draft-ietf-kitten-digest-to-historic-02.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-digest-to-historic-03.txt 
Kitten Working Group A. Melnikov Kitten Working Group A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft Isode Limited Internet-Draft Isode Limited
Intended status: Informational September 22, 2010 Intended status: Informational March 28, 2011
Expires: March 26, 2011 Expires: September 29, 2011
Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic
draft-ietf-kitten-digest-to-historic-02 draft-ietf-kitten-digest-to-historic-03
Abstract Abstract
This memo describes problems with the DIGEST-MD5 Simple This memo describes problems with the DIGEST-MD5 Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanism as specified in Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanism as specified in
RFC 2831. It recommends that DIGEST-MD5 to be marked as OBSOLETE in RFC 2831. It recommends that DIGEST-MD5 to be marked as OBSOLETE in
the IANA Registry of SASL mechanisms, and that RFC 2831 be moved to the IANA Registry of SASL mechanisms, and that RFC 2831 be moved to
Historic status. Historic status.
Note Note
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 26, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 29, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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C. Lack of support for SASLPrep [RFC4013] or any other type of C. Lack of support for SASLPrep [RFC4013] or any other type of
Unicode character normalization of usernames and passwords. Unicode character normalization of usernames and passwords.
The original DIGEST-MD5 document predates SASLPrep and The original DIGEST-MD5 document predates SASLPrep and
doesn't recommend any Unicode character normalization. doesn't recommend any Unicode character normalization.
8. The cryptographic primitives in DIGEST-MD5 are not up to today's 8. The cryptographic primitives in DIGEST-MD5 are not up to today's
standards, in particular: standards, in particular:
A. The MD5 hash is sufficiently weak to make a brute force A. The MD5 hash is sufficiently weak to make a brute force
attack on DIGEST-MD5 easy with common hardware [MD5]. attack on DIGEST-MD5 easy with common hardware [RFC6151].
B. Using the RC4 algorithm for the security layer without B. Using the RC4 algorithm for the security layer without
discarding the initial key stream output is prone to attack discarding the initial key stream output is prone to attack
[RC4]. [RC4].
C. The DES cipher for the security layer is considered insecure C. The DES cipher for the security layer is considered insecure
due to its small key space [RFC3766]. due to its small key space [RFC3766].
Note that most of the problems listed above are already present in Note that most of the problems listed above are already present in
the HTTP Digest authentication mechanism. the HTTP Digest authentication mechanism.
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mechanism registration in the SASL mechanism registry to OBSOLETE. mechanism registration in the SASL mechanism registry to OBSOLETE.
The SASL mechanism registry is specified in [RFC4422] and is The SASL mechanism registry is specified in [RFC4422] and is
currently available at: currently available at:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms
4. Acknowledgements 4. Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback provided by Chris The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback provided by Chris
Newman, Simon Josefsson, Kurt Zeilenga, Sean Turner and Abhijit Newman, Simon Josefsson, Kurt Zeilenga, Sean Turner and Abhijit
Menon-Sen. [[anchor3: Various text was copied from other RFCs.]] Menon-Sen. Various text was copied from other RFCs, in particular
from RFC 2831.
5. References 5. References
5.1. Normative References 5.1. Normative References
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999. RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a [RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a
SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000. SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000.
5.2. Informative References 5.2. Informative References
[DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Data [DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Data
Encryption Standard (DES)", FIPS PUB 46-3, October 1999. Encryption Standard (DES)", FIPS PUB 46-3, October 1999.
[MD5] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
draft-turner-md5-seccon-update-02.txt (work in progress),
July 2010.
[RC4] Strombergson, J. and S. Josefsson, "Test vectors for the [RC4] Strombergson, J. and S. Josefsson, "Test vectors for the
stream cipher RC4", stream cipher RC4",
draft-josefsson-rc4-test-vectors-01.txt (work in draft-josefsson-rc4-test-vectors-02.txt (work in
progress), June 2010. progress), June 2010.
[RFC0822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet [RFC0822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet
text messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982. text messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982.
[RFC2195] Klensin, J., Catoe, R., and P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP [RFC2195] Klensin, J., Catoe, R., and P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP
AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response", AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response",
RFC 2195, September 1997. RFC 2195, September 1997.
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For [RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
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[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007. Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax [RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008. Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams, [RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010. (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, March 2011.
Author's Address Author's Address
Alexey Melnikov Alexey Melnikov
Isode Limited Isode Limited
5 Castle Business Village 5 Castle Business Village
36 Station Road 36 Station Road
Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2BX
UK UK
Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
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