified in this
document, as well as the described considerations when calculating
the signatures.
4. Security Architecture 4. Security Architecture
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be
rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded. rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded.
Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons Protocols such as [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons
(such as failure to verify a signature) for rejecting a message as (such as failure to verify a signature) for rejecting a message as
"badly formed", and therefore "invalid for processing". This "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for processing". This
architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms. proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms.
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"badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain "badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain
specific security requirement. specific security requirement.
o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a
common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making
reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and Address reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and Address
Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among
MANET routing protocol security extensions, establishing two IANA MANET routing protocol security extensions.
registries for code-points for hash functions and cryptographic
functions adhering to [RFC5444]. For the specific decomposition of a signature into a cryptographic
function over a hash value, specified in Appendix A, this document
establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash functions
and cryptographic functions adhering to [RFC5444].
With respect to [RFC5444], this document: With respect to [RFC5444], this document:
o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B. use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B.
o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
5. Protocol Overview and Functioning 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning
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5.2 of [RFC5444]. 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<msg-hop-count> - hop count of a message, as specified in Section <msg-hop-count> - hop count of a message, as specified in Section
5.2 of [RFC5444]. 5.2 of [RFC5444].
<length> - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 <length> - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1
of [RFC5444]. of [RFC5444].
7. General Signature TLV Structure 7. General Signature TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic The following data structure allows a generic representation of a
signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function cryptographic signature. This <signature> data structure is
and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature. This specified, using the regular expression syntax of [RFC5444], as:
<signature> data structure is specified, using the regular expression
syntax of [RFC5444], as:
<signature> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function>
<key-index>
<signature-value>
where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-index> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key
index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows
unique identification of different keys with the same originator.
It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and
that all key indices have a value unequal to 0x00. Value 0x00 is
reserved for a pre-installed, shared key.
<signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is
<length> - 3, and which contains the cryptographic signature.
The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature
can be decomposed into:
signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in
Section 12.
7.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic <signature> := <signature-value>
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if
further hash functions or cryptographic functions are added in the
future, the number space might not remain continuous. More
importantly, the number space of possible combinations would be
rapidly exhausted. As new or improved cryptographic mechanism are
continuously being developed and introduced, this format should be
able to accommodate such for the foreseeable future.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the This generic specification allows for adding a signature in a TLV,
cryptographic signature in the TLV is, that before being able to using TLV type extension 0, and does not stipulate how to calculate
validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or the signature-value. Appendix A specifies a concrete calculation of
acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be the signature-value, using a cryptographic function over a hash
provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is function of the content to be signed. Other methods of how to
therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to calculate the signature-value may be specified in future documents.
transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently
included parameter is the length of the signature, which is <length>
- 3 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
8. General Timestamp TLV Structure 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The following data structure allows the representation of a The following data structure allows the representation of a
timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as: timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as:
<timestamp> := <time-value> <timestamp> := <time-value>
where: where:
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9. Packet TLVs 9. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the
time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV
A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
in Section 7. When calculating the <signature-value> for a Packet, in Section 7.
the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>,
<cryptographic-function> and <key-index> (in that order),
concatenated with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all
Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included
Messages and their message headers.
The following considerations apply: The following considerations apply:
o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, it o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, it
is unnecessary to consider mutable fields (e.g. <msg-hop-count> is unnecessary to consider mutable fields (e.g. <msg-hop-count>
and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating the signature. and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating the signature.
o any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block o any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block
MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet
TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be
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10. Message TLVs 10. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV
A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
in Section 7. When determining the <signature-value> for a message, in Section 7. When determining the <signature-value> for a message,
the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, the following considerations must be applied:
<cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in that order),
concatenated with the entire message with the following
considerations:
o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST
both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the
signature. signature.
o any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV o any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV
block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the
message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be
recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored after having recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored after having
calculated the signature value. calculated the signature value.
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11. Address Block TLVs 11. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic
signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV
An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as
described in Section 7. The signature is calculated over the three described in Section 7. The signature is calculated over the
fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in address, concatenated with any other values, for example, any other
that order), concatenated with the address, concatenated with any TLV value that is associated with that address. A routing protocol
other values, for example, any other TLV value that is associated or routing protocol extension using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST
with that address. A routing protocol or routing protocol extension specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address
using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to include any in the verification process of the signature.
such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification
process of the signature.
11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV
An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
described in Section 8. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV described in Section 8. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV
are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be
considered when calculating the value of the signature. considered when calculating the value of the signature.
