draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-00.txt		draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-01.txt
	Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg		Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
	Internet-Draft T. Clausen		Internet-Draft T. Clausen
	Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique		Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
	Expires: December 22, 2010 June 20, 2010		Expires: January 28, 2011 July 27, 2010
	MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition		MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition
	draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-00		draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a general and flexible TLV (type-length-value		This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value
	structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as		structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as
	timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format		timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format
	[RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two		[RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two
	Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and		Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and
	timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively.		timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 35		skipping to change at page 1, line 35
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2010.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. Imported TLV Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	7. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	9.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	10.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	10.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 9		12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	10.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		12.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	10.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10		12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 10
	10.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11		12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	10.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	10.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12		12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11
	10.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		12.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	10.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12
	11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		12.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
			A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document:		This document specifies:
	o specifies two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and		o two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in
	timestamps in packets, messages and address blocks as defined by		packets, messages and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444],
	[RFC5444],
	o requests IANA allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address		o how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for Message
	Block TLVs from the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV		TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-
	range and the 0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444],		limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields are present in
			messages.
	o describes how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for		This document requests from IANA:
	Message TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields
	(<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields are
	present in messages,
	o requests creation of two IANA registries for recording code points		o allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from
	for hash function and signature calculation, respectively.		the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the
			0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444],
	This document does not stipulate how to sign or validate messages. A		o creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash
	specification of a routing protocol or routing protocol extension,		function and signature calculation, respectively.
	using the security representation of this document, MUST specify
	appropriate interpretation of the TLVs. This document does
	specifically not suggest specific cryptographic algorithms or hash
	functions, but rather establishes IANA registries for such.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	[RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].		This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
	Additionally, it defines the following terminology:
	o Hash-Function
	A hash function is an algorithm that takes a message of any
	length as input and produces a fixed-length string as output.
	Hash functions are used in cryptography for authentication and
	message integrity.
	o Object
	An object, here, is any sequence of bytes that is used to
	calculate the signature over (e.g. a packet, a message, an
	address as defined in [RFC5444], a timestamp, or a combination
	of these).
	o Signature
	A digital signature can be used to (i) authenticate the
	originator and (ii) to assure that the object, which has been
	signed, has not been altered in transit. In many cases, a
	signature is calculated by encrypting a hash of the object,
	which is the basic assumption of this specification.
	o Timestamp
	The timestamp indicates the time when the timestamp has been
	created. If a timestamp is added to an object before signing
	the object, this information can be useful to determine the
	"freshness" of the signed object. "Old" objects can indicate
	replayed objects. The minimal requirement for a timestamp is
	to provide a logical representation of time (e.g. Lamport
	time). Using timestamps may require - at least roughly -
	synchronized clocks among the routers in the network.
	3. Applicability Statement		3. Applicability Statement
	The packet and message format defined in [RFC5444] accords MANET		MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
	routing protocols, using this format, the ability to carry additional		accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
	information in control messages, through inclusion of TLVs.		messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so
	Information so included in a control message MAY be used by the		included MAY be used by a routing protocol, or by an extension of a
	routing protocol, or by an extension of the routing protocol,		routing protocol, according to its specification.
	according to its specification.
	This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for		This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for
	a packet, message or address block by way of such TLVs. This		a packet, message or address by way of such TLVs. This document also
	document also specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop-		specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop-count> and <msg-
	count> and <msg-hop-limit>) in the message header when calculating		hop-limit>), if present, in the message header when calculating
	signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly		signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly
	verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature. A		verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature.
	MANET routing protocol, or an extension of a MANET routing protocol,
	MAY use such included cryptographic signatures for, for example,		4. Security Architecture
	rejecting messages where signature verification fails.
	Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to		Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
	security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be		security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be
	rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded.		rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded.
	Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons		Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons
	(such as failure to verify a signature) as being reasons for		(such as failure to verify a signature) for rejecting a message as
	rejecting a message as "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for		"badly formed", and therefore "invalid for processing". This
	processing". This architecture is a result of the observation that		architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
	with respect to security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and		security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
	that MANET routing protocol deployment domains have varying security		protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
	requirements ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The		ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
	virtue of this approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications		approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
	(and implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing		implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
	proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms.		proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms.
