draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-00.txt   draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-01.txt 
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft T. Clausen Internet-Draft T. Clausen
Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
Expires: December 22, 2010 June 20, 2010 Expires: January 28, 2011 July 27, 2010
MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition
draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-00 draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-01
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a general and flexible TLV (type-length-value This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value
structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as
timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format
[RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two [RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two
Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and
timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively. timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 1, line 35 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Imported TLV Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 9 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 12.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 10
10.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11 12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11
10.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 12.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document: This document specifies:
o specifies two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and o two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in
timestamps in packets, messages and address blocks as defined by packets, messages and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444],
[RFC5444],
o requests IANA allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address o how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for Message
Block TLVs from the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields (<msg-hop-
range and the 0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444], limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields are present in
messages.
o describes how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for This document requests from IANA:
Message TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields
(<msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>) where these fields are
present in messages,
o requests creation of two IANA registries for recording code points o allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from
for hash function and signature calculation, respectively. the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the
0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444],
This document does not stipulate how to sign or validate messages. A o creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash
specification of a routing protocol or routing protocol extension, function and signature calculation, respectively.
using the security representation of this document, MUST specify
appropriate interpretation of the TLVs. This document does
specifically not suggest specific cryptographic algorithms or hash
functions, but rather establishes IANA registries for such.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444].
Additionally, it defines the following terminology:
o Hash-Function
A hash function is an algorithm that takes a message of any
length as input and produces a fixed-length string as output.
Hash functions are used in cryptography for authentication and
message integrity.
o Object
An object, here, is any sequence of bytes that is used to
calculate the signature over (e.g. a packet, a message, an
address as defined in [RFC5444], a timestamp, or a combination
of these).
o Signature
A digital signature can be used to (i) authenticate the
originator and (ii) to assure that the object, which has been
signed, has not been altered in transit. In many cases, a
signature is calculated by encrypting a hash of the object,
which is the basic assumption of this specification.
o Timestamp
The timestamp indicates the time when the timestamp has been
created. If a timestamp is added to an object before signing
the object, this information can be useful to determine the
"freshness" of the signed object. "Old" objects can indicate
replayed objects. The minimal requirement for a timestamp is
to provide a logical representation of time (e.g. Lamport
time). Using timestamps may require - at least roughly -
synchronized clocks among the routers in the network.
3. Applicability Statement 3. Applicability Statement
The packet and message format defined in [RFC5444] accords MANET MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are
routing protocols, using this format, the ability to carry additional accorded the ability to carry additional information in control
information in control messages, through inclusion of TLVs. messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so
Information so included in a control message MAY be used by the included MAY be used by a routing protocol, or by an extension of a
routing protocol, or by an extension of the routing protocol, routing protocol, according to its specification.
according to its specification.
This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for
a packet, message or address block by way of such TLVs. This a packet, message or address by way of such TLVs. This document also
document also specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop- specifies how to treat "mutable" fields (<msg-hop-count> and <msg-
count> and <msg-hop-limit>) in the message header when calculating hop-limit>), if present, in the message header when calculating
signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly
verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature. A verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature.
MANET routing protocol, or an extension of a MANET routing protocol,
MAY use such included cryptographic signatures for, for example, 4. Security Architecture
rejecting messages where signature verification fails.
Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to
security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be
rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded. rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded.
Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons
(such as failure to verify a signature) as being reasons for (such as failure to verify a signature) for rejecting a message as
rejecting a message as "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for processing". This
processing". This architecture is a result of the observation that architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to
with respect to security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing
that MANET routing protocol deployment domains have varying security protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements
requirements ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this
virtue of this approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and
(and implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing
proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms. proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms.
The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this
specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as
follows: follows:
o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a
clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to
processing/forwarding) as "badly formed". processing/forwarding) as "badly formed".
o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as
"badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain "badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain
specific security requirement. specific security requirement.
o Code-points and an exchange format for information necessary for o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for
specification of such security extensions. specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions.
This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a
common exchange format for cryptographic signatures. This document common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making
also makes reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and Address
Address Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among
among MANET routing protocol security extensions. Finally, this MANET routing protocol security extensions, establishing two IANA
document establishes two IANA registries for code-points for hash registries for code-points for hash functions and cryptographic
functions and cryptographic algorithms for use by protocols adhering functions adhering to [RFC5444].
to [RFC5444].