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
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12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations 12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the
"Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. "Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet | | SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a packet |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash |
| | | | value, as specified in Appendix A |
| | | | in this document. |
| | | 2-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol | | | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | has to define how to interpret | | | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | this timestamp | | | | | this timestamp |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV types Table 1: Packet TLV types
12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the
"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message | | SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a message |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash |
| | | | value, as specified in Appendix A |
| | | | in this document. |
| | | 2-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. | | | | | field. |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV types Table 2: Message TLV types
12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from
the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an | | SIGNATURE | TBD5 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an |
| | | | address) | | | | | address) |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1 | Signature, decomposed into |
| | | | cryptographic function over a hash |
| | | | value, as specified in Appendix A |
| | | | in this document. |
| | | 2-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. | | | | | field. |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV types Table 3: Address Block TLV types
12.2. New IANA Registries 12.2. New IANA Registries
skipping to change at page 12, line 18 skipping to change at page 11, line 29
12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is
required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
12.2.2. Hash Function 12.2.2. Hash Function
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions
that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments that can be used when creating a signature, as specified in the
and allocation policies are specified in Table 4. Appendix A of this document. The initial assignments and allocation
policies are specified in Table 4.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description | | Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| function | | | | function | | |
| value | | | | value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself | | | | of an object is the object itself |
| 1-223 | | Expert Review | | 1-223 | | Expert Review |
| 224-255 | | Experimental Use | | 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 4: Hash-Function registry Table 4: Hash-Function registry
12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic
function. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified function, as specified in the Appendix A of this document. Initial
in Table 5. assignments and allocation policies are specified in Table 5.
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| function value | | | | function value | | |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself | | | | itself |
| 1-223 | | Expert Review | | 1-223 | | Expert Review |
| 224-255 | | Experimental Use | | 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
skipping to change at page 14, line 7 skipping to change at page 13, line 19
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, "Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
February 2009. February 2009.
15.2. Informative References 15.2. Informative References
[NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130,
March 2011.
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in
progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010. progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010.
Appendix A. Examples [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130,
March 2011.
A.1. Example of a Signed Message Appendix A. Signature Decomposition into Cryptographic Function of a
Hash Value
This section specifies how to calculate the signature-value in a
Signature TLV, as described in Section 7. A common way of
calculating a signature is applying a cryptographic function on a
hash value of the content. This decomposition is specified in the
following, using a type extension of 1 in the Signature TLVs.
A.1. General Signature TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function
and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature:
<signature> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function>
<key-index>
<signature-value>
where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function.
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-index> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key
index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows
unique identification of different keys with the same originator.
It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and
that all key indices have a value unequal to 0x00. Value 0x00 is
reserved for a pre-installed, shared key.
<signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is
<length> - 3, and which contains the cryptographic signature.
The version of this TLV, specified in this section, assumes that
calculating the signature can be decomposed into:
signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in
Section 12.
A.1.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if
further hash functions or cryptographic functions are added in the
future, the number space might not remain continuous. More
importantly, the number space of possible combinations would be
rapidly exhausted. As new or improved cryptographic mechanism are
continuously being developed and introduced, this format should be
able to accommodate such for the foreseeable future.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic signature in the TLV is, that before being able to
validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or
acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be
provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is
therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to
transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently
included parameter is the length of the signature, which is <length>
- 3 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
A.2. Considerations for Calculating the Signature
In the following, considerations are listed, which have to be applied
when calculating the signature for Packet, Message and Address
SIGNATURE TLVs, respectively.
A.2.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for a Packet, the signature is
calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-
function> and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the
entire Packet, including the packet header, all Packet TLVs (other
than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included Messages and their
message headers.
A.2.2. Message SIGNATURE TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for a message, the signature
is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-
function>, and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the
entire message.
A.2.3. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV
When determining the <signature-value> for an address, the signature
is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-
function>, and <key-index> (in that order), concatenated with the
address, concatenated with any other values, for example, any other
TLV value that is associated with that address. A routing protocol
or routing protocol extension using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST
specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address
in the verification process of the signature.
A.3. Example of a Signed Message
The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from the appendix The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from the appendix
of [RFC5444]. A SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added, with the value of [RFC5444]. A SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added, with the value
representing a 15 octet long signature of the whole message. representing a 14 octet long signature of the whole message. The
type extension of the Message TLV is 1, for the specific
decomposition of a signature into a cryptographic function over a
hash value, as specified in Appendix A.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | |0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr | |1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | | Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| | Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0| |0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index | Sign. Value | |0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0| Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| | Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value | |0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value (cont) |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| | Value (cont) |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|
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