	The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this		The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
	specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as		specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
	follows:		follows:
	o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a		o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a
	clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to		clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to
	processing/forwarding) as "badly formed".		processing/forwarding) as "badly formed".
	o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as		o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as
	"badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain		"badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain
	specific security requirement.		specific security requirement.
	o Code-points and an exchange format for information necessary for		o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
	specification of such security extensions.		specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
	This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a		This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a
	common exchange format for cryptographic signatures. This document		common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making
	also makes reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and		reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and Address
	Address Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared)		Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among
	among MANET routing protocol security extensions. Finally, this		MANET routing protocol security extensions, establishing two IANA
	document establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash		registries for code-points for hash functions and cryptographic
	functions and cryptographic algorithms for use by protocols adhering		functions adhering to [RFC5444].
	to [RFC5444].
	With respect to [RFC5444], this document:		With respect to [RFC5444], this document:
	o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of		o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
	use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B.		use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B.
	o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of		o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of
	[RFC5444] (the authentication part).		[RFC5444] (the authentication part).
	4. Protocol Overview and Functioning		5. Protocol Overview and Functioning
	This specification does not describe a protocol, nor does it mandate		This specification does not describe a protocol, nor does it mandate
	specific router or protocol behavior. It represents a purely		specific router or protocol behavior. It represents a purely
	syntactical representation of security related information for use		syntactical representation of security related information for use
	with [RFC5444] messages and packets, as well as establishes IANA		with [RFC5444] addresses, messages and packets, as well as
	registrations and registries.		establishes IANA registrations and registries.
	5. General Signature TLV Structure		6. Imported TLV Fields
			In this specification, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are
			used:
			<msg-hop-limit> - hop limit of a message, as specified in Section
			5.2 of [RFC5444].
			<msg-hop-count> - hop count of a message, as specified in Section
			5.2 of [RFC5444].
			<length> - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1
			of [RFC5444].
			7. General Signature TLV Structure
	The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic		The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
	signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function		signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function
	and cryptographic algorithm used for calculating the signature. This		and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature. This
	<signature> data structure is specified, using the regular expression		<signature> data structure is specified, using the regular expression
	syntax of [RFC5444], as:		syntax of [RFC5444], as:
	<signature> := <hash-function>		<signature> := <hash-function>
	<cryptographic-algorithm>		<cryptographic-function>
			<key-index>
	<signature-value>		<signature-value>
	where:		where:
	<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the		<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
	hash function.		hash function.
	<cryptographic-algorithm> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field		<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
	specifying the cryptographic algorithm.		specifying the cryptographic function.
			<key-index> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key
			index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows
			unique identification of different keys with the same originator.
			It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
			actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and
			that all key indices have a value unequal to 0x00. Value 0x00 is
			reserved for a pre-installed, shared key.
	<signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is		<signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is
	<tlv-length>-2, and which contains the cryptographic signature.		<length>-2, and which contains the cryptographic signature.
	The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature		The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature
	can be decomposed into:		can be decomposed into:
	signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(message))		signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
	The hash function and the cryptographic algorithm correspond to the		The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
	IANA registry in the two registries set up by this specification, see		entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in
	Section 10.		Section 12.
	5.1. Rationale		7.1. Rationale
	The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic		The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
	algorithm into two octets instead of having all combinations in a		function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
	single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if		single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if
	further hash functions or cryptographic algorithms are added in the		further hash functions or cryptographic functions are added in the
	future, the number space might not remain continuous. More		future, the number space might not remain continuous. More
	importantly, the number space of 256 possible combinations would be		importantly, the number space of possible combinations would be
	rapidly exhausted: 16 different hash functions and 16 different		rapidly exhausted. As new or improved cryptographic mechanism are
	cryptographic algorithms would lead to exhaustion. As new or		continuously being developed and introduced, this format should be
	improved cryptographic mechanism are continuously being developed and		able to accommodate such for the foreseeable future.
	introduced, this format should be able to accommodate such for the
	foreseeable future.
	The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the		The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
	cryptographic signature in the TLV is the following: Before being		cryptographic signature in the TLV is, that before being able to
	able to to validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to		validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or
	exchange keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be		acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be
	exchanged together with the keys in this bootstrap process. It is		provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is
	therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to		therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to
	transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently		transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently
	included parameter is the length of the signature, which is tlv-		included parameter is the length of the signature, which is <length>
	length - 2 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic		- 2 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
	algorithm.