With respect to [RFC5444], this document: With respect to [RFC5444], this document:
o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of
use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B. use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B.
o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of
[RFC5444] (the authentication part). [RFC5444] (the authentication part).
4. Protocol Overview and Functioning 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning
This specification does not describe a protocol, nor does it mandate This specification does not describe a protocol, nor does it mandate
specific router or protocol behavior. It represents a purely specific router or protocol behavior. It represents a purely
syntactical representation of security related information for use syntactical representation of security related information for use
with [RFC5444] messages and packets, as well as establishes IANA with [RFC5444] addresses, messages and packets, as well as
registrations and registries. establishes IANA registrations and registries.
5. General Signature TLV Structure 6. Imported TLV Fields
In this specification, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are
used:
<msg-hop-limit> - hop limit of a message, as specified in Section
5.2 of [RFC5444].
<msg-hop-count> - hop count of a message, as specified in Section
5.2 of [RFC5444].
<length> - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1
of [RFC5444].
7. General Signature TLV Structure
The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic
signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function
and cryptographic algorithm used for calculating the signature. This and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature. This
<signature> data structure is specified, using the regular expression <signature> data structure is specified, using the regular expression
syntax of [RFC5444], as: syntax of [RFC5444], as:
<signature> := <hash-function> <signature> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-algorithm> <cryptographic-function>
<key-index>
<signature-value> <signature-value>
where: where:
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the <hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the
hash function. hash function.
<cryptographic-algorithm> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field <cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field
specifying the cryptographic algorithm. specifying the cryptographic function.
<key-index> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key
index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows
unique identification of different keys with the same originator.
It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that
actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and
that all key indices have a value unequal to 0x00. Value 0x00 is
reserved for a pre-installed, shared key.
<signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <signature-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is
<tlv-length>-2, and which contains the cryptographic signature. <length>-2, and which contains the cryptographic signature.
The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature
can be decomposed into: can be decomposed into:
signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(message)) signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))
The hash function and the cryptographic algorithm correspond to the The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the
IANA registry in the two registries set up by this specification, see entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in
Section 10. Section 12.
5.1. Rationale 7.1. Rationale
The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic
algorithm into two octets instead of having all combinations in a function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a
single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if
further hash functions or cryptographic algorithms are added in the further hash functions or cryptographic functions are added in the
future, the number space might not remain continuous. More future, the number space might not remain continuous. More
importantly, the number space of 256 possible combinations would be importantly, the number space of possible combinations would be
rapidly exhausted: 16 different hash functions and 16 different rapidly exhausted. As new or improved cryptographic mechanism are
cryptographic algorithms would lead to exhaustion. As new or continuously being developed and introduced, this format should be
improved cryptographic mechanism are continuously being developed and able to accommodate such for the foreseeable future.
introduced, this format should be able to accommodate such for the
foreseeable future.
The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the
cryptographic signature in the TLV is the following: Before being cryptographic signature in the TLV is, that before being able to
able to to validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or
exchange keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be
exchanged together with the keys in this bootstrap process. It is provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is
therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to
transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently
included parameter is the length of the signature, which is tlv- included parameter is the length of the signature, which is <length>
length - 2 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic - 2 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function.
algorithm.
6. General Timestamp TLV Structure 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure
The following data structure allows the representation of a The following data structure allows the representation of a
timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as: timestamp. This <timestamp> data structure is specified as:
<timestamp> := <time-value> <timestamp> := <time-value>
where: where:
<time-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <tlv- <time-value> is an unsigned integer field, whose length is <length>,
length>, and which contains the timestamp. The value of this and which contains the timestamp. The value of this variable is
variable is to be interpreted by the routing protocol as specified to be interpreted by the routing protocol as specified by the type
by the type extension of the Timestamp TLV (refer to Table 1). extension of the Timestamp TLV, see Section 12.
A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its
setting and interpretation is to be determined by the routing setting and interpretation is to be determined by the routing
protocol (or the extension to a routing protocol) that uses it, and protocol (or the extension to a routing protocol) that uses it, and
may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple
sequence number. This is out of the scope of this specification. sequence number.