	6. General Timestamp TLV Structure		8. General Timestamp TLV Structure
	The following data structure allows the representation of a		The following data structure allows the representation of a
	timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as:		timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as:
	<timestamp> := <time-value>		<timestamp> := <time-value>
	where:		where:
	<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <tlv-		<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length>,
	length>, and which contains the timestamp. The value of this		and which contains the timestamp. The value of this variable is
	variable is to be interpreted by the routing protocol as specified		to be interpreted by the routing protocol as specified by the type
	by the type extension of the Timestamp TLV (refer to Table 1).		extension of the Timestamp TLV, see Section 12.
	A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its		A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
	setting and interpretation is to be determined by the routing		setting and interpretation is to be determined by the routing
	protocol (or the extension to a routing protocol) that uses it, and		protocol (or the extension to a routing protocol) that uses it, and
	may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple		may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple
	sequence number. This is out of the scope of this specification.		sequence number.
	7. Packet TLVs		9. Packet TLVs
	Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic		Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
	signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the		signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the
	time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.		time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
	7.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV		9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV
	A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described		A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
	in Section 5. When calculating the <signature-value> for a Packet,		in Section 7. When calculating the <signature-value> for a Packet,
	the signature is calculated over the entire Packet, including the		the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>,
	packet header, all Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and		<cryptographic-function> and <key-index> (in that order),
	all included Messages and their message headers.		concatenated with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all
			Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included
			Messages and their message headers.
	7.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV		The following considerations apply:
			o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, it
			is unnecessary to consider mutable fields (e.g. <msg-hop-count>
			and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating the signature.
			o any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block
			MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet
			TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be
			restored after having calculated the signature value.
			The rationale for removing any Packet SIGNATURE TLV already present
			prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be
			added to the same packet, e.g., using different signature functions.
			9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV
	A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described		A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
	in Section 6. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE		in Section 8. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE
	TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before the		TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any
	SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the		SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the
	signature.		signature.
	8. Message TLVs		10. Message TLVs
	Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic		Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
	signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating		signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating
	the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.		the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
	8.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV		10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV
	A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described		A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
	in Section 5. When determining the <signature-value> for a message,		in Section 7. When determining the <signature-value> for a message,
	the signature is calculated over the entire message with the		the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>,
	following considerations:		<cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in that order),
			concatenated with the entire message with the following
			considerations:
	o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count> MUST be both		o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST
	assumed to have the value 0 (zero).		both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the
			signature.
	o all Message SIGNATURE TLVs MUST be removed before calculating the		o any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV
	signature, and the message size as well as the Message TLV block		block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the
	size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored		message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be
	after having calculated the signature value.		recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored after having
			calculated the signature value.
	8.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV		The rationale for removing any Message SIGNATURE TLV already present
			prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be
			added to the same message, e.g., using different signature functions.
			10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV
	A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described		A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
	in Section 6. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE		in Section 8. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE
	TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the		TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the
	SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the		SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the
	signature.		signature.
	9. Address Block TLVs		11. Address Block TLVs
	Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic		Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic
	signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating		signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating
	the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.		the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
	9.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV		11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV
	An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as		An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as
	described in Section 5. The signature can be calculated over any		described in Section 7. The signature is calculated over the three
	object, including, for example, the address to which this TLV is		fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in
	associated to.		that order), concatenated with the address, concatenated with any
			other values, for example, any other TLV value that is associated
			with that address. A routing protocol or routing protocol extension
			using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to include any
			such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification
			process of the signature.
	9.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV		11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV
	An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as		An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
	described in Section 6. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV		described in Section 8. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV
	are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be		are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be
	considered when calculating the value of the signature.		considered when calculating the value of the signature.
	10. IANA Considerations		12. IANA Considerations
	10.1. TLV Registrations		This section specifies requests to IANA.
			12.1. TLV Registrations
	This specification defines:		This specification defines:
	o two Packet TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-223 range		o two Packet TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-223 range
	of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as		of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as
	specified in Table 1,		specified in Table 1,
	o two Message TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-127 range		o two Message TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-127 range
	of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as		of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as
	specified in Table 2,		specified in Table 2,
	o and two Address Block TLV types which must be allocated from the		o and two Address Block TLV types which must be allocated from the
	0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository		0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository
	of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3.		of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3.
			This specification requests:
			o set up of type extension registries for these TLV types.
	IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet		IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet
	TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name.		TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name.
	10.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines		12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
	For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is		For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is
	required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general		required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
	recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].		recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
	10.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations		For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet,
			Message and Address TLVs should be numbered identically.
			12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
	The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the		The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the
	"Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].		"Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| Name | Type | Type | Description |		| Name | Type | Type | Description |
	| | | Extension | |		| | | Extension | |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet |		| SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet |
	| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |		| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length, given by the tlv-length |		| | | | length, given by the TLV length |
	| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to |		| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
	| | | | increase strictly monotonously by |		| | | | has to define how to interpret |
	| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing |		| | | | this timestamp |
	| | | | protocol has to define how to |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | | interpret this timestamp |
	| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
	| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
	| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
	| | | | [RFC4330] |
	| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length with no constraints such as |
	| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
	| | | | may represent any random value |
	| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	Table 1: Packet TLV types		Table 1: Packet TLV types
	10.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations		12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
	The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the		The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the
	"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].		"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| Name | Type | Type | Description |		| Name | Type | Type | Description |
	| | | Extension | |		| | | Extension | |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message |		| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message |
	| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |		| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length, given by the tlv-length |		| | | | length, given by the TLV length |
	| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to |		| | | | field. |
	| | | | increase strictly monotonously by |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing |
	| | | | protocol has to define how to |
	| | | | interpret this timestamp |
	| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
	| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
	| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
	| | | | [RFC4330] |
	| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length with no constraints such as |
	| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
	| | | | may represent any random value |
	| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	Table 2: Message TLV types		Table 2: Message TLV types
	10.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations		12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
	The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from		The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from
	the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].		the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| Name | Type | Type | Description |		| Name | Type | Type | Description |
	| | | Extension | |		| | | Extension | |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an |		| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an |
	| | | | address) |		| | | | address) |
	| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |		| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length, given by the tlv-length |		| | | | length, given by the TLV length |
	| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to |		| | | | field. |
	| | | | increase strictly monotonously by |		| | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing |
	| | | | protocol has to define how to |
	| | | | interpret this timestamp |
	| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
	| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
	| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
	| | | | [RFC4330] |
	| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
	| | | | length with no constraints such as |
	| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
	| | | | may represent any random value |
	| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
	| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |		| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
	+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+		+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
	Table 3: Address Block TLV types		Table 3: Address Block TLV types
	10.2. New IANA Registries		12.2. New IANA Registries
	This document introduces three namespaces that have been registered:		This document introduces three namespaces that have been registered:
	Packet TLV Types, Message TLV Types, and Address Block TLV Types.		Packet TLV Types, Message TLV Types, and Address Block TLV Types.
	This section specifies IANA registries for these namespaces and		This section specifies IANA registries for these namespaces and
	provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority		provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
	regarding registrations in these namespaces.		regarding registrations in these namespaces.
	The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:		The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
	"Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned",		"Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned",
	"Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert".		"Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert".
	The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:		The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
	"Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action".		"Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action".
	10.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines		12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
	For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is		For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is
	required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general		required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
	recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].		recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
	10.2.2. Hash Function		12.2.2. Hash Function
	IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions		IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions
	that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments		that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments
	and allocation policies are specified in Table 4.		and allocation policies are specified in Table 4.
	+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+		+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
	| Hash | Algorithm | Description |		| Hash | Algorithm | Description |
	| function | | |		| function | | |
	| value | | |		| value | | |
	+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+		+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
	| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value |		| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value |
	| | | of an object is the object itself |		| | | of an object is the object itself |
	| 1 | MD5 | The hash function as specified in |		| 1-223 | | Expert Review |
	| | | [RFC1321] |
	| 2 | SHA1 | The hash function as specified in |
	| | | [RFC3174] |
	| 3 | SHA256 | The hash function as specified in |
	| | | [SHA256] |
	| 4-223 | | Expert Review |
	| 224-255 | | Experimental Use |		| 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
	+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+		+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
	Table 4: Hash-Function registry		Table 4: Hash-Function registry
	10.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm		12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm
	IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic		IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic
	algorithm. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified		function. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified
	in Table 5.		in Table 5.