7. Packet TLVs 9. Packet TLVs
Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the
time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
7.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV
A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
in Section 5. When calculating the <signature-value> for a Packet, in Section 7. When calculating the <signature-value> for a Packet,
the signature is calculated over the entire Packet, including the the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>,
packet header, all Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and <cryptographic-function> and <key-index> (in that order),
all included Messages and their message headers. concatenated with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all
Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included
Messages and their message headers.
7.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV The following considerations apply:
o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, it
is unnecessary to consider mutable fields (e.g. <msg-hop-count>
and <msg-hop-limit>), if present, when calculating the signature.
o any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block
MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet
TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be
restored after having calculated the signature value.
The rationale for removing any Packet SIGNATURE TLV already present
prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be
added to the same packet, e.g., using different signature functions.
9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV
A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 6. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE in Section 8. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE
TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before the TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any
SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the
signature. signature.
8. Message TLVs 10. Message TLVs
Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic
signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
8.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV
A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described
in Section 5. When determining the <signature-value> for a message, in Section 7. When determining the <signature-value> for a message,
the signature is calculated over the entire message with the the signature is calculated over the three fields <hash-function>,
following considerations: <cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in that order),
concatenated with the entire message with the following
considerations:
o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count> MUST be both o the fields <msg-hop-limit> and <msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST
assumed to have the value 0 (zero). both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the
signature.
o all Message SIGNATURE TLVs MUST be removed before calculating the o any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV
signature, and the message size as well as the Message TLV block block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the
size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be
after having calculated the signature value. recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored after having
calculated the signature value.
8.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV The rationale for removing any Message SIGNATURE TLV already present
prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be
added to the same message, e.g., using different signature functions.
10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV
A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described
in Section 6. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE in Section 8. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE
TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the
SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the
signature. signature.
9. Address Block TLVs 11. Address Block TLVs
Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic
signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating
the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated.
9.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV
An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as
described in Section 5. The signature can be calculated over any described in Section 7. The signature is calculated over the three
object, including, for example, the address to which this TLV is fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, and <key-index> (in
associated to. that order), concatenated with the address, concatenated with any
other values, for example, any other TLV value that is associated
with that address. A routing protocol or routing protocol extension
using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to include any
such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification
process of the signature.
9.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV
An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as
described in Section 6. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV described in Section 8. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV
are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be
considered when calculating the value of the signature. considered when calculating the value of the signature.
10. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
10.1. TLV Registrations This section specifies requests to IANA.
12.1. TLV Registrations
This specification defines: This specification defines:
o two Packet TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-223 range o two Packet TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-223 range
of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as
specified in Table 1, specified in Table 1,
o two Message TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-127 range o two Message TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-127 range
of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as
specified in Table 2, specified in Table 2,
o and two Address Block TLV types which must be allocated from the o and two Address Block TLV types which must be allocated from the
0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository 0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository
of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3. of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3.
This specification requests:
o set up of type extension registries for these TLV types.
IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet
TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name. TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name.
10.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is
required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
10.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet,
Message and Address TLVs should be numbered identically.
12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the
"Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. "Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet | | SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the tlv-length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to | | | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | increase strictly monotonously by | | | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing | | | | | this timestamp |
| | | | protocol has to define how to | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | | interpret this timestamp |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV types Table 1: Packet TLV types
10.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the
"Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message | | SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the tlv-length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to | | | | | field. |
| | | | increase strictly monotonously by | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing |
| | | | protocol has to define how to |
| | | | interpret this timestamp |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV types Table 2: Message TLV types
10.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from
the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444].
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description | | Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | | | | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an | | SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an |
| | | | address) | | | | | address) |
| | | 1-223 | Expert Review | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
| TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the tlv-length | | | | | length, given by the TLV length |
| | | | field. The timestamp is assumed to | | | | | field. |
| | | | increase strictly monotonously by | | | | 1-223 | Expert Review |
| | | | steps of 1. The MANET routing |
| | | | protocol has to define how to |
| | | | interpret this timestamp |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp as |
| | | | specified in [POSIX] |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format as defined in |
| | | | [RFC4330] |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | 4-223 | Expert Review |
| | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 3: Address Block TLV types Table 3: Address Block TLV types
10.2. New IANA Registries 12.2. New IANA Registries
This document introduces three namespaces that have been registered: This document introduces three namespaces that have been registered:
Packet TLV Types, Message TLV Types, and Address Block TLV Types. Packet TLV Types, Message TLV Types, and Address Block TLV Types.