	+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+		+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
	| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |		| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
	| algorithm value | | |		| function value | | |
	+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+		+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
	| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value |		| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value |
	| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |		| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
	| | | itself |		| | | itself |
	| 1 | RSA | RSA as specified in [RFC2437] |		| 1-223 | | Expert Review |
	| 2 | DSA | DSA as specified in [DSA] |		| 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
	| 3 | HMAC | HMAC as specified in [RFC2104] |		+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
	| 4 | 3DES | 3DES as specified in [3DES] |
	| 5 | AES | AES as specified in [AES] |
	| 6-223 | | Expert Review |
	| 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
	+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+
	Table 5: Cryptographic algorithm registry		Table 5: Cryptographic function registry
	11. Security Considerations		13. Security Considerations
	This document does not specify a protocol itself. However, it		This document does not specify a protocol itself. However, it
	provides a syntactical component for cryptographic signatures of		provides a syntactical component for cryptographic signatures of
	messages and packets as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to		messages and packets as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to
	address security issues of a protocol or extension that uses the		address security issues of a protocol or extension that uses the
	component specified in this document. As such, it has the same		component specified in this document. As such, it has the same
	security considerations as [RFC5444].		security considerations as [RFC5444].
	In addition, a protocol that includes this component MUST specify the		In addition, a protocol that includes this component MUST specify the
	usage as well as the security that is attained by the cryptographic		usage as well as the security that is attained by the cryptographic
	signatures of a message or a packet.		signatures of a message or a packet.
	As an example, a routing protocol that uses this component to reject		As an example, a routing protocol that uses this component to reject
	"badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain a valid		"badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain a valid
	signature, should indicate the security assumption that if the		signature, should indicate the security assumption that if the
	signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also should		signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also should
	indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure		indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure
	(e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not		(e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not
	counteracted (e.g. compromised keys).		counteracted (e.g. compromised keys).
	12. Acknowledgements		14. Acknowledgements
	The authors would like to thank Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique)		The authors would like to thank Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique)
	for his advice as cryptographer. In addition, many thanks to Alan		for his advice as cryptographer. In addition, many thanks to Bo
	Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), and		Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher
	Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document.		Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert (Marvell), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for
			their constructive comments on the document.
	13. References		15. References
	13.1. Normative References		15.1. Normative References
	[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
	May 2008.		May 2008.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
	[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,		[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
	"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,		"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
	February 2009.		February 2009.
	13.2. Informative References		15.2. Informative References
	[3DES] American National Standards Institute, "Triple Data
	Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", ANSI X9.52-1998,
	1998.
	[AES] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Advanced
	Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
	[DSA] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Digital
	Signature Standard", NIST, FIPS PUB 186, May 1994.
	[NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET		[NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET
	Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", work in		Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", work in
	progress draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-12.txt, March 2010.		progress draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-14.txt, July 2010.
	[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized		[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized
	Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in		Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in
	progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010.		progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010.
	[POSIX] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for
	Information Technology - Portable Operating System
	Interface (POSIX)", Base Specifications Issue 7,
	December 2008.
	[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
	April 1992.
	[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
	February 1997.
	[RFC2437] Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
	Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
	[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
	(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
	[RFC4330] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
	for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 4330, January 2006.
	[SHA256] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
	Hash Algorithm", NIST FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	A.1. Example of a Signed Message		A.1. Example of a Signed Message
	The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is taken from the appendix of		The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from the appendix
	[RFC5444]. However, a SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added. It is		of [RFC5444]. A SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added, with the value
	assumed that the SIGNATURE TLV type is lesser than the TLV type of		representing a 15 octet long signature of the whole message.
	the second message TLV (i.e. it comes first in the order of Message
	TLVs). The TLV value represents a 16 octet long signature of the
	whole message.
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |		|0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr |		|1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |		| Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|		| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0|		|0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0|
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Hash Func | Crypto Func | Signature Value |		| Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index | Sign. Value |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Signature Value (cont) |		| Signature Value (cont) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Signature Value (cont) |		| Signature Value (cont) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Signature Value (cont) |		| Signature Value (cont) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|		| Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value |		|0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value |
End of changes. 81 change blocks.
	311 lines changed or deleted		249 lines changed or added
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