This section specifies IANA registries for these namespaces and This section specifies IANA registries for these namespaces and
provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
regarding registrations in these namespaces. regarding registrations in these namespaces.
The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
"Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned", "Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned",
"Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert". "Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert".
The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]:
"Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action". "Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action".
10.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is
required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general
recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444].
10.2.2. Hash Function 12.2.2. Hash Function
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions
that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments
and allocation policies are specified in Table 4. and allocation policies are specified in Table 4.
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description | | Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| function | | | | function | | |
| value | | | | value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself | | | | of an object is the object itself |
| 1 | MD5 | The hash function as specified in | | 1-223 | | Expert Review |
| | | [RFC1321] |
| 2 | SHA1 | The hash function as specified in |
| | | [RFC3174] |
| 3 | SHA256 | The hash function as specified in |
| | | [SHA256] |
| 4-223 | | Expert Review |
| 224-255 | | Experimental Use | | 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 4: Hash-Function registry Table 4: Hash-Function registry
10.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm
IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic
algorithm. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified function. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified
in Table 5. in Table 5.
+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| algorithm value | | | | function value | | |
+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+ +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": the value | | 0 | none | The "identity function": the value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself | | | | itself |
| 1 | RSA | RSA as specified in [RFC2437] | | 1-223 | | Expert Review |
| 2 | DSA | DSA as specified in [DSA] | | 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
| 3 | HMAC | HMAC as specified in [RFC2104] | +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 4 | 3DES | 3DES as specified in [3DES] |
| 5 | AES | AES as specified in [AES] |
| 6-223 | | Expert Review |
| 224-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-----------------+-----------+-------------------------------------+
Table 5: Cryptographic algorithm registry Table 5: Cryptographic function registry
11. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
This document does not specify a protocol itself. However, it This document does not specify a protocol itself. However, it
provides a syntactical component for cryptographic signatures of provides a syntactical component for cryptographic signatures of
messages and packets as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to messages and packets as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to
address security issues of a protocol or extension that uses the address security issues of a protocol or extension that uses the
component specified in this document. As such, it has the same component specified in this document. As such, it has the same
security considerations as [RFC5444]. security considerations as [RFC5444].
In addition, a protocol that includes this component MUST specify the In addition, a protocol that includes this component MUST specify the
usage as well as the security that is attained by the cryptographic usage as well as the security that is attained by the cryptographic
signatures of a message or a packet. signatures of a message or a packet.
As an example, a routing protocol that uses this component to reject As an example, a routing protocol that uses this component to reject
"badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain a valid "badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain a valid
signature, should indicate the security assumption that if the signature, should indicate the security assumption that if the
signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also should signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also should
indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure
(e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not (e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not
counteracted (e.g. compromised keys). counteracted (e.g. compromised keys).
12. Acknowledgements 14. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique) The authors would like to thank Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique)
for his advice as cryptographer. In addition, many thanks to Alan for his advice as cryptographer. In addition, many thanks to Bo
Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), and Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher
Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document. Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert (Marvell), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for
their constructive comments on the document.
13. References 15. References
13.1. Normative References 15.1. Normative References
[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, "Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
February 2009. February 2009.
13.2. Informative References 15.2. Informative References
[3DES] American National Standards Institute, "Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", ANSI X9.52-1998,
1998.
[AES] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[DSA] National Institute of Standards & Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard", NIST, FIPS PUB 186, May 1994.
[NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET [NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", work in Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", work in
progress draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-12.txt, March 2010. progress draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-14.txt, July 2010.
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized
Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in
progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010. progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010.
[POSIX] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for
Information Technology - Portable Operating System
Interface (POSIX)", Base Specifications Issue 7,
December 2008.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2437] Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC4330] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 4330, January 2006.
[SHA256] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Algorithm", NIST FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Example of a Signed Message A.1. Example of a Signed Message
The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is taken from the appendix of The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from the appendix
[RFC5444]. However, a SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added. It is of [RFC5444]. A SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added, with the value
assumed that the SIGNATURE TLV type is lesser than the TLV type of representing a 15 octet long signature of the whole message.
the second message TLV (i.e. it comes first in the order of Message
TLVs). The TLV value represents a 16 octet long signature of the
whole message.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | |0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr | |1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | | Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| | Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0| |0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hash Func | Crypto Func | Signature Value | | Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index | Sign. Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | | Signature Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| | Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value | |0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value |
 End of changes. 81 change blocks. 
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